G 2/24 - Intervention in appeal

Key points

• The Enlarged Board confirmed that G 3/04 is still good law: after withdrawal of all appeals, appeal proceedings may not be continued with a third party who intervened during the appeal proceedings.
• The Technical Board of Appeal wished to depart from G 3/04 and had referred the question under Art. 21 RPBA. 
• "Although Article 21 RPBA allows for, and even encourages, the further development of the case law, thereby granting the boards of appeal ample discretion for referral, the Enlarged Board does not find the prospect of a board of appeal referring a question of law solely because it disagrees with an earlier G-decision or opinion to be particularly appealing in terms of safeguarding consistent case law. In view of the legislative intent of Article 112 EPC to ensure a uniform application of the law, a board of appeal is expected to substantiate why it considers the earlier ruling on the interpretation of the law to have been superseded by a subsequent change in the law or for potential gaps in its reasoning. Another motivation for referring a question that had previously been answered by the Enlarged Board could be that a board of appeal is confronted with a new factual or procedural situation that distinguishes it substantially from the situation underlying the earlier referral. The Enlarged Board takes note of the referring board's criticism of the legal reasoning behind decision G 3/04 and will consider this in the following points."
• It seems that the President of the EPO, the epi and the German Patentanwaltskammer had also proposed to revise G 3/04. 
• Compared to the two recent decisions of the EBA, the present decision is of the usual length and contains detailed reasoning, applying the conventional types of legal reasoning.
• The EBA observes that there have been no relevant changes to the EPC since the time G 3/04 was given.
• The EBA analyses the 'legal concept of appeals' under the EPC,  citing the case law and the legal literature (handbooks), and in the same way analyses the legal concept of a 'party' to the proceedings (also citing the travaux), and the concept of intervention.
• The EBA also compares the legal situation in several EPC contracting states.
• "It follows from this comparative study that the procedural treatment of an intervener essentially depends on the specific regulation applicable in the respective court system. In the absence of a specific statutory provision stating that an intervention is independent of the main parties' procedural actions, an intervention is considered an accessory to the proceedings and ceases to have effect if the proceedings are terminated by the main parties."
• "As in the laws analysed in the comparative study, awarding an intervener an independent party status would require an explicit legal provision in the EPC. Hence, following and implementing the general, abstract and to some extent rather political observations of the President of the Office, four amicus curiae briefs (epi, Patentanwaltskammer, Mr Exner and Mr Thomas) and, to a certain extent, the referring board, would thus require amending the legal framework, i.e. the EPC and/or the Implementing Regulations."
• cf. Niklas Luhmann, Legitimiation durch Verfahren, page 131 (in the German original): "All dies ist bei Konditionalprogrammen [i.e., as in legal proceedings]  im Prinzip und weitgehend auch in der Praxis anders. Hier wird nach Maßgabe eines »Wenn« das programmierte »Dann« gewählt. Die Folgen werden von dem Entscheidenden nicht mit verantwortet, sondern dem angelastet, der das Programm erließ (und damit vielleicht seinerseits bestimmte Zwecke erreichen wollte). Die Verantwortlichkeit kann hier in weitem Umfange nach oben abgeschoben werden. Beim konditional programmierten Entscheiden geht es nur noch um den Nachweis, daß ein bestimmter Tatbestand faktisch vorliegt und daß es sich dabei um jenes Signal handelt, das nach dem Programm die Entscheidung auslösen sollte. Zum Entscheiden genügt juristischer Sachverstand, der sich nach Bedarf durch Zeugen und Sachverständige informieren läßt, die Entscheidung aber allein verantwortet. Auf diese Weise kann die Entscheidung gegen zahlreiche Möglichkeiten der Kritik praktisch immunisiert werden, vor allem ...  (4) gegen eine Kritik der Auswirkungen (im Unterschied zu den rein juristischen Konsequenzen). (...) Der dichotomisch zugeschliffene Darstellungsstil juristischer Begründungen, das Feststellen von Begriffen und Fakten als so und nicht anders, entspricht genau dieser Funktion, die Kritikfähigkeit einer Entscheidung zu reduzieren und auf wenige kontrollierbare Fehlerquellen zu beschränken - im Unterschied zum Denken in Wahrscheinlichkeiten und Chancen, gleitenden Skalen, Nutzenschätzungen, Wertverhältnissen und zeitbedingten Opportunitäten, das bei Zweckprogrammen [i.e., political decision-making] angebracht ist.
• Note that in the quote above, the part "i.e. the EPC and/or the Implementing Regulations" might be a key insight that was not a priori evident.
• The EBA refers in poin 37 to the 'rubrum' of the decision ("More specifically, the parties to the proceedings are first of all the parties for whom the deciding body intended to issue the decision. These are the parties that are named in the rubrum of the decision.")  It appears to be a German term (as explained e.g. here: https://www.pf.um.si/site/assets/files/5987/germany.pdf ) 

• EPO

The link to the decision can be found after the jump.

T 1841/23 - Intervention and UPC litigation

Key points

• Intervention - who expected it to become a hot topic (see G2/24).
• "the board summoned the proprietor and opponent 1 to oral proceedings to be held before the board on 11 December 2024." 
• "A notice of intervention was filed on 18 November 2024, "
  
• The intervention was based on UPC litigation on the patent.
• "In support of its requests for postponement of the oral proceedings before the board or of the board's decision on the appeal, the proprietor submitted, at the outset of those oral proceedings, essentially the following arguments."
• "the matter of postponement of the arranged oral proceedings is at the board's discretion."
• "In the present case, unlike the one underlying T 1961/09, the notice of intervention did, in the now relevant parts, not raise any further objections or new issues, but only argued on old topics. At oral proceedings before the board, opponent 2 was also free to put forward and develop such arguments, which it also did to some extent, as had the proprietor. Further, to ensure fairness between the parties, the present board had taken pains, in the run-up to the oral proceedings before it, to concentrate the debate on a few old, limited and highly relevant issues"
• " As a result, the proprietor's requests for postponement were to be refused and the oral proceedings continued, with the objection of added subject-matter as the next issue to be discussed."
• " In view of the above, the main request is not allowable under Article 123(2) EPC."
• "While an admissible intervention is to be treated as an opposition (Article 105(2) EPC), its filing shortly prior to the oral proceedings before a board does not generally excuse the proprietor (or the other parties), and in particular it does not hand them a voucher for more time. Its concrete implications for opposition appeal proceedings are rather to be determined on a case-by-case basis, under the provisions of the EPC and the RPBA. "
• "Nor are opposition appeal proceedings designed to serve as a placeholder for tactical considerations in parallel proceedings for infringement. They are rather an existential challenge to the title, on the basis of which enforcement is pursued in the infringement proceedings, and parameters such as legal certainty and procedural economy are also involved. Any difficulties for the proprietor in drafting auxiliary requests that also provide the best scope of protection, considering the ongoing infringement proceedings, are not a reason to delay the opposition appeal proceedings."
• Not sure what the Board means with 'placeholder' here, but clearly opposition appeal proceedings are not to be treated as subordinate to any parallel UPC proceedings.
• 
  

EPO 

The link to the decision can be found after the jump.

T 0439/17 - Intervention and two national procedures

Key points

• In this opposition appeal, the Board has to decide on the admissibility of a Notice of intervention under Article 105 EPC.
• The intervener basis the intervention on a " Beweissicherungsverfahren nach § 485 Abs. 2 ZPO (Deutsche Zivilprozessordnung)" (evidence seizure proceedings). The question is whether such a procedure is a "proceedings for infringement " of the patent in the sense of Art.105(1)(a) EPC.
• Following recent decision T1746/15, the Board decides that they are not. 
• The fact that the evidence seizure procedure was followed by an actual infringement complaint in the national procedure, does not change this. The later national infringement procedure is a separate procedure which can not retroactively make the intervention admissible.
• The intervener had based a second intervention on the national infringement procedure. However, that second intervention was filed during the appeal procedure. However, the other parties had withdrawn their appeal (during the oral proceedings). Hence, the appeal proceedings are terminated if the first notice of intervention is not admissible (G3/04).  

EPO Headnote


1. Die Entscheidung T 1713/11 definiert eine Klage wegen Verletzung für die Zwecke des Artikels 105 EPÜ als "ein Verfahren zur Feststellung, ob ein Dritter in einem Bereich, der dem Ausschlussrecht des Patentinhabers unterliegt, wirtschaftlich tätig ist". Nach Meinung der Kammer bedeutet dies, dass das Entscheidungsorgan, üblicherweise ein Gericht, aufgefordert wird, "[eine Verletzung] festzustellen", als abschließendes Rechtsergebnis dieses Verfahrens. Die Tatsache, dass die Patentinhaberin oder eine andere Partei das fragliche Verfahren ganz offensichtlich mit dem Ziel eingeleitet hat, dem Patentinhaber die Feststellung einer Verletzung (als Tatbestand) zu ermöglichen, ist für das Vorliegen einer "Klage" im Sinne von Artikel 105 EPÜ irrelevant. (Nr. 6 der Gründe)

2. Die Zulässigkeit des Beitritts muss zum Zeitpunkt des Beitritts gegeben sein und kann nicht später rückwirkend (ex tunc) hergestellt werden. (Nr. 13 der Gründe)

3. Die Kammer stellt fest, dass ein Beweissicherungsverfahren nach § 485 Abs. 2 ZPO und die anschließende Verletzungsklage im Hinblick auf die Anwendung von Artikel 105 (1)(a) EPÜ als zwei getrennte Verfahren zu betrachten sind. (Nr. 15 der Gründe)

EPO T 0439/17 -  link

Entscheidungsgründe

1. Die Beschwerde und die Beschwerdebegründung wurden rechtzeitig eingereicht, und die Gebühren wurden entrichtet. Die Beschwerdeführerin ist durch die Entscheidung beschwert. Die Beschwerde ist zulässig.

Parteistellung der beschwerdeführenden Einsprechende 2

2. Wie bereits in der vorläufigen Stellungnahme der Kammer erläutert, wird die Parteistellung der Einsprechenden 2 durch die Beurteilung der Frage bestimmt, ob ihr erster oder zweiter Beitritt zulässig und damit auch rechtswirksam ist. Wird lediglich ihr zweiter Beitritt anerkannt, aber nicht der erste, so erlangt sie nur die Parteistellung einer Einsprechenden, nicht aber die einer Beschwerdeführerin in Bezug auf die Feststellungen der Entscheidung über das Streitpatent (G 3/04 vom 22. August 2005, ABl. EPA 2006, 118, Gründe Nr. 6 und Nr. 10, erster Absatz). Ihre Parteistellung als Beschwerdeführerin in der vorliegende Beschwerde wird sich somit auf die Frage der Zulässigkeit ihres (ersten) Beitritts beschränken.

T 0435/17 - Intervention by (not?) a third party

Key points

• In this opposition appeal, two notices of intervention were filed under Article 105 EPC. The patentee protests that the interveners are not really third parties, because of their "factual proximity" to the opponent " in geographical, accounting (i.e. EPO deposit account] and representational terms". The interventions would, therefore, be an abuse of procedure to delay the opposition.
• The Board finds that there is no legal basis to hold an intervention inadmissible because of proximity to the opponent.

EPO T 0435/17 -  link

Motifs de la décision

1. Recevabilité des interventions

1.1 Dans la notification selon l'article 15(1) RPCR la Chambre a annoncé et motivé son avis provisoire que les deux interventions sont recevables comme suit:

"8.1 La Chambre juge les deux interventions recevables parce qu'elles satisfont aux dispositions de l'article 105 CBE et de la règle 89 CBE. En particulier, les deux contrefactrices présumées ont apporté la preuve qu'une action en contrefaçon fondée sur le brevet a été introduite à leur encontre (cf. assignation devant le TGI Paris du 22 décembre 2017).
8.2 La titulaire du brevet soutient que les deux interventions sont irrecevables parce que les contrefactrices présumées ne sont pas des tiers au sens de l'article 105(1) CBE, en raison de leur proximité factuelle en termes géographiques, comptables et de représentation avec l'opposante 1, et qu'elles utilisent donc la procédure d'intervention pour porter tardivement à la procédure des moyens qui auraient déjà pu être présentés devant la division d'opposition.
8.3 Toutefois, la Chambre estime que le terme "tout tiers" figurant à l'article 105(1) CBE doit être interprété au sens où le contrefacteur présumé doit être une entité juridique distincte des autres parties à la procédure (cf. par exemple la Jurisprudence des Chambres de recours de l'OEB, 2016, chapitre IV.C.3.1.1), et qu'il n'existe aucune base juridique pour exclure qu'un contrefacteur présumé partage avec un opposant des locaux, un compte courant pour le paiement de taxes - lesquelles peuvent par ailleurs être payées par toute personne - et/ou un mandataire agréé. Il ne ressort pas des éléments présentés par la titulaire du brevet que les contrefactrices présumées et l'opposante 1 ne sont pas des entités juridiques distinctes.
8.4 La Chambre n'est donc pas persuadée que le fait d'autoriser les interventions revienne à permettre à l'opposante 1 d'introduire tardivement de nouveaux moyens dans la procédure de recours."

1.2 La titulaire du brevet n'a pas répondu sur le fond à cet avis provisoire.

1.3 Au début de la procédure orale, la Chambre a constaté qu'en l'absence d'élément nouveau la conclusion communiquée à titre provisoire devait s'appliquer de manière inchangée et a ainsi décidé que les interventions étaient recevables.

1.4 Les intervenantes sont par conséquent assimilées à des opposantes pour la suite de la procédure (article 105(2) CBE).

T 1593/15 - CPA and effective and efficient conduct of oral proceedings

Key points

• In this opposition appeal, the Board gives important comments on the role of the CPA. There is also an intervention of an assumed infringer.
• " the [opponent] argued that a procedural violation had occurred since it had been prevented by the Opposition Division at the oral proceedings from presenting its line of argument on inventive step starting from D2 as the closest prior art." 
• " the Opposition Division applied the problem-solution approach stage by stage[]. Thus, in view of an effective and efficient conduct of oral proceedings, it systematically limited its decision-making process and accordingly the discussion with the parties to the determination of the closest prior art first, before discussing the other aspects of the inventive step of the claimed subject-matter. Such conduct of the oral proceedings was imposed in the present case by the numerous lack of inventive step objections raised by the opponents. " 
• The OD had heard the parties on which document was the CPA. After the OD decided that D4 was the CPA, it gave the opponents sufficient time to make their case from D4 as CPA.
• " In view of the above, the Board considers that the appellant's right to be heard was not violated and so no substantial procedural violation occurred. " 
• As to the effects of the intervention, made during the appeal of Opponent I: the ground of Art. 100(c), not admitted by the OD as being late filed, is admitted because it was raised again by the intervener. The ground of Art.100(b) raised for the first time by the intervener is also admitted. For the ground of Art. 54, this ground was raised before the OD only by opponent II (who did not appeal and is no longer a party), but that opposition was found inadmissible. The intervener did not raise the ground. The appellant raised the ground for the first time in appeal, but the ground is not admitted because the patentee does not consent (G1/95). The Board finds the main request to be allowable, the appeal of Opponent I is dismissed. 

EPO T 1593/15 - link

Reasons for the Decision

1. Intervention

Notice of intervention was filed by "DE IULIIS MACCHINE S.P.A.".

As appears from document E1 ("Tribunale Civile Di Napoli - Sezione Specializzata In Materia Di Impresa") filed with the notice of intervention, proceedings for infringement of the contested patent have been instituted in Italy against the intervener (Article 105(1)(a) EPC).

The notice of intervention was filed on Monday, 15 May 2017, i.e. within three months of the date on which said proceedings were instituted (14 February 2017, Rules 131(4) and 134(1) EPC), together with a written reasoned statement and payment of the opposition fee. Thus, the requirements set out in Rule 89 EPC are fulfilled.

As a consequence, the intervention is admissible and is treated as an opposition (Article 105(2) EPC; see also G 3/04, OJ EPO 2006, 118, in particular Reasons 10 and 11).

The above was the Board's preliminary opinion as set out in the annex to the summons to oral proceedings, point 1.3. It has not been contested by the respondent, either in writing or orally at the oral proceedings; it is maintained by the Board in deciding the case at hand.

T 0384/15 - Intervention and straw man opponent

Key points

• The opponent was a straw man, intervention was later filed by two legal entities (within the same company). The patentee protested that the opponent (straw man) was already acting for the same company as now intervening. The Board decides that the interventions are admissible.
• " The board agrees with the proprietor that an intervener must be a different party to the opponent in order to be a "third party" within the meaning of Article 105(1) EPC. However, the board considers that there is no question that the interveners are "third parties", i.e. different legal entities, with respect to the opponent Santarelli SA whether or not one of Bose GmbH and Bose Limited is the principal instructing Santarelli SA." 
• "In the board's view, the same situation exists in the present case [as in T 305/08, in which case the opponent-appellant OI was alleged to be the patent department (although had an entirely different name) acting for interveners OII and OIII] . The respondent has produced evidence suggesting a relationship between the appellant and the interveners, but no proof, as admitted by the respondent, that Santarelli SA was acting directly on behalf of either Bose GmbH or Bose Limited. Further, the representatives for the appellant and the interveners expressly denied that this was the case."

EPO T 0384/15 - link

Reasons for the Decision

1. Admissibility of the opposition and the interventions (cf. respondent's requests 1.1 and 1.3)

1.1 The respondent argued that there was credible evidence that the opponent Santarelli SA was acting on behalf of one or more divisions of Bose Corporation, but had concealed this relationship. Further, all divisions of Bose, including the assumed infringers and interveners Bose GmbH and Bose Limited, were legally inextricably linked to the Bose Corporation. A requirement for an admissible intervention is that it be filed by a third party. By having chosen to protect its anonymity by filing the opposition in the name of a straw man, the true opponent has availed itself of the possibility of also intervening in the opposition proceedings because it is impossible, at least at first glance, for the EPO or any other party to ascertain whether the interveners are third parties or not. This constituted an abuse of process allowing circumvention of the law as laid out in Article 105(1) EPC. This anonymity also allowed Bose to pick and choose who they might subsequently wish to present as the true opponent, depending on circumstances, which also resulted in an abuse of process. As a consequence, the opposition filed in the name of Santarelli SA must be deemed inadmissible ex tunc. In turn, this meant that there were no pending opposition proceedings when the notices of intervention were filed by Bose GmbH and Bose Limited respectively. It followed that the interventions were also inadmissible.

T 1534/16 - Prior use and withdrawn opposition

Key points

• In this opposition appeal, the opponent and the intervener had asserted a public prior use, and had subsequently withdrawn the opposition (and intervention).
• The patentee had defended the claims by casting doubts on whether the prior use was public, or whether an obligation to maintain secrecy had been in place.
• " The Board, regarding the appellant's doubts as justified and considering that further investigations would require the co-operation of the opponent and/or intervener, who have withdrawn their oppositions and their intervention [], concludes that the allegations of prior use are to be disregarded."

	T 1534/16 - link

Reasons for the Decision

1. Prior uses
The opponent and the intervener submitted a plurality of allegations of prior use before their respective oppositions were withdrawn.
The appellant replied by raising doubts concerning the public availability of the installations in accordance with the alleged prior uses, in particular by referring to the presence of an obligation to maintain secrecy.
The Board, regarding the appellant's doubts as justified and considering that further investigations would require the co-operation of the opponent and/or intervener, who have withdrawn their oppositions and their intervention (see Case Law of the Boards of Appeal, 8th edition 2016, IV.D.2.2.9 (c)), concludes that the allegations of prior use are to be disregarded.

2. Exclusion from file inspection
During the written proceedings before the Board, documents E48, E48a, E49, E51, E52, E53 and E54 filed by the appellant before it withdrew its opposition were provisionally excluded from file inspection (see communication dated 28 February 2018) at the request of the appellant (patentee). The Board, considering that the opponent and intervener had explicitly agreed by letters of 6 March 2018 to the appellant's request and being satisfied that the documents in question do not serve the purpose of informing the public about the patent in suit, concludes that the above-mentioned documents should remain excluded from file inspection pursuant to Rule 144(d) EPC.

T 1746/15 - Intervention not admitted

Key points

• An admissible intervention of an accused infringer in opposition, requires that "proceedings for infringement" have been instituted.
• The Board decides in this case that "selbstständiges Beweisverfahren" under German law are not such proceedings. Therefore, the intervention is not admissible. The German procedure is similar to "saisie" procedures as they exist e.g. in France, and "saisie" procedures do not make an intervention admissible according to existing case law.

Headnote
Independent evidentiary proceedings under § 485 of the German Code of Civil Procedure ("selbstständiges Beweisverfahren", also known under "Beweissicherungsverfahren" or "Düsseldorfer Verfahren") do not qualify as proceedings for infringement under Article 105(1)(a) EPC (see reasons, point 1).
T 1746/15 - link

Summary of Facts and Submissions

VII. The appellant argued essentially as follows:
Admissibility of opponent/respondent II's intervention
The independent evidentiary proceedings to which respondent II is currently subject in Germany ("selbstständiges Verfahren", also known as "Beweissicherungsverfahren" or "Düsseldorfer Verfahren"), hereafter referred to as "BSV proceedings", do not qualify as proceedings for infringement pursuant to Article 105(1)(a) EPC.
Proceedings initiated by the patent proprietor are deemed to be "proceedings for infringement" pursuant to Article 105(1)(a) EPC only where a court is called upon to establish by a ruling "whether a third party is commercially active in an area that falls within patentee's right to exclude".
This is not the case in BSV proceedings, since no facts are established by a court in the sense that the opinion provided by the expert inspecting the alleged infringing product or process is not binding for the subsequent distinct infringement proceedings to be initiated by an action.
There is no automatic or procedural link between BSV proceedings and subsequent infringement proceedings. There is no time limit for bringing the case to infringement proceedings, so that opponent/respondent II in the present case may not even be faced with an actual accusation of infringement.
Respondents in BSV proceedings are not faced with injunctions, contrary to the order in the Belgian proceedings discussed in T 188/97 (not published in OJ EPO), in which the assumed infringer is unambiguously prohibited from "releasing or alienating" in any way the infringing articles described by the expert.
In BSV proceedings, the assumed infringer is not left without any means of defence, since, according to § 494a German Code of Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung, hereafter "ZPO"), it can force the patent proprietor to bring the case to infringement proceedings.
According to the Case Law of the Boards of Appeal (see T 1713/11 and T 305/08, neither published in OJ EPO), "saisie-contrefaçon" in France or "descrizione" in Italy, which are proceedings comparable to BSV proceedings, do not qualify as "proceedings for infringement" pursuant to Article 105(1)(a) EPC.
As a consequence, BSV proceedings under German law cannot be considered as proceedings for infringement within the meaning of Article 105(1)(a) EPC. Therefore, the intervention of opponent/respondent II should not be admitted.

Reasons for the Decision

1. Admissibility of opponent/respondent II's intervention

1.1 The present intervention of respondent II was filed pursuant to Article 105(1)(a) EPC, which states the following (emphasis added by the Board):

"(1) Any third party may, in accordance with the Implementing Regulations, intervene in opposition proceedings after the opposition period has expired, if the third party proves that

(a) proceedings for infringement of the same patent have been instituted against him, or..."

Hence, for an intervention to be admissible and treated as an opposition pursuant to Article 105(2) EPC, "proceedings for infringement" must have been initiated against the intervener, i.e. respondent II in the present case.

T 0614/13 - Admissibility of intervention

T 0614/13 

For the decision, click here ([C] / DE)

Key points

• The case is about admissibility of an intervention by an alleged infringer, since the three month  period of Rule 89 EPC was triggered by the serving of a writ in China of which the precise date was difficult to prove. 
• A party intervening in opposition can appeal the decision of the OD holding the intervention to be inadmissible as being late filed after the three month period of Rule 89. 
• In this case, the period of about six months between the filing of the complaint with the German court and the serving the writ in China under the 1965 The Hague Service Convention, does not change the fact that the three month period of Rule 89 started from the receipt of the writ by the defendant.  
• The case is interesting since the patentee disputed admissibility of the appeal, of the intervention, and of the documents filed as evidence of the date of serving of the writ. 
• Refusal of the remittal to the OD requested by patent proprietor and intervener (not by other opponent). 

Sachverhalt und Anträge

I. Die Beschwerde der Einsprechenden/Beitretenden Kingfa Sci. & Tech. Co. Ltd. (Beitretende) richtet sich gegen die auf die mündliche Verhandlung vom 14. Dezember 2012 ergangene Entscheidung der Einspruchsabteilung vom 22. Januar 2013. Mit dieser Entscheidung hat die Einspruchsabteilung u.a. den "… Einspruch der Einsprechenden Kingfa Sci. & Tech. Co. Ltd. … als unzulässig verworfen". Die Beitretende habe nicht hinreichend nachgewiesen, dass ihr die Klageschrift (beim Landgericht Düsseldorf von der Patentinhaberin gegen die Beitretende eingereichte Klage auf Verletzung des Streitpatents) erst am 3. Juli 2012 zugestellt wurde, und damit die Erklärung des Beitritts mit Schreiben vom 27. September 2012 rechtzeitig erfolgte.

Mit der angefochtenen Entscheidung hat die Einspruchsabteilung zugleich den Einspruch der Einsprechenden Arkema France (Einsprechende 1) zurückgewiesen. Die Einsprechende 1 hat gegen die Entscheidung der Einspruchsabteilung ebenfalls Beschwerde erhoben.

II. Mit ihrem Schreiben vom 27. September 2012 hat die Beitretende u.a. die Dokumente D 13 und D 14 vorgelegt. Danach - insoweit zwischen den Beteiligten unstreitig - hat die Patentinhaberin gegen die Kingfa Sci. & Tech. Co. Ltd. am 3. November 2011 auf der Grundlage des Streitpatents eine Verletzungsklage beim Landgericht Düsseldorf (Az: 4b O 168/11) eingereicht (D 13). Das Landgericht Düsseldorf hat dann mit Datum vom 11. Januar 2012 einen Antrag auf Zustellung der Klage an das Bureau of International Judicial Assistance, Ministry of Justice der Volksrepublik China nach dem "Übereinkommen über die Zustellung gerichtlicher und außergerichtlicher Schriftstücke im Ausland in Zivil- oder Handelsachen, unterzeichnet in Den Haag am 15. November 1965" ("Haager Zustellungsübereinkommen") gerichtet (D 14).