30 September 2019

T 0787/14 - Plausibility and patient subgroup

Key points

  • In this opposition appeal, the issue is inventive step of the vaccine of claim 1 over D10.
  • "[claim 1] differs from the disclosure of document D10 as regards the composition used, namely in that [details of the composition] and further in that the patient has been pre-immunised at least six months previously and within 1 year of the patient's birth with a conjugate of a capsular saccharide of an organism other than N. meningitidis and a diphtheria toxoid or CRM197."
  • " the board notes that the patent is silent on the pre-immunisation status of the patients enrolled in the clinical trial V59P2 [described in the examples of the patent]"
  • "Thus, from the information provided in the patent for clinical trial V59P2, the skilled person cannot conclude that the patients [...] represented the subgroup of patients to be treated according to the embodiment under consideration."
  • " Accordingly, any advantageous effect of the composition that may be seen in clinical trial V59P2 cannot be taken into account in assessing inventive step. "
  • About plausibility: "Nor can the appellant rely on post-published documents D14, D30, D34 and D35: The assessment of inventive step is to be made at the effective date of the patent on the basis of the information in the patent together with the common general knowledge then available to the skilled person. The verification of whether or not the claimed solution actually solves the problem, i.e. whether the claimed subject-matter actually provides the desired effect, must be based on the data in the application in order to avoid that an invention is based on knowledge available after the effective date only. "
  • The Board then deals with the question of whether the distinguishing features relating to the composition are obvious and considers that the skilled person is "well aware" of these features based on prior art documents. Finally, the particular combination of features does not make the claim inventive.
  • "The specific vaccine considered here by the board (see point 14 above) would be one of these vaccines. However, no surprising technical effect is linked to this vaccine in the specified patient population. Thus, in terms of its technically relevant effects, this vaccine is not distinguished from any of the other possible vaccines, i.e. it is a selection of one of several equally available alternative solutions to the problem formulated. Such a situation is referred to in the jurisprudence as an "arbitrary selection". Arbitrary selections are considered to be obvious"



EPO T 0787/14 - link

Closest prior art

6. In the decision under appeal, document D10 was considered to represent the closest prior art (see Reasons, point 1.3). The appellant maintains that document D26 rather than document D10 is the closest prior art.
[D10 Rennels M. et al., The Pediatric Infectious Disease Journal (2002), vol. 21, pages 978 to 979]

7. In accordance with established jurisprudence, the closest prior art for assessing inventive step is normally a prior art document disclosing subject-matter conceived for the same purpose or aiming at the same objective as the claimed invention and having the most relevant technical features in common, i.e. requiring the minimum of structural modifications (see Case Law of the Boards of Appeal of the EPO, 8th edition 2016, section I.D.3.1).

8. The invention concerns vaccines against Neisseria meningitidis (N. meningitidis) (also referred to hereinafter as "meningococcal vaccines" or "meningococcal conjugates"), in particular vaccines based on conjugated capsular saccharides from multiple meningococcal serogroups (see paragraph [0001] of the patent). [...]

27 September 2019

T 2491/12 - A business-related administrative concept

Key points

  • The Board agrees with the decision under appeal [of the examining division sion] that the subject-matter of independent claim 1 lacks an inventive step." 
  • "the question of inventive step requires an assessment of whether the invention makes a technical contribution over the prior art. Features which do not make such a contribution cannot support the presence of an inventive step" (Comvik)
  • " The Board does not consider that the "configuration" of using a trading engine and a trade history database communicatively connected to each other and to counterpart computers provide for a real-time operation as argued by the appellant []" 
  • " There is no disclosure on a technical level in the application as filed which supports such a point of view. In particular, there is no disclosure or corresponding features of the claims which contribute to making a technical process faster. The problem of difficulties for market counterparties (such as customers and dealers) to monitor outstanding transactions (such as tear-ups and assignments) are solved by establishing a notification system on the basis of a networked client-server computer system. [...] Consequently, the Board does not agree with the appellant's formulation of the problem as how to allow parties to monitor derivatives transactions in real time [.]"
  • " The problem to be solved is the implementation of the claimed business related administrative concept [... on a  ...]  general purpose networked computer. The person skilled in the art within the meaning of Article 56 EPC, a computer expert provided with the complete description of the non-technical abstract administrative concept, would have considered the claimed implementation obvious in view of the normal skills and the general knowledge of computer programming." 




EPO Headnote
The claimed invention is not directed to a real-time problem in the sense of improving a technical process, but rather to automation in the sense of making (non-technical) financial information available quickly. This automation is achieved by mapping the financial concept of derivative transactions on a client-server computer system.


VI. Independent claim 1 of the main request reads as follows:

"1. A system for monitoring derivatives transactions, comprising:
a trading engine (10) capable of communication with a plurality of counterpart computers (50, 55) and enabling the execution of the derivatives transactions;
a trade history database (20) communicatively connected to the trading engine and capable of communication with the plurality of counterpart computers, the trade history database configured to store a set of records of at least a portion of the derivatives transactions executed on the trading engine; and
wherein the trading engine is configured to enable an unwinding of a derivatives transaction, initiate a record of the unwinding to be stored in the trade history database, and send a notification of the unwinding of the derivatives transaction."


Reasons for the Decision
Introductory remarks
1. The present main request corresponds to the set of claims on which the decision under appeal is based.
The assessment of inventive step in the decision under appeal considered a general purpose networked computer system as described in the description of the present application to be the closest prior art.
2. Article 56 EPC - Inventive step
The Board agrees with the decision under appeal that the subject-matter of independent claim 1 lacks an inventive step.
2.1 The claim is directed to a mix of technical and non-technical features. The Board does not dispute that the system according to claim 1 appears in a technical context. The system for monitoring derivatives transaction can be considered to be performed by technical means, because it involves a computer with means for storing data, means for processing data and means for transmitting and receiving data, and, therefore, has technical character. Accordingly, the claimed subject-matter is an invention in the sense of Article 52(1) EPC (see T 258/03 "Auction method/HITACHI").

26 September 2019

T 2180/16 - A disadvantage of 16 years opposition proceedings

Key points

  • In this opposition appeal, the Board notes that if the priority date of the patent is 1997 and the opponent invokes certain alleged common general knowledge for the first time during the oral proceedings before the Board in May 2019, the argument is 'rather an ex post facto analysis' if the opponent does not provide evidence of the CGK in 1997.
  • Filing date of the patent in 1998, grant in 2002, notice of opposition on 03.04.2003. Summons for OD in 2012. Decision OD in 2013 (claims as granted and AR-3 lack basis, AR-4 not novel over D1. First appeal decision July 2015 (T2308/13; D1 does not anticipate the new Main Req, remittal). Second OD decision July 2016: patent maintained in amended form (things are speeding up). The present decision of 08.05.2019, notified in writing 01.07.2019: opponent's appeal dismissed.



EPO T 2180/16 -  link


2.6.5 La chambre rappelle que la priorité du brevet en litige date de 1997, c.-à-d. plus que vingt ans avant la procédure orale devant la chambre lors de laquelle la requérante a, pour la première fois, fait valoir des connaissances générales de l'homme du métier telles qu'énoncées aux points 2.6.3 et 2.6.4 ci-dessus. Or, la requérante n'a pas fourni de preuve pour de telles connaissances générales à la date effective du brevet en litige. En l'absence de telles preuves et au vu de l'enseignement de D1, la chambre ne peut accepter l'argument que l'homme du métier n'aurait pas suivi cet enseignement et n'aurait pas choisi les exemples 9 et 11 de D1 afin de résoudre le problème posé. Cet argument relève plutôt d'une analyse a posteriori. Par ailleurs et comme l'admet la requérante elle-même, bien que l'exemple 5 de D1 montre qu'une augmentation de la température de recuit mène à une valeur "r moyen" plus élevée (1,6 comparé à 1,5 pour l'exemple 4), l'homme du métier n'aurait pas augmenté davantage la température de recuit afin d'éviter des phénomènes de recristallisation. L'augmentation de la température de recuit n'aurait par conséquent pas permis à l'homme du métier d'obtenir une tôle selon la revendication unique qui requiert une valeur "r moyen" supérieure à 1,6.
2.6.6 Il résulte de ce qui précède que la revendication unique de la requête principale est considérée comme satisfaisant à la condition d'activité inventive requise dans l'article 56 CBE.
Dispositif
Par ces motifs, il est statué comme suit
Le recours est rejeté.

25 September 2019

T 1230/15 - The very nature of the PSA

Key points

  • "The  [opponent] argued that its right to be heard had been violated at the oral proceedings before the opposition division since it was allowed to present only two lines of attack on inventive step, namely, one starting from D1 and one starting from D11, each in combination only with a single document." 
  • " The [opponent's] understanding appears to be that there exists an absolute right to present all possible inventive-step attacks orally before the opposition division. Anything else incurs, in its view, a violation of its right to be heard. This is, however, in fundamental contradiction to the problem and solution approach as applied by the departments of the EPO for assessing inventive step." 
  • " The first step in this approach entails selecting the closest prior art []. It is in the very nature of the problem and solution approach that the closest prior art constitutes "the easiest route for the skilled person to arrive at the claimed solution or the most promising starting point for an obvious development leading to the claimed invention" []. If an invention is not obvious when starting from the closest prior art, it is reasonable to say that it will not be obvious when starting from a more remote document." 
  • "On the basis of the [opponent's] own account, it was allowed to present, at the oral proceedings [before the OD], a complete problem and solution approach starting from a document of its choice, namely, D1, as the closest prior art []. The opponent was also allowed to reply to the patent proprietor's arguments based on D5 as the closest prior art []. Indeed, D5 was ultimately used as the only closest prior-art document in the appealed decision. Finally, the opponent was also allowed to present a further attack starting from D11 []. This was another document taken from the pool of (potential) closest prior-art documents proposed by the opponent." 
  • " This chain of events shows that the opponent had the opportunity to present its comments on the essential legal and factual reasoning on which the appealed decision is based (Article 113(1) EPC) and cannot, hence, demonstrate a violation of the right to be heard."
  • " As regards the argument that the [OD] discussed further inventive-step attacks as evidence for patentability, the board cannot agree with the appellant's reading of the appealed decision. The relevant section [] merely sets out the opposition division's reasoned assessment as to why some of the documents which the opponent had cited were not the closest prior art.
  • " It follows that no violation of the right to be heard has occurred, at any rate none which would justify the remittal of the case to the opposition division. The board thus proceeded with the examination of the appeal as to the substance".
  • As a comment, with hindsight, an opponent could possibly try to attack the argument "If an invention is not obvious when starting from the closest prior art, it is reasonable to say that it will not be obvious when starting from a more remote document." If the argument is not in the impugned decision, there is a gap in the reasoning why the non-obviousness over D1, D5 and D11 show that the claimed subject-matter is not obvious having regard to the other prior art documents on file. If the impugned decision includes that "it is reasonable to say", the question arises if this is not a "fact" in the sense of Article 113 EPC (note that some arguments are actually facts according to the recent case law about the admissibility of late filed arguments under Article 114 EPC).


    EPO T 1230/15 - link


2. Right to be heard and remittal
2.1 The appellant [opponent] argued that its right to be heard had been violated at the oral proceedings before the opposition division since it was allowed to present only two lines of attack on inventive step, namely, one starting from D1 and one starting from D11, each in combination only with a single document. In addition, the opposition division discussed in the decision under appeal, as evidence of patentability, further inventive-step attacks which had not been discussed at the oral proceedings. In view of these deficiencies, the case had to be remitted to the opposition division. Moreover, a decision by the board on those inventive step arguments would deprive the appellant of a first-instance decision on them.
2.2 The appellant's understanding appears to be that there exists an absolute right to present all possible inventive-step attacks orally before the opposition division. Anything else incurs, in its view, a violation of its right to be heard.
2.3 This is, however, in fundamental contradiction to the problem and solution approach as applied by the departments of the EPO for assessing inventive step.

24 September 2019

T 1896/18 - Making the appeal inadmissible

Key points

  • This appeal is rejected as inadmissible because the appellant had not indicated its address and had not replied to the invitation of the Board to correct this deficiency under Rule  99(1)(a) and Rule 41(2)(c) EPC.
  • The Notice of appeal was submitted by a professional representative of a large firm. 
  • The appellant had not replied to the Board's first Communication of 27.07.2018 (except for a stamped advice of delivery) and neither to the second Communication of 27.11.2018 before the expiry of the period (again, except for a stamped advice of delivery).  Only on 11.02.2019 the professional representative had indicated the address of the appellant, without requesting any remedy. 
  • A divisional application was filed on 11.02.2019.




EPO T 1896/18 -  link

Entscheidungsgründe
1. Die Beschwerde wurde fristgerecht am 26. April 2018 eingelegt (Artikel 108, Sätze 1 und 2, in Verbindung mit Regeln 126 und 131 EPÜ). Allerdings fehlte in der Beschwerdeschrift die von Regel 99 (1) a) in Verbindung mit Regel 41 (2) c) EPÜ verlangte Angabe der Anschrift der Beschwerdeführerin.
2. Trotz Aufforderung der Beschwerdekammer vom 27. Juli 2018 gemäß Regel 101 (2) Satz 1 EPÜ reichte die Beschwerdeführerin ihre in der Beschwerdeschrift fehlende Adresse nicht innerhalb der ihr hierfür gesetzten Zweimonatsfrist nach. Zu einer Mitteilung der Kammer vom 27. November 2018, mit welcher ihr eine weitere Zweimonatsfrist zur Äußerung zu diesem Umstand eingeräumt worden war, äußerte sie sich innerhalb dieser Frist ebenfalls nicht. Erst am 11. Februar 2019 - und damit nach Ablauf der Äußerungsfrist zur Fristversäumnis (Regeln 126 und 131 EPÜ) - teilte die Beschwerdeführerin ihre Anschrift im Zeitpunkt der Einlegung der Beschwerde mit, ohne sich zur Fristversäumnis zu äußern.
3. Nach Alledem ist die Beschwerde nach Regel 101 (2) Satz 2 EPÜ als unzulässig zu verwerfen.
Entscheidungsformel
Aus diesen Gründen wird entschieden:
Die Beschwerde wird als unzulässig verworfen.

23 September 2019

T 0439/17 - Intervention and two national procedures


Key points

  • In this opposition appeal, the Board has to decide on the admissibility of a Notice of intervention under Article 105 EPC.
  • The intervener basis the intervention on a " Beweissicherungsverfahren nach § 485 Abs. 2 ZPO (Deutsche Zivilprozessordnung)" (evidence seizure proceedings). The question is whether such a procedure is a "proceedings for infringement " of the patent in the sense of Art.105(1)(a) EPC.
  • Following recent decision T1746/15, the Board decides that they are not. 
  • The fact that the evidence seizure procedure was followed by an actual infringement complaint in the national procedure, does not change this. The later national infringement procedure is a separate procedure which can not retroactively make the intervention admissible.
  • The intervener had based a second intervention on the national infringement procedure. However, that second intervention was filed during the appeal procedure. However, the other parties had withdrawn their appeal (during the oral proceedings). Hence, the appeal proceedings are terminated if the first notice of intervention is not admissible (G3/04).  


EPO Headnote


1. Die Entscheidung T 1713/11 definiert eine Klage wegen Verletzung für die Zwecke des Artikels 105 EPÜ als "ein Verfahren zur Feststellung, ob ein Dritter in einem Bereich, der dem Ausschlussrecht des Patentinhabers unterliegt, wirtschaftlich tätig ist". Nach Meinung der Kammer bedeutet dies, dass das Entscheidungsorgan, üblicherweise ein Gericht, aufgefordert wird, "[eine Verletzung] festzustellen", als abschließendes Rechtsergebnis dieses Verfahrens. Die Tatsache, dass die Patentinhaberin oder eine andere Partei das fragliche Verfahren ganz offensichtlich mit dem Ziel eingeleitet hat, dem Patentinhaber die Feststellung einer Verletzung (als Tatbestand) zu ermöglichen, ist für das Vorliegen einer "Klage" im Sinne von Artikel 105 EPÜ irrelevant. (Nr. 6 der Gründe)

2. Die Zulässigkeit des Beitritts muss zum Zeitpunkt des Beitritts gegeben sein und kann nicht später rückwirkend (ex tunc) hergestellt werden. (Nr. 13 der Gründe)

3. Die Kammer stellt fest, dass ein Beweissicherungsverfahren nach § 485 Abs. 2 ZPO und die anschließende Verletzungsklage im Hinblick auf die Anwendung von Artikel 105 (1)(a) EPÜ als zwei getrennte Verfahren zu betrachten sind. (Nr. 15 der Gründe)

EPO T 0439/17 -  link


Entscheidungsgründe


1. Die Beschwerde und die Beschwerdebegründung wurden rechtzeitig eingereicht, und die Gebühren wurden entrichtet. Die Beschwerdeführerin ist durch die Entscheidung beschwert. Die Beschwerde ist zulässig.

Parteistellung der beschwerdeführenden Einsprechende 2

2. Wie bereits in der vorläufigen Stellungnahme der Kammer erläutert, wird die Parteistellung der Einsprechenden 2 durch die Beurteilung der Frage bestimmt, ob ihr erster oder zweiter Beitritt zulässig und damit auch rechtswirksam ist. Wird lediglich ihr zweiter Beitritt anerkannt, aber nicht der erste, so erlangt sie nur die Parteistellung einer Einsprechenden, nicht aber die einer Beschwerdeführerin in Bezug auf die Feststellungen der Entscheidung über das Streitpatent (G 3/04 vom 22. August 2005, ABl. EPA 2006, 118, Gründe Nr. 6 und Nr. 10, erster Absatz). Ihre Parteistellung als Beschwerdeführerin in der vorliegende Beschwerde wird sich somit auf die Frage der Zulässigkeit ihres (ersten) Beitritts beschränken.

20 September 2019

T 2972/18 - Notice of appeal late

Key points

  • In this examination appeal, the refusal decision was posted on 20.09.2018. The Notice of appeal was filed on 03.12.2018, the appeal fee was paid on the same date. That is too late (the appeal period expired on Friday 30.11.2018; the fact that 20.09 + 10 days =  30.09 is a Sunday does not matter, of course). 
  • In this decision taken on 03.06.2019, the appeal is rejected as inadmissible. No refund of the appeal fee is ordered.
  • That is a pity because, on 18.07.2019, the Enlarged Board issued opinion G 1/18 stating that also in this case, the appeal fee is to be reimbursed and the appeal is deemed to not have been filed (G1/18 headnotes 1(b) and 2).
  • I don't know why the Board did not wait for G 1/18 in this case. It was an ex parte appeal so any need for disposing of it in June 2019 is not apparent to me.  
  • 20.09.2019: edited to correct typo's in the dates above.



Summary of Facts and Submissions
I. The appeal is directed against the decision of the Examining Division of 20 September 2018, posted on the same day.
II. The appellant filed a notice of appeal on 3 December 2018 and paid the appeal fee on the same day.
III. By communication of 15 January 2019, received by the appellant, the Registry of the Board informed the appellant that it appeared from the file that the notice of appeal had not been filed in due time, and that it was therefore to be expected that the appeal would be rejected as inadmissible pursuant to Article 108, first sentence, EPC in conjunction with Rule 101(1) EPC. The appellant was informed that any observations had to be filed within two months of notification of the communication.
IV. No reply was received.
Reasons for the Decision
No observation was filed within the time limit provided by Article 108, first sentence, EPC in conjunction with Rule 126(2) EPC. Therefore, the appeal has to be rejected as inadmissible (Rule 101(1) EPC).
Order
For these reasons it is decided that:
The appeal is rejected as inadmissible.

19 September 2019

T 2186/14 - On the ashtray example

Key points

  • In this examination appeal, the board finds claim 1 unclear. Claim 1 is directed to essentially a nasal spray device for spraying a medicine into a patients nose and has the feature that the device "is configured such that at least 30 % of the dose [of the medicine is deposited in a specific part of the nose], and thereby provides a [pain relieve] effect which is significantly greater than that predicted from a counterpart blood plasma concentration of the [medicine]".
  • The appellant argues that these features meet the requirements for allowable 'result to be achieved' features according to GL F-IV.4.10.
    • GL F-IV.4.10: "For example, the invention may relate to an ashtray in which a smouldering cigarette end will be automatically extinguished due to the shape and relative dimensions of the ashtray. The latter may vary considerably in a manner difficult to define whilst still providing the desired effect. So long as the claim specifies the construction and shape of the ashtray as clearly as possible, it may define the relative dimensions by reference to the result to be achieved, provided that the specification includes adequate directions to enable the skilled person to determine the required dimensions by routine test procedures "
  • The present Board: "In this example [of the Guidelines about the ashtray], it is clear which structural features have to be appropriately designed to achieve the desired effect. The relative dimensions of the ashtray may vary but will always be such that a cigarette is automatically extinguished. However, in the present case, the specific structural features which have to be appropriately designed are not clear from the wording of the claim. The only structural features included in the claim are a nosepiece unit comprising a nozzle and a substance supply unit."
  • I guess that the ashtray example was already in the first edition of the GL (still looking for those) and comes from some actual (older) decision of the German Patent Office (most likely) but I would like to learn more about that. Apparently, the self-extinguishing effect of the ashtray was due to both the shape and the relative dimensions and it was sufficient that the claim specified the shape of the ashtray as clearly as possible. 



EPO T 2186/14 -  link



3. Article 84 EPC
3.1 Article 84 EPC requires that the claims define the matter for which protection is sought in a clear and concise manner and that the claims be supported by the description. These requirements ensure that the public is not left in any doubt as to the subject-matter covered by a claim.
3.2 Claim 1 includes a functional feature, namely, that the delivery device is configured such that at least 30 % of the dose as initially deposited in the nasal airway is deposited in an upper posterior region of the nasal airway which is posterior of the nasal valve and above the inferior meatus.

18 September 2019

T 0054/17 - (2) Vague terms and software

Key points

  • In this opposition appeal, the Board finds that the invention is insufficiently disclosed. Claim 1 is for monitoring a processor system, wherein operating parameters and ambient parameters are observed, an operational event ("Betriebsereignisses") is determined and a response pattern ("Reaktionsmuster" ) is selected and accordingly, the processor is instructed to shut down individual components or put them in sleep mode.
  • The Board considers the terms "Betriebsereignisses" and "Reaktionsmuster" to be unusual parameters because they don't have as such a technical meaning in the technical context of the claim. As they are also the distinguishing features, the patentee has a special burden to disclose sufficient information (referring to T172/99). The "contribution of the invention is only a very general idea". Moreover, " The description does not include an embodiment that would explain and illustrate this idea." 
  • " Weiterhin ist es nicht möglich diese Idee hinsichtlich der Parameter "Betriebsereignis" und "Reaktionsmuster" durch die Offenbarung der Beschreibung zu abstrahieren. Die Kammer kommt daher zu dem Schluss, dass die Erfindung nicht ausreichend offenbart ist und daher der Einspruchsgrund nach Artikel 100 b) EPÜ der Aufrechterhaltung des Patents entgegensteht."



EPO Headnote 3
  • 3. Wird die Lösung eines technischen Problems mithilfe eines neu formulierten und damit unüblichen Parameters definiert, so trifft den Patentinhaber eine besondere Pflicht, sämtliche Informationen zu offenbaren.
  • Das beanspruchte "Betriebsereignis" und das beanspruchte "Reaktionsmuster" sind als solche "unüblichen Parameter" zu verstehen. Zwar haben sie einen gewissen Sinn in der deutschen Sprache, aber nicht ohne Weiteres einen technischen Sinn im Rahmen der Steuerung eines Prozessorssystems.
  • Der Beitrag der Erfindung ist nur eine sehr allgemeine Idee, nämlich Umgebungsparameter in einem Überwachungs- und Steuerungsprozess zu berücksichtigen. Die Beschreibung enthält kein Ausführungsbeispiel, das diese Idee erläutern und darstellen würde. Weiterhin ist es nicht möglich diese Idee hinsichtlich der Parameter "Betriebsereignis" und "Reaktionsmuster" durch die Offenbarung der Beschreibung zu abstrahieren.
  • (siehe Entscheidungsgründe 3.7, 3.8 and 3.13).


EPO T 0054/17 - link




XV. Der unabhängige Anspruch 1 des neuen Hauptantrages lautet wie folgt :

"1. Verfahren zur automatisierten Überwachung und Steuerung des Betriebsverhaltens eines Prozessorsystems (1) mit folgenden Schritten:
a) Erfassen von Betriebsparametern einzelner Komponenten und von Umgebungsparametern des Prozessorsystems (1);
b-c) Vergleichen der erfassten Betriebsparameter bzw. Umgebungsparameter mit vorgegebenen Grenzwerten zur Feststellung, ob bzw. welche der vorgegebenen Grenzwerte durch einen oder mehrere der erfassten Betriebsparameter bzw. Umgebungsparameter über- oder unterschritten werden;
d) Bestimmen eines Betriebsereignisses auf Grundlage der über- oder unterschrittenen Grenzwerte, wobei auf Grundlage einer kombinierten Bewertung mehrerer Grenzwert-Über- bzw. -Unterschreitungen als Betriebsereignis ein solches Ereignis bestimmt wird, das für diese verantwortlich ist;
e) Auswahl eines dem bestimmten Betriebsereignis entsprechenden Reaktionsmusters aus einer Anzahl von vorgegebenen Reaktionsmustern, wobei in Abhängigkeit vom Betriebsereignis ein den Betrieb des Systems aufrechterhaltendes Reaktionsmuster ausgewählt wird, wenn ein solches in Bezug auf das bestimmte Betriebsereignis existiert; und
f) Übertragen eines dem ausgewählten Reaktionsmuster entsprechenden Steuerbefehls zur Veränderung des Betriebsverhaltens an das zu überwachende Prozessorsystem (1), wobei der Steuerbefehl in der Anweisung besteht, einzelne Komponenten stillzulegen oder in einen Sleep-Modus zu versetzen."



3. Artikel 100 b) EPÜ

3.1 Ein europäisches Patent muss die Erfindung so deutlich und vollständig offenbaren, dass ein Fachmann sie ausführen kann (Artikel 100 b) EPÜ). Die Kammer ist der Meinung, dass dies hier nicht der Fall ist.

3.2 Es ist gängige Rechtsprechung, dass zu diesem Zweck zwei Bedingungen erfüllt sein müssen. Zum einem muss der Fachmann der Patentschrift zumindest einen Weg zur Ausführung der beanspruchten Erfindung entnehmen können, zum anderen muss er die Erfindung im gesamten beanspruchten Bereich ausführen können (siehe Rechtsprechung der Beschwerdekammern, 8. Auflage 2016, II.C.4.4).

17 September 2019

T 0054/17 - (1) Interruption of proceedings

Key points

  • The Board decides that it is itself competent to decide on any interruption of the proceedings under R142 EPC rather than the Legal Division, following T 854/12. ( Dec. Pres. OJ 2013 p.600 says that sole responsibility for the interruption and resumption of proceedings is vested with the Legal Division). 
  • Interruption of proceedings has retroactive effect, is effective from the date of the insolvency event in case of bankruptcy of the proprietor (Rule 142(1)(b) EPC) and is normally declared once the EPO has knowledge of the event (e.g. of the bankruptcy).
  • However, in this case, the patentee had continued the proceedings for years after the bankruptcy without invoking the bankruptcy until shortly before the oral proceedings in appeal.
  • Based on the principle of good faith, the Board finds the patentee in effect to be barred from invoking the bankruptcy in what appears to be a kind of estoppel. Hence, the proceedings are not interrupted.
  • The patentee brought up the bankruptcy of the (former) joint patentee only two days before the oral proceedings in appeal, which were then postponed. The Board awards a cost apportionment against the patentee.
  • As a note, the decision was given on 16.08.2018 in oral proceedings but notified in writing only about a year later on 08.08.2019. Overall timeline: filing in 23.11.2000 (so overall 19 years for grant and opposition), first and sole communication in 2006, grant March 2010. First OD decision March 2014 (only lack of novelty over D1) remittal in first appeal decision 07.10.2015 (T1195/14), second OD decision November 2016 (not novel over D4), accelerated proceedings in the second appeal. Does the EPO really needs 19 years to decide on whether this claim 1 is a patentable invention? (see also the next post about the Board deciding that claim 1 is insufficiently disclosed because it uses unusual and undefined terms for the distinguishing features).

A further post about the part of the decision about unusual parameters will follow in due course.



EPO T 0054/17 - link




EPO Headnote
1. Wenn eine Beschwerde vor der Beschwerdekamme anhängig ist, hat die Rechtsabteilung keine ausschließliche Zuständigkeit für die Frage der Unterbrechung des Verfahrens (siehe 1.4 der Entscheidungsgründe).

2. Setzt ein Patentinhaber in Kenntnis der Unterbrechungs-voraussetzungen, die ausschließlich in seiner Sphäre liegen, nach dem Wegfall der Unterbrechungsvoraussetzungen das Verfahren über Jahre uneingeschränkt fort, ohne sich darauf zu berufen, so erscheint es unbillig die Unterbrechung zu einem so späten Zeitpunkt geltend zu machen, mit der Folge, dass das bis dahin erfolgte Verfahren, an dem er bis dato aktiv mitgewirkt hat, zu wiederholen wäre. Dies widerspricht dem Grundsatz von Treu und Glauben (siehe 1.5 der Entscheidungs-gründe).

[Hn. 3 and 4 omitted]

Entscheidungsgründe


1. Unterbrechung des Verfahrens


1.1 Gemäß Regel 142 (1) b) EPÜ wird das Verfahren unterbrochen, wenn der Patentinhaber aufgrund eines gegen sein Vermögen gerichteten Verfahrens aus rechtlichen Gründen verhindert ist, das Verfahren fortzusetzen. Die Unterbrechung tritt automatisch ein und ist stets von Amts wegen zu berücksichtigen (J ../87, ABl. EPA 1988, 323). Gemäß § 80 Abs.1 der deutschen Insolvenzordnung (DE-InsO) geht mit Eröffnung des Insolvenzverfahrens das Recht des Schuldners, das zur Insolvenzmasse gehörende Vermögen zu verwalten auf den Insolvenzverwalter über, so dass hier am 30. Januar 2015 ein Unterbrechungstatbestand nach Regel 142 (1) b) EPÜ vorlag. Wird das Verfahren unterbrochen, beginnen die am Tag der Unterbrechung laufenden Fristen, mit Ausnahme der Frist zur Stellung des Prüfungsantrags und der Frist zur Zahlung der Jahresgebühren, an dem Tag von Neuem zu laufen, an dem das Verfahren wieder aufgenommen wird (Regel 142 (4) EPÜ). Mitteilungen und Entscheidungen des EPA, die in der Zeit zwischen dem Tag der Unterbrechung und dem Tag der Wiederaufnahme ergangen sind, sind gegenstandslos und sind nach Wiederaufnahme des Verfahrens erneut zuzustellen.

16 September 2019

T 2378/13 - Not using the PSA, so disregarded?

Key points

  • In this opposition appeal, the opponent as the appellant had submitted with its statement of grounds (in translation) " a variety of different arguments against the inventive step of [operative claim 1]. However, none of these arguments are based on the generally accepted problem-solution approach for assessing inventive step. Consequently, the complainant's allegations concerning the inventive step in writing are disregarded in this decision. During the oral proceedings, before the board, the [opponent] made attacks using the problem-solution approach, which the board acknowledged." The board finds that claim 1 is inventive. 
  • The board does not indicate the legal basis in the EPC for disregarding the arguments in the opponents' statement of grounds and does not mention the opponent's right to be heard under Art.113(2) EPC. 
  • A petition for review was recently filed (R5/19). However, admissibility of the petition appears a bit of an issue because the opponent (who was represented by an employee during the oral proceedings before the board; minutes) did not raise an objection under Rule 106 EPC.
  • As a comment, the legal basis for the Boards assumed power to disregard (i.e. declaring inadmissible) any timely filed inventive step attacks on the ground that they are not in the problem-solution approach format is not at all apparent to me, unless the Board, of course, understood that the opponent had waived its arguments during the oral proceedings.
  • The statement of grounds of the opponent was drafted by a professional representative. It includes from page 19 three inventive step attacks which appear to each individually state the distinguishing feature and the objective technical problem (e.g. the attack on p.24 starting from D13), for each attack detailed comments are given on the (adverse) reasoning in the impugned decision.  Hence, I don't fully understand what the Board means with " Allerdings basiert keine dieser Argumentationen auf dem allgemein anerkannten Aufgabe-Lösungs-Ansatz zur Beurteilung der erfinderischen Tätigkeit" unless this Board means that an opponent may present inventive steps attacks in appeal starting from only one single document as "the" closest prior art.

EPO T 2378/13 -  link

5. Erfinderische Tätigkeit (Artikel 56 EPÜ)
5.1 Mit der Beschwerdebegründung hatte die Beschwerdeführerin eine Vielzahl von unterschiedlichen Argumentationen gegen die erfinderische Tätigkeit des der angefochtenen Entscheidung zugrundeliegenden Anspruchs 1 eingereicht, der dem Anspruch 1 des gültigen Hauptantrags entspricht. Allerdings basiert keine dieser Argumentationen auf dem allgemein anerkannten Aufgabe-Lösungs-Ansatz zur Beurteilung der erfinderischen Tätigkeit. Die schriftlich vorgebrachten Angriffe der Beschwerdeführerin bezüglich der erfinderischen Tätigkeit finden folglich in dieser Entscheidung keine Beachtung.
Während der mündlichen Verhandlung vor der Kammer hat die Beschwerdeführerin Angriffe unter Verwendung des Aufgabe-Lösungs-Ansatzes vorgebracht, die die Kammer gewürdigt hat.
5.2 Dokument E6 und allgemeines Fachwissen oder D2
Der Gegenstand des Anspruchs 1 ist ausgehend von der Offenbarung des Dokuments E6 weder in Zusammenschau mit dem allgemeinen Fachwissen noch in Zusammenschau mit der Offenbarung des Dokuments D2 nahegelegt.



13 September 2019

T 0703/19 - XML debit orders and good faith

Key points

  • In this opposition appeal, the patentee files a Notice of appeal and uses Form 1038E where the appeal fee is indicated, but the payment method is "not specified". As readers may know, this is something the EPO Online Filing Software allows and even can have as a default setting. You have to actively check "debit order" if you forget the filing software gives only a very subtle warning even if you have already specified a fee to be paid (a small white triangle, I believe). In this case, the appellant had checked the appeal fee but not checked "debit order". 
  • The issue is not whether the debit order was valid. Rather, the appellant invokes the principle of good faith (EPO should inform parties of clear mistakes which they can still repair, G2/97) because the Notice was paid one month before the time limit and the Notice contained the express statement "Die Beschwerdegebühr wird hiermit via Online-Gebührenzahlung entrichtet". The appellant filed this request (and paid the appeal fee) after receiving the Rule 112 notice of loss of rights from the "Geschaftsstellenbeambtin".  
  • The Board grants the request and considers the appeal fee to be timely paid.
  • The Board notes that the ADA are not outside the scope of G2/97. "Allerdings hat die Tatsache, dass die Gebühr nun über die Online-Gebührenzahlung möglich ist und von den Vorschriften über das laufende Konto reguliert wird nicht zur Folge, dass damit jeglicher Anspruch auf Vertrauensschutz automatisch erlischt." 
  • The Board recalls that in G2/97, the Enlarged Board had assumed that documents received by the EPO are read (by the EPO). The present Board concludes that users of the EPO may trust that a plausibility check is done (by the EPO) when an appeal is filed.
  • In the present case, the error was clear to spot. In particular, because of the unambiguous statement in the appeal letter that the debit order was attached which provides the required statement of intention to pay with the filing of the notice of appeal. Moreover, there was still enough time before the expiry of the appeal period.
  • " Die Beschwerdeführerin konnte daher erwarten, dass sie auf die fehlenden Angaben unter Rubrik "Zahlungsart" hingewiesen würde, was es ihr in Hinblick auf die über einen Monat vor Fristende erfolgte Einreichung der Beschwerde erlaubt hätte, die Beschwerdegebühr fristgerecht zu entrichten." 
  • The above decision makes sense to me. I understand it also reflects first-instance practice. I really hope that the EPO updates the filing software to address this trap for parties (I am not sure if it is a bug or a feature, but this decision shows that there should be a better warning in the software in my view).
  • Note that the oppositions were withdrawn already before the filing of the notice of appeal.




EPO T 0703/19 (07.08.2019) - link
ECLI:EP:BA:2019:T070319.20190807

Sachverhalt und Anträge
I. Mit der am 30. Januar 2019 zur Post gegebenen Zwischenentscheidung hat die Einspruchsabteilung festgestellt, dass das Patent in der Fassung des Hilfsantrags 1 die Erfordernisse des EPÜ erfüllt. Die beiden Einsprüche gegen das Patent wurden mit Schreiben vom 1. Februar 2018 sowie vom 11. September 2018 zurückgenommen.
II. Die Patentinhaberin (Beschwerdeführerin)legte am 8. März 2019, und somit innerhalb der dafür vorgesehenen Zweimonatsfrist (Artikel 108 Satz 1), auf dem Wege der Online-Einreichung des EPA Beschwerde gegen die Entscheidung der Einspruchsabteilung ein. Im Zuge der Online-Einreichung des EPA wurde das Formular 1038 mit dem Titel "Begleitschreiben für nachgereichte Unterlagen" generiert, dem auch die Beschwerdeschrift als PDF angehängt war.
III. In der Beschwerdeschrift machte die Beschwerdeführerin unter anderem folgende Angabe: "Die Beschwerdegebühr wird hiermit via Online-Gebührenzahlung entrichtet". Auf dem Begleitschreiben für nachgereichte Unterlagen finden sich Angaben bezüglich der Art der Gebühren ("Beschwerdegebühr für eine Beschwerde..."), des zu zahlenden Betrags ("EUR 2 255.00"), nicht aber zur Zahlungsart. Zu letzterer ist "Nicht angegeben" aufgeführt. Die Angabe der Kontonummer fehlt. Eine Abbuchung der Beschwerdegebühr von dem laufenden Konto der Vertreterin der Beschwerdeführerin fand nicht statt.

12 September 2019

T 1304/18 - Not addressing the clarity objection

Key points

  • The Board holds this appeal against a refusal of a patent application inadmissible because the applicant did not properly address the ground of lack of clarity in his Statement of grounds (drafted by in-house counsel of an industrial company). The applicant had only submitted that the features were also used in the corresponding granted US patent.
  • " Der bloße Hinweis auf Ansprüche eines US-Patents, in denen die wesentlichen Merkmale bereits genannt sein sollen, ist nicht geeignet, um darzulegen, warum die in der angefochtenen Entscheidung genannten Einwände inkorrekt sein sollen und auf welche Tatsachen die Behauptung der Beschwerdeführerin gestützt ist. Ohne eigene Ermittlungen ist für die Kammer zum Beispiel nicht erkennbar, um welche "wesentlichen Merkmale" des ursprünglich eingereichten Anspruchs 1 der hier zu behandelnden Europäischen Patentanmeldung es sich dabei handeln könnte. Eine objektive Überprüfung des Beschwerdevorbringens auf seine Richtigkeit hin ist daher nicht möglich." 
  • The auxiliary requests do not make the appeal admissible either, because the objection was based on the claim failing to specify process conditions whereas in the auxiliary requests only feature concerning the device were added to claim 1.



EPO T 1304/18 - link

Entscheidungsgründe


1. Artikel 108 Satz 3 EPÜ erfordert, dass innerhalb von vier Monaten nach Zustellung der Entscheidung die Beschwerde nach Maßgabe der Ausführungsordnung zu begründen ist. Regel 99 (2) EPÜ führt dazu aus, dass in der Beschwerdebegründung vom Beschwerdeführer darzulegen ist, aus welchen Gründen die angefochtene Entscheidung aufzuheben oder in welchem Umfang sie abzuändern ist und auf welche Tatsachen und Beweismittel er seine Beschwerde stützt.

2. Um diesen Anforderungen zu entsprechen, muss nach der gefestigten Rechtsprechung der Kammern die Beschwerdeführerin in der Beschwerdebegründung darlegen, aus welchen rechtlichen oder tatsächlichen Gründen die angefochtene Entscheidung aufgehoben werden soll. Damit soll sichergestellt werden, dass eine objektive Überprüfung des Beschwerdevorbringens auf seine Richtigkeit hin möglich ist, ohne dass die Kammer dabei eigene Ermittlungen durchführen muss (siehe z.B. T 220/83, Abl. EPA 1986, 249, Punkt 4 der Entscheidungsgründe; J 10/11, nicht veröffentlicht, Punkt 2.1 der Entscheidungsgründe und die dort zitierte Rechtsprechung).

Ob die Anforderungen des Artikels 108 Satz 3 in Verbindung mit Regel 99 (2) EPÜ erfüllt sind, muss anhand der Beschwerdebegründung und der Gründe in der angefochtenen Entscheidung entschieden werden. Die Anforderungen an die Zulässigkeit können ausnahmsweise als erfüllt gelten, wenn bei Durchsicht der angefochtenen Entscheidung und der Begründung sofort zu erkennen ist, dass die Entscheidung aufgehoben werden soll. (J 10/11, ibid.).

3. Im vorliegenden Fall hat die Prüfungsabteilung die Klarheit eines Merkmals im Anspruch 1 bemängelt und ihren Einwand damit begründet, dass dieses Merkmal nur ein zu erreichendes Ergebnis darstellt, welches die der Patentanmeldung zugrundeliegende Aufgabe angebe, ohne dass die dafür notwendigen Merkmale angegeben seien, entgegen den in den Richtlinien F-IV 4.10 ausgeführten Grundsätzen.

11 September 2019

T 1895/13 - Rule 63 and no refund search fee

Key points

  • In this examination appeal of this Euro-PCT application, the Supplementary Search Report gave a declaration under Rule 63 EPC with Rule 164(2) and (3) EPC (referred to as the "no-search declaration" by the Board).
  • The applicant requests a refund of the search fee because no search was carried out.
  • The refund is refused. "the Board can only apply the EPC and associated provisions as they are. Article 9(1) Rules Relating to Fees provides for a refund of the search fee only in the case that the European patent application is withdrawn at a time when the Office has not yet begun to draw up the Search Report, but not in the case of a no-search declaration under Rule 63 EPC." 
  • The applicant had also requested interpretation (from and to German) for the oral proceedings before the Examing Division although the language of the proceedings was English. By not providing for the interpretation, the EPO had committed a substantial procedural violation, according to the applicant.
  • " The Board, however, indicated that even if a procedural violation might have occurred, it did not appear to have substantially affected the appellant's right to be heard (Article 113(1) EPC). The appellant had not set out any actual communication problem caused by the lack of official interpretation, neither at the oral proceedings before the examining division nor with its statement setting out the grounds of appeal. Instead, the appellant addressed only hypothetical problems that might occur in general if the right to exchange arguments in a desired language was restricted." I'm not sure what the requested remedy was, but the case is not remitted. 


EPO T 1895/13 -  link

Summary of Facts and Submissions


VII. The appellant argued that the examining division erroneously denied inventive step, contested that no search was performed and therefore argued that the search fee be refunded. Finally, the appellant argued that the examining division violated it's right to be heard by refusing to provide interpretation during oral proceedings before the first instance.


Reasons for the Decision
Main request

1. Article 56 EPC - Inventive step

The Board agrees with the decision under appeal that the subject-matter of independent claim 1 lacks an inventive step for essentially the same reasons.

1.1 The claim is directed to a mix of technical and non-technical features. The Board does not dispute that the system according to claim 1 appears in a technical context. The system involves technical means such as a processor, a user interface and a communication network and, therefore, has technical character. Accordingly, the claimed subject-matter is an invention in the sense of Article 52(1) EPC (see T 258/03 "Auction method/HITACHI").

1.2 However, the question of inventive step requires an assessment of whether the invention makes a technical contribution over the prior art. Features which do not make such a contribution cannot support the presence of an inventive step (see T 641/00 "Two identities/COMVIK", Headnote I).
[..]

No-Search declaration
2. While the International Search Report cited several prior art publications, neither the Supplementary Search Report nor the Search Opinion cited any further prior art publication. Instead, the Supplementary Search Report gave a declaration under Rule 63 EPC with Rule 164(2) and (3) EPC (referred to as the "no-search declaration" by the Board).
3. Regarding the examining division's reliance on a general purpose data processing system and in contrast to the appellant's arguments, the Board accepts such prior art as notorious, i.e. no documentary evidence had to be adduced by the examining division in this respect (T 1411/08, points 4.1, 4.2). In particular, the examining division was not required to prove the pre-existence of features which even the application itself fails to disclose (such as technical details of a processor, communication networks or a user interface).
[...]
4.2 In the absence of any technical contribution beyond the straight-forward computer-implementation, the Board judges that the subject-matter of claim 1 does not involve an inventive step (Article 56 EPC) in view of the skilled person's common general knowledge or in view of D1.
[...]

Refund of the Search Fee

7. Regarding the request for a refund of the European search fee in the absence of any cited document, the Board can only apply the EPC and associated provisions as they are. Article 9(1) Rules Relating to Fees provides for a refund of the search fee only in the case that the European patent application is withdrawn at a time when the Office has not yet begun to draw up the Search Report, but not in the case of a no-search declaration under Rule 63 EPC.

Furthermore, the search division can be assumed to have analysed the set of claims before taking the decision to issue a no-search declaration, and, hence, it cannot be argued that the EPO has been unjustly enriched. The Board is also not competent to decide on claims for compensation in respect of a loss or damage allegedly caused by the EPO in the course of patent grant proceedings (J 14/87, OJ EPO 1988, 295).

Reference is made to decision T 2249/13, which concerned a similar situation (see in particular points 24 to 29 of the reasons). The Board concurs with the reasoning in this decision.

Therefore, the request for a refund of the search fee is inadmissible.

Language of the oral proceedings before the first instance

8. Oral proceedings before the first instance were held in the absence of interpreters although the appellant's representative had informed the examining division that he intended to speak and hear in the German language and had requested simultaneous translation. The examining division saw no good reason to depart from the language of the proceedings (English), but offered to clarify its comments in German where necessary while declining to act officially as interpreters.

8.1 The appellant argued that Rule 4(1) EPC unambiguously allowed a party to both speak and hear an official language chosen by the party and announced in good time. The examining division had no discretion to refuse interpretation in such a situation. By refusing to provide interpretation, the examining division also infringed the appellant's right to be heard according to Article 113(1) EPC which reflects the principle of procedural fairness. Discussing the invention in a common language served procedural economy and prevented misunderstandings. By dismissing the appellant's request for interpretation, the examining division accepted the possibility of a misdirected discussion. The dismissal limited the appellant's right to present its arguments in a desired manner in accordance with procedural regulations of the EPC. Despite a specific complaint by the appellant, the examining division was not willing to conform to those provisions, which suggested that the division was biased at least with respect to the language issue.

8.2 Again reference is made to decision T 2249/13, which concerned a comparable situation (see in particular point VII c)). In that case, the Board stated that in effect, the appellant's allegation was that the examining division infringed Rule 4(1)(5) EPC by declining to provide official interpretation when the appellant's representative had filed a timely request to speak and hear an official language other than the language of the proceedings.

The Board, however, indicated that even if a procedural violation might have occurred, it did not appear to have substantially affected the appellant's right to be heard (Article 113(1) EPC). The appellant had not set out any actual communication problem caused by the lack of official interpretation, neither at the oral proceedings before the examining division nor with its statement setting out the grounds of appeal. Instead, the appellant addressed only hypothetical problems that might occur in general if the right to exchange arguments in a desired language was restricted.

Indicating a potential problem does not mean that the problem actually occurred. The burden of proof lies with the appellant, who has not satisfied its obligation to submit facts, which allows an assessment of whether there was a substantial violation of rights.

9. For the aforementioned reasons, the Board cannot identify any substantial procedural violation by the examining division. Furthermore, the Board is not competent to revise acts (including a potential procedural violation) of the search division or to remit a case to it (Article 106(1) EPC). The Board does not need to remit the case to the department of first instance, but is able to exercise its power within the competence of the examining division (Article 111(1) EPC), in particular to assess inventive-step and to take a corresponding decision on the substance of the present case.

Order

For these reasons it is decided that:

1) The appeal is dismissed.

2) The request to remit the case to the department of first instance and the request to refund the European search fee are rejected.

10 September 2019

T 1731/12 - Product resulting from medical or surgical method

Key points

  • The Board finds, based on a detailed analysis, that a claim for a product only obtainable by a medical or surgical method is excluded from patentability under Article 53(c) EPC thereby following T775/97.
  • A question for the interested reader is how to relate this conclusion to the holding of G 2/13 ( Broccoli II) and G2/12 (Tomatoes II) that "[t]he fact that the only method available at the filing date for generating the claimed subject-matter is an essentially biological process for the production of plants disclosed in the patent application does not render a claim directed to plants or plant material other than a plant variety unallowable" (under Article 53(b) EPC) (G2/13 does not cite T775/97)
  • The present Board itself notes in r.35 that the case at issue can be distinguished from G 2/13 in that it was argued in G2/13 that it is factually difficult to determine, in case of a plant, whether it is obtained with an essentially biological method or possibly by a (according to Article 53(b) second sentence patentable) microbiological method (referring to G 2/13, VIII.2.(6)(a)). (Note, the reference to VII.2.6.(a) appears to be a mistake). 
  • The present Board agrees with T 775/97 that " ein durch einen chirurgischen Schritt definiertes Erzeugnis ohne diesen gar nicht existieren kann, so dass der chirurgische Schritt zum beanspruchten Erzeugnis dazugehört.". 
  • The difference with medical products for use in a medical method lays in the principle of exhaustion. The provision of Article 53(c) second sentence that such products are patentable, does not limit the medical freedom of medical practitioners because once they have lawfully procured the patented product, they can use it in any way they like due to the exhaustion of the patent rights. This is different for a product claim for a product formed by a surgical method because for such a claim the manufacture is an infringing act. Hence, a medical practitioner would need a license of the patentee for making the product, if the resulting patent was patented, " was - im Falle eines chirurgischen oder therapeutischen Verfahrensschritts im Herstellungsverfahren - genau in die Freiheit des medizinischen Personals eingreifen würde, die durch die Patentierungsausschlüsse nach Artikel 53(c) EPÜ geschützt sein sollte." 
  • As a comment, the Board's remarks on the (apparent) focus in G2/13 on practical difficulties in case of product-by-process claims for plants do not really engage with the reasoning about the freedom to carry out the non-patentable method. 

EPO T 1731/12 -  link

EPO Headnote
Eine Vorrichtung, die durch ein Merkmal definiert ist, das nur durch einen chirurgischen oder therapeutischen Schritt erzeugt werden kann, ist nach Artikel 53(c) EPÜ von der Patentierung ausgenommen (in Fortführung von T775/97).


Entscheidungsgründe

Ausschluss von der Patentierbarkeit (Artikel 100(a) EPÜ in Verbindung mit Artikel 53(c) EPÜ): Anwendung von Artikel 53(c) EPÜ auf Erzeugnisse

11. Nach Artikel 53(c) EPÜ werden europäische Patente unter anderem nicht erteilt für Verfahren zur chirurgischen oder therapeutischen Behandlung des menschlichen Körpers. Satz 2 des Artikels 53(c) EPÜ sagt darüber hinaus explizit: "Dies gilt nicht für Erzeugnisse, insbesondere Stoffe oder Stoffgemische, zur Anwendung in einem dieser Verfahren."

12. Es ist allgemein akzeptiert, und wird beispielsweise auch in den Entscheidungen der Großen Beschwerdekammer, die sich mit medizinischen Verfahren auseinandersetzen (zuletzt in G 1/07) erläutert, dass das Patentierungsverbot für diese Verfahren gewährleisten soll, "dass die Freiheit von Human- und Veterinärmedizinern, ihren Patienten die beste verfügbare Behandlung angedeihen zu lassen, ohne Einschränkungen durch etwaige Patentrechte befürchten zu müssen, geschützt wird, und zwar dadurch, dass solche Aktivitäten von der Patentierbarkeit ausgeschlossen sind" (G 1/07, Entscheidungsgründe, Abschnitt 3.2.3.2). Dabei reicht ein einzelner chirurgischer Verfahrensschritt aus, um ein mehrschrittiges Verfahren als nicht patentfähig anzusehen. Auf die Frage, ob ein Mediziner das beanspruchte Verfahren dann verletzen würde, kommt es nicht an (G 1/07, Entscheidungsgründe, Abschnitt 3.2.3.2).

09 September 2019

T 0052/15 - Filing new main requests before the OD

Key points

  • In this opposition appeal, the proprietor had, during the oral proceedings before the OD, filed a new main request "after a negative opinion was announced by the chairman" with respect to the claims as granted which were the original main request. " This occurred again two more times in succession. The new main requests were named Annex I, Annex II and Annex III in the minutes. After deliberation on the last main request filed, the chairman announced the opposition division's opinion that this request did not meet the requirements of inventive step and then announced the decision that the patent was revoked." 
  • With the Statement of grounds, patentee submits as main request the claims as granted, as Auxiliary Request 1 the claims of Annex I and as Auxiliary Request 2 essentially the claims of Annex II. These requests differ substantially from the claims of Annex III, the only claims that are substantively discussed in the impugned decision. 
  • The Board does not admit these requests under Article 12(4) RPBA. 
  • " As is apparent from pages 1 to 6 of the minutes of the oral proceedings before the opposition division, which lasted two days, a lengthy discussion took place on whether the aforementioned requests (the last one in slightly different form) complied with Articles 123(2), 83 and 84 EPC."
  • "  Since a negative opinion was announced in respect of these requests, whereas the following request was considered positively, as far as these articles were concerned, it can be deduced that the addition of specific definitions relating to the strength of the seals, the addition of the materials used for preparing the films, and the deletion of an independent claim were conspicuous for overcoming pending objections. However, neither the minutes nor the written decision report the reasoning followed by the opposition division when it orally announced its negative conclusion with respect to these requests." 
  • " Accordingly, admitting these requests into the appeal proceedings would compel the board to decide as if it were the department of first instance on the aforementioned complex issues (e.g. for compliance with Article 83 EPC). This course of action would run counter to the primary purpose of appeal proceedings [...]
  • The Patentee points to T 155/88 and T 386/04 which " are based on the idea that, when requesting maintenance of a patent in more limited form, the patentee is not irrevocably abandoning the subject-matter that lies outside such a request." The Board replies that "Even if, as a rule, a proprietor could not be prevented from reverting to the patent as granted, it would be illogical if this right could be exploited without restrictions. For example, a proprietor may not steer the appeal proceedings in a manner that undermines the main purpose for which these proceedings were foreseen, i.e. to give a judicial decision on what was decided at first instance. This would also result in the board being precluded from exercising its discretionary power under Article 12(4) RPBA in these cases." 
  • Finally, Patentee disputes that the claims as granted and those of Annex I and Annex II were actually withdrawn during the first instance proceedings. " The [patentee] argued that the expectation of the then proprietor was that a request would only be considered withdrawn if the relevant party expressly withdrew it, which was not the case in this instance. " 
  • The Board notes that withdrawal does not need to be explicit. "However, an explicit withdrawal is not required if a party's behaviour or procedural steps it takes during the proceedings make its intention unequivocal (see T 388/12, point 4.2, mentioned by the appellant). Requiring an explicit statement to be made for a withdrawal to take legal effect would render the proceedings a purely formalistic exercise in which the entire body of evidence and facts surrounding the specific case would not be taken into account." 
  • " In the present instance, from the sequence of events which took place during the oral proceedings, it was correct to conclude that each new main request which was subsequently filed replaced the previously filed main request. Furthermore, on the basis of the facts recorded in the minutes, there was no reason to assume that the proprietor intended to maintain those previously filed requests." Accordingly Article 12(4) RPBA applies.



EPO T 0052/15 -  link

Reasons for the Decision
1. Requests decided/not decided upon in the appealed decision
1.1 As set out in detail in the facts and submissions and as apparent from the minutes of the oral proceedings before the opposition division, the proprietor initially confirmed the request that the patent be maintained as granted. After a negative opinion was announced by the chairman with respect to this request, the proprietor filed a new request and identified it as the "main request". This occurred again two more times in succession. The new main requests were named Annex I, Annex II and Annex III in the minutes. After deliberation on the last main request filed, the chairman announced the opposition division's opinion that this request did not meet the requirements of inventive step and then announced the decision that the patent was revoked.
1.2 The appealed decision deals only with this last request, which was filed and identified as the "main request" by the then proprietor and is annexed to the decision as Annex III. As stated on page 5 of the decision, during the oral proceedings, the then proprietor requested that the patent be maintained on the basis of this request. No reference is made to any other request for maintenance of the patent on the basis of any auxiliary request. The reasons of the decision deal exclusively with said main request, Annex III. From the content of the decision, it does not transpire that the opposition division failed to deal with any pending request.

06 September 2019

T 2073/15 - Not unsearched

Key points

  • In this examination appeal, a partial ISR had been established and no additional search fees had been paid so that the ISR covered only the first invention which included claims 1-4. The claims were then amended by a feature taken from the decision. The ED considered this claim request to be unallowable under Rule 137(5) EPC. 
  • "The board agrees with the appellant that the feature [at issue] was included in the search." (underlining added)
  • The feature at issue is " the application of the precoding weights to the beams in conjunction with beam-forming ". [Not my field of technology but it is about wireless communication.]
  • The Board: "originally filed claim 3, which was included in the search [i.e. claim 3 was expressly covered by the ISR], comprised a list of transmission modes, including SDMA precoding. With respect to SDMA precoding, which was thus included in the scope of the search related to the first invention, the description in paragraph [0067] teaches how sectors, virtual sectors, and beams within a virtual sector, are formed in this transmission mode. This description of SDMA precoding, a feature included in the scope of the search, corresponds fairly well to the description of paragraphs [0049] and [0050] in combination with Figure 4 related to precoding weights applied in conjunction with beam-forming to the beams. The board therefore holds that the claims meet the requirements of Rule 137(5) EPC."
  • As a comment, in my view it is rather strange for the Board to decide what is included in the search (rather than what ought to be included in the search). If the ISA did not search the features of para. [0049] of the description, then I don't see how the Board can decide that the ISA did. The Board can decide that the ISA should have searched the feature in the description, and accordingly admit the amended claim and remit the case (such that the ED has to carry out an additional search, free of fee, for the feature). As I've discussed in my article in epi Information 2018/2, for a claim to be unallowable under Rule 137(5) it must be both (i) unsearched (which on a factual level was the case here) and (ii) lack unity of invention with the claims pending at the time of the search. If the feature at issue is a simple implementation of searched claim 3, the feature should not lack unity of invention with that claim 3 and the amendment at issue is allowable because the second requirement of Rule 137(5) EPC is not met. There is however indeed case law which interprets  "unsearched" in Rule 137(5) as "did not need to be searched" and then asks if the feature should have been searched - raising the question when the Examiner should or should not search features only mentioned in the description.



EPO T 2073/15 -  link




2.2 Rule 137(5) EPC
The board agrees with the appellant that the feature defining the application of the precoding weights to the beams in conjunction with beam-forming was included in the search.
In that respect, the board notes firstly that, in the search report issued by the EPO as International Searching Authority [IPRP Chapter I here; no additional search fees were paid; the searched claims included claims 1-4], the invention which was first defined in the originally filed claims, and which was the subject of the search, was defined as being related to "the set of different transmission modes contained in the codebook, of which one can be selected". This indicates the relevance of the transmission modes for the search.

05 September 2019

T 0737/14 - Analyzing the business method


Key points
  • In this examination appeal for a patent application directed to an "authorisation system", claim 1 specifies that the terminal rather than a person is authorized. The Board finds that in the business method of D1 (cited by the Examining Division), authorizing the terminal makes no sense.
  • The Board then assesses inventive step. "It is clear that the transaction scenario in the invention is crucial to the question of inventive step because this sets the framework of the technical problem given to the skilled person to solve (see e.g. T 1463/11 - [])). In the communication, the Board raised the question what that scenario was in view of the widely different embodiments disclosed in the application. The appellant neither replied, nor attended the oral proceedings. Thus, the Board has to find a reasonable interpretation based on the examples in the application." 
  • The Board turns to the description and finds on page 11 a few sentences discussing that in an embodiment, the "third party" provides funds to the credit card user instead of the "agent". 
  • " The description suggests that this idea allows a third party to offer a new type of financial service using existing point-of-sale systems" 
  •  "The functions performed by those entities in claim 1 [access terminal at the side of the agent, an account server at the side of the credit card issuer/processor, and an authorisation server on the side of the third party] follow directly from the business scenario. " 




EPO Headnote
The proper application of the COMVIK approach requires a thorough analysis of the business constraints when formulating the problem to be solved before investigating what the skilled person would have done to solve it. The failure to reflect all aspects of the business method in the problem to be solved led the examining division to argue unconvincingly that the inconvenient distinguishing feature of authorising the access terminal was an alternative whose choice was governed by unspecified business constraints (see reasons 4.2).

EPO T 0737/14 -  link

IV. Claim 1 reads:
An authorisation system comprising:
an authorisation server (140);
an account server (120) for storing account data relating to a plurality of accounts;
an access terminal (100), including:
a token reader (106) for inputting token data from a selected one of a plurality of tokens, the token data identifying one of the plurality of accounts; and input means (108) for inputting transaction data;
wherein the access terminal (100) is operable: to receive token data from the token reader (106) and to receive transaction data from the input means (108); to transmit to the account server (120) a first transaction request containing the token data and the transaction data; and to transmit to the authorisation (140) server a second transaction request including access terminal identification data identifying the access terminal;
the account server (120) is operable to receive the first transaction request; to process the token data to generate account identification data, the account identification data being associated with a portion of the account data; and to transmit a third transaction request to the authorisation server, the third transaction request including the transaction data;
the authorisation server (140) is operable to receive the second transaction request and to receive the third transaction request; to process the transaction data and the access terminal identification data to determine whether the access terminal (100) is authorised to enable the transaction; and, if applicable, to transmit to the account server (120) an authorisation request to indicate that the access terminal is authorised; and
in response to receipt of the authorisation request from the authorisation server, the account server (120) is operable to process the transaction data and to modify the account data associated with the account identification data in dependence on the processing.
Reasons for the Decision
1. Background
1.1 The invention concerns an authorisation system for authorising a transaction on an account. Looking at Figure 7, there are three entities in this system: an access terminal 100, an account server 120, and an authorisation server 140. The access terminal sends a first transaction request 204 to the account server that forwards this, as the third transaction request 208, to the authorisation server. The access terminal also sends a second transaction request 206, including a terminal identifier, to the authorisation server. Based on the transaction data, the authorisation server determines whether the access terminal is authorised to enable the transaction, and sends the response 210 to the account server that carries out the transaction on the account.
1.2 The independent claims do not define what sort of transaction is processed by the system. As it turned out, this caused some difficulties in the assessment of the invention, both in examination and appeal proceedings.
[...]

04 September 2019

T 0749/15 - Revoking without oral proceedings


Key points
  • In this opposition appeal, the OD had amended the patent in amended form. The opponent appeals, in particular on the ground that the claims in amended form lack basis in the application as filed.
  • The proprietor did not ask for oral proceedings in their Statement of response and did not submit auxiliary requests.
  • The Board agrees with the opponent's reasoning on added subject-matter and, therefore, issues the decision without oral proceedings and without advance notification (four years after the filing of the patentee's reply). The Board sets aside the impugned decision of the OD and revokes the patent (entirely).
  • As a comment, the Board seems to correctly follow the envisaged procedure but I'm not sure if the patentee had intentionally decided to not request oral proceedings taking the risk of this outcome.



EPO T 0749/15 -  link


Motifs de la décision


1. Le recours est recevable.

2. Décision à l'issue de la procédure écrite

2.1 Selon l'article 12(3) RPCR, la chambre peut, sous réserve des articles 113 et 116 CBE, statuer sur l'affaire à tout moment après l'expiration du délai de quatre mois à compter de la signification des motifs de recours.

2.2 L'intimée n'a pas requis de procédure orale. La requérante n'a requis une procédure orale qu'au cas où la chambre n'aurait pas admis sa requête principale. La prise de décision en faveur de l'intimée sans recourir à la tenue d'une procédure orale respecte donc les exigences de l'article 116 CBE.

2.3 Cette décision de la chambre repose exclusivement sur des motifs présentés par la requérante dans son mémoire de recours, au sujet desquels l'intimée a pu prendre position.

Il découle de l'article 12(2) RPCR qu'il incombe aux parties de présenter l'ensemble de leurs moyens invoqués dans le mémoire de recours, ou dans la réponse à ce mémoire. En l'espèce, la réponse de l'intimée se bornait à un renvoi général aux moyens soumis au cours de la procédure d'opposition antérieure. La chambre n'est pas tenue de rechercher les moyens pertinents susceptibles de soutenir les prétentions de l'intimée, voir par exemple la Jurisprudence des Chambres de recours, 8ème édition, 2016, IV.E.2.6.4, ce qui s'applique de manière analogue aux réponses au mémoire de recours. En l'espèce, seuls les moyens figurant dans la décision attaquée seront donc considérés. Une prise de décision sans recourir à une procédure orale respecte donc les exigences de l'article 113 CBE.

2.4 La chambre peut donc statuer sur cette affaire en procédure écrite.

[...]

3.5 L'objet de la revendication 1 telle que maintenue représente donc une généralisation de l'objet revendiqué qui n'a pas de base et s'étend donc au-delà du contenu de la demande telle que déposée.

4. Pour ces raisons, la chambre conclut au bien fondé de la requête principale de la requérante.
Dispositif
Par ces motifs, il est statué comme suit
1. La décision attaquée est annulée.
2. Le brevet est révoqué.