T 0655/24 - Post-published evidence for inventive step

Key points

• In the opposition case at hand, it is unclear if the distinguishing feature provides "a" technical effect or an improvement over the closest prior art. The case is about antibodies, and the distinguishing feature is a mutation (D265A) at a certain position (265). 
• The proprietor  referred to additional data provided in post-published documents D25 and D26 as evidence that the effect of further reduced effector function was achieved by essentially all claimed subject-matter.
• "The board, however, notes that such evidence (data) can only be taken into account when the technical effect that it is purported to show is already credible from the disclosure in the application as filed itself."
• "Applying the principles of G 2/21, the board does not consider that an improvement of an effect, here further reduced effector functions mediated by the Fc region, is encompassed by the technical teaching and embodied by the same originally disclosed invention merely because the effect itself (but not the improvement), was shown to be achieved in the application as filed "
•  The board is aware that a different approach to this issue was taken in decisions T 1989/19, T 2716/19 and T 840/22 and makes the following observations (...)
• "the approach taken in decisions T 1989/19, T 2716/19 and T 840/22 would allow an applicant to solely rely on post-published evidence to establish inventive step by filing an application disclosing an effect that was already known from the prior art or formed part of common general knowledge and subsequently invoking an improvement of said effect as "implicitly derivable" from the application as filed. This scenario goes against the principle that patents should not be granted for subject-matter whose inventive contribution is identified only after their effective date. Such an outcome directly contradicts the "first to file" principle enshrined in the EPC and confirmed in decisions G 1/03 and G 2/10. It is also in evident tension with the framework established by decision G 2/21 "
• "The board therefore must turn to the disclosure in the application as filed to determine if the evidence for a further reduced effector function of the FEA variant compared to the FE variant reported in post-published documents D25 and D26 can be taken into account."
• "In conclusion, the board considers the improved effect of decreased CD69 release of the FEA variant compared to the FEFE variant to have been credibly disclosed in the application as filed. Thus, while it is not strictly necessary to consult the evidence in documents D25 and D26, it can be noted that their disclosure supports the improved effect shown in the application as filed. "
• The Board considers the claimed subject-matter to be non-obvious based on said technical effect.
• The Board indicates that it considers the claimed subject-matter also non-obvious as an alternative.
• Hence, the whole point about the interpretation of G 2/21 seems obiter.
• I think the Board's proposed approach is very strict, especially if the applicant was unaware of the prior art cited by the opponent. If you find your molecule has a good score for a certain property, is there really a necessity to carry out comparative testing before filing the patent application (and against which prior art?)

EPO 

The link to the decision is provided after the jump.

T 0293/25 - Oral submissions that are too complex

Key points

• "The respondent did not respond in writing to the preliminary opinion, but rather contested the conclusion mentioned above at the oral proceedings before the board. In particular, they provided detailed oral submissions as to why it was not possible to derive from a comparison of example 1 and comparative example 4 [of the patent] that features (C), (G) and (H) contributed to achieving [a technical effect]"
• "the experimental section of the patent spans 20 pages and covers not only a great number of examples and comparative examples, but also various intermediate products, with multiple parameters for each of them being presented in 8 different tables"
•  "The respondent's oral submissions lasted for about 45 minutes and mostly, if not entirely, consisted of multiple comparisons of the properties of various examples and comparative examples and pairs thereof, which had not been presented in writing before. This submission of entirely new information was so extensive and complex that it was not possible for either the board or the appellant to take detailed note of, and to understand it sufficiently to form an informed opinion thereon."" '
• "In a case where new, technically complex information is provided in oral submissions lasting 45 minutes, the challenge of taking accurate note of what is said in itself prevents the other party from adequately responding thereto. Therefore, taking the new submissions into consideratidon would have violated the appellant's right to fair proceedings. In addition, postponing the oral proceedings until a later date would have gone against the principle of procedural economy, in particular because the situation could have easily been avoided, had the respondent filed their submissions in writing in due time (cf. the principles of fair proceedings and procedural economy, which are cornerstones of the proceedings (including) before the boards, and which have to be properly balanced, according to Articles 12 et seq of the RPBA, e.g. T 2920/18, T 339/19, T 1857/19, T 1800/21)."
• "For these reasons, it was not possible to consider the new submission."
• We don't have a transcript of the hearing, but I wonder if the opponent was warned during their 45 minutes by the Board that their submissions were too complex.
• 
  

EPO 

The link to the decision is provided after the jump.

T 1471/24 - No two-part form, application refused

Key points

• Rule 43(1) provides that "where appropriate" claims shall contain a preamble and a "characterised in that"  part (two-part form).
• "The examining division found that D1 represented the closest prior art to the claimed invention and that the subject-matter of claim 1 was both novel and involved an inventive step over the cited art (see page 5 of the decision). It nonetheless found that the requirements of Rule 43(1) of the Implementing Regulations were not fulfilled since claim 1 was not drafted in the two-part form, despite this being appropriate  ...."
• "It is noted that the purpose of the two-part form of claim is to allow the skilled person to see clearly which features necessary for the definition of the claimed subject-matter are, in combination, part of the prior art. It is established practice before examining divisions not to insist on the two-part form if it is sufficiently clear from the indication of prior art made in the description which features of the claim under examination are known therefrom (see also Guidelines for Examination, F-IV, 2.3.2). "
• "However, this proviso regarding the features known from the prior art, as found by the examining division in point 21.4 of its decision, has not been satisfied in the present application. D1 is indeed acknowledged on page 1 of the description (dated 15 December 2022) yet this acknowledgement fails to identify which specific features of the claim 1 under examination are known from D1. Fundamentally, therefore, in view of the two-part form not having been used in the independent claim, a resultant requirement for the content of the description to include an indication of which features of claim 1 were known from the prior art was not fulfilled."
• "The appellant further argued that the proposed two-part form was incorrect insofar as D1 discloses a set of various flat mirrors rather than, as proposed by the examining division for inclusion in the preamble of claim 1, merely a set of various mirrors. Herein lies a misunderstanding of the appellant. The preamble of a claim drafted in the two-part form should include those features of the claim known in combination from the prior art (Rule 43(1)(a) EPC). In the present case, a set of various mirrors is indeed known from D1, albeit in D1 the various mirrors of this set are flat. That the mirrors of D1 are flat is however irrelevant; D1 without doubt does disclose a set of various mirrors, such that this feature can be included in the preamble of a two-part form of claim."
• The applicant raised an argument based on Article 123(2), which is very interesting, although it was rejected by the Board. "The appellant's further contention in this regard that the generalisation of 'flat mirrors' of D1 to merely 'mirrors' in the preamble of claim 1 offended Article 123(2) EPC is also based on a misunderstanding of this provision of the EPC. Article 123(2) EPC prohibits a European patent application being amended in such a way that it contains subject-matter which extends beyond the content of the application as filed. How the claimed subject-matter, or even the features included in the preamble of a claim, differs from a prior art document is irrelevant for the consideration of meeting the requirement of Article 123(2) EPC. Similarly, as it is the subject-matter of a claim as a whole which is considered when evaluating compliance with Article 123(2) EPC, novel information derivable alone from the preamble of a claim does not give rise to objections under this article; it is the subject-matter of the claim as a whole for which the prohibition of extension beyond the content of the application as filed applies."
• The applicants are two natural persons, not represented by a professional representative. The current applicants are the heirs of the original applicant/inventor, who has deceased. 
• The applicant did not request oral proceedings. The Board issued the decision without oral proceedings or advance communication. 
• There was no auxiliary request with the claim in two-part form, and the appeal was dismissed. The examining division's refusal decision has, hence, become final. This is remarkable, as there was novel and inventive subject-matter.  
• 
  
EPO

The link to the decision is provided after the jump.

T 0528/25 - DABUS (II)

Key points

• The applicant essentially wishes to designate an AI tool as the inventor in this examination appeal.
• The  Board: "the EPC requires that a legally capable person is named as the inventor"
• Just as a note, the Board does not say "natural person" or "human" but refers to "legally capable persons" (as in J 8/20). Let's suppose that this choice of words is intentional. Then, considering that in legal English, the term "person" is the genus of the species "natural persons" and "legal persons" (companies etc.), the phrase ""legally capable persons"" is not limited to human persons. Perhaps, one day, if a national law treats an AI agent as capable of some legal transactions (and/or if a national law recognises an AI agent as a proprietor of some rights, i.e. as a valid holder of a bitcoin wallet or bank account), it may turn out that J 8/20 left a small door open. 
• "It must be considered that patent protection for an invention that was essentially developed using artificial intelligence (AI) would be impossible under the EPC, if natural persons were excluded from being regarded as inventors of AI-generated inventions, since, as indicated above, the EPC requires that a legally capable person is named as the inventor. "
• "the provisions on patentability under Article 52 ff. EPC do not rule out patent protection for AI-generated inventions. An invention involves an inventive step under Article 56 EPC if it is not obvious to a person skilled in the art in view of the prior art, which may also be the case for inventions developed by using artificial intelligence (AI). If an invention is developed using an AI-machine, this also requires some human input or influence, so that it is in principle not excluded to identify one or more natural persons to whom a causal contribution to the invention is attributable, and who can therefore be regarded as inventors within the meaning of the EPC.
• The Board thus concludes that, in principle, the designation of an inventor under the EPC is also possible for inventions developed using artificial intelligence (AI)."
• The appeal is dismissed.
• A divisional application has been filed already. 

EPO 

The link to the decision is provided after the jump.

T 0299/24 - Correcting errors in amended claims

Key points

• Claim 1 of the former main request reads: "(a) "Headrest (10), in particular headrest for vehicle seats, (b) comprising a bone conduction two-way sound transmission system (1), which in turn comprises at least one bone conduction loudspeaker (5) and at least one bone conduction microphone (7), ..."
• "With its written reply to the board's [preliminary opinion], the applicant filed a corrected main request, replacing the phrase "in particular headrest for vehicle seats" in claim 1 with the wording "headrest for vehicle seats" []. It framed this submission as a correction of an error under Rule 139 EPC."
• The Board: "Under Rule 139, second sentence, EPC, if a request for correction concerns the claims, the "correction must be obvious in the sense that it is immediately evident that nothing else would have been intended than what is offered as the correction". According to the established jurisprudence of the Boards of Appeal (see G 3/89, Reasons 5 and 6; G 11/91, Reasons 6), a two-step approach applies in this regard. It must first be established that it is obvious that an error is in fact present in the document filed with the EPO, the incorrect information having to be objectively recognisable by the skilled reader using their common general knowledge. Secondly, the correction of the error must be obvious."
• My analysis is that Rule 139, second sentence, is an implementation of Article 123(2) EPC and hence provides a rule for determining when a purported correction has sufficient basis in the application as filed (i.e., does not extend beyond the content of the application as filed). This follows directly from G 3/89, hn. 1, in my view ("Such a correction is of a strictly declaratory nature and thus does not infringe the prohibition of extension under Article 123(2) EPC."
• In the present case, the amended claim had an undisputed, explicit basis in the application as filed. The issue was not whether the application as filed contained an error. Hence, I don't think the second sentence of Rule 139 applied.
• Instead, the case concerns a case amendment, in particular one under Article 13(2) RPBA. Depending on the facts of the case, if a "subsequently filed document" (i.e., a document filed after the filing date of the patent application) contains an error, the party concerned may correct that error later in the procedure. The evident nature of the error and the correction (or lack thereof) are among the factors the board must consider when deciding whether to admit the correction. At any rate, a correction of an amended claim 
• Credit to Mr Thomas for flagging the decision on his weblog.
•  The Board does not admit the amended set of claims (with reasoning that would also apply under Art. 13(2) RPBA, in my view): " Crucially, nowhere in the statement of grounds of appeal does the appellant base any argument on the headrest being exclusively limited to a "headrest for vehicle seats". The appellant neither stated that claim 1 was restricted to overcome a specific objection, nor did it rely on the specific vehicle-seat environment to establish an inventive step. Because the appellant's technical arguments apply perfectly and seamlessly to the broader claim wording ("in particular headrest for vehicle seats") that was actually filed, the skilled reader reviewing the statement of grounds of appeal alongside the claims would find a coherent, self-consistent appeal case. There is thus no logical disconnect that would alert the skilled reader to a mistake.
• "Since the request for correction under Rule 139 EPC has been refused, the "corrected" main request constitutes an "amendment" of the appellant's appeal case. However, leaving the question of admittance aside, the board considers the "corrected main request" not to comply with Article 56 EPC. In this regard, the board endorses the examining division's assessment of inventive step set out in Reasons 10 of the appealed decision, for the following reasons."
• This makes the whole discussion of Rule 139 moot (or obiter), it seems to me.

EPO 

The link to the decision is provided after the jump.

T 1462/24 - Allocation of files to Boards (DMF for MS)

Key points

• A case with fourteen opponents and an opponent, about a (blockbuster) medicine (DMF for MS).
• Opponent 2 filed a Notice of appeal three days after the oral proceedings before the OD. O2 wrote that: "The subject-matter of the claims has changed significantly since the International Patent Classification was provided. The patent now claims a specific dose'"   and requested that  " these appeal proceedings be allocated to board of appeal 3.3.04 or 3.3.07" (instead of Board 3.3.08).
• An opposition was also filed against the parent patent, and the appeal in that case was decided by a panel including Ms P as the rapporteur. The Board (3.3.01) in that case dismissed the proprietor's appeal against the revocation of the patent (based on a lack of basis under Art. 123(2)). 
• The Chair of Board 3.3.08 and the Chair of Board 3.3.04 decided to transfer the case to Board 3.3.04. The Chair of Board 3.3.04 is Ms P, who is also the chair of the panel deciding the present case.
• The current Board finds the (very similar) claim to lack basis in the application as filed, for essentially the same recited feature as in the parent case.
• According to the EPO register, there are 9 divisional applications in this patent family. I wish to refrain from commenting on this point here, as it is sensitive after Copaxone (and I care to note that the proprietor did not disapprove of the text of the patent, allowing us and the opponents to benefit from the reasoned decision).
• "Oral proceedings took place before the Board on 25 and 26 November 2025 in the presence of all parties save for opponent 10. In the course of these proceedings, the patent proprietor confirmed that its request for referral of questions to the Enlarged Board of Appeal was no longer conditional and requested that three questions be put to the Enlarged Board of Appeal under Article 112(1)(a) EPC. The Board rejected this request. Subsequently, the patent proprietor submitted two written statements of objections under Rule 106 EPC, one on 25 November 2025 and one on 26 November 2025 (see Annexes of the minutes of the oral proceedings before the Board). The Board rejected these objections. At the request of all opponents present at the oral proceedings, the Board ordered a different apportionment of costs. "
• The proprietor is unhappy about the transfer of the case to Board 3.3.04, and raised an objection under Rule 106 - after the Board had announced the unfavorable conclusion on Art. 123(2) during the hearing.
•  The Board: "the RPBA and the BDS [Business Distribution Scheme] do not provide for parties to appeal proceedings to participate in the procedure set out in Article 1(2) of the BDS and thus do not provide for a right to be heard on the proper allocation of a case file. The latter is an internal case management process involving solely the Chairs of the Boards and, in case no agreement is reached on the allocation, the Presidium. Since the allocation of an appeal case to a Board of Appeal is not a subject for disposition by the parties, any submission by a party to appeal proceedings regarding the reallocation of an appeal pursuant to Article 1(2) of the BDS, including any wish of a party that an appeal be heard by a specific Board (e.g. opponent 02's request submitted in its notice of appeal for the appeal to be allocated to Board 3.3.04 or 3.3.07) is irrelevant and must therefore be disregarded."
• "The patent proprietor also made untenable assertions as to why the technical content of the appeal could not be a valid reason for the transfer (see letter of 14 March 2025, item 21 ii) and item 13), which ultimately amounted to an accusation of unprofessionalism or arbitrariness by the Chairs involved. The patent proprietor's unfounded accusations, which cannot be excused by a representative's lack of legal knowledge, culminated in an accusation of bias"

• "the objection pursuant to Rule 106 EPC came far too late to comply with the spirit and purpose of this provision, which is that a party should draw the Board's attention expressly, and separately from its other submissions, to any fundamental procedural defect to enable it to investigate and, if necessary, rectify the alleged defect while the proceedings are still pending. The Board therefore had no option but to dismiss the objections pursuant to Rule 106 EPC raised in the patent proprietor's letter dated 26 November 2025 also on formal grounds"

•  The Board considers that, despite repeated [questions] the patent proprietor has not provided any legitimate reason for its objections under Rule 106 EPC and their filing after completion of the debate on the merits of the appeal T 1462/24"

• " Since a whole day of discussions had been necessitated by the filing of the patent proprietor's unsubstantiated and even unwarranted objections set out in its letter dated 25 November 2025, which were specified and amended by its letter dated 26 November 2025, the Board considered it equitable to order the patent proprietor to bear the costs for remuneration of one day for at most two professional representatives present at the oral proceedings of 26 November 2025 for each opponent"

• "the patent proprietor remained convinced of its own biased view of events and accused the Chair involved in the reallocation and the Board subsequently constituted of having acted unlawfully. This was unprofessional and even disrespectful. While the patent proprietor's conduct can hardly be seen as compliant with its duty to act in good faith, it does not matter whether this conduct is also to be qualified as an abuse of proceedings since the request for reapportionment of costs could be allowed on the basis of Article 16(1)(c) RPBA"

EPO 

The link to the decision is provided after the jump.

T 1179/23 - Not a realistic starting point

Key points

• " in the Board's view, the "simple mixture" mentioned on page 14 of D1 does not represent a realistic starting point. The starting point for assessing inventive step starting from D1 is therefore the multilayered compositions of examples C1 or C2. 
• The reasons are as follow.
• " Both appellants-opponents considered that the embodiment mentioned in the sentence on page 14 lines 7 to 8 of D1 relating to a simple mixture of isolated tartaric acid pellets and dabigatran represented the closest prior art embodiment."
•  The Board disagrees and is of the opinion that the skilled person reading the sentence on page 14 lines 7 to 8 of D1 understands it as speculative and as not referring to an actual concrete realisation of simple mixtures. The reasons are the following: ... the "simple mixture" ... is disclosed at one single occurrence in D1 in one single sentence, namely "Alternatively, the simple mixture of isolated pellets and dabigatran is filled into capsules or sachets" ... There is no further mention or description of this "simple mixture" in the entire document. 
• "the core of the invention [of D1] is indeed the "isolated pellets" but for the further preparation of multilayered compositions. Indeed claim 1, the "summary of the invention" (see page 6 of D1) and the examples of final compositions exclusively concern multilayered pellets containing tartaric acid and the active ingredient [ dabigatran etexilate mesylate (DEM) ] in different layers."
• "The starting point for assessing inventive step starting from D1 is therefore the multilayered compositions of examples C1 or C2."

EPO 

The link to the decision is provided after the jump.