T 1473/13 (I) - Unsearched claims

Key points

• This is the first post about this examination appeal, dealing with Rule 137(5). The second post will be about the request for stay and German constitutional proceedings.
• The Board applies Rule 137(5) EPC in my view entirely correctly.
• The Board, notes in connection with Rule 137(5): According to established case law [...], features added from the description to further define an element already a feature of the original main claim do not "affect the notion of unity of invention". Amended claims can only be refused if the subject-matter of the claims filed originally and that of the amended claims was such that, had all the claims originally been filed together, a further search fee would have been payable." 
• " The supplementary European search report was based on the claims as published. In the European search opinion, point 2.1, the search division objected that the claims did not meet the requirements of Article 82 EPC because the claims related to two separate inventions" 
• " The board agrees with the appellant that the features added from the description further specify rather than replace the originally claimed in-band signalling of the deterministic mapping and that these features do not affect the notion of unity of invention" 
•  the board is not convinced that if the claims underlying the appealed decision "had been present in claims at the search stage of the application it would have resulted in requesting an additional search fee" []. The claims of the main and first and second auxiliary requests relate to in-band signalling of deterministic mapping. Thus, they would have been included in the first group of claims identified in point 2.1.1 of the European search opinion. No further search fee was requested for claims within the first group. In view of the above, the examining division was incorrect in refusing the application for not meeting the requirements of Rule 137(5) EPC." 

EPO T 1473/13 - link

Summary of Facts and Submissions

I. The appeal is against the decision of the examining division dated 19 February 2013 refusing European patent application No. 06751124.6 pursuant to Article 97(2) EPC. The application was published as international application WO 2006/113929 A2.

II. The documents cited in the decision under appeal included the following: [...]

III. The decision under appeal was based on the grounds that the independent claims of the main and the two auxiliary requests did not meet the requirements of Rule 137(5) EPC. In the section "Further Remarks" of the decision under appeal, the examining division noted that the independent claims of the main request did not meet the requirements of Articles 83, 84 and 56 EPC and that the independent claims of the auxiliary requests did not meet the requirements of Articles 84 and 56 EPC.

[...]

Reasons for the Decision

1. The appeal is admissible.

2. Main, first and second auxiliary requests - Rule 137(5) EPC

2.1 Rule 137(5) EPC provides that amended claims may not relate to unsearched subject-matter which does not combine with the originally claimed invention or group of inventions to form a single general inventive concept.

According to established case law (see Case Law of the Boards of Appeal of the EPO, 8th edition 2016 ("Case Law"), section IV.B.5.4), features added from the description to further define an element already a feature of the original main claim do not "affect the notion of unity of invention". Amended claims can only be refused if the subject-matter of the claims filed originally and that of the amended claims was such that, had all the claims originally been filed together, a further search fee would have been payable.

2.2 The originally filed claims included independent method claims 1, 3, 5 and 7, all relating to signalling a deterministic mapping with the mapping inserted in a reserved field of a vestigial sideband data frame (claim 1), transmitted through spread spectrum (claim 3), transmitted through a signalling channel (claim 5), or transmitted from a second provider (claim 7).

The supplementary European search report was based on the claims as published.

In the European search opinion, point 2.1, the search division objected that the claims did not meet the requirements of Article 82 EPC because the claims related to two separate inventions:

(a) in-band signalling of deterministic mapping using a single transmission channel for both, (ATSC) VSB frames and mapping information describing the frame structure, while retaining full (VSB frame) synchronisation between both (method claims 1 to 4);

and

(b) out-of-band signalling of deterministic mapping in which the actual service content is transmitted from one service provider (e.g. ATSC broadcaster), while mapping information to access data in the content from the first service provider is transmitted independently in a separate signalling channel from a second content provider (method claims 5 to 8).

2.3 Claim 1 of the main, first and second auxiliary request specifies "transmitting an information signaling a deterministic mapping in each VSB data frame of an ATSC data stream".

2.4 The board agrees with the appellant that the features added from the description further specify rather than replace the originally claimed in-band signalling of the deterministic mapping and that these features do not affect the notion of unity of invention (see point XIV(a) above).

2.5 Even though the added features had not been "hinted at in the original set of claims" and addressed "the different, unrelated problem of increasing resilience to long burst errors [...] by deeper than legacy ATSC interleaving", the board is not convinced that if the claims underlying the appealed decision "had been present in claims at the search stage of the application it would have resulted in requesting an additional search fee" (see point XIII(a) above). The claims of the main and first and second auxiliary requests relate to in-band signalling of deterministic mapping. Thus, they would have been included in the first group of claims identified in point 2.1.1 of the European search opinion. No further search fee was requested for claims within the first group.

2.6 In view of the above, the examining division was incorrect in refusing the application for not meeting the requirements of Rule 137(5) EPC.

T1845/14 - Parameter and invention

Key points

• This opposition appeal decision deals with the question when an ambiguity in a claim becomes a matter of insufficient disclosure rather than only a clarity issue (clarity not being a ground of opposition).
• The Board is of the opinion that T0593/09 is incorrect where it proposes that the question is whether the skilled person is able to identify the technical measures necessary to solve the problem underlying the patent at issue" (this test of T0593/09 is now frequently applied).
•  "The present Board is, however, convinced that the ability of the skilled person to solve the problem underlying the patent in suit, when seeking to carry out the invention, is not an appropriate criterion for assessing sufficiency of disclosure where the problem is not part of the definition of the subject-matter claimed." 
• The Board notes that for inventive step, it is not required that the claimed subject-matter recites the features necessary to provide the advantages mentioned in the description. Even if a technical effect is to be denied, the claimed subject-matter can still be a non-obvious alternative.
• " In accordance with this approach for assessing inventive step consistently adopted by the boards of appeal, a claimed invention should not be precluded from patentability on the mere ground that the problem indicated in the patent as underlying the claimed invention in suit is subsequent to a necessary objective assessment not considered solved over the whole scope". 
• In other words, a subject-matter which does not solve the problem indicated in the patent in suit but is still considered inventive after the necessary reformulation of the problem can be considered to provide a contribution to the art justifying the extent of the patent monopoly."  
•  "The term "invention" corresponds, in accordance with Rule 43(1) EPC, to the specific combination of features in the claim, as was reminded in Opinion G 2/98" 
• " The Board does not see any reason to consider a different meaning of the term "invention" in relation to the issue of sufficiency of disclosure. There is no reason to define the invention on the basis of an effect alleged in the patent to be achieved by the claimed subject-matter or on the basis of specific conditions for measuring a parameter when the wording of the claim does not require this. This would amount to considering sufficiency of disclosure on the basis of a restricted reading of the claim. This is not done when assessing other patentability requirements, such as novelty and inventive step, and there is no apparent reason why sufficiency of disclosure should be assessed on a different basis." 
•  "There is, therefore, no reason to base the assessment of sufficiency of disclosure on the ability to find out which definition of a parameter in a claim or which conditions for its measurement are necessary or the patentee had in mind when drafting the patent in cases when this definition or these conditions are held to be necessary to ensure that the problem underlying the patent is effectively solved, but the problem itself or an effect derivable from it is not defined in the claims." 
• " The position of the Board is also supported by G 1/03 (OJ 2004, 413) in which, concerning non-working embodiments" 
• " The view expressed above could be perceived as a deviation from the above cited decisions or other decisions of the Boards of Appeal in which a criterion for assessing sufficiency of disclosure was whether the ambiguity of a parametric definition deprived the person skilled in the art of the promise of the invention. However, there is no need to refer a question to the Enlarged Board of Appeal as the diverging views arise from a different approach regarding the meaning of the term "invention" in relation to the issue of sufficiency of disclosure and the approach taken in the present decision is supported by [G2/98]." 
• The Board does not state a test in general, but rather denies inventive step based on argumentation which is restricted to the specific facts of the case. 

Headnote
In case of an unclear parameter defined in a claim whose values required in the claim are indicated in the specification to be essential to solving the problem underlying the patent at issue, the ability of the skilled person to solve that problem by reproducing what is claimed is not a suitable criterion for assessing sufficiency of disclosure when the problem or an effect derivable from it are not explicitly or implicitly part of the definition of the claimed subject-matter (point 9.8 of the Reasons).

EPO T1845/14 - link

Ability of the skilled person to solve the problem underlying the patent

7. The respondents had a separate line of argument in support of their objection of a lack of sufficiency of disclosure. They argued that the meanings of the SCDB and CDBI parameters were so ambiguous that the skilled person would have been unable to select the copolymers which allegedly provided the benefits of the invention described in paragraph [0011] of the specification, namely, a good dart drop impact strength.

8. The respondents relied in support of their case on decisions T 0593/09 of 20 December 2011, T 0815/07 of 15 July 2008 and T 0172/99 of 7 March 2002, the rationale of which needs first to be addressed.

8.1 In T 0593/09, the criterion applied for assessing sufficiency of disclosure was whether the unclear parameter of the claim was so ill-defined that the skilled person would not have been able, on the basis of the disclosure as a whole and using their common general knowledge, to identify (without undue burden) the technical measures (e.g. selection of suitable compounds) necessary to solve the problem underlying the patent at issue (point 4.1.4 of the reasons, emphasis by the present Board). The subject-matter claimed was a polyethylene terephthalate resin covered metal sheet characterised inter alia by a polyethylene terephthalate having a low temperature crystallisation (LTC) temperature ranging from 130 to 165ºC. The LTC temperature was highly dependent on the conditions for its determination which were not specified in the patent. A LTC temperature in the range defined in the claim was crucial in order to solve the problem addressed in the description. That problem was not part of the definition of the subject-matter claimed. According to T 0593/09 (point 4.1.5 of the reasons), the rationale of this test underlay decisions T 0608/07 of 27 April 2009 (reference being made to point 2.5.2 of the reasons for the decision), T 0815/07 (reference being made to the headnote) and the decision in Kirin-Amgen Inc v. Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd [2004] UKHL 46 of the United Kingdom House of Lords, reference being made to paragraph 126 of the latter.

T 0047/18 - The Board is too fast

Key points

• In this opposition appeal, the Board does not admit a new attack of the opponent.
• The Board reviews the procedural history of the case and then concludes " Thus, the appellant [opponent] could have raised the objections in question at several instances in the proceedings before the opposition division. There is, therefore, no sound reason to raise these objections at such a late stage of the proceedings, i.e. only about 2 months before the oral proceedings before the board." 
• "  In this context the appellant submitted at the oral proceedings that it was surprised that the summons had been issued only a little more than two months after the respondent had filed its reply to the grounds of appeal and that, had the oral proceedings taken place later, the objections would not have been filed only two months before them. However, this argument is flawed because these objections were, in any event, raised after the appellant had filed its statement of grounds, and this is what is decisive for the discretion under Article 13(1) RPBA." 
• Statement of Grounds filed 20.02.2018, reply filed 09.07.2018, summons 20.09.2018, oral proceedings 06.02.2019!
• The Board also comments on whether the attacks are facts or argument (in view of  the 'rule' that new arguments are always admissible T 1914/12)
• " Furthermore, the objections in question also do not constitute merely a new argument (cf. T 1914/12 []) because they go beyond submissions serving to underpin the facts, evidence and grounds filed in good time (see Keussen in Benkard, EPÜ, 3rd ed. 2019, Art. 110, paragraph 52). Rather, they are based on new legal grounds (cf. G 4/92, Reasons 10: "des moyens nouveaux") that were not addressed before in the appeal proceedings." 

EPO T 0047/18

IX. The arguments of the appellant, as far as relevant for the present decision, may be summarised as follows:

The objections raised in the letter dated 4 December 2018 should be admitted into the proceedings. They were raised for the first time after the expiry of the time limit for filing the grounds of appeal and after the issuance of the summons to oral proceedings. Had the board not have issued the summons so early, these objections would have been raised before the issuance of the summons.

Reasons for the Decision

1. Admissibility of appellant's objections under Articles 84 and 123(2) EPC

1.1 The statement of grounds of appeal contains neither an objection of lack of clarity of the claims nor an objection under Article 123(2) EPC. Rather, it contains only submissions with respect to inventive step. It was only after the parties had been summoned to oral proceedings that the opponent raised such objections (see V and IX above).

1.2 According to the established case law of the boards of appeal, new objections which were not raised in the statement of grounds of appeal, respectively in the reply to the grounds of appeal, are considered an amendment to a party's case. Admission of such objections is at the discretion of the board pursuant to Article 13(1) and/or 13(3) RPBA (see for instance T 996/15, Reasons 3.1, for a new objection under Article 84 EPC; T 682/11, Reasons 3.2, for a new objection under Article 123(3) EPC; T 1307/13, Reasons 3, for a new objection regarding the validity of the priority claim).

1.3 Furthermore, the objections in question also do not constitute merely a new argument (cf. T 1914/12, Reasons 7 to 7.2) because they go beyond submissions serving to underpin the facts, evidence and grounds filed in good time (see Keussen in Benkard, EPÜ, 3rd ed. 2019, Art. 110, paragraph 52). Rather, they are based on new legal grounds (cf. G 4/92, Reasons 10: "des moyens nouveaux") that were not addressed before in the appeal proceedings.

1.4 The boards of appeal must exercise this discretion in view of, inter alia, the current state of the proceedings and the need for procedural economy (Article 13(1) RPBA).

1.5 The present main request was filed as auxiliary request 2 in the proceedings before the opposition division by letter dated 31 July 2015. In its letter dated 4 March 2016, the then opponent objected to this request only for lack of inventive step (see page 9, item IV ). In its communication dated 15 September 2016 accompanying the summons, the opposition division stated that the amendments in auxiliary request 2 appeared to comply with, inter alia, Articles 84 and 123(2) EPC and that "this has not been challenged by the Opponent" (see item 19 of the communication). According to the minutes of the oral proceedings before the opposition division, the opponent had only objections under Article 56 EPC against this request (see item 8 and following of the minutes). Also, the impugned decision contains the same observation as in the communication accompanying the summons (see II above).

Thus, the appellant could have raised the objections in question at several instances in the proceedings before the opposition division.

There is, therefore, no sound reason to raise these objections at such a late stage of the proceedings, i.e. only about 2 months before the oral proceedings before the board. In this context the appellant submitted at the oral proceedings that it was surprised that the summons had been issued only a little more than two months after the respondent had filed its reply to the grounds of appeal and that, had the oral proceedings taken place later, the objections would not have been filed only two months before them.

However, this argument is flawed because these objections were, in any event, raised after the appellant had filed its statement of grounds, and this is what is decisive for the discretion under Article 13(1) RPBA.

Taking these aspects into account, considering the state of the file and in particular procedural economy, the board did not admit the appellant's objections under Article 84 and 123(2) EPC into the proceedings.

T 0725/14 - Transfer of priority

Key points

• In this opposition appeal, the opponent asserts that the priority is invalid because the applicant Avantium had assigned the priority right (to a company Furanix) during the priority while later filing the PCT application in its own name. Because the priority right had been assigned before, the applicant did not have it at the PCT filing date and the priority is invalid, according to the opponent (the assignment is visible in the file of the published priority application EP06075565.9)
• So, in this case, it is the patentee who asserts that his own assignment of the priority is invalid.
• "[T]he transfer of a priority right has to be assessed by applying national law (see for example T 0205/14 []). The national law that applies to the assignment of the priority right is in general determined by the conflict of law rules of the court seised, here the board. However, such rules are absent in the EPC and the law derived from the EPC and thus no guidance is given in establishing the applicable national law." The parties however agreed that Dutch law was applicable; moreover, the priority application is a European patent application and the parties are Dutch.
• The assignment document D17 had been validly signed (by one person validly acting for both assignor and assignee) and stated that Avantium "declares to have assigned all rights pertaining to European Patent application Nos. [.priority application at issue]" to Furanix.
• The Board finds that this is an assignment of the priority right as well and is effective as an assignment (despite not using "herewith assigns"). The Board takes into account the intent of the parties as required for the interpretation of contracts under Dutch law.
• " The fact that only two weeks after the assignment Avantium filed the parent application, invoking the right to priority, is not convincing proof of the alleged intention either. Possibly and more likely, it had been overlooked that the application would now have to be filed in the name of Furanix to invoke the priority right." 
• The Board also holds that the term "or" in Article 4 Paris Convention stating " "Any person who has duly filed...an application for a patent... or his successor in title, " is an exclusive or. Hence not both the assignee and assignor can claim the priority right.
• The patentee had also request correction of the applicant identity under Rule 139 EPC. The Board applies the test of G1/12 and finds that requirement A is not met (" The correction must introduce what was originally intended"). 
• " From the onset of these appeal proceedings, the respondent has consistently argued that the true intention underlying assignment D17 was for Avantium to retain the priority right for the invention disclosed in the priority application. Therefore, the true intention was not to file the parent application (II, supra) in the name of Furanix. In any case, no proof of such an intention has been provided." 
• Furthermore, the request was not filed "without delay" (requirement D of G1/12).

EPO T 0725/14 -  link

Assignment of the priority right under Article 87 EPC

4. As mentioned in II above, the contested patent results from a divisional application divided from the parent application PCT/EP2007/002146. This parent application was filed on 12 March 2007 in the name of Avantium. It claims priority from the application published as D1, also filed in the name of Avantium.

In the present case, the claimed priority right is thus valid only if Avantium had the right to invoke the right to priority based on the priority application when the parent application was filed. This is common ground between the parties.

However, it is disputed whether the priority right had been transferred to Furanix by way of document D17 before the parent application was filed, and if so whether this transfer invalidates the priority of the parent application and consequently of the opposed patent.

T 2249/16 - Broad but enabled

Key points

• In this examination appeal, the ED found that claim 1 is directed to an "extremely large number of possible compositions". Moreover, the claims were broad compared to the examples. The application was therefore refused under Article 83 EPC.
• The Board: " Dies alleine begründet keine mangelnde Offenbarung." . The Board notes that the description teaches a general concept for preparing the compositions, discusses it in detail and also gives examples.
•  "Die angefochtene Entscheidung führt keinerlei Gründe oder Argumente an, warum ein Fachmann nicht in der Lage sein sollte, das in Anspruch 11 definierte Verfahren auszuführen und demgemäß die in Anspruch 1 definierten Kompositleuchtstoffe zu erhalten." 
• The Board finds Article 83 to be complied with. 
•  The ED had also refused the application for lack of support under Article 84 because a number of the examples would actually be outside the pending claims.
• "  Nach Ansicht der Kammer ist diese Frage jedoch für die ausreichenden Stütze der Ansprüche durch die Beschreibung unter Artikel 84 EPÜ zweitrangig." 
• The ED had also argued that the description "  seien keine ausreichende Stütze für die Ansprüche. Die Ansprüche seien zu breit und beträfen eine Vielzahl möglicher Verbindungen und Verfahren." To me this seems to be a typical "the claims are too  broad" objection. 
• The Board fins this reasoning to be insufficient. " Die Kammer hält diese Begründung nicht für stichhaltig. Die beanspruchten Verfahren und Leuchtstoffe sind als solche in der Beschreibung wörtlich wiedergegeben. Das Herstellungsverfahren für die beanspruchten Kompositleuchtstoffe ist auf Seiten 14-19 in technisch nachvollziehbarer Weise beschrieben. Es wurden von der Prüfungsabteilung keine Gründe angeführt, aus denen hervorginge, dass die Beschreibung technisch unvollständig oder unglaubwürdig wäre. " 
• The ED had also repeatedly referred to Rule 137(5) EPC to challenge claims that were not limited to searched subject-matter. The Board points out (in r.6) that because unity of invention was never objected to, Rule 137(5) first sentence does not apply. The second sentence does not apply because no Communication under Rule 62a or 63 was issued during the search and because the search report had already been drawn up before 1 April 2010. 

EPO T 2249/16 - link

II. Der unabhängige Anspruch 1 des Hauptantrags, auf dem die Entscheidung beruht, lautet wie folgt:

Kompositleuchtstoff, umfassend eine anorganische Matrix und einen organischen Fluoreszenzfarbstoff,
wobei die anorganische Matrix aus einer Verbindung, ausgewählt aus der Gruppe, bestehend aus MgCO3, CaCO3, SrCO3, BaCO3, MgSO4, CaSO4, SrSO4, BaSO4, Mg3(PO4)2, Ca3(PO4)2, Sr3(PO4)2, Ba3(PO4)2, Mg3(PO4)2, LaPO4, ScPO4, GaPO4, InPO4, ZrO(HPO4), ZrO(H2PO4)2, Zr3(PO4)4, einschließlich Zr(HPO4)2 bzw. Zr(H2PO4)4, und Kombinationen davon, aufgebaut ist,
wobei der organische Fluoreszenzfarbstoff eine oder mehrere funktionelle Gruppen, ausgewählt aus Sulfatgruppen, Phosphatgruppen, Phosphonsäuregruppen, Phosphansäuregruppen oder Carboxylatgruppen, aufweist, über welche der Fluoreszenzfarbstoff mittels ionischer Bindung in die anorganische Matrix eingebaut ist,

T 0016/14 - Atttack not admissible

Key points

• In this opposition appeal, the OD had rejected the ground of Article 100(a) EPC as inadmissible, because the publication of the cited prior art document E1 was not proven. E1 is an author's manuscript of a published article. The opponent had offered the filing of the published article in the Notice of opposition and had filed it during the opposition procedure. The Board considers this evidence to be timely and the publication of the article to be proven. 
• Hence, the ground of Article 100(a) EPC is admissible.
• However, the opponent had in its statement of grounds only referred to the earlier submissions for the relevance of E1. This contravenes Article 12 RPBA that parties must set out the complete case in the statement of grounds (or the response). Furthermore the submissions before the OD on the point were not entirely clear. Hence, the attack is not admitted. 
• There is a further document E6 which was introduced by the OD with the summons. The Board agrees with the opponent that E6 is therefore automatically admitted in the procedure. 
• "  Unbeschadet der Möglichkeit einer Einspruchsabteilung, ein eingeführtes Dokument für technisch nicht relevant zu erachten, bietet das EPÜ keine Rechtsgrundlage für einen nachträglichen Ausschluss eines gemäß Artikel 114 (1) EPÜ von Amts wegen eingeführten Dokuments aus dem Verfahren, aufgrund einer im Laufe des Verfahrens festgestellten mangelnden technischen Relevanz dieses Dokuments." 

EPO T 0016/14 -  link

Entscheidungsgründe

1. Die Beschwerde ist zulässig.

2. Dokumente E1/E1a und E2/E2a - Regel 76 (2) c) EPÜ und Artikel 54 (2) EPÜ

2.1 Die Einspruchsabteilung hat in der angefochtenen Entscheidung die Substantiiertheit des Einspruchsgrundes nach Artikel 100 a) EPÜ verneint und dies damit begründet, dass eine Veröffentlichung des einzigen diesbezüglich angeführten Dokuments E1 nicht nachgewiesen worden sei (siehe Punkt 4.6 der Entscheidungsgründe).

2.2 Die Beschwerdegegnerin hat nicht bestritten, dass es sich bei dem mit der Einspruchsschrift eingereichten Dokument E1 um einen Autorenabzug (Autorenexemplar, Freiexemplar) handelt. Die Kammer merkt in diesem Zusammenhang an, dass die Bereitstellung eines solchen Autorenabzugs für den oder die Autoren eines Fachzeitschriftenartikels der üblichen Praxis entspricht. Die Autorenabzüge sind dabei inhaltlich identisch mit dem veröffentlichten Artikel. Wie von der Beschwerdeführerin vorgetragen wurde, hat die Beschwerdegegnerin keine inhaltliche Diskrepanz zwischen dem Autorenabzug und dem tatsächlich veröffentlichten Artikel geltend gemacht, sondern sie hat lediglich auf die äußerlichen Unterschiede abgestellt, die zwangsläufig aus der Einbettung des Artikels in den Rahmen der Fachzeitschrift resultieren.

2.3 Die Beschwerdegegnerin hat geltend gemacht, dass zum Zeitpunkt der Einspruchseinlegung noch nicht bekannt war, dass es sich bei dem Dokument E1 um einen Autorenabzug handele. Eine etwaige inhaltliche Diskrepanz zwischen dem eingereichten Autorenabzug und dem tatsächlich veröffentlichten Artikel wäre aber auch ohne diese Kenntnis ohne Weiteres überprüfbar gewesen, sodass das Argument der Beschwerdegegnerin nicht überzeugen kann. Die Bezeichnung der Veröffentlichungsstelle des Dokuments E1 war nämlich jedenfalls dergestalt, dass eine Überprüfung ohne unzumutbaren Aufwand möglich war. Überdies hat die Beschwerdeführerin bereits in der Einspruchsschrift die Vorlage des Originals, d.h. des tatsächlich veröffentlichten Artikels, angeboten (siehe Seite 3, letzter Satz der Einspruchsschrift). Der angebotene Beweis wurde von der Beschwerdeführerin durch Einreichung des Dokuments E1a am 11. September 2013 auch angetreten. Es kann somit keine Rede davon sein, dass die Dokumente E1a und E2a verspätet waren, was der Einspruchsabteilung einen Ermessensspielraum hinsichtlich ihrer Zulassung zum Verfahren eingeräumt hätte.

2.4 Das Dokument E1/E1a wurde darüber hinaus vor dem Prioritätstag (31. Oktober 2006) des Streitpatents der Öffentlichkeit zugänglich gemacht. Wie von der Beschwerdeführerin vorgetragen wurde, lässt darauf insbesondere die Tatsache schließen, dass E1a ausweislich des Titelblattes einen Hinweis auf, und insbesondere einen "Vorbericht" über die im Zeitraum 19. - 22. September 2006 stattfindende Fachmesse "InnoTrans 2006" enthält. Die Kammer kann der Beschwerdegegnerin nicht darin folgen, dass eine Veröffentlichung der September-Ausgabe nach dem Prioritätstag, d.h. erst im November erfolgt sein könnte. Dies widerspricht der Lebenserfahrung und die Beschwerdegegnerin wäre, wie von der Beschwerdeführerin vorgetragen wurde, in der Beweispflicht für das Vorliegen des gegenteiligen Sachverhalts gewesen. Die vorhergehenden von der Kammer getroffenen Feststellungen gelten auch für das Dokument E2 bzw. E2a.

2.5 Die Kammer ist daher zu dem Schluss gelangt, dass die Dokumente E1/E1a und E2/E2a Stand der Technik im Sinne des Artikels 54 (2) EPÜ bilden und damit nicht nur die Tatsachen, sondern auch die Beweismittel in Übereinstimmung mit Regel 76 (2) c) EPÜ im Hinblick auf den geltend gemachten Einspruchsgrund nach Artikel 100 a) EPÜ in der Einspruchsschrift angegeben waren. Der Einspruchsgrund nach Artikel 100 a) EPÜ wurde im Ergebnis ausreichend substantiiert in der Einspruchsschrift vorgetragen.

3. Berücksichtigung des Vorbringens hinsichtlich der Dokumente E1/E1a und E2/E2a im Beschwerdeverfahren

3.1 Hinsichtlich der Relevanz der Dokumente E1/E1a bzw. E2/E2a bezüglich der Patentfähigkeit des Gegenstands des Anspruchs 1 gemäß Hauptantrag enthält die Beschwerdebegründung lediglich einen Verweis auf die Einspruchsschrift sowie auf die erstinstanzlichen Schriftsätze der Beschwerdeführerin vom 9. August 2013 und vom 11. September 2013, d.h. auf das ganze schriftliche Vorbringen der Einsprechenden im erstinstanzlichen Verfahren.

3.2 Gemäß Artikel 12 (2) VOBK muss die Beschwerdebegründung den vollständigen Sachvortrag eines Beteiligten enthalten. Ferner sollen alle Tatsachen, Argumente und Beweismittel ausdrücklich und spezifisch angegeben werden. Es entspricht der ständigen Rechtsprechung der Beschwerdekammern, dass eine Begründung, die pauschal auf ein in der ersten Instanz vorgelegtes Vorbringen verweist, prinzipiell nicht ausreichend ist (siehe Rechtsprechung der Beschwerdekammern, 8. Auflage, Abschnitt IV.E.2.6.4.a)). Die von der Beschwerdeführerin zitierte Entscheidung T 95/10 lässt sich auf den vorliegenden Fall nicht übertragen, denn ihr liegt ein anderer Sachverhalt zugrunde. Dieser bezieht sich auf die Nichtauseinandersetzung der Beschwerdeführerin mit den die angefochtene Entscheidung tragenden Gründen, was vorliegend nicht in Frage gestellt wird. Punkt 5 der Entscheidungsgründe betrifft insbesondere den Fall, dass die Entscheidung der Einspruchsabteilung nicht auf die durch die Beschwerdeführerin im Einspruchsverfahren vorgebrachten Tatsachen und Argumente in der angefochtenen Entscheidung eingeht, und damit einen wesentlichen Verfahrensfehler begeht. Dieser Sachverhalt unterscheidet sich somit grundlegend von dem vorliegenden Fall, denn die in der Beschwerdebegründung genannten Schriftsätze sowie die in diesen dargelegten Argumente beziehen sich nicht auf die in der angefochtenen Entscheidung genannten Gründe, sondern sie legen die Relevanz der Dokumente E1/E1a und E2/E2a hinsichtlich der Patentfähigkeit des beanspruchten Gegenstands dar.

3.3 Auch aus den Worten "...to the extent necessary"... in Punkt 38 der Entscheidungsgründe der R 8/16 kann nicht abgeleitet werden, dass die Kammer die Schriftsätze der ersten Instanz zu berücksichtigen hat. Die Kammer versteht diese Worte so, dass Vorbringen, das für die in der Beschwerde zu behandelnden Fragen nicht relevant ist, nicht erneut vorgebracht werden muss.

3.4 Die Kammer stellt in diesem Zusammenhang fest, dass die Beschwerdeführerin zu keinem Zeitpunkt eine Zurückverweisung an die erste Instanz beantragt hat. Sie hätte daher zumindest damit rechnen müssen, dass die Beschwerdekammer selber in der Sache entscheidet, zumal die Einspruchsabteilung bereits in der angefochtenen Entscheidung den Dokumenten E1/E1a bzw. E2/E2a eine prima facie Relevanz abgesprochen hatte. Eine ausdrückliche substantielle Auseinandersetzung seitens der Beschwerdeführerin mit den Dokumente E1/E1a und E2/E2a wäre somit in der Beschwerdebegründung angebracht gewesen.

3.5 Die Kammer stellt darüber hinaus fest, dass die im erstinstanzlichen Verfahren in Bezug auf E1/E1a und E2/E2a vorgetragenen Argumente entgegen der Auffassung der Beschwerdeführerin auch nicht klar nachvollziehbar waren. So enthält die Einspruchsschrift naturgemäß keinerlei Bezugnahme auf den im späteren Verfahren geänderten Hauptantrag. Die weiteren Schriftsätze vom 9. August 2013 und 11. September 2013 beziehen sich zwar auf den geänderten Hauptantrag, die in diesen Schriftsätzen vorgetragenen Argumente sind jedoch nicht ohne Weiteres nachvollziehbar. So erfolgt im erstgenannten Schriftsatz die Diskussion der erfinderischen Tätigkeit des Gegenstands des Anspruchs 1 in den Abschnitten 4.1.1 bis 4.1.5 im Hinblick auf die Dokumente E1 und E5 sowie in Abschnitt 4.1 unter Bezugnahme auf weitere Ausführungen in dem Einspruchsschriftsatz (siehe Seite 6, 3. Absatz des Schreibens vom 9. August 2013). In Abschnitt 3 wird das Merkmal e) im Hinblick auf E1 erörtert, wohingegen dasselbe Merkmal in Abschnitt 4.1.6 im Hinblick auf E6 erörtert und festgestellt wird, dass der Gegenstand des Anspruchs 1 im Hinblick auf E1, E5 und E6 nicht auf einer erfinderischen Tätigkeit beruht. Zudem wird in dem besagten Schriftsatz vom 9. August 2013 eine Interpretation des Merkmals e) zugrunde gelegt, welche die Beschwerdeführerin im Beschwerdeverfahren ausdrücklich nicht weiterverfolgt hat (siehe Abschnitt 3 des Schreibens vom 9. August 2013). Die im Schriftsatz vom 11. September 2013 enthaltenen Argumente beziehen sich hingegen auf das Merkmal b) im Hinblick auf E5 sowie auf das Merkmal e) im Hinblick auf E6. Der Tatsachenvortrag bezüglich E1/E1a bzw. E2/E2a ist somit in den betreffenden erstinstanzlichen Schriftsätzen nicht dergestalt, dass die Argumente der Beschwerdeführerin in ihrer Gesamtheit ohne das Anstellen von Vermutungen nachvollzogen werden konnten.

3.6 Die Kammer ist daher zu dem Schluss gelangt, dass die Erfordernisse des Artikels 12 (2) VOBK durch den bloßen Verweis auf den erstinstanzlichen Vortrag im vorliegenden Fall nicht erfüllt sind, und das Vorbringen hinsichtlich der Dokumente E1/E1a und E2/E2a gemäß Artikel 12 (4) VOBK daher nicht im Beschwerdeverfahren zu berücksichtigen ist.

T 0116/14 - Purpose feature of device claim

Key points

• In this opposition appeal, the Board comments on the interpretation of the feature of claim 1 that it is a light source "for producing weight light", in view of the question whether D1 discloses this feature.
• The Board recalls that a purpose feature of a device claim requires that the device must actually be suitable for the recited purpose. This must follow from the features recited in the claim. The Board also notes that in this respect, features that are not recited in the claim are not relevant, even if they are not excluded by the open claim language, because otherwise, the claim would be unclear. 
•  For a prior art device to disclose the feature, it is required that the features actually disclosed already make the device suitable for the recited purpose, according to the Board.  
• Hence, a lack of novelty can not be based (as the OD did) on the argument that D1 does not exclude the presence of additional LED in the device which would make the device suitable for producing white light. Such an approach goes against the rules the above-mentioned rules for claim interpretation, according to the Board. 

Claim 1:

"1. Lichtquelle
(A)|zur Erzeugung von weißem Licht, |
|um­fas­send | ...

4.2.6 Es ist ständige Rechsprechung, dass eine Zweckangabe in einem Vorrichtungsanspruch - welcher beispielsweise mit den Worten "Vorrichtung für ..." oder "Gerät zur ..." beginnt - dahingehend auszulegen ist, dass die bean­spruch­te Vorrichtung in der Tat für den angege­benen Zweck geeignet sein muss (siehe T 287/86, Punkt 2.1 der Gründe; Rechsprechung der Beschwerdekammern des EPA, 8. Auf­lage 2016, Abschnitt I.C.8.1.5).

Die beanspruchten Merkmale der Vorrichtung müssen also in ihrem Zusammenwirken­ bereits die Eignung für den an­gege­benen Zweck ergeben. Es darf dabei nicht auf nicht-beanspruchte Merkmale ankommen, auch wenn diese durch eine offene Anspruchsformulierung, z. B. unter Verwen­dung von Ausdrücken wie "umfassend" und "ent­haltend", nicht ausgeschlossen sind. Ansonsten würde der An­spruch einen Klarheitsmangel aufweisen.

Für die Prüfung, ob eine Entgegenhaltung ein mit Hilfe einer Zweckangabe formuliertes Merkmal ("Zweckmerkmal") offenbart, ergibt sich daraus, dass die Entgegenhaltung das Zweckmerkmal nur dann offenbart, wenn die Attribute der in der Entgegenhaltung beschriebenen Vorrichtung, welche mit den anderen (neben dem Zweckmerkmal) bean­spruchten Merkmalen identifizierbar sind, in ihrem Zusammenwirken­ bereits die Eignung für den angege­benen Zweck ergeben.

Im vorliegenden Fall entschied die Einspruchsabteilung, dass Dokument D1 die beanspruchte Lichtquelle zur Er­zeu­gung von weißem Licht offenbare, da es durch die An­spruchsformulierung nicht ausgeschlossen sei, dass die Lichtquelle weitere LEDs enthalte (siehe Punkte 1.3.1.1 und 1.3.1.3 der Gründe).

Dies widerspricht nach Ansicht der Kammer jedoch der oben angeführten Auslegung der Zweckangabe in einem Vor­richtungsanspruch und der entsprechenden Neuheits­prü­fung. Die oben zitierten, mit den Merkmalen (B), (C), (E) und (F) identifizierbaren Attribute der aus Dokument D1 bekannten Lichtquelle sind nämlich allein genommen nicht bereits zur Erzeugung von weißem Licht geeignet. Dazu sind - wie oben unter Punkt 4.2.1 be­schrie­ben - zusätz­lich sowohl die Umwandlungsmittel 10 als auch die roten LEDs 7, 7' ... notwendig.

Folglich ist das Merkmal (A), dass die Lichtquelle zur Erzeugung von weißem Licht ist, im Dokument D1 nicht offenbart.

4.2.7 Zusammenfassend wird festgestellt, dass sich der Gegen­stand von Anspruch 1 des Hauptantrags von der aus D1 bekannten Vorrichtung dadurch unterscheidet, dass die Lichtquelle

(A)|zur Erzeugung von weißem Licht ist, 

T 1668/15 - Patenting software

Key points

• The Board applies in a straightforward way the rule that a claim directed to a computer program is not excluded from patentability by Article 52(2)(c) EPC if the computer program has a technical character. The computer program at issue has technical character because it runs on a control device for a rolling mill.

EPO T 1668/15 -  link

3. Artikel 52(c) EPÜ [sic!]

Anspruch 8 ist auf ein Computerprogramm gerichtet.

Nach ständiger Rechtsprechung ist ein Computerprogramm dann patentierbar, wenn seine Umsetzung einen technischen Charakter hat (siehe Rechtsprechung der Beschwerdekammern, 8. Auflage, 2016, Kapitel I.A.2.4.3).

Die von der Beschwerdeführerin zitierte Meinung der Großen Beschwerdekammer G3/08 enthält in Hinblick auf die Patentierbarkeit von Computerprogrammen keine einschlägigen weiterführenden Auslegungshilfen, da die Vorlage des Präsidenten des Europäischen Patentamts, die zu G3/08 führte, bereits unzulässig gewesen ist.

Das im erteilten Anspruch 8 definierte Computerprogramm weist einen Maschinencode auf, der unmittelbar von einer Regelanordnung ausführbar ist und dessen Ausführung eine Umsetzung der Regelanordnung gemäß Anspruch 1 in einem Walzgerüst bewirkt.

Das in Anspruch 8 definierte Computerprogramm weist daher zweifelsfrei einen technischen Charakter auf und fällt daher nicht unter die Ausnahmen von der Patentierbarkeit gemäß Artikel 52(c) EPÜ [sic!].

T 1437/15 - Admissibility attack

Key points

• In this opposition appeal, the patentee submits that the attack of the opponent under Article 123(2) EPC against the first auxiliary request should not be admitted, because it is a new objection that was not made earlier.
• The patentee cites G9/19, r. 19: "In order to avoid any misunderstanding, it should finally be confirmed that in case of amendments of the claims or other parts of a patent in the course of opposition or appeal proceedings, such amendments are to be fully examined as to their compatibility with the requirements of the EPC (e.g. with regard to the provisions of Article 123(2) and (3) EPC)." 
• The patentee submits that this means that in the appeal stage, only amendments made during the appeal stage can be examined. The Board states that this argument is incorrect because r.19 says  "opposition or appeal proceedings".
• The Board notes that it is not a question of a new ground of opposition in appeal, because the attack concerns the lack of basis of the amendment. Further, the prohibition of reformatio in peius applies to the legal effect of a decision, which is given in the order of the decision. It does not apply to attacks.

EPO T 1437/15 -  link

3. Änderungen - Hilfsantrag 1

3.1 Anspruch 1 des Hilfsantrags 1 beruht auf dem ursprünglich eingereichten Anspruch 1, wobei die Formulierung "mindestens eine gasphasenreduzierende Substanz" im Merkmal a) durch "Aktivkohle als eine gasphasenreduzierende Substanz" ersetzt wurde. Außerdem wurde die Formulierung "die gasphasenreduzierenden Substanzen" im Merkmal c) durch "die Aktivkohle" ersetzt. Damit entspricht dieser Anspruch unbestritten dem Anspruch 1 des im Einspruchsverfahren vorgelegten Hilfsantrags 1.

3.2 Die Patentinhaberin bestreitet (siehe ihr Schreiben vom 4 Februar 2019, Seite 8, erster Absatz), dass die während des Einspruchsverfahrens vorgenommenen Änderungen in Anspruch 1 des Hilfsantrags 1 im Beschwerdeverfahren nach Artikel 123(2) EPÜ überprüft werden dürfen, da während des Einspruchsverfahrens keiner der Einsprechenden einen solchen Einwand gegen diesen Anspruch erhoben habe. Dazu verweist sie auf die Stellungnahme G 9/91 der Großen Beschwerdekammer, und insbesondere auf Punkt 19 der Entscheidungsgründe.

Die Kammer sieht das anders:

T 1551/14 - Witness Declaration admissible

Key points

• In this opposition appeal, the opponent filed a declaration about a prior use. The Board has to decide on the admissibility of the declaration.
• From the headnote, in translation: A legitimate reaction on a change of the subject of the proceedings (here the filing of a new declaration under oath after the filing of a new auxiliary request) is as a general rule admissible. The objection, that that reaction is inconsistent with a previous submission, can as a rule not lead to the non-admission. 
• The OD had heard four witnesses in a first hearing. The OD had then announced that it considered the public prior use to be proven. The procedure was continued in writing. The patentee filed a new auxiliary request. Second oral proceedings were summoned. The opponent then filed a new witness declaration on the prior use and offered the witness for a further hearing. The OD did not hear the witness and held the declaration to be inadmissible.
• The Board can not agree with this course of proceedings. The declaration engaged with how the public prior use disclosed the feature added by patentee in the new request, which feature only became relevant with the filing of the new request. The declaration was hence also timely filed. Since the OD admitted the new request, it should have also admitted the declaration of the opponent. By deciding otherwise, the OD violated the right to be heard of the opponent.
• Furthermore, even if the declaration is inconsistent, this is not a ground for holding the declaration inadmissible, because doing so would violate the right to be heard of the opponent.
• However, in order to decide on the case, the witness declaration is not sufficient evidence. The Board finds the declarations to be not very credible because they follow the language of the claim of the patent closely.  
• " Es ist auch denkbar, dass Herr Deckert eine nicht von ihm selbst verfasste Erklärung unterzeichnet hat, was auch dafür sprechen würde, dass sie nicht genau den Inhalt seiner mündlichen Ausführungen widerspiegelt." 
• Therefore, the case is remitted for a hearing of the witness. The Board expressly points to the possibility to have the witness heard under oath by a national court (Rule 120 EPC).

EPO T 1551/14 -  link

EPO Headnote

Legitime Reaktionen auf die Änderung der Verfahrenslage (hier: Einreichung einer eidesstattlichen Erklärung nach Einreichung eines neuen Hilfsantrags) sind grundsätzlich zuzulassen. Der Einwand, dass sie zum bisherigen Vortrag im Widerspruch stehen, kann eine Nichtzulassung in der Regel nicht rechtfertigen (siehe Punkt 3.2 der Gründe).

Zurückverweisung mit der Auflage, die Zeugeneinvernahme fortzusetzen, ggf. unter Eid vor einem nationalen Gericht (siehe Punkte 8.5 und 9 der Gründe).

Entscheidungsgründe

1. Anzuwendendes Recht

Die Anmeldung, auf deren Grundlage das Patent erteilt wurde, war am 3. Juli 2004 eingereicht worden. Deshalb sind im vorliegenden Fall in Anwendung von Artikel 7 der Akte zur Revision des EPÜ vom 29. November 2000 (ABl. EPA 2007, Sonderausgabe Nr. 4, 217) und des Beschlusses des Verwaltungsrats vom 28. Juni 2001 über die Übergangsbestimmungen nach Artikel 7 der Akte zur Revision des EPÜ vom 29. November 2000 (ABl. EPA 2007, Sonderausgabe Nr. 4, 219) die Artikel 54, 56, 84 und 111 EPÜ 1973 sowie Artikel 117 und 123 EPÜ [2000] anzuwenden. Da die Regel 120 EPÜ [2000] dem Artikel 117 EPÜ zugeordnet ist, ist sie in Analogie zur Entscheidung J 10/07 der Juristischen Beschwerdekammer vom 31. März 2008 im vorliegenden Fall ebenfalls anwendbar.

2. Einführende Bemerkungen

Von besonderer Bedeutung in diesem Fall ist eine angebliche offenkundige Vorbenutzung, die im Folgenden kurz beschrieben wird.

Die Firma Unicor hat im Januar 2004 jeweils ein Paar von Muffenformbacken (cuff mould blocks) an die Firma Politejo verkauft (siehe Rechnung D2.3). Diese Muffenformbacken wurden noch im Januar 2004 versandt, ausgeliefert und bezahlt (siehe Versandauftrag D2.5, Bestätigung D2.7 und Belege für die Bezahlung D2.11) und somit der Öffentlichkeit zugänglich gemacht. Der Aufbau der gelieferten Muffenformbacken ist aus den Zeichnungen D2.1 und D2.2 ersichtlich. Durch die Lieferung der Muffenbacken sind die Informationen zu ihrem Aufbau in den Besitz der Firma Politejo (und somit der Öffentlichkeit) übergegangen, und zwar unabhängig davon, ob die Zeichnungen D2.1 und D2.2 der Firma Politejo übergeben wurden.

T 2291/15 - Essential features

Key points

• This examination appeal is about the requirement of "support" of Article 84 EPC.
• " It is established case law of the Boards of Appeal that the requirement under Article 84 EPC  as to clarity of the claims implies that all the essential features of the invention have to be indicated in an independent claim. The essential features are those features which are necessary for solving the technical problem with which the application is concerned" 
• The question is: what is " the technical problem with which the application is concerned"? Is it the objective technical problem - which is always defined in view of one prior art document? Or is it the "subjective technical problem" as is apparent from the description only? 
• Still in connection with Article 84, the Board states: " In the present case, the board agrees with the appel­lant in that the technical problem of the application cannot be considered the prevention of the presence of hydrogen in the oxide layer. Such a formulation­ con­tains a pointer to the solution of the invention, which should be avoided as it results in an inadmissible ex post facto approach when assessing inventive step." 
• This means that the "problem" under Article 84 needs to be formulated according to the same rules as the objective technical problem for inventive step? (although I understand the Board's point).
• The Board: " The description of the invention starts by outlining the relevant state of the art, in particular the use of sili­con nitride layers in semi­conductor devices in or­der to improve their electronic properties and to pro­vide an environmental barrier. However, when chemi­cal vapour deposition (CVD) is used to form such nitride layers, they tend to contain hydrogen due to the use of silane (SiH4) or ammonia (NH3) as pre­cursors in the CVD schemes. The hydrogen may [...] degrade device performance of semi­con­duc­tor devices made of Group III nitrides or silicon carbide [...] . These are thus considered the tech­nical problems with which the application is concerned." (emphasis added).
• As a comment, for inventive step, the provision is an alternative can be sufficient. Hence, for inventive step, the applicant is not required to put in the claim all (or any) the features mentioned in the description as solving some problem. Under Article 84 EPC it seems that the Examiner can require so even though the subject matter is otherwise patentable. 

EPO T 2291/15 -   link

Reasons for the Decision

1. Clarity

1.1 The independent claims of the main and first auxiliary request correspond - apart from minor clari­fications and a spelling correction - to the respective indepen­dent claims of the main and first auxiliary requests underlying the decision under appeal.

In the contested decision the examining division held that the feature that the sputtered nitride layers were hydrogen-free was essential for solving the problem of preventing the presence of hydrogen in the oxide layer. Since the independent claims of the main and first aux­il­iary requests pending at the time did not con­tain this feature they were unclear (see points 22 and 23 of the Reasons).

1.2 It is established case law of the Boards of Appeal that the requirement under Article 84 EPC 1971 [sic!] as to clarity of the claims implies that all the essential features of the invention have to be indicated in an independent claim. The essential features are those features which are necessary for solving the technical problem with which the application is concerned (see Case law of the Boards of Appeal of the EPO, 8th edition 2016, section II.A.3.2).

1.3 In the present case, the board agrees with the appel­lant in that the technical problem of the application cannot be considered the prevention of the presence of hydrogen in the oxide layer. Such a formulation­ con­tains a pointer to the solution of the invention, which should be avoided as it results in an inadmissible ex post facto approach when assessing inventive step.

The description of the invention starts by outlining the relevant state of the art, in particular the use of sili­con nitride layers in semi­conductor devices in or­der to improve their electronic properties and to pro­vide an environmental barrier. However, when chemi­cal vapour deposition (CVD) is used to form such nitride layers, they tend to contain hydrogen due to the use of silane (SiH4) or ammonia (NH3) as pre­cursors in the CVD schemes. The hydrogen may lead to parasitic capaci­tan­ces or de­graded ohmic contact characteristics and thus limit or degrade device performance of semi­con­duc­tor devices made of Group III nitrides or silicon carbide (see paragraphs [0006] to [0012] of the descrip­tion of the applica­tion). These are thus considered the tech­nical problems with which the application is concerned. 

1.4 According to the invention the nitride layers are de­posited using sputtering rather than chemical vapour deposition. In this manner the nitride layers are sub­stantially hydrogen-free thereby overcoming the above problems (see e. g. paragraphs [0034] and [0039] of the descrip­tion of the applica­tion).

In the decision the examining division was of the opin­ion that the sputtering technique would not auto­mat­ic­ally result in a hydrogen-free nitride layer, because other process parameters such as hydrogen contamination in the process chamber could lead to the presence of hydrogen in the nitride layer (see point 22.3 of the Reasons).

The board notes that sputtering is conven­tion­ally per­formed using a noble gas such as argon or kryp­ton as the sputtering gas filling the sputtering chamber in or­­der to avoid reactions with the target source mate­ri­al. Only when such reactions are intended in reactive sput­ter­ing schemes the gas may also comprise the de­sired par­ticles. Accordingly, in the present case of sputter de­positing nitride layers the gas comprises argon and nitro­gen (see e. g. paragraph [0053] of the description of the application). Hence, the board con­siders that under realistic conditions there is no hydro­gen present when nitride layers are sputter de­posited.

Consequently, the features related to the sputter de­posited nitride layers and the corresponding deposition steps as claimed in the independent claims of the main request and first auxiliary request (see features (a)-(c) and (d)-(e), respectively) overcome the tech­nical problems stated above thereby leading to improved de­vice per­for­mance.

The independent claims of the main request and of the first auxiliary request are thus considered to contain all the essential features of the invention.

1.5 In the independent claims of the second auxiliary re­quest it is explicitly specified that the sputtered nitride layers are hydrogen-free. Hence, the above issue concerning lack of clarity due to the absence of precisely this feature as an essential feature does not arise for these claims.

1.6 In view of the above the board is of the opinion that the claims of the main request and of the first and second auxil­iary requests meet the requirements of the EPC as to clarity of the claims (Article 84 EPC 1973 in combi­na­tion with Rule 29 EPC 1973).

2. Further procedure

In the decision under appeal only the requirement of the EPC as to clarity of the claims (Article 84 EPC 1973 in combi­na­tion with Rule 29 EPC 1973) was dealt with. The other requirements of the Conven­tion were not dis­cussed. In order to allow for the examination of these requirements in two instances, remittal of the case to the department of first in­stance under Article 111(1) EPC 1973 - as requested by the appellant - is deemed appro­priate.

Order

For these reasons it is decided that:

1. The decision under appeal is set aside.

2. The case is remitted to the department of first instance for further prosecution.

T 2029/13 - Unity of invention and old Rule 164

Key points

• In this examination appeal, the claim requests were not admitted by the ED under Rule 137(5) EPC because "their differentiating subject-matter with respect to the main request related to unsearched subject-matter associated with the second invention identified during the supplementary European search".
• When drawing up the supplementary European search report, the EPO found the claims to lack unity of invention and to relate to three different inventions. The SESR was drawn up for the first-mentioned invention. No invitation to pay additional search fees was issued. 
• "In accordance with Rule 164(1) EPC (in the version which entered into force on 1 April 2010; see Decision of the Administrative Council of 27 October 2009 amending the Implementing Regulations to the European Patent Convention, OJ EPO 2009, 582 (CA/D 20/09)), the SESR was drawn up  those parts of the application which related to the invention, or the groups of inventions within the meaning of Article 82 EPC, first mentioned in the claims, i.e. in the present case only claims 1 to 6".  This was a particularly harsh version of Rule 164 EPC (see e.g. T 1981/12 where "the Board can accept that the position in which the appellant finds itself was apparently not taken into account when R 164 was implemented and that it operates in a way which was probably not foreseen and may be thought to be unfair"; see also E.A. Kennington in epi Information 1/2009. Whether or not using Rule 137(5) EPC as the legal basis for the refusal, rather than G 2/92 (see here) was appropriate is an interesting question though obsolete since it concerns a now abolished version of Rule 164 EPC. 
• However, the board is of the view that claims 1 to 13 do not lack unity of invention (Article 82 and Rule 44 EPC). [...] claims 7 to 13 contain all the features of claim 1 and, hence, also the STF identified with respect to that claim 1, i.e. the horizon adjustment control.
• "Consequently, the search division should also have searched claims 7 to 13 of the SESR, including the features in those claims relating to the mounting mechanism, and the examining division should not have raised an objection under Rule 137(5) EPC against the second and third auxiliary requests underlying the decision under appeal on the grounds that claim 1 of those requests comprised unsearched features relating to the mounting mechanism."
• The Board remits the case. 

EPO T 2029/13 - link

Reasons for the Decision

1. The appeal is admissible.

Main and first auxiliary requests

2. The claims of the main and first auxiliary requests are respectively based on the claims of the second and third auxiliary requests underlying the decision under appeal, from which they differ only by the following amendments in claim 1 (additions are underlined, deletions are [deleted: struck-through]):

"... and the lens (26) and the image sensor (18) having an orientation that is adjustable with respect to the housing plane (20);

... to rotate the lens (26) and the image sensor (18) which [deleted: is ]are supported in rotational congruence with..."

3. The examining division did not admit the claims of the second and third auxiliary requests underlying the decision under appeal into the proceedings under Rule 137(5) EPC because "their differentiating subject-matter with respect to the main request related to unsearched subject-matter associated with the second invention identified during the supplementary European search" (see point 1.8 of the "Summary of facts and submissions" and the minutes of the oral proceedings).

4. Since the appellant's present main request and first auxiliary request are based on the second and third auxiliary requests underlying the decision under appeal, the board must review whether the examining division's decision not to admit the second and third auxiliary requests underlying the decision under appeal into the proceedings under Rule 137(5) EPC was correct.

5. In the present case, the version of Rule 137(5) EPC that entered into force on 1 April 2010 applies to the present application, because the supplementary European search report (hereinafter "SESR") under Article 153(7) EPC was drawn up on 22 December 2010, i.e. after 1 April 2010 (see Article 1(7) and Article 2(2) of the Decision of the Administrative Council of 25 March 2009 amending the Implementing Regulations to the European Patent Convention (CA/D 3/09), OJ EPO 2009, 299).

T 0352/16 - Filing request one month before

Key points

• In this appeal of the patentee in an opposition case, the Board reject the new main request as inadmissible. The request was filed one month before the oral proceedings.
• " In addition, no valid reason was given by the appellant [patentee] why the operative main request was filed only one month prior to the oral proceedings, [while] the Board's communication had been sent about 5 months before the date of the oral proceedings. " 
• A further issue is that the opponent had filed a response ("rejoinder") to the patentee's statement of grounds. The opponent had raised a new clarity objection in his response. The Board points out that this is not a reason to wait with filing a Main Request which addresses this clarity issue only shortly before the oral proceedings. 
• " The appellant argued that the main request was also submitted as an attempt to overcome the objection pursuant to Article 84 EPC put forward by the respondent in its rejoinder to the statement of grounds of appeal" 
• " However, the filing of a new request at such a late stage in a case where a relevant objection (here pursuant to clarity) was known from the beginning of the appeal proceedings does not satisfy the requirements of due process and the need for economy of the proceedings. In that respect, it makes no doubt that the appellant [patentee] could have replied to that objection earlier, e.g. in direct reply to the respondent's rejoinder to the statement of grounds of appeal, after having received the summons to oral proceedings or, at the latest, in direct reply to the Board's communication, which was sent about 5 months before the date of the oral proceedings." 

EPO T 0352/16 - link

Reasons for the Decision

1. Admittance of the main request

1.1 Since the main request was filed after the parties had been summoned to oral proceedings, its admittance into the proceedings is subject to the Board's discretion pursuant to Article 13(1) RPBA and underlies the additional stipulations of Article 13(3) RPBA.

[...]

In addition, no valid reason was given by the appellant [patentee] why the operative main request was filed only one month prior to the oral proceedings, whereby the Board's communication had been sent about 5 months before the date of the oral proceedings. In doing so, the appellant did not leave much time to the respondent to prepare properly its case, in particular in view of the issue indicated in section 1.2.2 above.

For these reasons, the appellant's argument according to which the operative main request constituted a direct reply to the Board's communication does not justify the filing of that request only one month before the date of the oral proceedings.

1.2.4 The appellant argued that the main request was also submitted as an attempt to overcome the objection pursuant to Article 84 EPC put forward by the respondent in its rejoinder to the statement of grounds of appeal and identified in the Board's communication as relevant for the main request filed with the statement of grounds of appeal.

However, the filing of a new request at such a late stage in a case where a relevant objection (here pursuant to clarity) was known from the beginning of the appeal proceedings does not satisfy the requirements of due process and the need for economy of the proceedings. In that respect, it makes no doubt that the appellant could have replied to that objection earlier, e.g. in direct reply to the respondent's rejoinder to the statement of grounds of appeal, after having received the summons to oral proceedings or, at the latest, in direct reply to the Board's communication, which was sent about 5 months before the date of the oral proceedings. Under such circumstances, also the objection pursuant to Article 84 EPC raised against the main request filed with the statement of grounds of appeal cannot justify the filing of the operative main request only one month before the oral proceedings before the Board.

1.3 In view of the above, the Board finds it appropriate, in the circumstances of the present case, to exercise its discretion under Article 13(1) RPBA and its power under Article 13(3) RPBA by not admitting into the proceedings the operative main request.

T 2556/16 - Inadmissible appeal

Key points

• The Board rejects the appeal of the opponent as inadmissible because it is not sufficiently substantiated under Rule 99(2) EPC, in particular for the finding of the OD that claim 1 was novel.
•  " In the statement of grounds of appeal, the appellant-opponent did not challenge the legal basis given in the appealed decision, nor did it provide any evidence based arguments relating to the common general knowledge of the skilled person, which could serve as a basis for overturning the Opposition Division's decision on this point. This would have been even more important as the Opposition Division explicitly held that the opponent had not provided, "...convincing corresponding evidence, i.e. basic textbooks, representing common general knowledge and disclosing features p and q in combination" 
• " The Board is rather faced with a bald, unsupported statement from the appellant-opponent, ("Eine entsprechende Anordnung gehört jedoch zum allgemeinen Grundwissen des Fachmannes ...".). Such a statement does not go beyond merely stating that the Opposition Division was incorrect". The Board refers to T 395/12; T 1581/08 and T 213/85." 

EPO T 2556/16 -  link

Summary of Facts and Submissions

I. The appeal of the appellant-opponent lies against the decision of the Opposition Division to reject its opposition against European patent No. 2 442 968.

II. The Opposition Division found that the patent as granted satisfied the requirements of sufficiency, novelty and inventive step (that is the heads of opposition under Articles 100(a) and (b) EPC were considered).

III. During the discussion of novelty under Article 100(a) EPC a key issue was whether document D1, read in the light of the common general knowledge of the skilled person, disclosed features "p)" and "q)" - see point 2.3.1 of the Opposition Division decision. The Opposition Division thought not. In particular, the Opposition Division found that the opponent had not provided, "...convincing corresponding evidence, i.e. basic textbooks, representing common general knowledge and disclosing features p and q in combination". This was also an issue in the discussion of inventive step.

IV. The Opposition Division further found that the generic disclosure of an "end switch" in document D1 did not take away the novelty of the more specific combination of features, "p)" and "q)" - see last paragraph, point 2.3.1 of the Opposition Division decision.

V. In its written statement of grounds of appeal, the appellant-opponent merely repeated its argument that features p and q were disclosed in document D1 in combination with the common general knowledge of the skilled person. No evidence on this common general knowledge, the absence of which had been a decisive issue before the Opposition Division, was provided by the appellant-opponent. Finally, the appellant-opponent referred to its written submissions in the proceedings before the Opposition Division.

VI. The respondent-patent proprietor replied to the statement of grounds of appeal in substance and requested the dismissal of the appeal.

VII. With communication dated 31 July 2018 pursuant to Rule 100(2) EPC the Board set out its preliminary opinion according to which the appeal appeared to be found inadmissible (Rule 101(1) EPC). The appellant-opponent did not file a response to this communication.

VIII. The appellant-opponent requested, that the patent be revoked.

Oral proceedings were not requested.

Reasons for the Decision

Remark

Since oral proceedings were not requested by the appellant-opponent the Board was in the position to take a final decision without arranging for oral proceedings.