29 April 2026

T 0441/23 - Respondent withdraws request for oral proceedings

Key points

  • This decision was published already in February 2025.
  • In Visser's Annoted EPC, 2025 edition, we write: "According to T488/18 and T598/19, partial reimbursement of the appellant’s appeal fee can also be based on the withdrawal of a request for oral proceedings by another party to the appeal proceedings (e.g. a respondent) because R.103(4)(c) refers to ‘any request’. However, T777/15 and T795/19 have come to the opposite conclusion, i.e. that the appellant must have timely withdrawn its own request for oral proceedings to benefit from partial reimbursement."
  • The present decision:  "Since the respondent's withdrawal of the request for oral proceedings was made within one month of notification of the communication issued by the Board in preparation for the oral proceedings, both conditions of Rule 103(4)(c) EPC, that any request for oral proceedings is withdrawn within one month of notification of the communication issued by the Board of Appeal in preparation for the oral proceedings and no oral proceedings take place, are met  [and the appeal fee is reimbursed in part to the appellant]. It makes no difference that the withdrawing party and the appealing parties are not the same (cf. T 517/17, reason 6; T 488/18, reason 8). Hence, 25% of the appeal fee is to be reimbursed to each appealing party."

EPO 
The link to the decision is provided after the jump.

28 April 2026

R 0002/25 - Length of procedure

Key points

  • This decision dismissing a petition for review was taken by a three-member panel during oral proceedings held on 29.09.2025.  The decision was issued in writing on 10.02.2026.
    • There is no public or official target for how long decision writing in R cases should take.  Given that in three-member panel decisions, the decision is to unanimously reject the petition as being clearly unallowable and/or clearly inadmissible, the writing of the decision should not be very difficult - it can't be a borderline case. Given the President of the BoA being the Chair in this case, and considering the legislative purpose of  Rule 102 EPC - see especially Rule 102(1) EPC, I'm still surprised it took more than three months. 
  • " The petition for review concerns decision T 0314/20 ... dated 16 November 2023 (the decision under review). The decision was notified on 20 December 2024."
    • It was Board 3.3.04 that needed more than a year to write the decision. This is, of course, well beyond the period of three months specified in Art 15(9). It also caused a significant delay in the petition for review procedure by more than a year. 
    • One of the parties had filed a request for acceleration of the appeal proceedings after the oral proceedings and after the oral decision had been taken. The TBA denied the request and replied that "In light of the above, the Board will issue the written reasons for its decision at a time that is consistent with its members' workload, and in any event not before March 202[4]." Of course, the Board needed until December 2024.
      • If we infer from this remark that the delay was not due to, e.g., a Board member's illness, but to 'workload', we may observe a broader 'management' issue under Board 3.3.04 (at that time).  
      • I'm not sure whether Board 3.3.04 currently better meets the target of Art. 15(9) RPBA.
      • To be clear, I think it is also the responsibility of the Board of Appeals Unit's management to monitor whether any TBA is overloaded or experiencing exceptional circumstances (e.g., board members being unavailable due to health reasons).
  • The opposition was filed in 2017. The entry into the EP phase was in 2009.
EPO 
The link to the decision is provided after the jump.

27 April 2026

T 0639/23 - Lapse of patent and continuation opposition

Key points

  • This decision was published in December 2025.
  • The OD decided to maintain the patent in amended form. Both the opponent and the proprietor appealed. 
  • The Board, in machine translation: "By letter dated October 14, 2025, the patent proprietor withdrew his appeal and his request for oral proceedings. At the same time, he declared that the patent had lapsed in all contracting states in which it would have been effective (DE, FR, AT, IT) by declarations of renunciation." 
  • "In a communication under Rule 84(1) EPC dated 3 November 2025, the Board considered the documents submitted with the letter of 31 October 2025 to be sufficient to clearly demonstrate the effective waiver in all Contracting States in which the patent was last in force. The appeal proceedings could therefore be continued at the request of the opponent, provided that such a request was filed within two months of service of this communication."
  • "By letter dated 10 November 2025, the opponent requested the continuation of the appeal proceedings."
  • "By letter dated 17 December 2025, the patent proprietor commented on the opponent's letter of 10 November 2025". The proprietor submitted arguments that the proceedings should be terminated without a (substantive) decision.
  • "The patent proprietor contested the opponent's arguments and, in its letter of December 17, 2025, asserted that the opponent had failed to sufficiently demonstrate a concrete, seriously threatened infringement and thus a concrete interest in legal protection. "
  • " According to Decision T 598/98, Guidelines 1 and 2 and Reasons 1.6 to 1.8, in addition to the (in this case disputed, see above) existence of a legitimate interest of the opponent in the retrospective revocation of the patent, the Board's discretionary decision under Rule 84(1) EPC may also take into account ...."
    • I still think T 598/98 conflated German national practice with the EPC, or too readily assumed that German practice in cases of lapse of the German patent is to be applied equally under the EPC.
    • I don't think Rule 84 gives the OD discretion to continue the opposition procedure if the opponent requests that the OD take a written decision on the merits. In particular, if Rule 84 is interpreted to give the OD to discretionarily terminate the procedure against the request of the opponent (in case of a lapse), then Rule 75 EPC is meaningless ("An opposition may be filed even if the European patent has been surrendered in all the designated Contracting States or has lapsed in all those States."). Rule 84 must be interpreted (also) using the systematic method of interpretation.
    • See my extensive comments on T 598/98 in this blog post.
  • The Board decides to continue the procedure. "The "legal added value" of a decision on the merits, as demanded by the patent proprietor, compared to the mere discontinuation of the proceedings, is also present if the proceedings are continued, since, unlike discontinuation, the effect of a patent that is not valid is eliminated retroactively. Finally, the patent proprietor's argument that there is no concrete impact on a third party in this case is also unconvincing. Such a thing is not decisive for the continuation of the proceedings, since the objection (appeal) procedure is by its nature a review procedure for which a concrete impact on the objector or third parties is not necessary."
  • The Board decides to revoke the patent.
  • I don't know why the proprietor did not disapprove of the text. It could have been related to the mutual requests for a different cost apportionment (the Board refused both, though likely Rule 84 does not preclude a decision under Art. 104). Teva/Copaxone should also be considered, of course. 
EPO 
The link to the decision is provided after the jump.

24 April 2026

T 0538/24 - The photograph is in color for the Board

Key points

  • The Board, in translation: "in the opposition proceedings, the object of the alleged prior use, Recaro, was inspected during an oral hearing held as a videoconference. The Opposition Division rejected the opponent's request for an in-person hearing, which was based on the planned inspection, because it considered the conditions for an in-person hearing, as defined in the decision of the President of the EPO (OJ EPO 2022, A103), to be not met."
  • " The appellant argued that it had been virtually impossible to explain the mechanics of the object under consideration in a manner as adequate as would have been possible in a face-to-face event. This was also evident from the inadequate black-and-white photographs in the transcript of the taking of evidence provided to her, which were partly of poor quality and partly blurry."
  • The appellant requests a new inspection of the device, in person.
  • The Board refuses the request.
  • The Board: "The alleged poor quality of the photographs taken during the inspection with a high-resolution camera does not relate to the inspection itself, but rather to its documentation and transmission to the parties. In fact, the Chamber has received the photographs in good quality and in color."
    • It is strange, to say the least, that the Board looks at a different picture than the parties. The question is: how do you know what the Board is actually looking at, during vico oral proceedings? Perhaps it will be less of an issue now that documents are made visible in color in the public online file.
  • The primary reason for refusing the request for a new inspection is that "As the respondent argued, there was agreement at the end of the inspection regarding the functionality of the prior use by Recaro"
EPO 
The link to the decision is provided after the jump.

22 April 2026

T 0514/24 - Deleting from lists

Key points

  • Claim 17 is directed to a chemical material and contains six lists of elements. In AR-2a, the proprietor deletes elements from every list.
  • Three out of eight elements are deleted in list II, 3 of 10 elements in list III, two out of 5 elements in list IV, and four out of six elements are deleted in list IV.
  • The Board, in translation, "Claim 17 combines an arbitrarily chosen subgroup of the possible compositions of the metal oxide layer with an equally arbitrarily chosen subgroup of the possible laser types, without specifying a basis for the remaining combinations. The compatibility of this multiple deletion with Article 123(2) EPC is not immediately apparent and should have been substantiated by the appellant (Article 12(3) RPBA)."
    • The decision contains additional reasoning on Article 123(2) and amendments consisting of selecting alternatives from the claim, but the above point appears to be crucial. 
  • This reasoning is, as such, unremarkable. However, the auxiliary request serves to make the claim novel over a prior right under Article 54(3) EPC.
  • The difficulty for me is that an undisclosed disclaimer would have been possible in these circumstances, under G 2/03 and G1/16 (it seems to me). But deleting elements from the recited lists is not. 

  • EPO 
The link to the decision is provided after the jump.

20 April 2026

T 0832/18 - Post-published evidence and Art. 83

Key points

  • The decision is dated 09.12.2024; by Board 3.3.04,  and the written decision was issued 30.10.2025. I assume there were exceptional circumstances, such as the illness of a Board member.
  • The interesting point is the importance of a post-published document for the sufficiency of disclosure of an in vitro diagnostic method claim."
    • ""1. A method for determining the likelihood of effectiveness of an EGFR tyrosine kinase inhibitor [a class of medicaments] to treat cancer [, the method] comprising: determining whether the erbBl gene obtained from a biological sample obtained from said patient comprises at least one nucleic acid variance, selected from [ a list of mutations] 

      wherein the biological sample is a sample of tissue or fluid isolated from the patient and wherein the presence of the at least one nucleic acid variance indicates that the EGFR tyrosine kinase inhibitor is likely to be effective;

  • "Post-published document D132, ... shows that lapatinib, another EGFR-TKi inhibitor, is a better inhibitor of wild type EGFR (EGFR-wt) than of EGFR-L858R mutant ...  the board considers that ... that lapatinib has been shown to be less effective, or ineffective, in inhibiting EGFR-TK and in treating cancer in patients with a nucleic acid mutation according to claim 1(b) or (c), compared to patients who do not have such a mutation.
  • "Documents D134, D132, D50 and D72 thus provide serious doubts based on verifiable facts that there is no increased therapeutic effectiveness of EGFR TKis in patients affected with cancer comprising at least one mutation as set out in claim 1. Some TKis, such as lapatinib or neratinib, do not have or have a lower effect on such patients in comparison with patients comprising a wild type EGFR. Hence, the subject-matter of claim 1 of the main request is not sufficiently disclosed (Article 83 EPC)."
  • As a comment, it remains interesting that post-published documents cannot be used in some aspects of Article 83, also for functional features (such as second medical use claims), while such documents can be used in other aspects of Art. 83.
    • G 2/21, r.77 : "the scope of reliance on post published evidence is much narrower under sufficiency of disclosure (Article 83 EPC) compared to the situation under inventive step (Article 56 EPC). In order to meet the requirement that the disclosure of the invention be sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by the person skilled in the art, the proof of a claimed therapeutic effect has to be provided in the application as filed, in particular if, in the absence of experimental data in the application as filed, it would not be credible to the skilled person that the therapeutic effect is achieved. A lack in this respect cannot be remedied by post-published evidence.

  • EPO
The link to the decision is provided after the jump.

17 April 2026

T 1898/23 - (II) Novelty based on patient group

Key points

  • At issue is whether a claim is a valid second medical use claim.
  • The Board: "4.1 As to whether the claimed use qualifies as a specific use in a method referred to in Article 53(c) EPC which is not comprised in the state of the art, the parties agree that the following three criteria mentioned in the decision T 1491/14 have to be fulfilled for the treatment of the same disease with the same substance in a specific group of patients to be considered a new therapeutic use: (i) the patient group is not disclosed in the relevant prior art; (ii) the patients belonging to the group can be distinguished from those of the prior art by their physiological and pathological status; (iii) there is a functional relationship between the characterising physiological or pathological status and the therapeutic treatment, and thus the selection of the patients is not arbitrary. [formatting added].
  • "The Board agrees that a patient group fulfilling these three criteria would render the claimed subject-matter novel."
  • As a comment, criterion (i) seems strange: a second medical use claim is no longer a valid second medical use claim if the feature is disclosed in the prior art? Is claim interpretation not a preliminary step before the comparison with the prior art?
  • As a further comment, criterion (iii) seems more about inventive step? See T 1688/20 for selection inventions in general ("the Board concurs with the most recent decisions of the Boards of Appeal, including T 261/15, point 2.2.2 of the reasons, according to which this criterion of purposive selection is relevant for the question of inventive step rather than for novelty.")
EPO 
The link to the decision is provided after the jump.

15 April 2026

T 1898/23 - Argon-containing plasma as medical composition

Key points

  • Claim 1 of the main request reads as follows. "Cold atmospheric plasma for use in treating therapy-refractory actinic keratosis in a patient in need thereof, wherein the cold atmospheric plasma is an argon-containing plasma."
  • Is this a valid second medical use claim?
  • "it has to be considered: (a) whether claim 1 concerns a substance or composition within the meaning of Articles 54(4) and (5) EPC"
  • The Board: "for the sake of argument and in the respondent's [proprietor's] favour, it is ... assumed that the alleged therapeutic effect is indeed caused by the parts of the claimed plasma that qualify as a substance or composition within the meaning of Article 54(5) EPC."
    • The Board considers the claim to be obvious, even when assuming that is a valid second medical use claim.
  • The Board, obiter, sets out the legal framework: - I omit the case law references from the quote:  "While this "subgroup of the larger group of 'products'" ... excludes medical devices ..., it does not seem justified to say that any product which does not qualify as a medical device because of e.g. a lack of shape automatically qualifies as a substance or composition within the meaning of Article 54(4) and (5) EPC ... . If that were so, any shapeless physical entity (e.g. electromagnetic radiation or ultrasound waves) could qualify as a substance or composition, regardless of whether it is a chemical entity. Having said this, the current Board agrees that whether something qualifies as a substance or composition within the meaning of Articles 54(4) and (5) EPC should be decided, in the first place, on the basis of what is claimed as such and not on the basis of its mode of action ... .
    • The Board indicates it does not agree with T 1252/20.
  • "In order to benefit from the notional novelty afforded by Article 54 (4) and (5) EPC, it must be a substance or composition - as opposed to other subject-matter not qualifying as such - which is used in a method referred to in Article 53(c) EPC,  ... . In the case at hand, where the method relates a treatment by therapy, it must thus be assessed whether the therapeutic effect can be ascribed to the chemical entities in the plasma or (only) to the other entities, such as the photons"
EPO 
The link to the decision is provided after the jump.

13 April 2026

T 0077/23 - Absent proprietor, new attacks oral proceedings

Key points

  • The Board in translation: "The Board is aware that the argument of lack of novelty of claim 1 of auxiliary request 8 in relation to document E1 was first raised during the oral proceedings before the Board. However, for the reasons explained below, the Board cannot conclude that this violated the right to be heard (Article 113(1) EPC) of the respondent [proprietor], who was absent from the oral proceedings. 
  • Opinion G 4/92: "A decision [in inter partes proceedings] against a party who has been duly summoned but who fails to appear at oral proceedings may not be based on facts put forward for the first time during those oral proceedings." 
    • See also point 1 of the reasons: ".... it is clear that the referred question relates to inter partes proceedings. "
    • In G4/92, the divergence in the caselaw was that T 574/89 had held "that by choosing to stay away from oral proceedings the parties "had forfeited their right to present comments", and hence that "any arguments or evidence submitted by the parties present at oral proceedings" could "be used as a basis for the decision without it being relevant whether such evidence or arguments were already known to the absent parties from the written submissions or whether they could expect such evidence or arguments to be presented". On the other hand, "T 484/90 ... held that "a decision against a party duly summoned to but failing to appear at oral proceedings which is based on new evidence, such as a new document, on which that party has not had the opportunity to comment, may not be pronounced at the close of those proceedings without infringing that party's right to be heard, unless the absent party indicates that it is forfeiting this right"."
  • Puzzling enough, the current Board does not cite or comment on G 4/92 and does not explain how the current decision complies with G 4/92 (viz, that the novelty attack does not involve new facts forward for the first time during the oral proceedings).
    • As also noted by Daniel X Thomas on his weblog
  • Possibly, G4/92 would be decided differently nowadays. However, as of yet, it is valid case law.
EPO 
The link to the decision is provided after the jump.

10 April 2026

T 1772/23 - More on Rule 80

Key points

  • The Opposition Division had decided that the amendments leading to Auxiliary Request 2 did not meet the requirements of Rule 80 EPC. ... The set of claims of auxiliary claim 2 comprises four independent claims [by splitting claim 1]. 
  • The proprietor appeals.
  • The Board in translation: "The Board does not follow this view, but considers the amendments to be in conformity with Rule 80 EPC."
  • "Rule 80 EPC stipulates as its sole condition for amendments that they must represent a bona fide attempt to overcome a ground for opposition and thus prevent the revocation of the granted patent."
    • It must be noted that Rule 80 adds "even if that ground has not been invoked by the opponent".
  • "In the present case, in all four independent claims of auxiliary request 2, the claimed method [of granted claim 1] is restricted by additional features from dependent claims, which is to be regarded as an attempt to distinguish the method claimed in the claims from the method known from E1."
  • "The excessive use of and/or formulations in the dependent claims of a claim set can make it difficult to anticipate potential future withdrawal positions in the granted claim set. This can also, under certain circumstances, lead to questions as to whether the withdrawal positions were originally disclosed. However, these are questions that would have to be examined under the provisions of Articles 84 and 123(2) EPC and do not affect the assessment of the amendment under Rule 80 EPC."
  • " Furthermore, the methods defined in the four independent claims of auxiliary request 2 do not necessarily have to be based on alternative, mutually exclusive embodiments. ... According to the settled case law of the Boards of Appeal, the existence of two alternative embodiments in the patent in suit may lead to the admissibility of using two independent claims if the scope of protection is limited. However, this does not imply that this criterion is mandatory, i.e., that only in the case of several alternatives mentioned in the patent in suit may these be pursued in independent claims. On the contrary, it has already been established in T0262/05 (Reasons in Section 4 to Rule 59a EPC, which corresponds to the current Rule 80 EPC) and T0123/22 (Reasons 3.12) that the replacement of a single granted independent claim with two independent claims is not only permissible in exceptional cases, but that in each specific case the amendments must be individually assessed to determine whether they constitute an appropriate and necessary response to avoid the revocation of the patent in suit on the basis of a ground for opposition."
  •  " The Opposition Division is correct in asserting that the submission of more than 100 auxiliary requests can lead to an overload of the proceedings ... However, this is a question to be examined when these applications are admitted, not whether the respective amendments comply with the requirements of Rule 80 EPC. This must be clearly distinguished, as explained in detail, for example, in T0123/22 (see Reasons 3.7 and 3.10). The Board therefore sees no reason why the amendments leading to the claim set of auxiliary request 2 should not be in compliance with Rule 80 EPC and therefore does not follow the decision of the Opposition Division."
  • The opponent had withdrawn the opposition during the appeal stage.
  • The case is remitted back to the OD.

EPO 
The link to the decision is provided after the jump.

08 April 2026

T 1965/23 - Starting from wrong document, clueless choice

Key points

  • Under the PSA, the CPA or starting point document must be a 'feasible' document. What happens if you try the PSA from a document that is not suitable?
  • Claim 1 as granted defines: "A medical device containing a separately prepared freeze-dried cake composition comprising aripiprazole as an active ingredient in a storage container whose inner wall is treated with silicone, wherein there is a space between the inner wall of the storage container and the cake composition."

  • "The patent addresses the specific issue of the agglomeration of aripiprazole following resuspension when it is provided as a cake composition in a storage container of a medical device, such as a syringe, of which the inner wall is treated with silicone"

  • " The patent teaches in this context that by reducing the contact of the cake composition comprising aripiprazole with the silicone this agglomeration can be suppressed  ... . The patent presents experimental results in support of this teaching"

  • "According to the established jurisprudence (see [CLBA] I.D.3.4) a central consideration in selecting the closest prior art is that it must be directed to the same purpose or effect as the claimed invention; otherwise, it cannot lead the skilled person in an obvious way to the claimed invention. "

  • "if an inventive step can be acknowledged starting from a particular prior art that is convincingly identified as the most promising starting point and therefore indeed constitutes the closest prior art, the attempt to deny an inventive step starting from a less promising starting point must fail"

  • The concept of the closest prior art in the problem solution approach not only obviates the need to address repetitive lines of argument, it also allows for the due appreciation of specific effects in relation to the prior art that may be associated with the distinguishing features

  • Document D2 describes the preparation of a formulation comprising aripiprazole by freeze-drying a suspension in a vial 

  • "documents D12, D11 and D18 describe silicone-treated medical devices comprising freeze-dried formulations without mention of aripiprazole or problems resulting from the presence of silicone. Documents D12, D11 and D18 therefore do not address a similar purpose or effect as the patent. Arriving at the development of a freeze-dried composition comprising aripiprazole in a silicone-treated container of a medical device as disclosed in the patent starting from these documents would require the clueless choice of aripiprazole from all possible candidates of active ingredients, which the Board does not consider a reasonable proposition."

  • The Board therefore considers that documents D12, D11 and D18 do not represent reasonable alternative starting points in the assessment of inventive step, irrespective of the number of other features shared with the claimed subject-matter.

    • Now, as a question: how could a national court assess inventive step over D12, assuming the court cannot disregard D12 as a starting point, as the Board did?
EPO 
The link to the decision is provided after the jump.

06 April 2026

T 0981/23 - Review of positive admittance decisions (?)

Key points

  • "Positive admittance decisions by departments of first instance are not regulated in Article 12(6), first sentence, RPBA. Having said this, in this Board's opinion such decisions are still subject to a board's limited power to review discretionary decisions of departments of first instance (see G 7/93, Reasons 2.6; for claim requests, see also T 1202/19, Reasons 39 to 43)."
    • G7/93 r.2.6 is the well known remark about "in the circumstances of a case such as that before the referring Board, a Board of Appeal should only overrule the way in which a first instance department has exercised its discretion if it comes to the conclusion either that the first instance department in its decision has not exercised its discretion in accordance with the right principles as set out in paragraph 2.5 above, or that it has exercised its discretion in an unreasonable way, and has thus exceeded the proper limits of its discretion"
    • T 1202/19 - blog post
  • "In the case in hand, there was no error in the opposition division's exercise of discretion."
  • See also T 0909/23"Nach Ansicht der Kammer ist die Ausübung des Ermessens einer erstinstanzlichen Abteilung auch im Rahmen einer positiven Zulassungsentscheidung einer Überprüfung im Beschwerdeverfahren nach den in G 7/93 dargelegten Grundsätzen zugänglich"
  • On the other hand, see T 1884/19 (24-10-2022): "D25 to D30 were not only admitted into the proceedings, but considered by the opposition division for assessing sufficiency of disclosure of claim 6 as granted. There is in such a case no legal basis for excluding documents D25 to D30 from the appeal proceedings (see also T 0487/16, point 3.1 of the Reasons for the decision, as well as the case law developed under RPBA 2007, e.g. T 0026/13, point 2 of the Reasons for the decision; T 1568/12, point 2.4 of the Reasons for the decision; T 2603/18 points 1.1 to 1.2 of the Reasons for the decision)."
  • For a more recent case, see T 2036/22 (2024), and T 0189/23 (07-10-2025): "According to a number of decisions to which the present Board agrees (Case Law, V.A.3.4.3 and in particular T 617/16, point 1.1.1 of the reasons or T 2603/18, points 1.1 and 1.2 of the reasons), the EPC does not provide a legal basis for excluding documents, requests or evidence on appeal if the contested decision was based on them. In view of the very aim of the appeal proceedings to review the decision under appeal in a judicial manner according to Article 12(2) RPBA, such submissions are automatically part of the appeal proceedings". 
  • See also the extensive reivew of the issue in CLBA V.A.3.4.3 "Submissions admitted at first instance are part of the appeal proceedings"
  • I wonder whether / how / when this divergence in the case law will be resolved. Can the Board unadmit documents or claim requests that were examined on the merits (and decided on) by the OD?
EPO 
The link to the decision is provided after the jump.

03 April 2026

T 0456/24 - No review of decision to admit

Key points

  • "The respondent [proprietor] argued that document D20 should not be admitted into the appeal proceedings, contending that the reasoning provided by the opposition division for admitting this document was insufficient, as late-filed documents should only exceptionally be admitted if there are reasons to suspect that such late-filed documents prejudice the maintenance of the patent in suit. 
  • The board disagrees. According to established case law, since D20 was part of the opposition proceedings and the decision was based on D20, this document cannot be excluded from appeal proceedings (see Article 12(2) RPBA and the Case Law of the Boards of Appeal, 11th edition 2025, CLB in the following, V.A.3.4.3).
  • This is because the aim of appeal proceedings is to review the decision under appeal in a judicial manner, which, in the present case, also inevitably requires a review of the findings drawn by the opposition division on the basis of D20."
  • "In addition, no error in the use of discretion from the opposition division is apparent, because the appealed decision clearly shows that the opposition division decided to admit D20 after a prima facie review of the content of the disclosure of this document  ... ."

EPO 
The link to the decision is provided after the jump.

01 April 2026

T 0508/24 - New public prior use after remittal

Key points

  • "In the present case, the alleged prior use "Tulip-Oldenburg" was introduced for the first time after remittal of the case to the opposition division and was not directly related to the prior art already on file."
  • "To assess whether feature e) of claim 1 was disclosed, the opposition division specifically analysed the videos D36 and D37. Their conclusion, that feature e) is not disclosed because the machine shown in the videos includes grippers which operate independently from the conveyor belts and are not connected thereto, clearly represents a technical assessment based on prima facie relevance examination which does not appear to violate the opposition division's discretionary powers.
  • Based on the prima facie finding of the distinguishing feature e), which feature e) was also not disclosed in any of the cited documents, the opposition division assessed the prima facie relevance of the alleged public prior use with respect to inventive step for the outcome of the case."
  • The OD did not admit the new attack based on an alleged public prior use. The Board sees no mistake in this decision.
  • "The case law of the Boards of Appeal does not establish a fixed or uniform standard for how deeply an opposition division must examine late-filed evidence when assessing prima facie relevance. This means that an opposition division must exercise its discretion under Article 114(2) EPC according to the particular facts before it, and that boards of appeal should only intervene if that discretion was exercised on the basis of wrong principles, without taking account of the right principles, or in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner (CLB, V.A.3.4.1b)."
EPO 
The link to the decision is provided after the jump.