T 0538/24 - The photograph is in color for the Board

Key points

• The Board, in translation: "in the opposition proceedings, the object of the alleged prior use, Recaro, was inspected during an oral hearing held as a videoconference. The Opposition Division rejected the opponent's request for an in-person hearing, which was based on the planned inspection, because it considered the conditions for an in-person hearing, as defined in the decision of the President of the EPO (OJ EPO 2022, A103), to be not met."
• " The appellant argued that it had been virtually impossible to explain the mechanics of the object under consideration in a manner as adequate as would have been possible in a face-to-face event. This was also evident from the inadequate black-and-white photographs in the transcript of the taking of evidence provided to her, which were partly of poor quality and partly blurry."
• The appellant requests a new inspection of the device, in person.
• The Board refuses the request.
• The Board: "The alleged poor quality of the photographs taken during the inspection with a high-resolution camera does not relate to the inspection itself, but rather to its documentation and transmission to the parties. In fact, the Chamber has received the photographs in good quality and in color."
• It is strange, to say the least, that the Board looks at a different picture than the parties. The question is: how do you know what the Board is actually looking at, during vico oral proceedings? Perhaps it will be less of an issue now that documents are made visible in color in the public online file.
• The primary reason for refusing the request for a new inspection is that "As the respondent argued, there was agreement at the end of the inspection regarding the functionality of the prior use by Recaro"

EPO 

The link to the decision is provided after the jump.

T 0514/24 - Deleting from lists

Key points

• Claim 17 is directed to a chemical material and contains six lists of elements. In AR-2a, the proprietor deletes elements from every list.
• Three out of eight elements are deleted in list II, 3 of 10 elements in list III, two out of 5 elements in list IV, and four out of six elements are deleted in list IV.
• The Board, in translation, "Claim 17 combines an arbitrarily chosen subgroup of the possible compositions of the metal oxide layer with an equally arbitrarily chosen subgroup of the possible laser types, without specifying a basis for the remaining combinations. The compatibility of this multiple deletion with Article 123(2) EPC is not immediately apparent and should have been substantiated by the appellant (Article 12(3) RPBA)."
• The decision contains additional reasoning on Article 123(2) and amendments consisting of selecting alternatives from the claim, but the above point appears to be crucial. 
• This reasoning is, as such, unremarkable. However, the auxiliary request serves to make the claim novel over a prior right under Article 54(3) EPC.
• The difficulty for me is that an undisclosed disclaimer would have been possible in these circumstances, under G 2/03 and G1/16 (it seems to me). But deleting elements from the recited lists is not. 

• EPO 

The link to the decision is provided after the jump.

T 0832/18 - Post-published evidence and Art. 83

Key points

• The decision is dated 09.12.2024; by Board 3.3.04,  and the written decision was issued 30.10.2025. I assume there were exceptional circumstances, such as the illness of a Board member.
• The interesting point is the importance of a post-published document for the sufficiency of disclosure of an in vitro diagnostic method claim."
• ""1. A method for determining the likelihood of effectiveness of an EGFR tyrosine kinase inhibitor [a class of medicaments] to treat cancer [, the method] comprising: determining whether the erbBl gene obtained from a biological sample obtained from said patient comprises at least one nucleic acid variance, selected from [ a list of mutations] 

  wherein the biological sample is a sample of tissue or fluid isolated from the patient and wherein the presence of the at least one nucleic acid variance indicates that the EGFR tyrosine kinase inhibitor is likely to be effective;

• "Post-published document D132, ... shows that lapatinib, another EGFR-TKi inhibitor, is a better inhibitor of wild type EGFR (EGFR-wt) than of EGFR-L858R mutant ...  the board considers that ... that lapatinib has been shown to be less effective, or ineffective, in inhibiting EGFR-TK and in treating cancer in patients with a nucleic acid mutation according to claim 1(b) or (c), compared to patients who do not have such a mutation.
• "Documents D134, D132, D50 and D72 thus provide serious doubts based on verifiable facts that there is no increased therapeutic effectiveness of EGFR TKis in patients affected with cancer comprising at least one mutation as set out in claim 1. Some TKis, such as lapatinib or neratinib, do not have or have a lower effect on such patients in comparison with patients comprising a wild type EGFR. Hence, the subject-matter of claim 1 of the main request is not sufficiently disclosed (Article 83 EPC)."
• As a comment, it remains interesting that post-published documents cannot be used in some aspects of Article 83, also for functional features (such as second medical use claims), while such documents can be used in other aspects of Art. 83.
• G 2/21, r.77 : "the scope of reliance on post published evidence is much narrower under sufficiency of disclosure (Article 83 EPC) compared to the situation under inventive step (Article 56 EPC). In order to meet the requirement that the disclosure of the invention be sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by the person skilled in the art, the proof of a claimed therapeutic effect has to be provided in the application as filed, in particular if, in the absence of experimental data in the application as filed, it would not be credible to the skilled person that the therapeutic effect is achieved. A lack in this respect cannot be remedied by post-published evidence.
• 
  
• EPO

The link to the decision is provided after the jump.

T 1898/23 - (II) Novelty based on patient group

Key points

• At issue is whether a claim is a valid second medical use claim.
• The Board: "4.1 As to whether the claimed use qualifies as a specific use in a method referred to in Article 53(c) EPC which is not comprised in the state of the art, the parties agree that the following three criteria mentioned in the decision T 1491/14 have to be fulfilled for the treatment of the same disease with the same substance in a specific group of patients to be considered a new therapeutic use: (i) the patient group is not disclosed in the relevant prior art; (ii) the patients belonging to the group can be distinguished from those of the prior art by their physiological and pathological status; (iii) there is a functional relationship between the characterising physiological or pathological status and the therapeutic treatment, and thus the selection of the patients is not arbitrary. [formatting added].
• "The Board agrees that a patient group fulfilling these three criteria would render the claimed subject-matter novel."
• As a comment, criterion (i) seems strange: a second medical use claim is no longer a valid second medical use claim if the feature is disclosed in the prior art? Is claim interpretation not a preliminary step before the comparison with the prior art?
• As a further comment, criterion (iii) seems more about inventive step? See T 1688/20 for selection inventions in general ("the Board concurs with the most recent decisions of the Boards of Appeal, including T 261/15, point 2.2.2 of the reasons, according to which this criterion of purposive selection is relevant for the question of inventive step rather than for novelty.")

EPO 

The link to the decision is provided after the jump.

T 1898/23 - Argon-containing plasma as medical composition

Key points

• Claim 1 of the main request reads as follows. "Cold atmospheric plasma for use in treating therapy-refractory actinic keratosis in a patient in need thereof, wherein the cold atmospheric plasma is an argon-containing plasma."
• Is this a valid second medical use claim?
• "it has to be considered: (a) whether claim 1 concerns a substance or composition within the meaning of Articles 54(4) and (5) EPC"
• The Board: "for the sake of argument and in the respondent's [proprietor's] favour, it is ... assumed that the alleged therapeutic effect is indeed caused by the parts of the claimed plasma that qualify as a substance or composition within the meaning of Article 54(5) EPC."
• The Board considers the claim to be obvious, even when assuming that is a valid second medical use claim.
• The Board, obiter, sets out the legal framework: - I omit the case law references from the quote:  "While this "subgroup of the larger group of 'products'" ... excludes medical devices ..., it does not seem justified to say that any product which does not qualify as a medical device because of e.g. a lack of shape automatically qualifies as a substance or composition within the meaning of Article 54(4) and (5) EPC ... . If that were so, any shapeless physical entity (e.g. electromagnetic radiation or ultrasound waves) could qualify as a substance or composition, regardless of whether it is a chemical entity. Having said this, the current Board agrees that whether something qualifies as a substance or composition within the meaning of Articles 54(4) and (5) EPC should be decided, in the first place, on the basis of what is claimed as such and not on the basis of its mode of action ... .
• The Board indicates it does not agree with T 1252/20.
• "In order to benefit from the notional novelty afforded by Article 54 (4) and (5) EPC, it must be a substance or composition - as opposed to other subject-matter not qualifying as such - which is used in a method referred to in Article 53(c) EPC,  ... . In the case at hand, where the method relates a treatment by therapy, it must thus be assessed whether the therapeutic effect can be ascribed to the chemical entities in the plasma or (only) to the other entities, such as the photons"

EPO 

The link to the decision is provided after the jump.

T 0077/23 - Absent proprietor, new attacks oral proceedings

Key points

• The Board in translation: "The Board is aware that the argument of lack of novelty of claim 1 of auxiliary request 8 in relation to document E1 was first raised during the oral proceedings before the Board. However, for the reasons explained below, the Board cannot conclude that this violated the right to be heard (Article 113(1) EPC) of the respondent [proprietor], who was absent from the oral proceedings. 
• Opinion G 4/92: "A decision [in inter partes proceedings] against a party who has been duly summoned but who fails to appear at oral proceedings may not be based on facts put forward for the first time during those oral proceedings." 
• See also point 1 of the reasons: ".... it is clear that the referred question relates to inter partes proceedings. "
• In G4/92, the divergence in the caselaw was that T 574/89 had held "that by choosing to stay away from oral proceedings the parties "had forfeited their right to present comments", and hence that "any arguments or evidence submitted by the parties present at oral proceedings" could "be used as a basis for the decision without it being relevant whether such evidence or arguments were already known to the absent parties from the written submissions or whether they could expect such evidence or arguments to be presented". On the other hand, "T 484/90 ... held that "a decision against a party duly summoned to but failing to appear at oral proceedings which is based on new evidence, such as a new document, on which that party has not had the opportunity to comment, may not be pronounced at the close of those proceedings without infringing that party's right to be heard, unless the absent party indicates that it is forfeiting this right"."
• Puzzling enough, the current Board does not cite or comment on G 4/92 and does not explain how the current decision complies with G 4/92 (viz, that the novelty attack does not involve new facts forward for the first time during the oral proceedings).
• As also noted by Daniel X Thomas on his weblog. 
• Possibly, G4/92 would be decided differently nowadays. However, as of yet, it is valid case law.

EPO 

The link to the decision is provided after the jump.

T 1772/23 - More on Rule 80

Key points

• The Opposition Division had decided that the amendments leading to Auxiliary Request 2 did not meet the requirements of Rule 80 EPC. ... The set of claims of auxiliary claim 2 comprises four independent claims [by splitting claim 1]. 
• The proprietor appeals.
• The Board in translation: "The Board does not follow this view, but considers the amendments to be in conformity with Rule 80 EPC."
• "Rule 80 EPC stipulates as its sole condition for amendments that they must represent a bona fide attempt to overcome a ground for opposition and thus prevent the revocation of the granted patent."
• It must be noted that Rule 80 adds "even if that ground has not been invoked by the opponent".
• "In the present case, in all four independent claims of auxiliary request 2, the claimed method [of granted claim 1] is restricted by additional features from dependent claims, which is to be regarded as an attempt to distinguish the method claimed in the claims from the method known from E1."
• "The excessive use of and/or formulations in the dependent claims of a claim set can make it difficult to anticipate potential future withdrawal positions in the granted claim set. This can also, under certain circumstances, lead to questions as to whether the withdrawal positions were originally disclosed. However, these are questions that would have to be examined under the provisions of Articles 84 and 123(2) EPC and do not affect the assessment of the amendment under Rule 80 EPC."
• " Furthermore, the methods defined in the four independent claims of auxiliary request 2 do not necessarily have to be based on alternative, mutually exclusive embodiments. ... According to the settled case law of the Boards of Appeal, the existence of two alternative embodiments in the patent in suit may lead to the admissibility of using two independent claims if the scope of protection is limited. However, this does not imply that this criterion is mandatory, i.e., that only in the case of several alternatives mentioned in the patent in suit may these be pursued in independent claims. On the contrary, it has already been established in T0262/05 (Reasons in Section 4 to Rule 59a EPC, which corresponds to the current Rule 80 EPC) and T0123/22 (Reasons 3.12) that the replacement of a single granted independent claim with two independent claims is not only permissible in exceptional cases, but that in each specific case the amendments must be individually assessed to determine whether they constitute an appropriate and necessary response to avoid the revocation of the patent in suit on the basis of a ground for opposition."
•  " The Opposition Division is correct in asserting that the submission of more than 100 auxiliary requests can lead to an overload of the proceedings ... However, this is a question to be examined when these applications are admitted, not whether the respective amendments comply with the requirements of Rule 80 EPC. This must be clearly distinguished, as explained in detail, for example, in T0123/22 (see Reasons 3.7 and 3.10). The Board therefore sees no reason why the amendments leading to the claim set of auxiliary request 2 should not be in compliance with Rule 80 EPC and therefore does not follow the decision of the Opposition Division."
• The opponent had withdrawn the opposition during the appeal stage.
• The case is remitted back to the OD.
• 
  

EPO 

The link to the decision is provided after the jump.

T 1965/23 - Starting from wrong document, clueless choice

Key points

• Under the PSA, the CPA or starting point document must be a 'feasible' document. What happens if you try the PSA from a document that is not suitable?

• Claim 1 as granted defines: "A medical device containing a separately prepared freeze-dried cake composition comprising aripiprazole as an active ingredient in a storage container whose inner wall is treated with silicone, wherein there is a space between the inner wall of the storage container and the cake composition."

• "The patent addresses the specific issue of the agglomeration of aripiprazole following resuspension when it is provided as a cake composition in a storage container of a medical device, such as a syringe, of which the inner wall is treated with silicone"

• " The patent teaches in this context that by reducing the contact of the cake composition comprising aripiprazole with the silicone this agglomeration can be suppressed  ... . The patent presents experimental results in support of this teaching"

• "According to the established jurisprudence (see [CLBA] I.D.3.4) a central consideration in selecting the closest prior art is that it must be directed to the same purpose or effect as the claimed invention; otherwise, it cannot lead the skilled person in an obvious way to the claimed invention. "

• "if an inventive step can be acknowledged starting from a particular prior art that is convincingly identified as the most promising starting point and therefore indeed constitutes the closest prior art, the attempt to deny an inventive step starting from a less promising starting point must fail"

• The concept of the closest prior art in the problem solution approach not only obviates the need to address repetitive lines of argument, it also allows for the due appreciation of specific effects in relation to the prior art that may be associated with the distinguishing features

• Document D2 describes the preparation of a formulation comprising aripiprazole by freeze-drying a suspension in a vial 

• "documents D12, D11 and D18 describe silicone-treated medical devices comprising freeze-dried formulations without mention of aripiprazole or problems resulting from the presence of silicone. Documents D12, D11 and D18 therefore do not address a similar purpose or effect as the patent. Arriving at the development of a freeze-dried composition comprising aripiprazole in a silicone-treated container of a medical device as disclosed in the patent starting from these documents would require the clueless choice of aripiprazole from all possible candidates of active ingredients, which the Board does not consider a reasonable proposition."

• The Board therefore considers that documents D12, D11 and D18 do not represent reasonable alternative starting points in the assessment of inventive step, irrespective of the number of other features shared with the claimed subject-matter.

• Now, as a question: how could a national court assess inventive step over D12, assuming the court cannot disregard D12 as a starting point, as the Board did?

EPO 

The link to the decision is provided after the jump.

T 0981/23 - Review of positive admittance decisions (?)

Key points

• "Positive admittance decisions by departments of first instance are not regulated in Article 12(6), first sentence, RPBA. Having said this, in this Board's opinion such decisions are still subject to a board's limited power to review discretionary decisions of departments of first instance (see G 7/93, Reasons 2.6; for claim requests, see also T 1202/19, Reasons 39 to 43)."
• G7/93 r.2.6 is the well known remark about "in the circumstances of a case such as that before the referring Board, a Board of Appeal should only overrule the way in which a first instance department has exercised its discretion if it comes to the conclusion either that the first instance department in its decision has not exercised its discretion in accordance with the right principles as set out in paragraph 2.5 above, or that it has exercised its discretion in an unreasonable way, and has thus exceeded the proper limits of its discretion"
• T 1202/19 - blog post
• "In the case in hand, there was no error in the opposition division's exercise of discretion."
• See also T 0909/23: "Nach Ansicht der Kammer ist die Ausübung des Ermessens einer erstinstanzlichen Abteilung auch im Rahmen einer positiven Zulassungsentscheidung einer Überprüfung im Beschwerdeverfahren nach den in G 7/93 dargelegten Grundsätzen zugänglich"
• On the other hand, see T 1884/19 (24-10-2022): "D25 to D30 were not only admitted into the proceedings, but considered by the opposition division for assessing sufficiency of disclosure of claim 6 as granted. There is in such a case no legal basis for excluding documents D25 to D30 from the appeal proceedings (see also T 0487/16, point 3.1 of the Reasons for the decision, as well as the case law developed under RPBA 2007, e.g. T 0026/13, point 2 of the Reasons for the decision; T 1568/12, point 2.4 of the Reasons for the decision; T 2603/18 points 1.1 to 1.2 of the Reasons for the decision)."
• For a more recent case, see T 2036/22 (2024), and T 0189/23 (07-10-2025): "According to a number of decisions to which the present Board agrees (Case Law, V.A.3.4.3 and in particular T 617/16, point 1.1.1 of the reasons or T 2603/18, points 1.1 and 1.2 of the reasons), the EPC does not provide a legal basis for excluding documents, requests or evidence on appeal if the contested decision was based on them. In view of the very aim of the appeal proceedings to review the decision under appeal in a judicial manner according to Article 12(2) RPBA, such submissions are automatically part of the appeal proceedings". 
See also the extensive reivew of the issue in CLBA V.A.3.4.3 "Submissions admitted at first instance are part of the appeal proceedings"
• I wonder whether / how / when this divergence in the case law will be resolved. Can the Board unadmit documents or claim requests that were examined on the merits (and decided on) by the OD?

EPO 

The link to the decision is provided after the jump.

T 0456/24 - No review of decision to admit

Key points

• "The respondent [proprietor] argued that document D20 should not be admitted into the appeal proceedings, contending that the reasoning provided by the opposition division for admitting this document was insufficient, as late-filed documents should only exceptionally be admitted if there are reasons to suspect that such late-filed documents prejudice the maintenance of the patent in suit. 
• The board disagrees. According to established case law, since D20 was part of the opposition proceedings and the decision was based on D20, this document cannot be excluded from appeal proceedings (see Article 12(2) RPBA and the Case Law of the Boards of Appeal, 11th edition 2025, CLB in the following, V.A.3.4.3).
• This is because the aim of appeal proceedings is to review the decision under appeal in a judicial manner, which, in the present case, also inevitably requires a review of the findings drawn by the opposition division on the basis of D20."

• "In addition, no error in the use of discretion from the opposition division is apparent, because the appealed decision clearly shows that the opposition division decided to admit D20 after a prima facie review of the content of the disclosure of this document  ... ."

EPO 

The link to the decision is provided after the jump.

T 0508/24 - New public prior use after remittal

Key points

• "In the present case, the alleged prior use "Tulip-Oldenburg" was introduced for the first time after remittal of the case to the opposition division and was not directly related to the prior art already on file."
• "To assess whether feature e) of claim 1 was disclosed, the opposition division specifically analysed the videos D36 and D37. Their conclusion, that feature e) is not disclosed because the machine shown in the videos includes grippers which operate independently from the conveyor belts and are not connected thereto, clearly represents a technical assessment based on prima facie relevance examination which does not appear to violate the opposition division's discretionary powers.
• Based on the prima facie finding of the distinguishing feature e), which feature e) was also not disclosed in any of the cited documents, the opposition division assessed the prima facie relevance of the alleged public prior use with respect to inventive step for the outcome of the case."
• The OD did not admit the new attack based on an alleged public prior use. The Board sees no mistake in this decision.
• "The case law of the Boards of Appeal does not establish a fixed or uniform standard for how deeply an opposition division must examine late-filed evidence when assessing prima facie relevance. This means that an opposition division must exercise its discretion under Article 114(2) EPC according to the particular facts before it, and that boards of appeal should only intervene if that discretion was exercised on the basis of wrong principles, without taking account of the right principles, or in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner (CLB, V.A.3.4.1b)."

EPO 

The link to the decision is provided after the jump.

T 0781/24 - Case amendments after remittal

Key points

• The Board in the first appeal remitted the case for further prosecution (i.e., not finding a set of claims to be allowable). Next, the proprietor changed their auxiliary requests. The OD did not admit the claim requests. The proprietor contests this finding in the second appeal.
• The proprietor argued that: "these requests were submitted after the case had been remitted to the opposition division for further prosecution and before the opposition division summoned for oral proceedings after remittal, therefore before the final date set under Rule 116(1) EPC. "
• The Board: "Whether or not amended sets of claims presented after the expiry of the time limit set under Rule 79(1) EPC should be considered in opposition proceedings does not merely depend on their filing within the time limit under Rule 116 EPC, but also on the specific circumstances of the case. If all new submissions received within the time limit according to Rule 116 EPC were automatically to be considered timely, the time limit set according to Rule 79(1) EPC would be rendered meaningless. Therefore, when determining whether amended requests, such as the main request and auxiliary requests 1 to 7, submitted within the time limit set under Rule 116 EPC, were filed in due time, it has to be taken into account whether these requests were submitted in direct and timely response to a change in the subject of the proceedings (see also T 364/20, reasons 7.2.4 and 7.2.6)."
• I think this approach is too strict for first-instance proceedings in general; it describes the procedural framework of Art. 13 RPBA for appeals. However, first instance proceedings are of a different, more administrative nature. Having said that, the Board correctly recalls that the time limit of Rule 79(1) EPC should not be meaningless.
• "The case at hand deals with the judicial review of a decision in post-remittal opposition proceedings. The board is convinced that, in exercising its discretion in such post-remittal proceedings, the opposition division generally should have due regard to the framework defined in the first appeal proceedings which resulted in the remittal. This requirement serves to safeguard the legitimate interests of other parties and the public."
• The point of case amendments after remittal is interesting, and does not come up in the case law very often. I don't recall the GL discussing it specifically either. The Board's discussion of the topic is extensive, and I recommend reading it entirely.
• "Although the board agrees that a patent proprietor is generally not barred from submitting requests that are consistent with the principles of res judicata and ratio decidendi, the patent proprietor is not at absolute liberty to file amended claim requests in opposition proceedings subsequent to a remittal without constraint, even though the order of the first appeal proceedings' decision in T 423/18 merely states that the "[T]he case is remitted to the opposition division for further prosecution", i.e. does not specify on which set(s) of claims this further prosecution is to be performed."
• "The board is of the view that further prosecution of a case after remittal must proceed, as a rule, on the basis of the situation prevailing at the conclusion of the first appeal proceedings that gave rise to the remittal (see also T 383/11, Reasons 1.4). This principle should be observed in post-remittal proceedings when assessing the admissibility of a party's submissions, notably where, as in the present case, the appellant-patent proprietor seeks to justify such requests as constituting a reasonable redefinition of fallback positions."
• I think the proposed criterion is "whether these requests were submitted in direct and timely response to a change in the subject of the proceedings after the Board's decision in the first appeal"

EPO 

The link to the decision is provided after the jump.

T 0981/23 - No functional or structural link between the features

Key points

• The question is whether, under Art. 123(2), a feature can be taken from a paragraph of the description without certain other features that are also taught in that paragraph.
• The Board: "There is no functional or structural link between the internal operations of power storage, power supply and activation of the controller and the fact that the remote control is suitable for controlling a "toilet device". The internal power management is not inextricably linked to the control functions assigned to the operating buttons either. Hence, the interaction with a toilet device and its functions can be omitted without infringing the requirement of Article 123(2) EPC."
• For a second amended feature: "Claim 1 specifies ... . The basis for these features is found in Figure 4 and the corresponding description on page 14, lines 4 to 7 of the application as filed. The respondent [opponent] submitted that claim 1 contained an unallowable intermediate generalisation because it did not specify the [a feature]  disclosed on page 14, lines 9 to 16, in .... In the Board's view, these additional features need not be explicitly specified. First, it is well known that a rectifier usually outputs currents flowing in only one direction ... . The inherent smoothing function of electric storage elements is also well known and thus implicit. Second, the generic term "rectifier" is not limited to a diode bridge ... "
• "This implies that the disclosed distribution of the functions of current inversion and smoothing between the rectifier and the electric storage element is not inextricably linked to the specification of a rectifier, electric storage element and voltage detector as disclosed in Figure 4 and incorporated in claim 1. Either way, omitting the more specific features from page 14, lines 9 to 17 does not extend beyond the content of the application as filed."

EPO 

The link to the decision is provided after the jump.

T 0193/23 - An undisclosed embodiment is now encompassed by claim 1

Key points

• At issue is Art. 123(2).
• "The appellant (patent proprietor) argued that the introduction of feature 1.4 in claim 1 as granted is supported by paragraph [0019] of the originally filed application. Under dispute is whether the omission in claim 1 of further features recited in paragraph [0019], namely that the openable cover ...  "is sealable by way of engagement of two halves of a zipper ..." results in an unallowable intermediate generalisation of the specific embodiment disclosed in the cited paragraph of the originally filed description [,] as concluded by the Opposition Division."
• "As correctly pointed out by the department of first instance and the appellant (opponent), the originally filed application does not indeed describe or even envisage an embodiment of the claimed luggage including an openable cover attached to the expansion body wherein these two elements are not sealable/openable by a zipper disposed along their perimeter. As a matter of fact, no embodiment can be found where a zipper is not present or replaced by another element. However, by omitting the zipper in feature 1.4, such an undisclosed embodiment is now encompassed by independent claim 1. "
• I wonder if this is the correct test. Any generalised claim includes embodiments that were not  "describe[d] or [...] envisage[d]". However, for most claims, if not all claims, one can probably construct an embodiment that falls under the claim yet is not mentioned in the description. Hence, the test cannot be if the opponent can construct an embodiment that falls under the claim but was not 'described or envisaged' in the application as filed.
• With this test, a generalisation is never possible, it seems. Is that desirable?
• "The argument of the appellant (patent proprietor) that since the functionalities of attaching the openable cover to the expansion body and of closing and sealing the article luggage by a zipper disclosed in paragraph [0019] were not inextricably linked [,] no unallowable intermediate generalisation arose, is not convincing either. In this respect, the Board concurs with the Opposition Division and the appellant (opponent) that a functional overlap between these functionalities exists. In fact and to a certain extent, means to attach the openable cover to the expansion body and the zipper to seal the luggage article are required for the functionality of the luggage according to the application as filed."
• I wonder if a 'functional overlap' between features is the same as "inextricably linked. 
• The Board does not elaborate further on how the zipper is 'to a certain extent' "required for the functionality of the luggage according to the application as filed".
• Cf. CoA UPC 2 October 2025, expert e-Commerce/Seoul Viosys - https://www.unifiedpatentcourt.org/sites/default/files/files/api_order/Decision%20764-2025%20774-2025%20EP698%20EN.pdf 
• 
  

EPO 

The link to the decision is provided after the jump.

R 16/23 - On the right to oral proceedings

Key points

• This is the 13th successful petition for review, by my count. 
• The EBA corrects J 6/22, wherein the LBA had intentionally denied oral proceedings (and had dismissed the appeal), despite a valid request for oral proceedings of the applicant, in a case with a request for re-establishment for the late filing of the statement of grounds.
• Moreover, even though the underlying case is unusual, the LBA's reasoning was, though extensive on the legal points, quite generic and indeed suitable for copy/past in other (re-establishment) cases, as a TBA did in T 1874/23.
• The written reasoning of the LBA to deny the appellant's right to oral proceedings was extensive, and relied essentially on a purported 'dynamic' interpretation of Article 116, referring to the "substantial yearly number of appeals being filed and a considerable workload for the boards. Furthermore, the timely adjudication of cases has become a matter of increased interest to the stakeholders in the system, while it remains a challenge for the boards to carry out their function of effec­tively brin­ging justice to all parties within a reaso­nable time frame."
• The EBA holds, in the headnote, that "As oral proceedings had been requested by the appellant-applicant in the event that an adverse decision on the request for re-establishment of rights and on the appeal were taken, the [Legal Board of Appeal] should have arranged for the holding of oral proceedings pursuant to Article 116(1) EPC before taking any such adverse decision.
• " The failure to arrange oral proceedings constitutes a fundamental procedural defect within the meaning of Article 112a(2)(d) and Rule 104(a) EPC since, as a result, the appellant-applicant did not have the opportunity to present the case orally on the decisive issues of re-establishment of rights and the admissibility of the appeal"
• The EBA: "The second consideration referred to in the decision under review relates to aspects such as a timely adjudication of cases and the creation of legal certainty.  These are indeed aspects of great importance. The starting point is, however, that they are to be taken into account within the legal framework as provided by the legislator. In the view of the Enlarged Board, they are not sufficient on their own to justify a dynamic interpretation that would limit the scope of application of Article 116(1) EPC in such a way that a right to oral proceedings could be balanced against them."
• In addition, "As already stated in decision T 383/87, Article 116(1) EPC guarantees the right of any party to request oral proceedings, i.e. to argue its case orally before the relevant instance of the EPO. This includes the right for the party requesting oral proceedings merely to present orally what it has already submitted in writing (see also R 3/10, Reasons 2.11 confirming T 125/89, Reasons 7), without having to fear that, if it does so, the deciding body will order a different apportionment of costs for that reason alone (see also T 125/89, Reasons 7; T 383/87, Reasons 9)."
  
• The EBA's reasoning is extensive and clear. I recommend reading the entire decision. 

• The successful petitions are now: R 16/23; R11/23, R 12/21,   R3/22,  R 5/19 , R 4/17 , R 3/15, R 2/14 , R 15/11, R 3/10, R 7/09 , R 21/11 , R 16/13 (sorry  no links). See also the list here.

EPO 

The link to the decision is provided after the jump.

R 11/23 - A new clarity issue raised in the written decision

Key points

• This is the twelfth successful petition for review, by my count. The decision was already published in July 2025. The blog post was kept in stock for some time by oversight. 
• The successful petitions are now: R11/23, R 12/21,   R3/22,  R 5/19 , R 4/17 , R 3/15, R 2/14 , R 15/11, R 3/10, R 7/09 , R 21/11 , R 16/13 (sorry  no links).
• The patent application was filed in 2004 (as a PCT application). The grant was in 2017 (!). EP Entry in 2005, first action from the Examining Division in 2010, second Communication in 206 - we are looking back at the dark ages of the EPO. The decision of the TBA was T0532/20. 
• "Specifically, the petitioner [proprietor] argues that there were two distinct clarity objections against claim 1 of auxiliary request 8: The alleged lack of clarity what "maintaining currents in an allowable range" meant (the "allowable current range objection") and the alleged lack of information on which components were to be protected by the protective circuit (the "unspecified components objection"). The petitioner acknowledges that it was heard in the context of the "allowable current range objection" but it asserts that it was confronted with the "unspecified components objection" [and the Board's negative finding on that point] when reading the written decision only. Referring to pertinent case law of the boards of appeal, the petitioner argues that Article 113 EPC particularly meant that a party shall not be surprised by previously undisclosed reasons and evidence when studying the decision (pages 2 and 3 of the petition). "
• "The Enlarged Board also does not see any clear indication that the "unspecified components objection" was raised implicitly, for example as an aspect of an overarching clarity objection. During the written appeal proceedings, an objection was made that the critical feature (as quoted above in point VI.) defined a result to be achieved ("a protective circuit for maintaining currents within an allowable range") but not the technical measure of how to achieve it"
• "The "allowable current range objection" and the "unspecified components objection" are the aspects of the overall clarity or "result to be achieved" objection against the critical issue which were discussed in the decision under review. The objections were addressed separately (Reasons points 7.4 and 7.5), with a different outcome. The Board's finding that the "unspecified components objection" was justified in view of Article 84 EPC ultimately led to the revocation of the patent even though the "allowable current range objection" was not justified in the Board's view."
• On the burden of proof of the petitioner to show that an issue was not discussed during the oral proceedings before the BoA: "Since the Enlarged Board has no power or ability to investigate further whether other facts or indications might suggest that the petitioner could be aware that the Board had doubts about the specific aspect of clarity (namely, the "unspecified component" issue), it has to rely on the parties' submissions in this respect. In the absence of any such indication it is not for the party alleging a breach of its right to be heard to prove that there were no such facts or indications (see R 15/11, Reasons point 5). Any doubts remaining on whether a decision under review is based upon facts and considerations on which the parties had an opportunity to comment must be solved to the affected party's benefit (see R 2/14, Reasons point 10.3.4)."
• "The "unspecified components objection" which had not been discussed during the appeal proceedings eventually was the reason for the Board's finding that the patent was invalid. The Enlarged Board concludes that a fundamental violation of Article 113(1) EPC occurred."

EPO 

The link to the decision can be found after the jump.

T 0821/24 - Essential features and permitted generalisation

Key points

• The patent application was refused. The applicant appeals. The question is whether claim 1 is clear or lacks essential features.
• The Board: "The Board acknowledges that generalisation in claim drafting is permissible. However, even in a generalised form, an independent claim must still include all features essential to solving the (subjective) technical problem addressed by the application and to achieving the technical effect relied upon, across the whole breadth of the claim. If the claim, by virtue of its general wording, encompasses embodiments that do not achieve that effect or solve the problem, its scope is not clear. In line with established case law of the Boards of Appeal, the claim does not meet the requirements of Article 84 EPC "
• I'm not entirely sure in what sense the term 'technical effect' is used here.
• "The overarching principle is that the applicant is entitled to protection only for the invention disclosed. "The invention", however, is necessarily linked to the solution of a technical problem with reference to the pertinent background art as addressed in or at least understandable from the application, as required by Rule 42(1)(c) EPC. Accordingly, claim generalisation cannot extend to embodiments that do not solve that problem or achieve the stated technical effect, since such embodiments do not belong to "the invention" and thus cannot be the subject-matter of a claim. This basic principle sets the permissible limits for generalisation."
• "The Board notes that a claim must also be clear in itself. If the skilled person must rely on the description merely to work out, within a broadly generalised claim, which features actually achieve the technical problem with which the application is concerned, this indicates a lack of clarity under Article 84 EPC."

EPO 

The link to the decision is provided after the jump.

T 0129/24 - Not paying the opposition fee

Key points

• The opponent filed an opposition in August 2020 using Form 2300E, but did not specify a debit order or fee payment method in that form. The reasoned statement of opposition did not indicate a (purported) debit order or a statement about an attached debit order.
• The OD decided that the opposition was deemed not filed for not paying the prescribed fee in time (after holding oral proceedings which lasted two hours, see the minutes.
• The opponent appeals. The Board summons for oral proceedings, but these are cancelled after the appellant (opponent) announces that it will not attend the hearing.
• The appeal is dismissed.
• The most interesting points are the following. First, the OD / formalities officer first issued an invitation on 03.09.2020 to reply under Rule 79 to the proprietor (supposedly, the OD / formalities officer declares the opposition inadmissible ex officio / in the ex parte procedure of Rule 77(1). The formalities officer then issues a notice of loss of rights to the opponent (03.09.2020). The opponent then requests re-establishment (which is not available for the opponent for non-payment of the opposition fee). 
• On 21.05.2021, the formalities officer issued a letter stating "for the opposition division" that "Opposition was filed with EPO Form 2300 on 20.08.2020. However, the method of payment was not specified on the mentioned form. Having regard to the circumstances including technical aspects, the EPO has come to the conclusion that the opposition fee is considered deemed to have been paid due in time, i.e. on 20.08.2020."
• The formalities officer then issues a new invitation to the proprietor to reply to the opposition (18.06.2021).
• The proprietor contests the validity of the payment of the opposition fee.
• The OD is enlarged with a legal member, and summons are issued.
• The OD issued summons. The preliminary opinion was negative on the validity of the payment. The OD noted that at the relevant time, OLF (old), in the then applicable version 5.12, did give a warning if the payment method was left 'not specified'). The OD also qualifies the letter of 21.05.2021 as a preliminary view.
• The opponent in appeal inter alia argues that the EPO's letter of 21.05.2021 created legitimate expectations that the opposition fee was considered to have been paid.
• The Board: "The principle of the protection of legitimate expectations is a general principle well established in EU law and generally recognised in the EPC contracting states and boards of appeal case law (see CLB III.A.1). The protection of the legitimate expectations of users of the European patent system has two main principles. It requires that the user must not suffer a disadvantage as a result of having relied on erroneous information or a misleading communication received from the EPO. ... In the present case no legitimate expectations were created because the above conditions were not fulfilled as will be explained in the following paragraphs.
• "contrary to how the appellant has argued, the opposition division did not conclude (communication of 21 May 2021) that the opposition fee was "in fact paid on time". Rather it concluded that the "opposition fee is considered deemed to have been paid due in time, i.e. on 20 August 2020". In other words the opposition division merely treated the fee as if it had been paid on 20 August 2020 which was the last day of the 9 month opposition period. The appellant does not otherwise dispute the opposition division's statement of fact in its decision (facts and submissions, 5) that the opposition fee was paid on 9 October 2020 together with a fee for re-establishment of rights under Article 122 EPC. Indeed the appellant confirmed this in its appeal grounds (page 1, second bullet point), thus it appears indisputable that in fact the opposition fee was paid late, several weeks after the end of the nine month opposition period."
• "he Board takes the view that T595/11 [blog post] is not relevant to the present case. In that case, a formal check that the correct appeal fee had been paid had not been carried out four years after the filing of the appeal (see reasons point 1.7 and 1.8), and the board in that case considered that after such a long time, since the issue had not already been raised, a legitimate expectation that the fee had been correctly paid was created.
• The present case is not comparable in that the formal check that the opposition fee had been paid was not delayed but timely carried out at the start of the opposition proceedings and the opponent correctly notified of the result that it had not been paid (see communication noting loss of rights of 29 September 2020). The Board also does not see that any legitimate expectations comparable to those considered in T595/11 were created by the opposition division's communication of 21 May 2021, informing the opponent that the opposition fee was deemed to have been paid. This is because the issue had already been raised and the opponent was aware that the proprietor had not commented on the matter at that stage of the proceedings. Indeed, the proprietor questioned the correctness of the information in the communication of 21 May 2021 at its earliest opportunity (27 October 2021) about five months after the communication. This position was taken up by the opposition division in its annex to the summons of 9 December 2022. "

• Compare T 0130/19 for a similar case, but with crucial factual differences.

EPO 

The link to the decision is provided after the jump.

T 0729/24 - A case with a letter rogatory

Key points

• A rare case with a letter(s) rogatory.
• The opponent had filed emails, as alleged prior art, that the original applicant sent to third parties. The original applicant was summoned as a witness by the OD. The witness, an Italian national, requested to be heard by the competent national court
• The EPO sent a letter to the Italian authorities requesting that the competent Italian court hear the witness (the document refers to an attached letter rogatory, but I've not found that in the public file wrapper. The EPO's letter uses 'letter rogatory', though customarily it is always plural (I understand).
• The transcript of the hearing by (and before) the Italian court (attended by the chair and the legal member of the OD), and the English translation of the transcript, can be found here.
• The OD concluded that the emails and documents at issue were not public, except for one email (D18) with attachments (see the OD's decision). D18 was sent to a prospective customer a couple of days before the filing date of the patent (and the priority is only partially valid). 
• The Board's preliminary opinion was that the claims as granted lacked basis in the application as filed, and that D18 was prejudicial to inventive step of most of the auxiliary requests.
• The proprietor then withdraws all auxiliary requests on file. The Board finds, as the OD, that the claims as granted lack basis in the application as filed.
• See T 2893/18 for an earlier appeal in this opposition case.

EPO 

The link to the decision is provided after the jump.

T 1789/22 (II) Amended description can be filed later

Key points

• The Board, in headnote 2: 'A proprietor cannot be expected to file an amended description in appeal proceedings until an allowable set of claims is found. The lack of an adapted description constitutes no obstacle to the admittance of an amended set of claims into the appeal proceedings (see Reasons points 6.3 and 6.4)."
• "There is also a whole body of decisions of the boards of appeal in which the cases where remitted to the opposition division for adaptation of the description to the claims found allowable. This practice is common where the patent proprietor attends the oral proceedings. The board sees no reason to deviate from it where the patent proprietor does not attend the oral proceedings. Decisions addressing requests to not admit a set of claims due to lack of an adapted description, where the board acknowledged the practice of allowing an adapted description to be filed once there is an allowable set of claims, possibly before the opposition division, include T 0807/16 (see Reasons 1.4), T 146/17 (see Reasons 1.2 and 1.3), and T 155/20 (see Reasons point 1.4). 
• 6.4 In view of this long-standing practice, the proprietor cannot be expected to file an amended description until an allowable set of claims is found. Taking into account that the board had not indicated prior to the oral proceedings that it intended to deviate from this established practice, applying the principle of legitimate expectations, the board decided that the lack of an adapted description constituted no obstacle to the admittance of the request into the appeal proceedings."
• Of course, this could be different if the Board expressly indicates that a revised description must be filed.

EPO 

The link to the decision is provided after the jump.

T 0824/23 - An intermediate generalisation is allowable ...

Key points

• The Board: "An intermediate generalisation is allowable ..." (this should pique your interest).
• That's not something I've seen very often in the recent case law, so let's pay attention.
• "An intermediate generalisation is allowable if it is directly and unambiguously, explicitly or implicitly, derivable for a skilled person from the application as filed that the feature can be isolated from the other features, such that the omission of the other features does not add new technical information (i.e. the "gold standard", G 2/10, Reasons 4.5.1). In accordance with the established case law of the Boards, the omission is justified only if the isolated feature is not inextricably linked with the other features, or, as sometimes expressed, "in the absence of any clearly recognisable functional or structural relationship" among those features or if it is clearly recognisable that the extracted characteristics are "not closely related" to the omitted characteristics (see Case Law of the Boards of Appeal of the EPO, 11th edn., 2025 (Case Law), II.E.1.9.1)."
• "These criteria do not refer to the mere "context" in which the isolated feature was presented. The decisive factor is whether the isolated features taken up in the claim are understood, by the skilled person in the art, to be inextricably linked to the omitted features to which the features taken up were linked but which were left out of the claim. This is the case if the person skilled in the art would have regarded the omitted features to be necessary for achieving the effect associated with the added features (see T 1762/21, Catchword)."
  
  
• After a detailed technical analysis: "Accordingly, the specification  [by the amendment of the claim ]of a direct connection in the vertical direction between the straight vertical inner side surface 52b and the waste receiving surface 44 top end 44a (Feature g') is not inextricably linked with the configuration of the flush water spouting system(s), the structure and geometry of further surfaces involved in the flush water distribution, and the problem of avoiding splashing of flush water out of the bowl."
• The amendment is deemed allowable. 

EPO 

The link to the decision is provided after the jump.

T 2342/22 - Partial priority and generic intermediate art

Key points

• Claim 1 is a second medical use claim for a combination therapy. Claim 1 has partial priority for only one embodiment. In particular, the priority document discloses only an embodiment with a specific order for administering the medicines. 
• D9 is a conference paper published in the priority year. It teaches the medical use (the method of therapy), but not the order of the administration. D9 does not specify the order in which the components of the combination therapy were administered to patients. 
• Is claim 1 novel over D9?
• According to the Board, yes, because "Since document D9 fails to disclose an order of administration not covered by the partial priority right conferred by the disclosure in [the priority document], the board considers that the disclosure of document D9 cannot anticipate the subject-matter of claim 1 within the meaning of Article 54 EPC."
• Hence, to anticipate the claim, D9 should have taught an embodiment that is unambiguously outside the part of the claim for which the priority is valid (and that is, also, in accordance with the claim).
• However, the claim is not inventive over D9 as the CPA. 
• "Starting from document D9 as the closest prior art, which discloses the use of a FITC-tagged adapter molecule in combination with AT-CAR T cells but does not specify an administration regimen, the skilled person would recognise that document D9 leaves open three alternative possibilities: administering the tagged adapter molecule prior to, simultaneously with or after the AT-CAR T cells. ... The arbitrary selection of one of them does not involve an inventive step."

EPO 

The link to the decision is provided after the jump.

T 0083/23 - Debit order on paper

Key points

• " In the present case, the opponent filed a notice of appeal within two months of notification of the opposition division's decision. As to the appeal fee, an order to debit the opponent's deposit account was given in the notice of appeal, thus on paper rather than in an electronically processable format."
• Also in January 2023, the ADA specified that debit orders must be "filed in an electronically processable format (xml) via one of the following: - EPO Online Filing using EPO Forms 1001E, 1200E, 2300E or 1038E, or Online Filing 2.0 using EPO Forms 1001E, 1200E or 1038E ... "
• "In the board's view, the debit order filed by the opponent on paper with the notice of appeal on 16 January 2023 was not validly filed. The filing of the debit order in an electronically processable format after expiry of the time limit of two months as set by Article 108 EPC, i.e. on 3 February 2023, was late, with the consequence that the opponent's appeal is deemed not to have been filed."
• " Where an opponent decides to avail itself of the use of a deposit account as a method for paying the relevant fees with the EPO (Article 5(2) Rules relating to fees), it is also its duty to know the relevant requirements for debiting a deposit account, including the types of debit orders and the accepted ways of filing them. The opponent's reference to its clear intention to give the order to deduct the appeal fee is not relevant under the present circumstances either."
• No request for correction under Rule 139 was filed.
• Three comments. First, the Notice of appeal was filed electronically, via Online Filing 2.0 (see the receipt), and Form 1038E was used (link), but that form did not include the debit order. The purported debit order was in the 'PDF' Notice (which does not bear a signature, so could not have been a valid paper Notice of appeal at any rate. The electronic signature is, however, in Form 1038E). Was the debit order really filed on paper?
• Second, the Board obiter holds that a request for correction is ruled out.  "A correction of the debit order in application of Rule 139 EPC presupposes that a valid debit order exists, i.e. filed in an electronically processable format. In the jurisprudence of the Boards of Appeal, correction of a debit order has only been allowed in case of errors concerning the amount of the appeal fee (see e.g.J 8/19 Reasons 2.4, T 317/19 Reasons 2.4.2, T 444/20 Reasons 2.4.3, T 2620/18 Reasons 5)."
• However, see T1146/20.
• Third. The opponent's appeal is deemed not to have been filed. The appeal fee is reimbursed. However, it may be a case of winning by losing. The OD maintained the patent in amended form; the proprietor also appealed, and the Board found the claims as granted allowable. Had the opponent validly paid the appeal fee, the decision in the patent would have been the same, and the appeal fee would not have been reimbursed.

EPO 

The link to the decision is provided after the jump.

T1620/23 - Inventive step as new ground (?)

Key points

• The Board, in translation: "The ground for opposition of lack of inventive step pursuant to Article 100(a) in conjunction with Article 56 EPC was mentioned in the notice of opposition dated 30 August 2021, but not substantiated in accordance with Rule 76(2)(c) EPC. Rather, the opponent reserved the objection of lack of inventive step for a later stage of the proceedings, should this objection become relevant due to new requests (notice of opposition, page 11). Accordingly, no statement was made regarding the question of the lack of inventive step in claim 1 as granted."
• The claim was attacked as not novel, I understand.
• The OD found the claims to be not novel. "the opponent did not make any statements regarding the lack of inventive step of the granted patent in the further course of the opposition proceedings."
• The Board finds the claim to be novel (contrary to the OD). The opponent would like to attack the claim for lack of inventive step.
• "The opposition ground of lack of inventive step under Article 100(a) in conjunction with Article 56 EPC – which, according to the decision of the Enlarged Board of Appeal G 7/95, is to be distinguished from the opposition ground of lack of novelty – was therefore not effectively raised by the opponent. The Opposition Division also did not introduce this opposition ground into the proceedings pursuant to Article 114(1) EPC. In particular, the Opposition Division's decision on claim 1 of the granted version of the patent was limited to the lack of novelty of the subject-matter. If the opposition ground is neither asserted and substantiated in the notice of opposition nor introduced into the proceedings by the Opposition Division, a "new opposition ground" exists according to G 1/95 and G 7/95, in each case reason 5.3. In appeal proceedings, such a new opposition ground may, according to decision G 10/91, only be examined with the consent of the patent proprietor."
• "The patent proprietor refused to consent to the examination of this ground for opposition. The ground for opposition of lack of inventive step may therefore not be examined in the appeal proceedings (G 10/91, principle 3). 
• Cf. T 131/01, published in the OJ: "In a case where a patent has been opposed under Article 100(a) EPC on the grounds of lack of novelty and inventive step having regard to a prior art document, and the ground of lack of novelty has been substantiated pursuant to Rule 55(c), a specific substantiation of the ground of lack of inventive step is neither necessary - given that novelty is a prerequisite for determining whether an invention involves an inventive step and such prerequisite is allegedly not satisfied - nor generally possible without contradicting the reasoning presented in support of lack of novelty. In such a case, the objection of lack of inventive step is not a fresh ground for opposition and can consequently be examined in the appeal proceedings without the agreement of the patentee"
• As discussed in  Visser's Annotated EPC, Rule 76(2):4.3.3, incidentally. 

EPO 

The link to the decision is provided after the jump.

T 1789/22 - Two opponents, one appeals, attacks submitted by the other

Key points

• Decision of 12.12.2024, written decision issued on 19.12.2025 (Board 3.3.04, no communication under Art. 15(9) RPBA visible in the online file).
• There were two opponents. Opponent 1 appeals. Opponent 2 and the proprietor do not appeal. Opponent 1 maintains only some of the attacks in their Statement of grounds. Opponent 2 is a party as of right and uses its 'reply' to the appeal to submit additional attacks.
• "The submissions of the party as of right-opponent 2 included objections under lack of novelty in view of document D27 and lack of inventive step where documents D6 and D31 were taken to represent the closest prior art. Since the opposition division took a decision on these lines of attack in favour of the respondent, an appeal should have been filed to have these findings reviewed [*], rather than merely contesting them in the reply to the statement of grounds of appeal. However, as indicated above, the appeal of the appellant did not contest the decision in these respects, therefore these objections are outside the legal and factual framework for review by the board. Their consideration is in principle not excluded but is subject to the discretion accorded to the board under Article 114(2) EPC and Articles 12 and 13 RPBA."
• The Board's exercise of its discretion is intertwined with its decision on the subsequent letter of the appellant (opponent 1) that it agreed with the attacks (objections) of opponent 2.
• " The board notes that the appellant provided no justification for not having raised these objections with the statement of grounds of appeal, and the board cannot see any either. Moreover admitting these several additional attacks would be detrimental to procedural economy and unfair for the respondent, who relied on these parts of the appealed decision not having being contested. Accordingly, the objections filed by the appellant with this letter were not admitted into the appeal proceedings. The same applies to the corresponding objections filed by the part as of right."
• * - Note that this point is a bit tricky. Had the OD revoked the patent as novel over D1 but not inventive over D2, the opponent could not have appealed on the ground of the unfavorable reasoning on novelty (the requirement of being adversely affected of Art. 107 is determined by reference to the order of the decision, not the reasons). 
• By the same token, had the proprietor appealed as well, opponent 2 as a respondent could have submitted the attacks validly in their reply to the appeal.
• 
  
• Furthermore, opponent 1 had attacked only some of the independent claims of the set of claims held allowable by the OD in its statement of grounds, but did not attack independent claim 5 in its statement of grounds.  
• The Board holds a later-filed attack against claim 5 to be inadmissible: " As set out above, the statement of grounds of appeal defines the framework of the appeal and in the present case it did not include novelty of claim 5 of the request held allowable by the opposition division (see points 2., 5. and 5.1). Accordingly, novelty of claim 1 of the main request is not open for review by the board in this appeal proceedings."
• The Board first recalled the principle of the 'extent of the opposition'. The Board then reasoned that: "2. With regard to opposition appeal proceedings, in addition the statement of grounds of appeal determines the object of the appeal proceedings and the legal and factual framework for the review of the appealed decision by the board. In other words, the statement of grounds of appeal determines the extent to which amendment or cancellation of the appealed decision is requested (see e.g. G 9/92, Reasons 1)."
• G 9/92 r.1: "...  Proceedings under the EPC in respect of European patent applications and patents are, with some exceptions, initiated by a party. The initial "request" determines the extent of the proceedings. This is known as the principle of party disposition (ne ultra petita). The present case concerns the question whether the extent of the initial appeal, i.e. the statement in the notice of appeal, affects the extent of the subsequent proceedings, and this has to be examined systematically in conjunction with procedural law under the EPC." (emphasis added)
• G 9/92 is about reformatio in peius, i.e. the subject-matter of the patent (as amended), i.e. the order of the decision and not the reasons for the decision (there is quite some case law on this point). Opponent's 1 request in its notice of appeal was to revoke the patent in its entirety (link).  The TBA acknowledges that G 9/92 does not directly support its reasoning by citing it as 'see ... G 9/92').
• The Board's reasoning seems new to me.
• I also wonder how to reconcile it with the case law that there is no concept of partial inadmissibility of an appeal in the EPC.  
• The Board's headnote 1 is as follows: "1. ... The provisions of Article 107, second sentence, EPC guarantee a non-appealing party the right to participate to pending appeal proceedings. However, they do not provide it an autonomous right to have requests which go beyond the scope of the appeal as defined by the appellant's statement of grounds of appeal, decided by the board (as a direct consequence of G 2/91, Headnote)."
• This headnote puts it too strongly, in my view.
• The case is about a non-appealing opponent, not about a proprietor submitting claim requests. Furthermore, G2/91 is about the termination of the appeal if the appellant withdraws his appeal (heandnote 1) and the refund of the appeal fee (headnote 2).
• I think the 'reply' of the non-appealing second opponent should be treated as a case amendment under Article 13(1) RPBA, similar to the case where a respondent/appellant uses his reply under Art.12(1)(c) to the appeal of the other appellant as a supplement to his own statement of grounds (treated as an appeal case amendment under Art. 13(1), see T 2701/19).
• See also T 250/20 about cross-party reliance, referring to "established case law according to which, for example, an opponent may rely on a ground of opposition invoked by other opponents either during the opposition proceedings or during any subsequent appeal proceedings". This suggests that Opponent 2 can rely on the Statement of grounds of Opponent 1 and then submit any further attacks as case amendments under Art. 13(1).
• "By not filing an appeal, a non-appealing party has not contested the findings of the opposition division, beyond the framework of the appeal filed by the appellant."
• This does not seem correct, to the extent that it suggests the opponent as a respondent cannot introduce objections against the broader claims (sought by the proprietor as appellant) that were not decided on in the impugned decision. 

EPO 

The link to the decision is provided after the jump.

T 0439/22 - Deleting statement from description in opposition

Key points

• This is the appeal that led to case G 1/24. After the remittal, the TBA now decides on the patent.
• The Board considers claim 1 to be not novel because a term in the claim is given a broad definition in the description. The definition given in the description is broader than the normal meaning of the term in one aspect. Under the broader definition, the claim is anticipated by a prior art document. Hence, the definition in the description is considered and adopted as decisive under Art. 54 by the Board. 
• Although the definition is broadening in one aspect, in other aspects it narrows the scope of the claim compared to the term's normal meaning. 
• In AR-1, the proprietor deletes the paragraph from the description. This causes an issue, namely an extension of the scope of protection under Article 123(3). 
• The Board: "Claim 1 contains neither explicit nor implicit features that necessarily limited the claimed aerosol-forming article to a rod-shaped configuration or, as a consequence, required the tobacco sheet to be gathered by being compressed or constricted substantially transversely to the cylindrical axis of a rod. In the absence of the definition formerly provided in paragraph [0035], claim 1 also encompasses aerosol-forming articles that are not rod-shaped, i.e. not substantially elongated in one direction and, if they are, sheets that are folded and gathered not substantially transversely to but along the cylindrical axis of the rod, like a bellows, thus extending the scope of protection compared with claim 1 of the main request." 
• "For the reasons above, the auxiliary request does not comply with the requirement of Article 123(3) EPC, and is therefore not allowable."
• In the case at hand, the definition may have been included in the description from the outset. However, the present case also serves to illustrate that if the description is amended in the pre-grant procedure, it may not always be possible to revert to the original text after grant, nor to simply delete the relevant passages of the description. 

EPO 

The link to the decision is provided after the jump.

T 0487/23 - Withdrawal request oral proceedings

Key points

• The opponent and the proprietor both appeal. The Board issues a communication (that contains the preliminary opinion). The proprietor withdraws its request for oral proceedings within one month of the communication. The opponent withdraws its request for oral proceedings more than one month of the communication (by announcing it will not attend the oral proceedings). The oral proceedings are then cancelled.
• Is the opponent's appeal fee reimbursed at 25% under Rule 103(4)(c)??
• The Board: "As no oral proceedings took place, both conditions of Rule 103(4)(c) EPC, that "any request for oral proceedings is withdrawn ... within one month ..." and "no oral proceedings take place" (emphasis by the Board), are met(Case Law of the Boards of Appeal 11th Edition (2025), V.A.11.12, e.g. T 488/18). 3. 
• Consequently, both appeal fees are to be reimbursed at 25%."
• Rule 103 EPC is a gift that keeps on giving for bloggers and handbook writers.
• I don't think the decision is correct, by the way. According to CA/80/19, point 82, "If a request for oral proceedings is withdrawn in good time before the oral proceedings, the Board may be able to use this freed-up capacity to schedule oral proceedings in another appeal case. Such withdrawals will also allow interpretation to be cancelled in sufficient time to reduce or eliminate interpreting costs."
• In the present case, the oral proceedings could be cancelled only after the opponent withdrew its request for oral proceedings, which was more than one month after the communication. The incentive for any appellant who had requested oral proceedings should be to withdraw its request for oral proceedings within one month of the Board's communication. 
• On the other hand, the AC document is from 2019, before Vico oral proceedings became the rule. Hence, there may be less of a need for an early withdrawal of the request for oral proceedings.

EPO 

The link to the decision is provided after the jump.

T 0749/23 - Any embodiment as starting point (Mite composition)

Key points

• Claim 1 of AR-3 at issue  “is for a composition comprising (i) a population of individuals from a Phytoseiid mite species, (ii) a food source for the mite individuals selected from rearing prey from the suborder Astigmata and (iii) stacked carrier elements selected from millet husks, where the carrier elements comprise shelters for mite individuals”
• Documents D3/D9 describe five mite compositions comprising, as equal alternatives, the carrier elements wheat bran, buckwheat husks, rice husks, saw dust and corn cob grits”
• “The patent proprietor contended that the composition comprising rice husks of documents D3/D9 was not a suitable starting point for the assessment of inventive step for various reasons. First, they argued that buckwheat husks, rather than rice husks, should be taken as the starting point since buckwheat husks were used in the examples of documents D3/D9 and were therefore highlighted.”
• The Board: “The starting point for assessing inventive step is normally a set of features disclosed in combination in a document, typically in the form of an embodiment or example.”
• “the board considers that each of these embodiments [of the five compositions] can be used as the starting point for assessing inventive step. All embodiments are presented as suitable, and there is nothing in documents D3/D9 that would disqualify any of them. Since each embodiment can be used, the board also agrees with the opponents that the assessment of inventive step can be based on a mite composition containing rice husks as carrier elements as the starting point.”
• “the board does not concur with the patent proprietor's view [that the rice husk embodiment of D3 is not a starting point].  First, Article 56 EPC requires that an invention, having regard to the state of the art, not be obvious to a person skilled in the art. The state of the art for the purpose of considering inventive step is the entire state of the art as defined in Article 54(2) EPC, without any ranking or distinction (T 2140/22, Reasons 1.9.1).”
• “if inventive step is to be acknowledged, the claimed subject-matter must be inventive starting from any starting point in the prior art. Conversely, if the invention is obvious to the skilled person from at least one starting point, an inventive step is lacking (Case Law, I.D.3.3). Neither the EPC nor the case law of the boards stipulate that the starting point for assessing inventive step must be the entire disclosure, an example, or a preferred embodiment in the prior art. Rather, the starting point may be any disclosure in the prior art.”
• Still, it may not be obvious to a skilled person to develop a non-preferred embodiment.
• “There is also no requirement that an embodiment must be exemplified for it to be considered in the assessment of inventive step. There is, likewise, no requirement that the prior art contain any pointer, suggestion or incentive to select a particular embodiment for further development for this embodiment to qualify as the starting point in the problem solution approach”.
• “as a matter of principle and in agreement with T 2001/23 (Reasons 3), that if the subject-matter of a claim is found to lack an inventive step starting from a particular disclosure, as is the case here (see below), it is not possible to establish inventive step by proposing that the assessment be started from a different starting point.”
• The Board then distinguishes T 1126/19 on the facts.
• “Third, G 1/23 does not support the patent proprietor's argument that the skilled person is the relevant point of reference in selecting the starting point for the inventive step analysis. Points 93 to 95 of decision G 1/23 are concerned with the impact on novelty and inventive step of accessible but not fully reproducible products which the Enlarged Board of Appeal accepted as being part of the prior art. According to these considerations, the relevance of such a product for assessing inventive step, namely its suitability as a starting point or secondary source of information, depends on the available information associated with the product, i.e. it depends on what is disclosed to the skilled person.”
• “ The Enlarged Board of Appeal [in G 1/23] did not make any finding that the choice of starting point in the problem-solution approach requires motivation by the skilled person. In the case in hand, all carrier elements disclosed in documents D3/D9 are available, and all can be used. Indeed, the patent proprietor never argued that rice husks would be obviously defective or not enabled.”
• In view of T 2759/17: “In the case in hand, as correctly noted by opponent 2, the starting point for assessment of inventive step, namely a composition comprising rice husks, is disclosed for the same purpose as the compositions comprising other carrier materials disclosed in documents D3/D9, namely the rearing of predatory mites, which is also the purpose to which the patent is directed. The board concludes that in the case in hand, a composition comprising rice husks would also be a realistic starting point under the approach set out in T 2759/17.”
• “The patent proprietor's assertion that documents D3/D9 did not disclose a list of equal alternatives to the skilled person is based on the results in Example II of the [opposed] patent, in which millet husks performed better than bran. Since the closest prior art must be assessed from the skilled person's point of view on the day before the filing or priority date valid for the claimed invention, the assertion must be rejected for this reason alone.”
• One would expect that, starting from the embodiment of D3 with rice husk as the carrier element, the distinguishing feature would lie in the other components of the composition. However, the difference is that the patent claims the use of millet husk as the stacked carrier elements. The Board does not acknowledge any technical effect of that difference. “the patent describes that millet husks have a sheltering effect in comparison with the non-sheltering carriers wheat bran and vermicullite (paragraphs [0005] and [0006], experiments I and II). The patent does not indicate any advantageous effect of millet husks over rice husks.” A post-published document was not admitted, as filed late (namely, in appeal).
• The patent is revoked.
• “The objective technical problem is the provision of alternative carrier elements for a mite composition comprising a population of a phytoseiid predatory mite species and a factitious host population which comprises at least one species selected from the family of the Carpoglyphidae.”
• I think a key question could have been whether the OTP was indeed simply providing an alternative, given that the advantages of risk husk were unrecognised in the prior art document D3.
  
  
• Partiality of the OD?
• “opponent 2 submitted that the chairman of the opposition division stated during oral proceedings that in coming to the conclusion that auxiliary request 3 was inventive over document D9 as the closest prior art, it was also taken into account that the claims were restricted to particular mites and that, from the perspective of a work-around, there were sufficient possibilities.”
• The Board dismisses the objection on the ground that the reasoning about the workaround is not part of the OD’s written decision. Furthermore, “an objection on the ground of suspected partiality before the department of first instance can be disregarded if it is not raised immediately after the party concerned becomes aware of the reason for the objection (G 5/91, Reasons 4 [...]”

EPO 

The link to the decision is provided after the jump.