31 August 2020

Summertime reading: Perpetual motion machines

Perpetual motion machines are back, but then, they never really went away. Set one going, and by definition it will still be running whenever you next look at it—if you can find it, that is, since no self-respecting perpetual motion machine would remain in the same place for ever. One which is unlikely to hang around for long is US patent 6,960,975 (Volfson). Modestly or prudently concealed behind the uninformative title of a ‘Space vehicle propelled by the pressure of inflationary vacuum state’, this patent 1 describes and claims a space vehicle provided with a superconductive ‘anti-gravity shield’ which distorts the local space-time continuum, thereby tapping into an effectively infinite source of energy for propulsion, and accelerating the vehicle, its inventor, and up to two other occupants to within a fraction of the local speed of light, without requiring a conventional engine, or apparently consuming any fuel. I wonder if the Examiner wishes he was on board.” 


Christopher Wadlow, Patents for perpetual motion machines, Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, Volume 2, Issue 3 (2007), Pages 136–144, https://doi.org/10.1093/jiplp/jpl242 (open access)

"[T 5/86] seems to discourage the Article 52 approach, even in a case to which it obviously applied, and I still cannot understand why."

28 August 2020

T 1232/15 - Not a diagnostic method (breast examination)

Key points

  • Claim 1 is directed to the 'use of several adhesive and haptic strips for forming an aid for blind persons to enable the line-by-line palpation of skin areas including the breasts of a female human body when performing a clinical breast examination'.
  • The Board finds that the claimed use is not excluded under Art. 53(c), in particular, that it is not a diagnostic method.
  • " Die beanspruchten Schritte dienen lediglich der Vorbereitung eines von einem Blinden durchzuführenden Diagnostizierverfahrens mittels Palpation, z. B. zur Erkennung von Brustkrebs. Das Diagnostizierverfahren selbst wird jedoch nicht beansprucht. Insbesondere enthalten die Ansprüche des Hauptantrags keine Schritte, welche die Diagnose strictu sensu betreffen, z. B. die Diagnose einer Brustkrebserkrankung aufgrund von durch Palpation ertasteten Knoten. "
  • The Board does not comment on the requirement of Article 57 EPC, that “an invention shall be considered as susceptible of industrial application if it can be made or used in any kind of industry, including agriculture.”


EPO T 1232/15 - link



IV. Der Wortlaut des unabhängigen Anspruchs 1 des Hauptantrags lautet wie folgt:


"1. Verwendung mehrerer Klebe- und Haptikstreifen (1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 1e) zur Ausbildung eines Hilfsmittels für Blinde zur Ermöglichung der zeilenmäßigen Abtastung von die Brüste (7) eines weiblichen menschlichen Körpers umfassenden Hautbereichen bei Durchführung einer klinischen Brustuntersuchung, wobei fünf Klebe- und Haptik­streifen (1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 1e),

die jeweils eine Oberfläche aufweisen, die aus einer Reihe aneinandergereihter Felder (2, 3, 4; 2', 3', 4'; 2'', 3'', 4'') besteht, wobei die Felder (2, 3, 4; 2', 3', 4'; 2'', 3'', 4'') ein mehrfach wiederkehrendes, gleichmäßiges Muster (5) ausbildend angeordnet sind, das sich aus mindestens drei taktil unterschiedlich wahrnehmbaren Feldtypen (2, 3, 4) zusammensetzt, wobei jeweils aneinander angrenzende Felder (2, 3, 4; 2', 3', 4'; 2'', 3'', 4'') eine mit den Fingern taktil wahrnehmbare, unterschiedliche Oberflächenhaptik oder Oberflächenstruktur aufweisen und wobei die den Feldern (2, 3, 4; 2', 3', 4'; 2'', 3'', 4'') gegenüberliegende, rückseitige Oberflächenseite der Klebe- und Haptikstreifen (1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 1e) mit einem hautverträglichen Klebstoff versehen ist,

jeweils mit Abstand zueinander und senkrecht sowie parallel zueinander auf die Brüste (7) eines weiblichen menschlichen Körpers umfassende Hautbereiche und jeweils mit einer solchen Länge, dass sie jeweils länger als der Durchmesser der zu untersuchenden weiblichen Brüste (7) sind, aufgeklebt werden,

wobei die fünf Klebe- und Haptikstreifen (1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, 1e) längs verlaufend zumindest im Wesentlichen parallel zur Längsachse des weiblichen Körpers auf diesem aufgebracht und taktil gleichartig wahrnehmbare Felder (2, 3, 4; 2', 3', 4'; 2'', 3'', 4'') jeweils auf einer zumindest im Wesentlichen waagerecht verlaufenden Linie gleicher Höhe liegend einander koordiniert zeilenmäßig zugeordnet und zueinander ausgerichtet angeordnet und aufgeklebt werden,

wobei ein erster Klebe- und Haptikstreifen (1b) die Mamille der rechten Brust (7) überstreicht und ein zweiter Klebe-und Haptikstreifen (1d) die Mamille der linken Brust (7) überstreicht, wobei der erste und der zweite Haptik- und Klebestreifen (1b, 1d) jeweils direkt über die jeweilige Brustmitte gelegt und geklebt werden,

wobei ein dritter Klebe- und Haptikstreifen (1c) zwischen den beiden Brüsten (7) längs der Sternummitte verlaufend angeordnet wird,

ein vierter Klebe- und Haptikstreifen (1a) lateral rechts in Höhe der mittleren Axillarfalte und

ein fünfter Klebe- und Haptikstreifen (1e) lateral links in Höhe der mittleren Axillarfalte angeordnet wird, und

wobei jeweils ein Feld (2) eines ersten Feldtyps (2) von erstem und zweitem Klebe- und Haptikstreifen (1b, 1d) auf zumindest im Wesentlichen gleicher Höhe auf dem Zentrum der jeweiligen Mamille angeordnet wird und jeweils ein Feld (2) des ersten Feldtyps (2) von drittem bis fünftem Klebe- und Haptikstreifen (1c, 1a, 1e) zumindest im Wesentlichen auf derselben Höhe angeordnet wird."

27 August 2020

T 1916/19 - Mixed medical methods

Key points

  • The Examining Division held that independent claims 1 and 5 related to a method of treatment of the human or animal body by therapy and contravened thus Article 53(c) EPC.
    In particular it held that antimicrobial activity of [the composition specified in method claim 1] is inherent to [provide] a therapeutic prophylactic treatment to several diseases. Thus, a method providing antimicrobial activity could only be considered a therapeutic treatment even if the method could also be used in a non-therapeutic (e. g. cosmetic) way." 
  • "[T]he Board follows the arguments of the appellants in that there are at least some realisations of the method which are clearly non-therapeutic. Removing non-pathogenic bacteria responsible for unpleasant body odour (page 1 lines 14-18 of the originally filed patent application), e. g. by applying a deodorant composition, is not a therapeutic/prophylactic, but a cosmetic application. The argument that in such cases inevitably also pathogenic bacteria are removed, thus implying prophylactic treatment, is not convincing. Removal of bacteria from healthy skin is not necessarily prophylactic."
  • " The Board comes to the conclusion that there are realisations of the claimed methods that are of a non-therapeutic nature, others that are of a therapeutic nature, and others that may be mixed." 
  • " Independent claims 1 and 5 contain the feature "non-therapeutic". This feature was not present in the original application documents and is an undisclosed disclaimer in the sense of G 01/03." The Board considers the disclaimer to be allowable.
  • " Independent claims 1 and 5 are directed to non-therapeutic methods/uses of providing an anti-microbial effect to skin. As discussed above, such methods exist and can be identified.". Therefore, these claims comply with Art.53(c) EPC.




EPO T 1916/19 - link



V. The independent claims of the main request underlying the impugned decision, as well as the present appeal proceedings, read as follows:
Claim 1 reads:
A non-therapeutic method of providing an anti-microbial effect to skin comprising the steps of
(i) applying a composition to the skin comprising
(a) a polymer A selected from the group of polyacrylic acid or a copolymer thereof or a polyalkylene oxide having a molecular mass greater than 2x10**(4) D, and
(b) at least two essential oils selected from eugenol, thymol, and terpineol; and
(ii) waiting for at least 15 seconds.


Reasons for the Decision


1. The appeal is admissible.

Main Request

2. Reasoning of the Examining Division

The Examining Division held that independent claims 1 and 5 related to a method of treatment of the human or animal body by therapy and contravened thus Article 53(c) EPC.

In particular it held that antimicrobial activity of a composition is inherent to a therapeutic prophylactic treatment to several diseases. Thus, a method providing antimicrobial activity could only be considered a therapeutic treatment even if the method could also be used in a non-therapeutic (e. g. cosmetic) way.

In the view of the Examining Division the subject-matter of these claims related to a method having both therapeutic and non-therapeutic effects which are inextricably linked. Since the method thus inevitably encompassed a therapeutic effect the method as a whole fell under the provisions of Article 53(c) EPC. In this respect it was referred to T 290/86 (OJ 1992, 414).

3. The appellants' argumentation on the objection under Article 53(c) EPC

26 August 2020

T 0141/15 - Medical method

Key points

  • In this decision taken 03.03.2020, the Board finds a method to be excluded from patentability as medical method.
  • A petition for review is pending as R 7/20
  • Claim 1 as granted is directed to " A method for measuring the adequacy parameters that are achieved during a kidney substitution treatment".
  • " The claim wording "the kidney substitution treatment [i.e. the dialysis treatment] is provided..." makes it unequivocally clear that a dialysis treatment is indeed performed. Feature [1.2] of claim 1 specifies, moreover, that the treatment is carried out by pumping the patient blood at a set blood flow rate through the blood chamber of a dialyser, the dialysing fluid collecting the waste products from the patient after flowing through the dialysing fluid chamber of the dialyser."
  • " dialysis is a blood manipulation process involving the continuous removal of blood from the patient, its subsequent flowing through a circulating line of an extracorporeal circuit and its re-delivery to the patient, which, in accordance with T 1695/07 (points 8 to 12), is considered to be a treatment of the human body by surgery." 
  • " According to the established case law of the Boards of Appeal, a multi-step method falls under the exception clause of Article 53(c) EPC if it includes at least one feature that constitutes a method step for treatment of the human body by therapy or surgery (G 1/04 [and G1/07])"




EPO T 0141/15 - link






III. Claim 1 of the granted patent (main request) reads as follows (feature numbering in square brackets added by the Board):
"1. [1.1] A method for measuring the adequacy parameters that are achieved during a kidney substitution treatment,
- [1.2] wherein the kidney substitution treatment is provided by a machine, which has an extracorporeal blood system pumping the patient blood at a set blood flow rate through the blood chamber of a dialyzer, divided by a semi-permeable membrane into the blood chamber and a dialyzing fluid chamber, the dialyzing fluid flows at a preset flow rate through the dialyzing fluid system of the machine and collects the waste products from the patient after flowing through the dialyzing fluid chamber of the dialyzer,
- [1.3] wherein a device able to measure continuously a kidney substitution treatment related waste product is mounted in the dialyzing fluid system of the kidney substitution treatment machine,
- [1.4] wherein the data provided by the kidney substitution treatment machine is used to measure the adequacy parameters at the end of the kidney substitution treatment,
- [1.5] wherein the data provided by the device able to measure continuously any kidney substitution treatment waste product is split in subsets to be used to determine the adequacy parameters achieved during the kidney substitution treatment with an algorithm,
- [1.6] wherein a data interface is implemented between the kidney substitution treatment machine and the measuring device in order to register machine events to be considered in the algorithm for the determination of the adequacy parameters, and
- [1.7] wherein the measuring algorithm is based on a kind of non linear fitting procedure for each of the data subsets with or without considering any kind of event happening on the dialysis machine."

Reasons for the Decision


1. The appeal is admissible.

2. The method of claim 1 (of all requests) is addressed at a "method for measuring the adequacy parameters that are achieved during a kidney substitution treatment" (feature [1.1]), that is, a method for measuring parameters reflecting the adequacy of a dialysis treatment, such as Kt/V, as explained in paragraphs [0001] and [0002] of the patent (K is the effective clearance for urea, t is the treatment time and V is the urea distribution volume which matches the total body water).

3. The claimed method recites a first step (feature [1.2]), according to which "the kidney substitution treatment is provided by a machine, which has an extracorporeal blood system pumping the patient blood at a set blood flow rate through the blood chamber of a dialyzer, divided by a semi-permeable membrane into the blood chamber and a dialyzing fluid chamber, the dialyzing fluid flows at a preset flow rate through the dialyzing fluid system of the machine and collects the waste products from the patient after flowing through the dialyzing fluid chamber of the dialyzer".

The appellant considered this definition to merely state the operational conditions of the dialysis machine under which the claimed measuring method takes place. According to the appellant, the latter did not comprise any therapeutic or surgical step.

25 August 2020

T 1414/18 - The application will be refused

Key points

  • This is an examination appeal.
  • The Board: “A statement such as "the next procedural step will be summons to oral proceedings during which the application will be refused" made prior to a final decision to refuse a patent application may infringe a party's right to be heard and thus may lead to a substantial procedural violation” (and in this case, such statement indeed was a substantial procedural violation).
  • The application was refused for lack of unity of invention.
  • "In order to properly assess the compliance with Article 82 EPC, the underlying "invention(s)" is (are) to be established on the basis of the technical problem(s) to be solved according to the description of the application in question (see e.g. W 11/89, [] point 4.1; W 6/97, point 6.3; T 173/06, point 8; T 1888/09, point 2.1). This is apparently also endorsed by the Guidelines for Examination in its applicable edition of November 2017 (see e.g. F-V, section 8, second paragraph, and section 8.1, penultimate sentence). 
    • The Guidelines 2017, cited paragraph: "In particular, the reasons must highlight the technical problem(s) addressed by the different (groups of) inventions" [F-V, 4.3 in the 2019 version]
    • The phrase "the Guidelines for Examination in its applicable edition of November 2017" appears a bit particular.
      First of all, the Boards needs to decide whether the claims have unity of invention and is not bound by the Guidelines. So there is no applicable edition of the GL in appeal, I would say.
      Secondly, as I understand it, the decision-making body applies the GL as in force of on the date taking the decision, unless there are transitional provisions. So when taking a decision in July 2020, the November 2017 edition is no longer applicable.
      I assume that the Board is not reviewing whether the Examining Division applied the Guidelines correctly in 2017 (that is not the purpose of the appeal procedure in my view when it is about the question whether the claims meet Article 82 or not.).
  • The Board: “Claim 1 as originally filed thus describes the invention (i.e. the solution to the above technical problem) from the perspective of the [user equipment] whilst claim 2 as originally filed describes the same invention from the perspective of the network node ”. Therefore these claims have unity of invention according to the Board.
  • The Board: “Thus, the reasoning of the examining division drawing upon the aspects of a "single general inventive concept", "special technical features" and "non-unity a-posteriori" is moot and does not need further consideration.”
    • I note that Rule 44(1) EPC gives a definition of unity of invention focusing on 'special technical features'. Rule 44(1) was introduced by substantially amending Rule 30 EPC 1973 in 1991. That amendment of the Rules 'introduced the special technical feature as a requirement for unity'  (Visser, 2019 ed., p.501). Rule 44 reads: “the requirement of unity of invention under Article 82 shall be fulfilled only when there is a technical relationship among those inventions involving one or more of the same or corresponding special technical features”. I find it difficult to see how reasoning about 'special technical features' can then be 'moot'. 
    • The EPC 1973 included a Rule 30 on the interpretation of Article 82 from the Munich Diplomatic Conference.



EPO Headnote
(1) As to unity of invention under Article 82 EPC, only if the application relates to more than one "invention", the notion of "a single general inventive concept" under Article 82 EPC and the concept of the "same or corresponding special technical features" under Rule 44(1) EPC have to be assessed for the purpose of deciding upon unity of invention (see Reasons, point 1).
(2) As to a refund of further search fees under Rule 64(2) EPC, the decision to refuse a patent application may be understood to implicitly contain the decision to refuse the refund of a further search fee, if the examining division's intent is clear (see Reasons, point 4).
(3) A statement such as "the next procedural step will be summons to oral proceedings during which the application will be refused" made prior to a final decision to refuse a patent application may infringe a party's right to be heard and thus may lead to a substantial procedural violation (see Reasons, point 5).

EPO T 1414/18 - link


Summary of Facts and Submissions


I. The appeal is against the decision of the examining division refusing the present European patent application. The grounds for refusal of the examining division consisted of a mere reference to their latest communication pursuant to Article 94(3) EPC dated 27 March 2017.

II. A partial European search report under Rule 64(1) EPC for the present application had been issued by the search division on 6 November 2014. In an annex to this search report ("sheet B"), the search division indicated that the application contained two inventions and thus did not meet the requirements of unity of invention. The search division found that claim 1 as well as, partially, dependent claims 3 to 13 on file related to the first invention and claim 2 to the second invention, and conducted a search for the first invention pursuant to Rule 64(1) EPC.

In addition, the applicant was invited via EPO Form 1507U to pay a further search fee within two months in order to have the second invention searched, too.

III. After payment of the further search fee, a full European search report covering both inventions was issued on 26 March 2015.

IV. In a communication under Article 94(3) EPC of 22 April 2015, the examining division confirmed the search division's view on lack of unity under Article 82 EPC.

V. In their reply of 1 September 2015, the applicant contested the examining division's assessment of unity of the invention and requested a refund of the further search fee. This request was maintained by their submission of 13 June 2016.

VI. In their further communications under Article 94(3) EPC of 3 December 2015 and 27 March 2017, the examining division maintained their non-unity objection. In particular, the communication of 27 March 2017 included the following statement (cf. point 1, last paragraph):

"In the present case, two searches needed to be performed as claim 1 discloses a broad claim relating to scheduling meanwhile claim 2 is restricted to specific features describing overlapping frames. As seen by the documents cited in the search report, two searches were performed and different documents were found."

In addition, that communication comprised the following closing (cf. points 4 and 5):

"4 As to the reimbursement of the search fee. The preliminary opinion of the examining division is to refuse the reimbursement of such fee ...

5 The next procedural step will be summons to oral proceedings during which the application will be refused (Article 97(2) EPC)."

VII. In reaction to the above communication, the applicant withdrew the request for oral proceedings and requested an appealable "decision according to the state of the file".

VIII. In the statement of grounds of appeal, the appellant requests that the decision under appeal be set aside and, as a main request, that a patent be granted on the basis of the claims subject to the decision under appeal, or, in the alternative, on the basis of the claims of an auxiliary request filed with the statement of grounds of appeal.

It is also requested (again) that the further search fee be refunded.



Reasons for the Decision


1. Unity of invention - originally filed claims (Article 82 EPC)

1.1 According to Article 82 EPC, a patent application "shall relate to one invention only or to a group of inventions so linked as to form a single general inventive concept".

That means that only if the application relates to more than one "invention", the notion of "a single general inventive concept" under Article 82 EPC and the concept of the "same or corresponding special technical features" under Rule 44(1) EPC come into play, i.e. have to be assessed for the purpose of deciding upon the question of unity of invention. As a consequence, it is first to be determined whether the present application covers only one or several "inventions".

1.2 In order to properly assess the compliance with Article 82 EPC, the underlying "invention(s)" is(are) to be established on the basis of the technical problem(s) to be solved according to the description of the application in question (see e.g. W 11/89, OJ 1993, 225, point 4.1; W 6/97, point 6.3; T 173/06, point 8; T 1888/09, point 2.1). This is apparently also endorsed by the Guidelines for Examination in its applicable edition of November 2017 (see e.g. F-V, section 8, second paragraph, and section 8.1, penultimate sentence).

1.3 In the present case, the original application as a whole (i.e. including the description and drawings) refers consistently to a single invention, the objective of which is "to provide a method to configure timing resource so that data transmission/reception for D2D communication and normal communication do not interfere with each other" (see e.g. paragraph [0008] of the description as filed). According to paragraph [0029] of the original description, "... [t]he process 50 used for the network node may be in coordination with the process 40 used for a UE ...".

24 August 2020

T 0041/17 - Polymorphs (II)

Key points

  • Inventive step is always highly fact-specific.
  • This decision is dated 14.01.2020, the patent was revoked for lack of inventive step, and the patentee has filed a petition for review R 8/20.
  • “The invention as defined in granted claim 1 concerns a specific crystalline form of sorafenib tosylate (polymorph I).” “D1 discloses sorafenib tosylate without characterising the form thereof.”
  • “[Post-published evidence] D32, D40a, D40b and D41 show that polymorph I of sorafenib tosylate is more thermodynamically stable than polymorph II and polymorph III, ”
  • “Faced with the objective technical problem and starting from the sorafenib tosylate of D1, the skilled person would therefore have performed a screening of the different polymorphs of sorafenib tosylate which could exist in order to isolate and identify the thermodynamically most stable form thereof. By doing so, he would have arrived at polymorph I of sorafenib tosylate, which is the thermodynamically most stable form and which is, for this reason, expected not to convert to other forms under mechanical stress.”
  • “This finding is in line with decisions T 777/08 ”
  • “Since the property of polymorph I of sorafenib tosylate not to convert to other forms is expected by virtue of it being the thermodynamically most stable form, it does not represent an unexpected property as referred to in decision T 777/08. Consequently, the board's finding above is in line with decision T 777/08.”
  • See also T 1684/16, decision taken 03.03.2020






EPO T 0041/17 -  link

Reasons for the Decision


Main request

Inventive step - Article 56 EPC

1. The invention

The invention as defined in granted claim 1 concerns a specific crystalline form of sorafenib tosylate (polymorph I).

Polymorph I according to the invention was found to be thermodynamically stable at room temperature and storage-stable and particularly suitable for preparations that are prepared via granulation or grinding (patent, paragraph [0007]).

1.1 The closest prior art

Both parties considered the disclosure of D1 as the closest prior art.

In the same way as the patent, D1 aims at providing aryl ureas which are used for the treatment of disorders mediated by the vascular endothelial growth factor (VEGF) in which angiogenesis plays an important role, for example in tumor growth (abstract of D1). Claim 22 of D1 relates to a method of therapeutic treatment comprising administering N-(4-chloro-3-(trifluoromethyl)phenyl)-N'-(4-(2-(N-methylcarbamoyl)-4-pyridyloxy)phenyl) urea tosylate. This compound is known as sorafenib tosylate.

The distinguishing feature in view of D1 is the crystalline form of sorafenib toyslate ("polymorph I") as defined in claim 1. D1 discloses sorafenib tosylate without characterising the form thereof.

1.2 Formulation of the technical problem

D32 shows in conjunction with D40b that polymorph I of sorafenib tosylate as claimed is thermodynamically stable under mechanical stress conditions. The mechanical stress test consists of grinding for about 30 seconds 100 mg of polymorph I in a mortar and comparing it with the untreated sample by differential scanning calorimetry (DSC). D40b shows that the DSC thermograms of ground polymorph I ("pestled") and of the initial sample ("untreated") are the same.

21 August 2020

T 2437/13 - Patent pertaining to a coronavirus

Key points

  • The Board: “ The patent provides a virus comprising specific nucleic acid sequences isolated from a child with coryza, conjunctivitis and fever and suffering from bronchiolitis (see e.g. [0004], [0006]). The patent identifies the virus as a new member of the group 1 coronavirus most related to HCoV-229E a common cold virus. The technical contribution of the claimed invention can be defined as the provision of a further coronavirus. The solution to this technical problem is the virus characterized by the nucleic acid sequences depicted in Table 3 and Figure 19 []”
  • “The board concludes from these data that even if the skilled person following the teaching of document D13 would, despite the odds, have found cells showing a cytopathic effect, it would not have had a reasonable expectation of successfully isolating a coronavirus with the structural and pathological properties of the claimed virus.”
  • Claim 1 reads: “1. An isolated and/or recombinant nucleic acid having at least 95% sequence identity to a nucleic acid sequence as depicted in table 3 or comprising a sequence having at least 99% sequence identity to a nucleic acid sequence as depicted in figure 19.”
  • The Board, about whether the priority of claim 1 is valid: “The nucleic acid sequences depicted in Table 3 and sequences having at least 95% sequence identity can be generated by standard techniques. There is thus no need for a virus to be deposited under Rule 31(1) EPC in order to disclose the claimed subject matter in an enabling manner. The board concludes that the first embodiment of claim 1 is directly and unambiguously disclosed in document P1.”
  • As to inventive step: “In the board's view, a skilled person starting from document D13, would not have arrived at the claimed virus in an obvious way. First, the skilled person had no indication where to find a clinical specimen comprising the infectious agent responsible/causative for the 7 month old hospitalized child symptoms.

Disclosure: my firm was involved in this case.



EPO T 2437/13 -   link




IX. Independent claims 1 to 3 of the main request read as follows:

- "1. An isolated and/or recombinant nucleic acid having at least 95% sequence identity to a nucleic acid sequence as depicted in table 3 or comprising a sequence having at least 99% sequence identity to a nucleic acid sequence as depicted in figure 19.

- 2. An isolated and/or recombinant nucleic acid according to claim 1, comprising a sequence as depicted in table 3 or figure 19.

- 3. An isolated and/or recombinant proteinaceous molecule that is the ORF-2 Spike protein/S-gene sequence as depicted in figure 22; or that is selected from the group consisting of:
- the ORF 1ab replicase polyprotein sequence as depicted in figure 21;
- the 3ClPro Coronavirus polyprotein processing endoprotease sequence as depicted in figure 21;
- the RNA dependent RNA polymerase (pfam00680) sequence as depicted in figure 21;
- the ExoN 3' to 5' Exonuclease and helicase sequence as depicted in figure 21;
- the XendoU (homolog of) polyU-specific endoribonuclease sequence as depicted in figure 21;
- the 2'-O-MT 2: S-adenosylmethionine-dependent ribose 2'-orthomehyltransferase sequence as depicted in figure 21;
- the ORF-5 pfam01635, Corona_M, Coronavirus M matrix/glycoprotein sequence as depicted in figure 23; and
- the ORF la, replicase enzyme complex sequence as depicted in figure 20."

20 August 2020

Summertime reading: Servier decision

Key points

  • Today a decision of the EU Commission (AT.39612) in the Servier case, as published online 30.09.2016.
  • “On 24 November 2008, the Commission started its ex-officio investigation with unannounced inspections of the premises of Servier, Krka, {} and Teva in various Member States.”
  • “From the end of the 1990s and in the early 2000s, Servier progressively devised a strategy aimed at preventing or at least delaying generic entry after expiry of the perindopril compound patent. The strategy consisted of a variety of measures that were constantly adapted to take into account market developments.”
  • “All of these practices are described in the subsequent subsections in the following order: (1) filing a patent cluster  [...] The description of these practices is without prejudice to their legality under Union competition law.”
  • “In this context, contemporaneous evidence reveals that, of the 33 process patents (mostly patents for synthesis routes), 21 {patents} were described by Servier internally as "*blocking" patents or "*paper patent". Three of these 21 process patents were in addition characterised as involving "*zero inventive step". As shown in Table 4, these patents were, however, granted by the EPO.”
  • “Furthermore, minutes of one of Servier's internal meetings {}, show that Servier continued throughout the lifecycle of perindopril to develop and file patent applications which were themselves considered internally as "*blocking" patents.
    The minutes categorise as such 31 synthesis process patent applications. For those patent applications Servier proposes filing with the EPO as a purely editorial task – i.e. without conducting any patentability studies or any laboratory trials: "*Purpose of the meeting: […] to establish a list of ‘reasonable’ synthesis processes of perindopril or of its synthesis intermediates, which will be the subject of ‘blocking’ patent applications. […] The 31 corresponding patent applications, which will be subjected neither to patentability studies nor to laboratory tests, will have to be drafted and filed as soon as possible (as early as February 2003 for the first), the aim being to obtain the publication of a first ‘wave’ of these applications in June 2003".”
  • An appeal was filed with the General Court. In the decision of 12.12.2018, the Court reduced the fine imposed on Servier (and Biogaran) from EUR 330  million to EUR 228 million. Of note, this fine was imposed in view of certain agreements with generic companies  (as I understand it), not in view of the filing strategy mentioned above.
  • The General Court decision includes the statement that: “It should also be noted that, in the present case, in the contested decision, although the Commission referred, in recitals 113 to 123, to the applicants’ strategy of creating a ‘patent cluster’ and ‘paper patents’, it did not, however, rule on the validity of the disputed patents at the time the agreements were concluded.”
  • Still from the Commission decision: “During the inspections in 2008, a number of documents were identified for which Servier claimed inter alia that they were protected by Legal Professional Privilege (hereinafter "LPP"). Servier's claims for LPP were all subsequently resolved. On 10 June 2010, the Commission returned unopened two sealed envelopes to Servier, opened four sealed envelopes and added the latter content to the case file with Servier's consent.”
  • For all quotes: footnotes omitted; underlining added; insertions and edits marked with {} are made by me.

Commission Decision AT.39612 09.07.2014
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39612
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39612/39612_12422_3.pdf

Appeal press release
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2018-12/cp180194en.pdf
Appeal decision ECLI:EU:T:2018:922. French only. See in particular para. 243.

19 August 2020

T 1111/14 - Support and sufficiency

Key points

  • The application was refused for lack of support under Art. 84 and lack of sufficient disclosure under Art. 83.
  • “In the jurisprudence of the Boards of Appeal the requirement that the claims be supported by the description (Article 84 EPC, second sentence) is viewed either as a formal matter, which means that the requirement is considered to be met if the subject-matter of the claims is also apparent from the description (see, e.g., decision T 1020/03 []), or as a substantive matter, i.e. as requiring that the claims reflect the actual contribution to the art in such a way that the skilled person is able to perform the invention in the entire range claimed (see, e.g., decisions T 409/91 [] and T 659/93 []).”
  • The Board does not need to take position because “In the present case, the requirement of support for the claims in the description is met not only from the formal, but also from the substantive point of view. ”
  • The Examining Division argued that the claims lacked an essential feature, i.e. that the description did not support the embodiments of the claim without the allegedly essential feature of administering a uPA vector to the mouse at issue.
  • “The quoted passages disclose, clearly and unambiguously, an embodiment of the invention that does not require the administration of a uPA vector to the mouse prior to transplantation. The amount of technical details provided in the application for this particular embodiment might have to be considered for the assessment of sufficiency of disclosure, but it is of no relevance as regards the question whether claim 1 is supported by the description. Otherwise, the boundary between the requirements of Articles 83 and 84 EPC becomes blurred.”
  • " In view of the above, the board is persuaded that, on the balance of evidence, the requirements of Article 83 EPC are met.




EPO T 1111/14 - link




Article 84 EPC


7. The claimed invention relies on genetic modifications of the murine genome resulting in loss of expression of functional FAH, RAG-2 and IL-2Rgamma proteins. The genetically modified mouse, which is immunodeficient and exhibits decreased liver function, is used as a recipient in a method of expanding human hepatocytes in vivo.

8. In the decision under appeal, the examining division found that the claims then on file lacked support of technical nature in the description. In their view, "... it is not unambiguously derivable [from the description] that it may be possible to achieve the desired technical effect i.e. expanding human hepatocytes into FRG mice in absence of treatment with urokinase, without specific adaptation, such as an hypothetical depletion of the macrophages" (see third paragraph on page 16 of the decision).

9. In the jurisprudence of the Boards of Appeal the requirement that the claims be supported by the description (Article 84 EPC, second sentence) is viewed either as a formal matter, which means that the requirement is considered to be met if the subject-matter of the claims is also apparent from the description (see, e.g., decision T 1020/03, OJ EPO 2007, 204), or as a substantive matter, i.e. as requiring that the claims reflect the actual contribution to the art in such a way that the skilled person is able to perform the invention in the entire range claimed (see, e.g., decisions T 409/91, OJ EPO 1994, 653; and T 659/93 of 7 September 1994).

10. In the present case, the requirement of support for the claims in the description is met not only from the formal, but also from the substantive point of view. The subject-matter of claim 1 is apparent from the passage on page 19, lines 3 to 20 of the description - which is quoted on pages 9 and 10 of the decision under appeal -, as well as from the passage from page 2, line 22 to page 3, line 5. A genetically modified mouse as defined in claim 15 is apparent from the passage on page 3, lines 23 to 27 of the description.

11. In the decision under appeal, the examining division admitted that the administration of a vector encoding human urokinase to the genetically modified recipient mouse prior to injection of the human hepatocytes was not disclosed in the application as being an essential feature of the invention. But in its view, it was not clearly stated in the description that it would be possible to carry out the invention without expression of urokinase in the recipient mouse, and the description did not disclose "... how it would be possible" (see the first paragraph on page 11 of the decision under appeal).

12. Contrary to the examining division's view, the fact that it is not expressly stated in the description that the method of the invention can be carried out without administering a vector encoding urokinase to the recipient mouse, does not justify an objection of lack of support within the meaning of Article 84 EPC. As readily apparent from various passages of the description, e.g., the sentence bridging pages 2 and 3, as well as the passage on page 34, lines 12 and 13, a method that includes, in addition to the steps recited in claim 1, the step of administering a vector encoding urokinase to the mouse prior to injection of the human hepatocytes, represents only a particular embodiment of the method of claim 1.

13. As for the question whether (and how) the invention can be carried out without urokinase expression in the recipient mouse, it is disclosed in the application (see page 25, lines 10 and 11) that successful engraftment and expansion of human hepatocytes in murine liver requires an immunodeficient mouse with some degree of liver dysfunction. It is further stated that, as known in the art, liver dysfunction in mice can be achieved by expressing a gene encoding urokinase (also called urokinase-type Plasminogen Activator (uPA)) in the liver. Purportedly, this creates a growth disadvantage for the murine hepatocytes which facilitates the expansion of transplanted human hepatocytes (see page 25, lines 15 to 19 of the application as filed and document (4) cited therein).

14. As apparent from the application as filed (see page 26, lines 13 to 22 read in the light of the passage on page 25, lines 21 to 23), according to the invention severe liver dysfunction is achieved by homozygous deletion of - or one or more point mutations in - the murine Fah (fumarylacetoacetate hydrolase) gene. Hence, while the extent of liver disease and the selective pressure towards human hepatocytes in FRG or FpmRG mice may be enhanced by administering a vector encoding uPA prior to transplantation, this is not absolutely required for carrying out the invention. In fact, as a further embodiment, the application discloses:

"In one embodiment, in FRG mice the extent of liver disease and selective pressure can be controlled by administering and withdrawing NTBC [...]. Withdrawal of NTBC provides a selective advantage for the transplanted human hepatocytes." (see the first two sentences of the passage bridging pages 36 and 37)

Further, it is stated in Example 1 of the application that:

"... NTBC withdrawal resulted in gradual hepatocellular injury in FRG mice and eventual death after 4-8 weeks ..." (see last sentence in page 38)

15. In the decision under appeal, the examining division expressed the view that, in the passages quoted above "... the skilled person is not given sufficient technical information or incentive [...] and would not consider this as more than a 'try and see' possibility" (see last sentence of the fourth paragraph on page 13 of the decision). The board disagrees with this view. The quoted passages disclose, clearly and unambiguously, an embodiment of the invention that does not require the administration of a uPA vector to the mouse prior to transplantation. The amount of technical details provided in the application for this particular embodiment might have to be considered for the assessment of sufficiency of disclosure, but it is of no relevance as regards the question whether claim 1 is supported by the description. Otherwise, the boundary between the requirements of Articles 83 and 84 EPC becomes blurred.

16. For these reasons, the board concludes that claim 1 is supported by the description, within the meaning of Article 84 EPC.

Article 83 EPC

17. According to the established jurisprudence of the boards of appeal, a finding of lack of sufficient disclosure should be based on serious doubts, substantiated by verifiable facts (see e.g. decision T 19/90, OJ EPO 1990, 476 and decision T 890/02, OJ EPO 2005, 497). In order to establish insufficiency of disclosure, it must be established, on the balance of probabilities, that a skilled person reading the patent, using his/her common general knowledge, would be unable to carry out the invention.

18. In the present case, the facts put forward by the examining division to substantiate the finding of lack of a sufficient disclosure over the whole scope of claim 1 were based on statements made in Example 4 of the application, and on documents (1) to (3) and (18).

19. Example 4 of the application shows the repopulation of the liver of FRG mice with human hepatocytes. It is stated on page 42, lines 23 to 25 that "... [the] experiments were performed to determine whether administration of a urokinase expressing adenovirus prior to transplantation of human hepatocytes would be beneficial" (emphasis added by the board). This statement is interpreted by the board as meaning that the purpose of the experiments was to try to improve a method as defined in claim 1 which does not require the administration of urokinase.

20. In the decision under appeal, the examining division relied for its adverse finding on, in particular, the following statements in Example 4:

"In three separate transplantations, primary engraftment of human hepatocytes was observed in FRG mice in recipients which had first received the uPA adenovirus. The uPA-pretreatment regimen was therefore used in most subsequent transplantation experiments.

In total, human hepatocytes from nine different donors were used successfully and no engraftment failures occurred after introduction of the uPA adenovirus regimen." (see page 43, lines 13 to 18 of the application; emphasis as in the decision under appeal)

21. In the examining division's view, the remark that no engraftment failures occurred after introduction of the uPA adenovirus regimen, implied that some engraftment failures occurred without introduction of the uPA adenovirus regimen. The examining division went on to conclude that "... this information does not lead the skilled person to conclude that in absence of uPA treatment, there would be reasonable expectation of success to achieve the technical effect" (see fifth paragraph on page 15 of the decision under appeal).

22. It is apparent from this conclusion and further statements in the decision under appeal (see, e.g., third and eight paragraph on page 16) that the examining division deviated from the legal and factual standards established in the jurisprudence of the Boards of Appeal for the assessment of sufficiency of disclosure. Contrary to its view, "some engraftment failures" cannot be equated to a failure to carry out the claimed method without administration of uPA. Occasional failure when testing a technical teaching does not impair its reproducibility, if the attempts are kept within reasonable bounds and do not require inventive skill (see decision T 931/91 of 20 April 1993). As a matter of fact, in the technical field at issue occasional failure is the rule, rather than the exception. For instance, it is reported in document (3) that transplantation success rate was between 45% and 100% for adult animals, and 73% for pups (see page 20509, last paragraph in the left-hand column, and page 20510, first sentence of the second full paragraph). Even when uPA adenovirus is administered to a genetically modified mouse according to the invention, at most 67% of the engraftments succeeded (see Table 1 in document (1)).

23. As further evidence that the claimed invention cannot be carried out without the administration of uPA, the examining division referred to the passage on page 904, second paragraph in the left-hand column of document (1). This document is a scientific paper by the inventors which was published after the priority date. The relevant passage reads: "... we were able to observe primary engraftment of human hepatocytes only in recipients that had first received the uPA adenovirus".

24. In document (21), Dr Grompe, one of the authors of document (1), stated that the statement on which the examining division relied concerned only primary engraftment, whereas in secondary recipients (i.e., those transplanted with hepatocytes previously expanded in another mouse) which had not received any prior uPA adenovirus treatment, liver repopulation was highly successful, as Figure 3c of document (1) showed. Dr Grompe also pointed out that, as stated in the first sentence of the same paragraph as the passage quoted above, overexpression of urokinase in fact enhances hepatocyte engraftment, but that in the absence of such a treatment there is at least some level of engraftment, otherwise there was nothing to be "enhanced". In document (21), Dr Grompe provided also experimental results showing that, while liver repopulation was faster in those mice that had received the uPA pre-treatment, also mice without uPA pre-treatment showed repopulation after 5 months (in contrast to 3 months in the pre-treated mice).

25. In the decision under appeal, the examining division stated that these results, which had already been presented in document (18), an earlier declaration by Dr Grompe, "... successfully addressed the issue whether uPA-pretreatment is essential to repopulate FRG mice with human hepatocytes" (see page 18, last sentence of the fifth paragraph). In view of the adverse decision, the wording "successfully addressed" in this passage can only have the meaning that the examining division considered the results to confirm that uPA treatment is essential. The results indicate, however, the opposite. Although delayed, in comparison to those transplanted to uPA pre-treated mice, human hepatocytes did in fact expand in mice without uPA pre-treatment. This is confirmed by document (34) published by an independent group that reports robust repopulation of the murine liver (up to approximately 95%) with human hepatocytes in FRG mice applying the method of the invention without uPA pre-treatment (see the sentence bridging the left and right-hand columns on page 925).

26. The examining division relied also on document (2) in which the scientific publication of Azuma et al. (document (1)) is commented. Like the examining division, the author of this document appears to have misinterpreted the passage of document (1) quoted in paragraph 23 above, as stating that pre-treatment of FRG mice with uPA-expressing adenovirus is required for repopulation with human hepatocytes (see last paragraph of the left-hand column on page 872, in particular the last sentence). As explained above, this interpretation is incorrect.

27. As regards document (3), also published after the priority date of the present application, the examining division admitted that the experiments described therein showed that pre-treatment with uPA was not essential for successful engraftment in FRG mice. It held, however, that additional specific adaptations of the methodology were required. In fact, in the experiments described in document (3) two further components of the murine immune system (complement system and macrophages) were blocked by drug treatment. Depletion of macrophages is disclosed in the present application as a particular embodiment of the method of the invention (see page 21, first full paragraph). The use of a complement inhibitor is mentioned on page 37, lines 7 to 12, although it is stated that its administration to FRG mice is not required for liver repopulation with human hepatocytes. There is however no evidence on file showing that these two adaptations are essential for human hepatocytes to expand in FRG mice.

28. In view of the above, the board is persuaded that, on the balance of evidence, the requirements of Article 83 EPC are met.

Article 53(a) and Rule 28(1)(c) EPC

29. In the decision under appeal, the examining division held that the subject-matter of claim 14 then on file, which corresponds to that of present claim 12 (see section X above), was excepted from patentability under Article 53(a) and Rule 28(1)(c) EPC.

30. In view of the revised interpretation of Rule 28(1)(c) EPC (formerly Rule 28(c) EPC) by the European Patent Office (see decision T 385/14 of 11 September 2019), the examining division's objection cannot be upheld for claim 12 on file.

18 August 2020

T 0901/16 - Breadth of claim 1

Key points


  • In this examination appeal, the Board observes as follows:
  • " The breadth of claim 1 however does not render it unclear in the present case. Article 84 EPC is essentially concerned with setting clearly defined limits on the scope of protection conferred as well as indicating the essential technical features of the solution." 
  • "In the present case, the wording of the features of claim 1 is technically and linguistically not ambiguous, and the broad claim is also supported by the numerous embodiments set out in the description.
  • " claim 1 defines how the input signals, the prototype signal, the non-linear function and the linear estimate interact to generate the output signal. These are the essential features which result in an improved performance as regards the presence of sonic artefacts and/or processing latency []" 
  • " it is not necessary, having regard to the requirement of clarity, that every possible embodiment embraced by the claim provide an improved performance, since this is not claimed." 
  • The case is remitted to the Examining Division. 



EPO T 0901/16 -  link

The breadth of claim 1 however does not render it unclear in the present case. Article 84 EPC is essentially concerned with setting clearly defined limits on the scope of protection conferred as well as indicating the essential technical features of the solution.
In the present case, the wording of the features of claim 1 is technically and linguistically not ambiguous, and the broad claim is also supported by the numerous embodiments set out in the description. In this latter respect, although embodiments relating to upmixing predominate in the description, there are indications of other applications (cf. page 3, lines 14-21; page 10, line 16 - page 11, line 5). The input signals also need not be a multichannel source (e.g. a stereo signal), but for example may be signals from a microphone array (cf. page 7, line 1).
Further, the problem of "performing upmixing in a manner that accurately renders spatially separated audio channels from a multichannel source" is not the most general problem to which the claimed subject-matter is said to provide a solution, which is "synthesizing output signals that both permit flexible and temporal and/or frequency local processing while limiting or mitigating artifacts in such output signals" (cf. page 3, lines 5-7). Finally, claim 1 defines how the input signals, the prototype signal, the non-linear function and the linear estimate interact to generate the output signal. These are the essential features which result in an improved performance as regards the presence of sonic artefacts and/or processing latency (cf. page 11, lines 3-5), whereby it is not necessary, having regard to the requirement of clarity, that every possible embodiment embraced by the claim provide an improved performance, since this is not claimed.

17 August 2020

T 0674/20 - Appeal quickly allowed

Key points

  • In this examination appeal, the Statement of grounds was filed 19.02.2020 and was forwarded to the Board on 24.03.2020. The Board's decision allowing the appeal was issued 25.06.2020.
  • The Board considers claim 1 to be novel over D1 and also over D2. Moreover, the claims are considered to be inventive. The Board remits the case with the order to grant the patent.


EPO T 0674/20 - link



Entscheidungsgründe
1. Neuheit gegenüber D1
1.1 Das Verfahren des Anspruchs 1 ist neu gegenüber D1 (Artikel 54(1) EPÜ).
1.2 D1 offenbart ein mathematisches Modell zur Ermittlung der Effizienz eines Gabelstaplers (Titel). Darin wird u.a. die potenzielle Energie, die zum Heben und Senken einer Last benötigt wird, berücksichtigt (Zusammenfassung). Das Modell wird mit Hilfe der Geometrie und der Kennwerte eines beschriebenen Gabelstaplers beispielhaft angewendet.
[...]


Auch die weiteren, im Recherchenbericht genannten Druckschriften enthalten einen solchen Hinweis nicht.



4. Daraus folgt, dass die Ansprüche gemäß Hauptantrag (die den Ansprüchen wie ursprünglich eingereicht entsprechen) mit der am 29. Juni 2018 geänderten Beschreibung und den Figuren wie ursprünglich eingereicht eine geeignete Grundlage für die Patenterteilung darstellen.
Entscheidungsformel
Aus diesen Gründen wird entschieden:
1. Die angefochtene Entscheidung wird aufgehoben.
2. Die Sache wird an die Prüfungsabteilung zurückverwiesen mit der Anordnung, ein europäisches Patent auf der Grundlage folgender Unterlagen zu erteilen:
- Ansprüche 1 bis 10 des Hauptantrags wie ursprünglich eingereicht

14 August 2020

T 0437/17 - Superfluous, unnecessary and misleading

Key points

  • In this opposition appeal, oral proceedings took place on 23.06.2020 and the patent was revoked, despite the patentee having requested postponement because of Covid-19. 
  • Furthermore, the ‘essentially test’ was discussed by the Board. The Board concludes that it “[is] superfluous, unnecessary and misleading and shall not be applied”.
  • The postponement had been requested on the ground that "considering the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and continued health risk associated with travel to and from the Boards of Appeal".
  • The Board: “The Board closely followed the development of the Coronavirus pandemic in particular in Germany and in the other EPC Contracting States and was thus aware that, despite of singular incidences of infection, the overall situation in particular in Germany has eased in the course of June 2020 to allow a lift of previous travel restrictions within that country. Against this background the Board did not consider the rather general and unspecific reasons given by the respondent as serious reasons justifying the fixing of a new date in the meaning of Article 15(2) RPBA 2020. With a communication of 2 July 2020, the Board, noting that the respondent was effectively represented by a professional representative established in Berlin (Germany) and in view of no apparent travel restrictions that would hinder the respondent to attend the oral proceedings at the premises of the Boards of Appeal, did not grant the respondent's request for postponement of the oral proceedings and maintained the oral proceedings for the scheduled date.”
  • “On 8 July 2020 the oral proceedings took place in the presence of the appellant, who travelled from Padova (Italy), but in the absence of the respondent in accordance with Article 15(3) RPBA 2020 and Rule 115(2) EPC. As a consequence, the respondent was treated as relying on their written case.”
Essentiality test
  • The patentee had submitted that  the removal of the feature "of a bottom" does not violate Article 123(2) EPC, arguing that the 3 condiditions of the "so-called essentiality or three-point test" were met. 
  • “The Board notes that these conditions above correspond to the so-called essentiality or three-point test set out in the decision T 331/87 []which is also reflected in the Guidelines for Examination H-V, 3.1 - November 2019 version. The Board, in line with several decisions such as T 1472/15, point 2.3 of the reasons, and T 1852/13, point 2.2.3 of the reasons [], holds that the criteria (i)-(iii) listed above are to be seen as condiciones sine quibus non, which means that fulfilment of these criteria is a necessary requirement but not a sufficient one for the compliance of Article 123(2) EPC. 
  • In the present case, the Board is convinced that the consequence of the application of the essentiality test has been misinterpreted by the opposition division, by considering that the removal of the feature meeting the criteria (i) to (iii) of the test, inevitably results in the compliance of Article 123(2) EPC.
  • It must be further underlined, that this test cannot in any case replace of the "gold standard" and should not lead to another result than when applying the "gold standard" directly.
  • Consequently, the Board concludes that in cases where it can be established whether an amendment is made within the limits of what a skilled person would derive directly and unambiguously, using common general knowledge, and seen objectively and relative to the date of filing, from the content of the application as originally filed, i.e. whether the amendment meets the "gold standard", the so-called three point essentiality test set out by decision T 331/87 is superfluous, unnecessary and misleading and shall not be applied (see Case Law of the Boards of Appeal, supra, II.E.1.4.2 and II.E.1.4.4.c), in particular T 2599/12, point 3.2 of the reasons [].
  • In the present case, as it has been discussed in point 3.2 above, the result after applying the "gold standard" is that the subject-matter of claim 1 of the patent as granted extends beyond the original disclosure, so that the requirements of Article 123(2) EPC are not met.”
    • Emphasis added.




EPO T 0437/17 -   link

13 August 2020

T 1378/16 - Video oral proceedings Board

Key points

  • In this examination appeal, the appellant agreed to oral proceedings being held through video conferencing.
  • “Oral proceedings that took place on 8 May 2020 were the first held by videoconference in the history of the Boards of the Appeal of the EPO. Unlike some national legal systems, the EPC does not stipulate explicitly the form(s) in which oral proceedings under Article 116 EPC shall take place. For these reasons, the Board considers it appropriate to address briefly the legal basis for oral proceedings within the meaning of Article 116 EPC.”
  • “oral proceedings held by videoconference are not excluded by the EPC and fulfil the requirements for holding oral proceedings within the meaning of Article 116 EPC. The EPC only requires that the public character of the proceedings be ensured (Article 116(4) EPC). The form in which the parties present orally their arguments - with or without physical presence - is not predetermined by Article 116 EPC.”
    • I suppose that question whether Article 116 EPC implies a right to ‘physical’ [in person] oral proceedings (or whether alternatively a voice-only or video conference call is enough) might be something that the Enlarged Board possibly has to decide on in due time in connection with mandatory video oral proceedings in cases where a party insists on oral proceedings in person.
    • G 2/19 clarified that under Article 116 EPC, the mere formal opportunity to present arguments orally is not enough, because there are limits at least to the time and place: "Parties seeking justice may perceive the choice of an entirely unusual place or date as an unwillingness to address their concerns and so regard it as adversely affecting them in the exercise of their rights to a degree that is unacceptable for legal purposes". I note that the time and place are neither 'predetermined' by the literal text of Article 116 EPC and still the Enlarged Board (rightly in my view) recognized that there are limits on them. The same may apply to the 'format' (video, audio-only / orally, in person). 



EPO T 1378/16 -  link




Reasons for the Decision
1. Procedural aspects: oral proceedings held by videoconference
1.1 Oral proceedings that took place on 8 May 2020 were the first held by videoconference in the history of the Boards of the Appeal of the EPO. Unlike some national legal systems, the EPC does not stipulate explicitly the form(s) in which oral proceedings under Article 116 EPC shall take place. For these reasons, the Board considers it appropriate to address briefly the legal basis for oral proceedings within the meaning of Article 116 EPC.
1.2 In the past, the Boards have rejected requests that the oral proceedings be held by videoconference (ViCo), mainly on the grounds that there was no "general framework" to this effect. In particular, there were no provisions made for suitable ViCo rooms and for the public to attend such ViCo-based hearings (see e.g. T 1266/07, Reasons, point 1; T 2068/14, Reasons, point 1.2.2).
At the same time, the Boards held that Article 116 EPC did not mandate that oral proceedings take place with the physical presence of the parties. As pointed out in T 2068/14, "while a video conference does not allow such direct communication as the face-to-face meeting involved in conventional oral proceedings, it nevertheless contains the essence of oral proceedings, namely that the board and the parties/representatives can communicate with each other simultaneously" (see point 1.2.3 of the Reasons). Hence, several Boards considered that it was in their discretion to decide whether nor not to select this form for the parties' oral submissions (T 2068/14, Reasons, point 1.2.2; T 195/14, Reasons, point 1; T 932/16, Reasons, point 1.1).
1.3 The present board agrees with this interpretation of the legal framework. Hence, oral proceedings held by videoconference are not excluded by the EPC and fulfil the requirements for holding oral proceedings within the meaning of Article 116 EPC. The EPC only requires that the public character of the proceedings be ensured (Article 116(4) EPC). The form in which the parties present orally their arguments - with or without physical presence - is not predetermined by Article 116 EPC.
1.4 Against this background, in the present case, the board considered it appropriate and expedient to convert the scheduled in-person oral proceedings into oral proceedings held by videoconference (cf. point II above). Indeed, and in contrast to the circumstances under which the decisions mentioned above were issued, the Boards of Appeal have now at their disposal suitable rooms at their premises for ViCo-based hearings.
Furthermore, appropriate provisions have been made for the public to attend such hearings. By means of a communication published on the website of the Boards of Appeal on 6 May 2020, it was indicated that "[o]ral proceedings will be conducted by VICO only in agreement with the parties concerned" and that "[a]ny member of the public wishing to attend oral proceedings conducted by VICO may do so in a dedicated room located at the premises of the Boards of Appeal in Haar".
1.5 The appellant agreed to oral proceedings being held without its physical presence. During those oral proceedings held on 8 May 2020, the public attended them by means of an additional connection to the board's videoconference system set up from a dedicated room at the premises of the Boards of Appeal.

12 August 2020

T 0989/19 - Missing signature

Key points
  • In this appeal against a refusal, the signature page of the refusal decision shows only two (wet ink) signatures. The decision is therefore invalid and this constitutes a substantial procedural violation. The case is remitted.
  • The file also did not contain any indication that the 2nd member was prevented from signing. 
  • The EPO recently introduced 'electronic authentication' for first instance departments (OJ 2020 A37; just like the Boards did earlier) but of course, the 'authenticated' stamp of 3 Examiners would need to be visible in the public file in the future and although such a stamp may possibly look like normal text in the public file, perhaps an electronic certificate is present in the internal file as evidence of the signature.



EPO T 0989/19 - link



Entscheidungsgründe


1. Nach Regel 113(1) EPÜ sind Entscheidungen des Europäischen Patentamts mit der Unterschrift und dem Namen des zuständigen Bediensteten zu versehen. Da ferner Artikel 18(2) EPÜ vorschreibt, dass sich eine Prüfungsabteilung aus drei Prüfern zusammensetzt, sind auch die entsprechenden Unterschriften von allen drei Prüfern erforderlich (siehe hierzu auch die Richtlinien für die Prüfung, E-X, 1.3 in der Fassung vom November 2018).

2. Im vorliegenden Fall hat die Beschwerdeführerin das Fehlen der Unterschrift des zweiten Prüfers nicht geltend gemacht.

11 August 2020

EU General Court 2010 - Astrazeneca decision




  • The EU General Court: “Article 82 EC prohibits a dominant undertaking from eliminating a competitor and thereby strengthening its position by using methods other than those which come within the scope of competition on the merits”
  • A key conclusion: “the Commission applied Article 82 EC correctly in taking the view that the submission to the patent offices of objectively misleading representations by an undertaking in a dominant position which are of such a nature as to lead those offices to grant it SPCs to which it is not entitled or to which it is entitled for a shorter period, thus resulting in a restriction or elimination of competition, constituted an abuse of that position. ”
  • The Courts initial reasoning: “the Court observes that the submission to the public authorities of misleading information liable to lead them into error and therefore to make possible the grant of an exclusive right {a supplementary protection certificate, in this case},  to which an undertaking is not entitled, or to which it is entitled for a shorter period, constitutes a practice falling outside the scope of competition on the merits which may be particularly restrictive of competition”
  • On the general principle: “in so far as an undertaking in a dominant position is granted an unlawful exclusive right as a result of an error by it in a communication with public authorities, its special responsibility not to impair, by methods falling outside the scope of competition on the merits, genuine undistorted competition in the common market requires it, at the very least, to inform the public authorities of this so as enable them to rectify those irregularities”
  • “The Court rejects the applicants’ argument that a finding of an abuse of a dominant position requires that an exclusive right obtained as a result of misleading representations has been enforced. When granted by a public authority, an intellectual property right is normally assumed to be valid and an undertaking’s ownership of that right is assumed to be lawful. The mere possession by an undertaking of an exclusive right normally results in keeping competitors away, since public regulations require them to respect that exclusive right. Furthermore, to the extent that the applicants argue that an intellectual property right must have been exercised in legal proceedings, that argument would tend to make the application of Article 82 EC conditional on the contravention by competitors of the public regulations by their infringing the exclusive right of an undertaking; that argument must be rejected.”
  • The CJEU dismissed the appeal. The fine set by the General Court was about EUR 50 million. This fine was for the finding that the parties “have infringed Article 82 of the Treaty and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement by the pattern of misleading representations before patent offices in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom and before national courts in Germany and Norway”. 
  • Edits with {...} are made by me.
Addendum 05.10.2021

Para 493 of T-321/05: “The Court therefore finds that, in view of the context in which those representations to the patent attorneys and patent offices were made, AZ could not reasonably be unaware that, in the absence of an express disclosure of the interpretation that it intended to adopt of Regulation No 1768/92 which underlay the choice of the dates provided in relation to France and Luxembourg, the patent offices would be prompted to construe those representations as indicating that the first technical marketing authorisation in the Community had been issued in Luxembourg in ‘March 1988’. Thus, there was no need for the Commission to demonstrate AZ’s bad faith or positively fraudulent intent on its part, it being sufficient to note that such conduct, characterised by a manifest lack of transparency, is contrary to the special responsibility of an undertaking in a dominant position not to impair by its conduct genuine undistorted competition in the common market (see, to that effect, Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie-Michelin v Commission, paragraph 30 above, paragraph 57).”Para. 494: “Accordingly, the dispute between the parties on the issue whether the misleading nature of the SPC applications stemmed from AZ’s bad faith is irrelevant. In any event, the applicants’ multiple arguments based on the alleged absence of bad faith on the part of AZ, as regards both the interpretation that it chose to adopt of Regulation No 1768/92 and the manner in which the SPC applications were presented, or the significance that it attached to the Luxembourg list, cannot constitute objective justification for the absence of proactive disclosure of the nature of the dates mentioned in relation to the Luxembourg and French marketing authorisations, on the one hand, and of the interpretation of Regulation No 1768/92 which led to the choice of those dates, on the other.”
See also this post, of a relevant law firm: “It was held to be sufficient that the conduct of AstraZeneca [towards the patent offices] was characterised by a "lack of transparency" or absence of "proactive disclosure" and was thereby contrary to the "special responsibility" of an undertaking in a dominant position "not to impair by its conduct genuine undistorted competition in the market".”



Case T‑321/05 AstraZeneca v. Commission [2010] ECLI:EU:T:2010:266 https://e-justice.europa.eu/ecli/ECLI:EU:T:2010:266
Case C-457/10 P AstraZeneca v. Commission [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:770 https://e-justice.europa.eu/ecli/ECLI:EU:C:2012:770
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/37507/37507_193_6.pdf published 19.07.2006

10 August 2020

T 1549/16 - Showering with active substance not medical

Key points

  • The Board decides that a claim directed to ‘a method of applying at least one active ingredient in water provided for showering the body of a living organism’ is not a medical method.
  • The Board: “Auch wenn es sich bei dem Wirkstoff gemäß Anspruch 5 um einen pharmazeutischen Wirkstoff handeln kann, richtet sich der Anspruch 1 nicht auf ein Verfahren zur Therapie eines Lebewesens, sondern auf ein Verfahren zum Bereitstellen von Duschwasser.”
  • The method is moreover deemed to be inventive. 



EPO T 1549/16 -  link




IX. Anspruchswortlaut

Anspruch 1 gemäß Hauptantrag inklusive einer von der Beschwerdeführerin vorgeschlagenen Merkmalsgliederung lautet:

1 Verfahren zur Applikation wenigstens eines Wirkstoffs in zum Abduschen des Körpers eines Lebewesens vorgesehenes Wasser, das einen Duschkopf durchströmt, der eine durch Durchströmöffnungen durchströmbare Aufnahmekammer für eine Wirkstoffdarreichung aufweist, wobei
2 während des Duschvorgangs die Wirkstoffdarreichung mit durchströmbaren Gebinden für jeweils eine Anwendung erfolgen soll,
3 die durchströmbaren Gebinde Pflanzenbestandteile und/oder Pflanzenextrakte enthalten und
4 durch durchströmbare Kapseln, Filterbeutel oder Pads gebildet werden,
5 vor jedem Duschvorgang, bei dem Wirkstoffe dem Körper zugeführt werden sollen, der Duschkopf geöffnet, das Gebinde eingelegt und die Aufnahmekammer mit Ausnahme der Durchströmöffnungen wasserdicht verschlossen wird,
6 eine dosierte Wirkstoffabgabe dadurch erfolgen soll, dass der Wirkstoff während des Duschvorgangs aus dem Gebinde abgegeben wird, bis die Wirkstoffdarreichung aufgebraucht ist, und
7 nach dem Duschvorgang oder vor dem nächsten Duschvorgang, mit dem eine gezielte Wirkstoffabgabe wieder erfolgen soll, das Gebinde entnommen wird.


Entscheidungsgründe


1. Artikel 53 c) EPÜ

Anspruch 1 und der davon abhängige Anspruch 5 sind auf ein Verfahren zur Applikation eines Wirkstoffs in zum Abduschen des Körpers eines Lebewesens vorgesehenes Wasser gerichtet.

Auch wenn es sich bei dem Wirkstoff gemäß Anspruch 5 um einen pharmazeutischen Wirkstoff handeln kann, richtet sich der Anspruch 1 nicht auf ein Verfahren zur Therapie eines Lebewesens, sondern auf ein Verfahren zum Bereitstellen von Duschwasser. In Analogie zu solchen Ansprüchen, die auf ein Verfahren zur Herstellung eines Medikaments gerichtet sind, definiert Anspruch 1 also die Herstellung eines Mittels und nicht die unmittelbare Verwendung dessen zur Therapie eines Lebewesens.

Da die Bereitstellung von Duschwasser nicht unmittelbar mit einer therapeutischen oder gar chirurgischen Behandlung eines Menschen verknüpft ist, sind auch die in G1/07 in Bezug auf chirurgische Verfahren aufgestellten Prinzipien, auf die in der angefochtenen Entscheidung verwiesen wird, für den in den Ansprüchen 1 bis 5 definierten Gegenstand unerheblich.

Der Gegenstand der Ansprüche gemäß Hauptantrag fällt daher nicht unter die Ausnahmen von der Patentierbarkeit gemäß Artikel 53 c) EPÜ.

2. Artikel 123(2) EPÜ

7 August 2020

Summertime reading: The mind of an EPO Examiner, by one



Abstract
This article provides an insight into the thinking of EPO examiners during the search process and how examiners balance high quality with service and efficiency.

[...]
In this respect, the examiners' job is very comparable to that of many knowledge workers in service organisations. Broken down to the level of an individual search, an experienced examiner working in a technologically complex field can be expected to complete a full search in about 1,5 days.


[...]
This immediately prompts the examiner to consider the question: “Which specific combination(s) of keywords and/or classes offers the best chances to find the most pertinent prior art quickly and perform a complete search?”

The answer to this question might depend on several considerations:•

  • Would I rather expect to find relevant scientific publications (a clear hint towards emphasising non-patent databases) or mainly patent applications?•

  • Is the technological activity in this field concentrated geographically (for instance, Asia)?•

  • Who are the main players in this field? Are there just a limited number of very active applicants or, on the contrary, is the market dispersed?•

  • What is the drafting and filing strategy of my applicant?•

  • Given the nature of the subject matter, what are the most relevant databases and search tools? Is it more appropriate to perform a full text based search or rather figure based? Etc …



Taking all of these considerations into account might inspire the examiner to adopt a highly targeted and focussed search strategy (e.g. an initial query limited to a limited number of documents of country codes, applicants, classes and/or keywords) in an attempt to find the “magical bullet” (e.g. novelty destroying documents for the independent claims) quickly. This scenario might apply for an application in a high tech, innovative field with one or two key players, the invention being well-drafted using field-specific jargon and concepts, and one or two relevant technical classes to be allocated.

6 August 2020

T 0247/17 - Res judicata, evidence CGK, and documents on appeal

Key points

  • The patentee appellant files documents with the Statement of grounds. The Board admits these documents.
  • “The opposition division thus had indicated that they intended to side with the patent proprietor on that point in the summons to oral proceedings. Consequently there was at this stage no necessity for the patent proprietor to provide further evidence regarding that question. The reversal of the opinion of the opposition division in the contested decision could not have been reasonably expected by the patent proprietor prior to the oral proceedings. This justifies, in the opinion of the Board, the filing of further evidence in that regard at the beginning of the appeal proceedings.”
    • So, in the first instance proceedings, the patentee can wait for the negative opinion of the OD with filing documents. This is of course different in appeal (and the justification for the different treatment is not clear to me).
  • As to evidence of CGK :“it is not because [the publication date of D14 and D16-D19] falls after the priority date of the patent in suit that these documents necessarily cannot be used to establish the content of the common general knowledge at the priority date of the patent in suit. It is thus not a factor of relevance in the admittance of these documents in the present case.”
    • D18 is a review article published 10 years after the filing date. I don't readily see how it can be used as evidence of CGK at the filing date/priority date.
  • On the issue of res judicata: “In decision T 731/11 of 29 June 2012 pertaining to an appeal lodged in the examination phase of the application underlying the present case, the Board in a different composition concluded that the claims of the then main request did not meet the requirements of Article 123(2) EPC [...] in accordance with consistent case law, opposition proceedings are separate and distinct from examination proceedings such that a decision by a board of appeal on an appeal against a decision from an examining division is not binding in subsequent opposition proceedings or on appeals therefrom, having regard both to the EPC and to the principle of res judicata”
  • The Board finds that claim 1 lacks basis. “Both features are however separately defined in claims 2 and 3 of the application as originally filed whereby these claims only depend on claim 1 and do not depend from one another. Claims 2 and 3 therefore do not provide an adequate basis for the combination of these features.”






EPO T 0247/17 -  link



V. The patent proprietor (appellant) lodged an appeal against that decision and filed with the statement of grounds of appeal two sets of claims as first and second auxiliary requests. Also, it was requested to admit the following documents into the proceedings:
D14: Wikipedia article of the term "Carothers equation" dated 1 March 2017
D15: Bland et al., Biomaterials 17 (1996), pages 1109-1114
D16: Schneider et al., Operative Dentistry, 2006, 31-4, pages 489-495
D17: Park et al., Dent. Mater. 2009, December 25 (12): pages 1569-1575
D18: Swiderska et al., Polish Journal of Chemical Technology, 2013, 15(2): pages 81-85
D19: Shalaby et al., Polymers for Dental and Orthopedic Applications, Shalaby and Salz, eds., CRC Press New York NY 2007, pages 112 and 113

Reasons for the Decision
1. Admittance of documents D14-D19
1.1 Article 12(4) RPBA 2007 applies to a statement of grounds of appeal filed before the entry into force of the RPBA 2020 (Article 25(2) RPBA 2020), and thus also to any document filed therewith.
1.2 Documents D14 to D19 were filed with the statement of grounds of appeal. The common denominator to these documents is that they relate to the polymerization of monomers containing more than one polymerizable group. These monomers are referred to as multifunctional monomers in D14-D19.
1.3 The appellant argued that documents D14-D19 were filed to address the reasoning of the opposition division under point 2.11 of the contested decision in which it was concluded that the term "multifunctional acidic monomer" in the sense of claim 1 of the main request covered the monomer 4-AET disclosed in the composition of comparative example 12 of D1, even if that monomer contained only one polymerizable group.