T 1553/16 - Proprietary parameter

Key points

• In this opposition case, claim 1 is directed to a pipe comprising a polyethylene resin, the resin having a number of parameter features including "an F time in Jana Laboratories Procedure APTF-2 of at least 1000 hours, under the following conditions: ... (± 10 percent)".
• The Board finds the claim to be insufficiently disclosed.
• " in the absence of any information in the patent in suit on how to determine the F time feature, the skilled person has no idea which kind of installation should be used in order to carry out said test according to said procedure APTF-2, nor any knowledge of how the test is carried out and how a failure is identified. The mere indication of some parameters to be fulfilled (as indeed specified in claim 1 of the main request) is of no help if the skilled person does not know on which installation said parameters are to be set and how a failure is identified." 
• The patentee submitted that "the Jana Laboratories Procedure APTF-2 was an established procedure, which was publicly offered as a service by Jana Laboratories."
• The Board: "However, it is derivable from the fourth paragraph on page 1 of C9 that the testing methodology APTF-2 was kept secret (see wording "proprietary testing methodologies" and "proprietary analysis methodologies", whereby the emphasis is made by the Board), i.e. it was not available to the public." 
• "considering that the appellant has deliberately defined the subject-matter of operative claim 1 by the way of an - apparently - unusual parameter and using a method which was not shown to be commonly used in the art, it would have been its duty to provide full information how said method should be carried out. Since, as explained above, that requirement is in the present case not satisfied, there is a fundamental lack of technical information concerning the determination method of the F time feature according to the Jana Laboratories Procedure APTF-2 mentioned in operative claim 1, so that it is not possible to know what measures have to be taken to produce a pipe according to claim 1 as it is not possible to verify whether a product having the property as claimed is obtained. This amounts to a lack of sufficient disclosure." 
• The Patentee submitted that the issue was a matter of clarity. The Board "the issue at stake is not related to an alleged ambiguity in the determination of a parameter, which could indeed in some cases be a matter of clarity, but rather to a lack of essential information in order to run a specific procedure (namely the APTF-2 procedure), which was not shown to be usual in the art and which is necessary to determine an unusual feature (F time) mentioned in the operative claims. In other words the lack of information does not result in the claim being unduly broad or with unclear edges, but derives from the presence of a parameter which is in itself very specific, but whose method of measurement is kept secret. Therefore, the appellant's argument is rejected." 

EPO T 1553/16 - link

2. Sufficiency of disclosure

2.1 In order to meet the requirements of sufficient disclosure, an invention has to be disclosed in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by the skilled person, without undue burden, on the basis of the information provided in the patent specification, if needed in combination with the skilled person's common general knowledge. This means in the present case that the skilled person should in particular be able to prepare a pipe according to claim 1, which is disputed by the respondents.

2.2 The pipe according to claim 1 is characterised by a combination of structural features related to the definition of a polyethylene resin and of antioxidants which have to be mandatorily present, with the additional functional feature "an F time in Jana Laboratories Procedure APTF-2 of at least 1000 hours, under the following conditions: ... (± 10 percent)".

2.3 The respondents argued that the patent failed to provide fundamental technical information on how to measure said feature "F time".

2.3.1 In that respect, it is noted that that issue was already addressed by the parties in the first instance proceedings, but that the opposition division reached its decision under the assumption that the patent proprietor's arguments could be adhered to (see section V above: last sentence).

2.3.2 In addition, the opposition division's conclusion according to which said functional feature was not mandatorily implicitly satisfied by all the pipes falling under the structural definition of claim 1 (reasons of the decision: page 9, second and third paragraphs), which was further adhered to by the respondents, was not contested by the appellant, in particular during the oral proceedings before the Board.

2.3.3 Furthermore, it was undisputed that the sole information provided by the patent in suit in relation to said F time feature and to the Jana Laboratories Procedure APTF-2 is the one which is indicated in operative claim 1.

T 0767/18 - Appeal fee only

Key points

• In this examination appeal case, only a debit order for the appeal fee was filed (in the proper format). The Board decides that the debit order is not an implicit notice of appeal. 
• The Board: "It follows from the above that the debit order in the present case does not constitute the notice of appeal required to institute appeal proceedings. Nor is there any other document on file which contains anything that could be regarded as notice of appeal. Nor has the applicant submitted that notice of appeal was filed in the present case. The board therefore concludes that the decision of the examining division has not been appealed at all."
• The order is that: "For these reasons it is decided that: 1. No appeal has been filed. 2. The reimbursement of the fee for appeal is ordered." 
• As a comment, oral proceedings had not been requested. Note that the Board furthermore does not decide that the appeal is deemed not to have been filed.
• The debit order for the appeal was filed by an in house professional representative.

EPO T 0767/18 - link

Summary of Facts and Submissions

I. In its decision posted on 27 November 2017, the examining division refused European patent application No. 13 716 288.9 pursuant to Article 97(2) EPC.

II. On 6 February 2018, the appeal fee was paid by means of an electronically filed debit form. Said form cited the above application number, and contained the name and address of the representative of the applicant.

T 0170/14 - Novelty as a new ground

Key points

• In this opposition case, the only ground of opposition in the first instance opposition proceedings was lack of inventive step. The opponent raises a novelty attack in appeal. The Board looks at the headnote of G 7/95 about lack of novelty and lack of inventive step being separate grounds of opposition, and the finding therein that "the allegation that the claims lack novelty in view of the closest prior art document may be considered in the context of deciding upon the ground of lack of inventive step " 
• The present Board: "The Enlarged Board considered only the case of the closest prior art destroying novelty; other documents were not mentioned. In the Board's opinion, however, it would seem odd not to apply this principle to other documents, since other such documents could always be used in a discussion of lack of inventive step".
• As a comment, the underlying issue is G10/91, hn.3: "Fresh grounds for opposition may be considered in appeal proceedings only with the approval of the patentee" with the underlying reasoning in G9/91, r.18. Under current Art.12(4) RPBA 2007, novelty attacks based on documents (evidence) newly cited in appeal can already be held inadmissible. Under Art.12(6) RPBA 2020, the new attack (objection) can still be held inadmissible if it could have been submitted earlier, even if based on documents already cited during the first instance proceedings. 
• The difficulty is the Enlarged Board opted for a prohibition of new grounds - not a discretionary power - in G 10/91 whereas Art. 12 RPBA sets a discretionary power. I'm not sure if the Boards can make further exceptions to G10/91 besides the one of G7/95. If G10/91 is considered as too restrictive, a new referral may be considered. I also note that for the closest prior art document, the whole teaching of that document is considered in order to determine the distinguishing features whereas secondary references can be cited for only teaching the  distinguishing feature(s) at issue. 

T 0170/14 - link


3. Main request - novelty

The appellant/opponent considered that both D3 and D5 anticipated the subject-matter of claim 1.

The only ground for opposition present in the notice of opposition and used in the opposition proceedings was lack of inventive step. Pursuant to G 7/95 (OJ EPO 1996, 626), the respondent/patent proprietor considered that the only document which could be used for a lack of novelty objection under the ground for opposition of lack of inventive step was the closest prior art as mentioned in the above decision.

In decision G 7/95, the Enlarged Board of Appeal decided that: "In a case where a patent has been opposed under Article 100(a) EPC on the ground that the claims lack an inventive step in view of documents cited in the notice of opposition, the ground of lack of novelty based upon Articles 52(1), 54 EPC is a fresh ground for opposition and accordingly may not be introduced into the appeal proceedings without the agreement of the patentee. However, the allegation that the claims lack novelty in view of the closest prior art document may be considered in the context of deciding upon the ground of lack of inventive step."

More explicitly, in the reasons for the decision the following was stated:
"7.2 Nevertheless, in a case such as that under consideration in the decision of referral in case G 7/95, if the closest prior art document destroys the novelty of the claimed subject-matter, such subject-matter obviously cannot involve an inventive step. Therefore, a finding of lack of novelty in such circumstances inevitably results in such subject-matter being unallowable on the ground of lack of inventive step."

The Enlarged Board considered only the case of the closest prior art destroying novelty; other documents were not mentioned. In the Board's opinion, however, it would seem odd not to apply this principle to other documents, since other such documents could always be used in a discussion of lack of inventive step, so lack of novelty in view of D3 or D5 could be examined in the present case under the ground for opposition of lack of inventive step.

T 0011/15 - Admissibility CGK docs before OD

Key points

• The OD had decided to not admit late-filed documents E8-E12. The Board approves of this, or at least does not overrule this decision of the OD.
• The Board: "Das Argument der Einsprechenden, wonach laut T 106/97 und T 1076/00 Belege für das allgemeine Fachwissen nicht verspätet seien, sei auf den vorliegenden Fall nicht anwendbar, da im vorliegenden Fall das Fachwissen nicht in Frage gestellt worden sei. Diese Dokumente seien also nicht in Reaktion auf einen Einwand der Einspruchsabteilung eingereicht worden " 
• The Board, in particular, considers whether or not E8-E12 were filed (with the Rule 116 submissions) in response to some specific issue raised by the OD in the summons. The Board find that the documents were not actually a response to such an issue raised by the OD and were hence late-filed. 
• In the following, the Board appears to indicate that the opponent can not file a common general knowledge document with by the Rule 116 date to make some point that should have been made with the Notice of Opposition.
• " Die Kammer stimmt mit der Auffassung der Einspruchsabteilung in der angefochtenen Entscheidung überein, dass im vorliegenden Fall das Fachwissen, wonach die Messgröße pH-Wert einen Bezug zu einem Wasser-Analysegerät habe und auf ein Wasser-Analysegerät hinweise, von der Einspruchsabteilung im Ladungsbescheid nicht bestritten wurde. Die Dokumente E8 - E12 wurden von der Einsprechenden eingereicht, um zu belegen, dass Wasser-Analysegeräte üblicherweise u.a. pH-, Temperatur- und Trübungssensoren umfassten (vgl Schreiben der Einsprechenden vom 28. Februar 2014, Seite 7, 2. und 3. Absatz). Die Dokumente E8 - E12 bestätigen somit bezüglich des pH-Wertes lediglich die vorläufige Meinung der Einspruchsabteilung im Ladungsbescheid, dass ein pH-Wert auf ein Wasser-Analysegerät hinweist. Die zusätzliche Aussage, dass Wasser-Analysegeräte üblicherweise u.a. auch Temperatur- und Trübungssensoren umfassen, wurde erstmals im Schreiben der Einsprechenden vom 28. Februar 2014 vorgebracht und konnte daher von der Einspruchsabteilung im Ladungsbescheid nicht in Frage gestellt werden. Diese zusätzliche Aussage mit den entsprechenden Dokumenten hätte die Einsprechende daher schon mit Einspruchsschrift einreichen können und müssen, denn das Dokument E2 bezieht sich nicht nur auf pH-Sensoren, sondern auch auf andere Sensoren und vor allem auf Temperatursensoren." 
• "Die Dokumente E8 - E12 und E14 wurden somit verspätet eingereicht und die Einspruchsabteilung hatte ein Ermessen nach Artikel 114 (2) EPÜ, diese Dokumente in das Einspruchsverfahren nicht zuzulassen." 

T 0011/15 -  link

Entscheidungsgründe

1. Zulassung der Dokumente E8 - E12 und E14, sowie E15 und E16 (Artikel 12 (4) VOBK)

1.1 Die Einspruchsabteilung hat die Dokumente E8 - E12 und E14 nicht in das Verfahren zugelassen, weil sie verspätet eingereicht worden seien und die darin offenbarten Lehren nicht prima facie für den Gegenstand des Streitpatents relevant seien. Die Dokumente E8 - E12 beschrieben allgemein Wasseranalysegeräte, bzw. den Aufbau eines pH-Sensors. Das Dokument E14 beschreibe einen Durchflussmesser, der einen Medienwechsel erkenne. Das Argument der Einsprechenden, wonach laut T 106/97 und T 1076/00 Belege für das allgemeine Fachwissen nicht verspätet seien, sei auf den vorliegenden Fall nicht anwendbar, da im vorliegenden Fall das Fachwissen nicht in Frage gestellt worden sei. Diese Dokumente seien also nicht in Reaktion auf einen Einwand der Einspruchsabteilung eingereicht worden (vgl. Entscheidungsgründe, Punkt 10).

T 1003/19 - Appeal against grant

Key points

• The patentee appeals against the grant of the patent, with success. 
• " Whereas the appellant neither by its letter dated 7 June 2018 nor by any prior letter requested the grant of a patent with any other than the 7 drawing sheets as initially submitted and published, the communication under Rule 71(3) EPC dated 13 August 2018 refers only to "drawings, sheets 1/1 as published"." 
• " The consequence as stipulated in Rule 71(5) EPC, i.e. "the applicant ... shall be deemed to have approved the text communicated to him under paragraph 3", only applies where the applicant, according to Rule 71(3) EPC, has been informed "of the text in which it [i.e. the examining division] intends to grant" the patent. The meaning of the word "text" (in German: "Fassung") is not limited to written information but may contain visual information" 
• " Under normal circumstances, it is to be assumed that the text referred to in a communication under Rule 71(3) EPC reflects the true will of the examining division and is therefore identical to the text on the basis of which the grant of the patent is intended." 
• " In the present case, however, there is sufficient evidence to conclude that this was not the case" 
• The appeal is admissible and allowable. However, the appeal fee is not refunded.
•  " The fact that a narrow interpretation of Rule 71(3) and (5) EPC as proposed by this board and by the board in decision T 2081/16 [...] allows for an appeal to be treated as admissible should not be misinterpreted as an invitation to neglect the applicant's duty to carefully check both the communication and the "Druckexemplar" sent to it under Rule 71(3) EPC." 

EPO Headnote

1. Rule 71(5) EPC only applies where the text intended for grant has been communicated to the applicant according to Rule 71(3) EPC (see Reasons 2.4).

2. The fact that the list of documents intended for grant neither corresponds to any request of the applicant nor to any amendment explicitly suggested by the examining division is sufficient to indicate that the communication under Rule 71(3) EPC does not contain the text intended for grant; the existence of discrepancies between the text of the communication and the "Druckexemplar" may be another indication (see Reasons 2.4.4).

3. Differentiation from G 1/10 (see Reasons 4).

4. Where the applicant could have noticed an apparent discrepancy between the text of the communication under Rule 71(3) EPC and the "Druckexemplar", the reimbursement of the appeal fee is not equitable by reason of a substantial procedural violation (see Reasons 5).

Summary of Facts and Submissions

I. This appeal of the applicant (appellant) lies from the decision of the examining division dated 7 January 2019 to grant a patent on the basis of application documents as indicated in a communication under Rule 71(3) EPC dated 13 August 2018 following examination of European patent application No. 11846831.3, which was filed on 7 December 2011 as an international application with publication No. WO 2012/076981 A1.

J 0016/96 - Competence to interpret

Key points

• Today, by way of exception, an old decision J 16/96 wherein the Legal Board sheds some light on the competence of the Administrative Council to take binding decision on the interpretation of legal provisions.
• The Legal Board: "Under Article 33 (1)(b) EPC, the Administrative Council of the European Patent Organisation is competent to amend the Implementing Regulations. However, the Convention does not expressly authorise the Administrative Council to take generally binding decisions on the interpretation of the Convention."
• As a comment, the phrase "however" in my view indicates that even though the AC is competent to amend the Implementing Regulations, this does not mean that the AS is competent to "take generally binding decisions on the interpretation of the Convention". In J 16/96, the interpretative decision at issue was a special decision (not laid down in the Implementing Regulations, but only in the minutes of the AC meeting) but the reasoning of the Legal Board appears to extend to the AC laying down binding decision on the interpretation of the EPC by amendment of the Implementing regulations.
• The Legal Board: "In the law of international organisations, it is a recognised principle that bodies competent to lay down internal law may claim a corresponding degree of competence to interpret that law". This appears to mean that the AC has a "degree to competence" to interpret the Implementing Regulations (since the AC is competent to lay down the Implementing Regulations). However, the cited passage does not support the position that the AC is competent to interpret the EPC Articles which are laid down (not by the AC, but) by the Diplomatic Conference (together with ratification).  
• The AC decision at issue (to be found in the minutes of the 4th AC meeting, according to the Legal Board J16/96; these minutes are secret as a far as I know) concerned "the interpretation of the provision of Rule 101(9) EPC [1973] [ R.152(11)]"
• The Legal Board: "In so far as the decision on a matter of interpretation - as in the present case - concerns a provision of the Implementing Regulations, the Administrative Council acted within the scope of its authority." So, the AC was competent to interpret Rule 101 EPC 1973. 

J 0016/96 - link

2.1 Under Article 33 (1)(b) EPC, the Administrative Council of the European Patent Organisation is competent to amend the Implementing Regulations. 
However, the Convention does not expressly authorise the Administrative Council to take generally binding decisions on the interpretation of the Convention.

In the law of international organisations, it is a recognised principle that bodies competent to lay down internal law may claim a corresponding degree of competence to interpret that law (see Seidl-Hohenveldern, Das Recht der Internationalen Organisationen (...), 5th ed., p. 233, No. 1614). 
In so far as the decision on a matter of interpretation - as in the present case - concerns a provision of the Implementing Regulations, the Administrative Council acted within the scope of its authority. The appellants have not disputed this.

T 0868/18 - Form refusal, appeal inadmissible

Key points

• This is an appeal against a form refusal (with Form 2061). There is no substantial procedural violation. Rather, the appeal is inadmissible.
• "The applicant lodged an appeal against the decision of the examining division which referred to the examining division's communications dated 6 April 2017 (communication C1) and 3 June 2016 (communication C2), refusing European patent application No. 06847717.3 on the basis of Article 97(2) EPC because the set of claims then on file did not fulfil the requirements of Articles 123(2) EPC, Article 56 EPC 1973 and Article 54(3) EPC."
•  The Board notes that: "[t]he present statement of grounds of appeal, however, does not contain such reasons for setting aside the decision relating to the objections raised under Articles 123(2) and 54(3) EPC. The amendment of claim 1 according to the main and sole request filed with the statement of grounds of appeal, consisting in moving a feature from the characterising portion of the claim to the preamble of the claim, is also not suitable to overcome these objections. Therefore, the appeal is inadmissible (Rule 101(1) EPC)."

EPO T 0868/18 -  link

Summary of Facts and Submissions

I. The applicant lodged an appeal against the decision of the examining division which referred to the examining division's communications dated 6 April 2017 (communication C1) and 3 June 2016 (communication C2), refusing European patent application No. 06847717.3 on the basis of Article 97(2) EPC because the set of claims then on file did not fulfil the requirements of Articles 123(2) EPC, Article 56 EPC 1973 and Article 54(3) EPC.

II. With the statement setting out the grounds of appeal, the applicant filed a new set of claims 1 to 9 and requested that the decision of the examining division be set aside and a patent be granted on the basis of this set of claims.
[...]

Reasons for the Decision

1. Admissibility of the appeal

1.1 With the statement of grounds of appeal, the applicant filed an amended set of claims as its main and sole request. The only amendment made in this new set of claims consisted in that claim 1 had been amended by moving the feature "a black matrix (39) separating said plurality of phosphor elements" to the preamble of the claim. In addition, the appellant presented arguments in favour of inventive step of the claimed subject-matter over the prior art documents.

No arguments dealing with the examining division's objections under Article 123(2) EPC and Article 54(3) EPC were submitted with the statement setting out the grounds of appeal.

T 2307/15 - Incomplete faxed Statement of grounds

Key points

• A Statement of grounds is sent by fax. The fax is incomplete, various paragraphs of the Statement are missing (however, the signature is included). This does not make the appeal inadmissible.
• "The Board finds that although some paragraphs are missing in the statement setting out the grounds of appeal filed by the appellant on 15 February 2016 when compared with the version filed on 16 February 2016, the document received by the EPO on 15 February 2016 still allows the reader to understand the reasons according to which the appellant requests the impugned decision to be set aside and the facts and evidence on which the appeal is based."
• "Since the reasons for setting aside the decision impugned and the facts and evidence on which the appeal is based are evident to the Board as well as to the respondent from the statement setting out the grounds of appeal filed by fax on 15 February 2016, the latter is considered to properly define the appellant's case in accordance with Rule 99(2) EPC and Article 12(2) RPBA." 
• The Board adds that: "the recent dissenting decision T 858/18 of Technical Board of Appeal 3.5.02 of 20 May 2019 [...] concerning the issue of admissibility of an opposition remains an isolated decision in an individual case based on a factual basis different from the current case, which is marked by the specific purpose of the requirements of an admissible appeal explicitly provided for in Article 12(2) RPBA and in Rule 99(2) EPC."

EPO  T 2307/15 -  link

2. Admissibility of the appeal

2.1 The respondent argues that, pursuant to Article 108, second sentence, EPC in combination with Rule 131(1) and (4) EPC, the delay for filing the statement setting out the grounds of appeal expired on 15 February 2016. The statement received by facsimile on that day was incomplete and therefore the document shall be deemed as not have been received by the EPO. That the appellant re-sent a complete statement of the grounds of appeal on 16 February 2016 was not to be taken into account because this occurred only after the due date.

The respondent further argues in reply to the Board's communication pursuant to Article 15(1) RPBA that the first issue to be addressed is not whether the incomplete statement of grounds of appeal complies with the requirements of Rule 99(2) EPC but rather whether the incomplete statement of grounds of appeal should be considered as properly received at the EPO. Article 6 of the decision of the President of the EPO dated 12 July 2007 (special edition No. 3 OJ EPO, A.3) should be taken into account together with Rule 2(1) EPC and accordingly the fax sent on 15 February 2016 shall be deemed not to have been received at the EPO.

Hence, the appeal should be rejected as inadmissible according to Rule 101(1) EPC.

2.2 The appellant reacted neither to this objection of the respondent nor to the Board's communication pursuant to Article 15(1) RPBA.

T 0694/16 - Insufficient disclosure of patient group

Key points

• "Since claim 1 is drafted under Article 54(5) EPC, attaining the claimed therapeutic effect is a functional technical feature characterising the claim. Thus, the issue of whether the claimed therapeutic method can be carried out and the purported effect achieved is relevant in the context of the assessment of sufficiency of disclosure (G 1/03, see point 2.5.2). [...] 
• "In the present case, for the therapeutic method to be carried out and the effect to be achieved, the skilled person must, in the first place, be able to identify patients that are in need of treatment and will benefit from the administration of the claimed composition. The selection of this patient group is an essential part of the claimed method. To identify these patients, the skilled person has to rely on the technical information in the patent (and the patent application) and on the common general knowledge available at the date of filing. [...] 
• "the patent teaches that prodromal patients are persons who score positively on at least one of a restricted list of criteria. Claim 1, however, does not mention those criteria; rather, it refers to unspecified "characteristics of a prodromal patient".
• "The difficulty in identifying further "characteristics" is highlighted by the fact that the patent acknowledges that other manifestations, such as "mild cognitive impairment" which can be observed before the onset of Alzheimer's disease, are not sufficient to consider a person to be a "prodromal patient" [..]. Thus, an entire research programme would have to be conducted in order to identify further criteria beyond those explicitly identified in paragraphs [0016-0019]. This would put an undue burden on the skilled person wishing to carry out the invention over the entire scope of claim 1. Thus, the invention identified in the main request does not meet the requirement of sufficiency of disclosure (Articles 83 and 100(b) EPC).
• Edit 17.02.2020: the following passage seems also important: “For this reason, the issue of whether patients displaying the markers of claim 1 were present among a population of previously treated patients and were already "inevitably" or "inherently" treated is irrelevant for assessing novelty in the present case. The only thing which counts is that D1 and D3 do not disclose a method whereby a patient or a group of patients displaying the relevant CSF markers but not affected by dementia was purposively and selectively targeted for carrying out the preventive treatment defined in claim 1.” (r. 5.14). (See also the headnote below, which can only be found in the PDF file).

EPO Headnote (only in PDF file)

If a claim is directed to a known compound or composition for use in a therapeutic method of treatment or prevention of a disease, and the claim specifies that the subject to be treated displays a clearly defined and detectable marker, which is not displayed by all subjects affected by or likely to develop that disease, then the purposive selection of the patients displaying the marker for the specified treatment is a functional feature characterising the claim.

T 0694/16 -  link

Main request

2. Sufficiency of disclosure

2.1 Claim 1 of the main request is drafted in accordance with Article 54(5) EPC and relates to a composition comprising omega-3 fatty acids, uridine derivatives, a methyl donor and other ingredients, for use in the prevention or delay of the onset of dementia in a person having "characteristics" of a prodromal dementia patient.

2.2 Dementia is a disease induced by a progressive degeneration of the brain cells affecting, for example, the hippocampus. The disease is accompanied by a gradual decrease in the ability to think and remember to such an extent that it interferes with a person's daily functioning. Alzheimer's disease is the most common form of dementia. The pathogenic process of dementia is believed to start long, even decades, before the clinical onset of the disease.

T 0657/17 - Interlocutory revision going wrong

Key points

• In this case, the application was refused on 03.08.2016. The applicant files an appeal. On 14.03.2017, the Examining Division filled in and signed a Form 2701 granting interlocutory revision; the applicant was informed accordingly. At the same time, "the case was referred to the Board of Appeal for a decision on a request for reimbursement of the appeal fee after rectification of the appeal". However, the applicant had not requested a refund of the appeal fee.
• " According to decision G 3/03, the issue of reimbursement of the appeal fee should therefore not have been referred to the Board for decision (see point 2 above)." 
• The ED had not taken any action after 2017. 
• The Board "A second copy of Form 2701 is on file which appears to be intended to retract the examining division's decision of 14 March 2017 rectifying its decision of 3 August 2016 and to replace it by an order stating that the decision under appeal is not rectified. It is not clear, when and by whom the initial order to rectify the decision dated 3 August 2016 was amended, since this was simply done by crossing out the order granting rectification on the original Form 2701 signed by the examiners." 
• " There is no evidence on file that the appellants had previously been informed of a retraction by the examining division of its decision granting interlocutory revision pursuant to Article 109(1) EPC. As from 31 March 2017 at the latest, the decision ordering rectification could no longer be amended. Therefore, the Board holds that the appeal was allowed by the examining division in accordance with Article 109(1) EPC and duly notified to the appellants. Consequently, there is no appeal pending before the Board." 
• The Board's order is that the case is remitted to the OD.

EPO T 0657/17 - link

Summary of Facts and Submissions

I. European patent application 03 729 689.4 was refused by the examining division by decision posted on 3 August 2016. On 16 September 2016, a notice of appeal was filed and the appeal fee was paid on the same day. On 13 December 2016, the appellants filed the statement setting out the grounds of appeal and requested that a patent be granted on the basis of an amended set of claims filed therewith. No request for reimbursement of the appeal fee was filed.

II. On 14 March 2017, the examining division rectified the decision under appeal by crossing the respective box on the internal (non-public) Form 2701. This was communicated to the appellants on 21 March 2017, by the use of Form 2710, which stated that following the appeal of 16 September 2016, rectification was ordered and the decision dated 3 August 2016 was set aside. The appellants were also informed that their request for reimbursement of the appeal fee could not be allowed and that this request would be forwarded to the Board of Appeal for decision.

III. On 14 March 2017, the case was referred to the Board of Appeal for a decision on a request for reimbursement of the appeal fee after rectification of the appeal.

Reasons for the Decision

1. As an exception to the devolutive effect of an appeal and in the interest of procedural expediency and economy, Article 109(1) EPC provides that the department of the first instance which rendered the decision under appeal has to rectify its decision, i.e. to grant interlocutory revision, if it considers the appeal to be admissible and well-founded, and the appellant is not opposed by another party. According to G 3/03, in case of interlocutory revision the decision under appeal is set aside and the appeal allowed by the department of the first instance. As a consequence, the appeal is no longer pending and will not be remitted to a board of appeal unless reimbursement of the appeal fee is contentious (G 3/03, OJ EPO 2005, 344, point 2).

2. In G 3/03 the Enlarged Board further stated that it followed from the wording of Rule 67 EPC 1973 (now Rule 103(1)(a) EPC) that the department of the first instance had to examine whether the requirements for reimbursement of the appeal fee were met, regardless of whether or not the appellant had actually submitted such a request. If the department of the first instance came to the conclusion that these requirements were not met, it could not order reimbursement of the appeal fee. In the absence of a request for reimbursement of the appeal fee, the decision of the department of the first instance granting interlocutory revision pursuant to Article 109(1) EPC would make no mention of the issue of reimbursement of the appeal fee, and the appellant would not be adversely affected by the decision (G 3/03, OJ EPO 2005, 344, point 3).

3. In the present case, the examining division rectified its decision dated 3 August 2016 on 14 March 2017. On the same day, the decision ordering rectification was handed over to the EPO postal service for notification (see date in the footer of Form 2710) and the matter referred to the Board for a decision on a request for reimbursement of the appeal fee (see internal Form 2703). Form 2710 informing the appellants of the rectification was dispatched on 21 March 2017.

4. A second copy of Form 2701 is on file which appears to be intended to retract the examining division's decision of 14 March 2017 rectifying its decision of 3 August 2016 and to replace it by an order stating that the decision under appeal is not rectified. It is not clear, when and by whom the initial order to rectify the decision dated 3 August 2016 was amended, since this was simply done by crossing out the order granting rectification on the original Form 2701 signed by the examiners.

5. However, it is not necessary to assess whether and, if so, until when the examination division could have reversed its decision of 14 March 2017 rectifying the decision of 3 August 2016, and whether the second Form 2701 was legally effective. The examining division's rectification of the decision of 3 August 2016 was notified, by the use of Form 2710, to the appellants on 31 March 2017 (Rule 126(2) EPC). There is no evidence on file that the appellants had previously been informed of a retraction by the examining division of its decision granting interlocutory revision pursuant to Article 109(1) EPC. As from 31 March 2017 at the latest, the decision ordering rectification could no longer be amended. Therefore, the Board holds that the appeal was allowed by the examining division in accordance with Article 109(1) EPC and duly notified to the appellants. Consequently, there is no appeal pending before the Board.

6. Furthermore, the Board notes that reimbursement of the appeal fee was not requested on appeal. According to decision G 3/03, the issue of reimbursement of the appeal fee should therefore not have been referred to the Board for decision (see point 2 above). In any case, in the absence of a request for reimbursement of the appeal fee, this matter does not constitute an ancillary issue to be dealt with in appeal proceedings (see T 242/05 of 20 September 2006, point 2.3, and T 2134/12 of 16 July 2013, point 3).

7. In view of the above, the Board holds that no appeal exists in respect of European patent application 03 729 689.4 for which the Board is responsible pursuant to Article 21(1) EPC. Moreover, in the absence of a request for reimbursement of the appeal fee (Rule 103(1)(a) EPC), the Board is also not empowered to decide on this issue as an ancillary matter. Since no appeal is pending, the Board can only remit the case which was erroneously referred to it, to the department of first instance (following decisions T 21/02 of 20 February 2006, T 242/05 of 20 September 2006, T 1703/12 of 14 March 2013, and T 2134/12 of 16 July 2013).

Order

For these reasons it is decided that:

The case is remitted to the examining division for further prosecution.

T 2322/15 - Not credible from the data

Key points

• Claim 1 is directed to a hypoallergenic high intensity fragrance composition in which all the ingredients are natural, which comprises A)  at least 4 fragrance ingredients selected from a list of fragrances, B) essential oils, and wherein C) a list of ingredients is excluded (the compounds recited in the exclusion list are not present, or present at less than 100 ppm [edit 26.11.2019]).
• "The feature that all the ingredients of the composition must be "natural" does not make it possible to clearly distinguish the claimed composition from the state of the art as natural compounds can also be synthesized. In any case, it is not a feature characterising the invention, as the appellant itself indicated that the fact that the ingredients are natural products did not provide any technical contribution with respect to the alleged improvement of the odour strength. [...] Therefore, this feature is disregarded when assessing obviousness (see T 22/81, [r.] 5.1 and 7".
• "The fragrance ingredients listed in claim 1 [under A] are known fragrances having no structural characteristic in common. Accordingly, it cannot be predicted for example from structure similarities between the individual fragrances listed in claim 1 that higher odour strength would also be expected for any combination of the listed individual fragrances. It is therefore not credible from the data provided by the appellant that the odour of all fragrance compositions according to claim 1 would also be more intense than that of the compositions disclosed in [D15]."
• "The [patentee] contends that the burden of proof lies by the [opponent'] to prove that the technical problem is not solved across the breadth of the claims. However, in the present case, since the extrapolation of the higher odour intensity of the four fragrance compositions tested to any composition of claim 1 lacks the required reasoning or experimental evidences to support its plausibility, the burden to prove that the technical effect alleged by the [patentee] is not achieved across the breath of claim 1 has not been shifted to the [opponents]."

[ Claim 1 of AR-7 appears to read as follows in relevant part]

"1. A hypoallergenic high intensity fragrance composition in which all the ingredients are natural, which comprises by weight:
a) [75% to 100% of at least 4 fragrance ingredients selected from the following ingredients: allyl hexanoate, n-amyl acetate, iso amyl acetate, n-amyl propionate, anisic aldehyde, benzaldehyde, benzyl acetate, butyl acetate, decalactone gamma, ethyl 2-methyl butyrate, ethyl butyrate, ethyl caproate, ethyl caprylate, ethyl heptanoate, ethyl lactate, ethyl propionate, heliotropine, trans hex-2-en-al, cis hex 3-en-l-ol, cis hex-3-en-l-yl acetate, cis hex-3-en-l-yl propionate, hexyl acetate, iso butyl acetate, L-menthol, methyl benzoate, methyl salicylate, methyl anthranilate, octalactone gamma, 2-phenyl ethyl acetate, 2-phenyl ethyl alcohol, l-terpinen-4-ol, terpineol alpha, vanillin, 3-hydroxy-2-methyl-4-pyrone] 
b) 0 to 25% of essential oils;
c) 0 to 25% of fragrance ingredients, other than those characterized under a) above;
wherein the sum of a), b) and c) must equal 100%;
wherein each of the following ingredients, if present in the fragrance composition, is present in an amount of less than 100 ppm (weight/weight): amyl cinnamic aldehyde, amyl cinnamic alcohol, anisyl alcohol, benzyl alcohol, benzyl benzoate, benzyl cinnamate, benzyl salicylate, cinnamic aldehyde, cinnamyl alcohol, citronellol, coumarin, eugenol, farnesol, geraniol, hexyl cinnamic aldehyde, hydroxycitronellal, hydroxymethylpentylcyclihexenecarboxaldehyde, isoeugenol, lilial, limonene, linalool, methyl heptine carbonate, 3-methyl-4-(2,6,6-trimethyl-2-cyclohexen-l-yl)-3-buten-2-one, citral, Oakmoss extract, treemoss extract."

EPO T 2322/15 -  link


2.2 Technical problem underlying the patent-in-suit

The Appellant stated that the technical problem was the provision of fragrance compositions having higher fragrance intensity.

2.3 Solution

The proposed solution is the [hypoallergenic high intensity fragrance ] composition of claim 1 of the seventh auxiliary request characterized in that all the ingredients of the composition are natural and that it comprises at least 85 to 100% of at least four flagrances selected from

 allyl hexanoate, n-amyl acetate, iso amyl acetate, n-amyl propionate, anisic aldehyde, benzaldehyde, benzyl acetate, butyl acetate, decalactone gamma, ethyl 2-methyl butyrate, ethyl butyrate, ethyl caproate, ethyl caprylate, ethyl heptanoate, ethyl lactate, ethyl propionate, heliotropine, trans hex-2-en-al, cis hex 3-en-l-ol, cis hex-3-en-l-yl acetate, cis hex-3-en-l-yl propionate, hexyl acetate, iso butyl acetate, L-menthol, methyl benzoate, methyl salicylate, methyl anthranilate, octalactone gamma, 2-phenyl ethyl acetate, 2-phenyl ethyl alcohol, l-terpinen-4-ol, terpineol alpha, vanillin and 3-hydroxy-2-methyl-4-pyrone.

T 0899/17 - Skipping AR's

Key points

• In this opposition appeal, the OD maintained the patent in amended form based on Auxiliary Request 10. 
• "In the impugned decision the [OD] gave reasons for the failure of the main request, auxiliary request 3, auxiliary request [10-old] and the success of new auxiliary request 10. " However, no reasons were given at all in connection with AR 1, 2, and 4-9 although these requests were maintained by the patentee. 
• " According to the minutes of the oral proceedings before the [OD] the [MR] was discussed and its subject-matter was not found patentable. On proposal of the patent proprietor the discussion went on with [AR-3] (leaving out [AR's] 1 and 2), and then - again on the patent proprietor's proposal - with [AR 10-old[ by skipping [AR's] 4 to 9, both requests discussed also not considered acceptable. [AR 10-old] was then replaced by [AR 10-new] which the [OD] finally found to meet the requirements of the EPC. According to the minutes, at the end of the oral proceedings the patent proprietor explicitly declared that it would not withdraw any of the auxiliary requests filed during the written procedure".
• The Board " However this [proposal of patentee during the oral proceedings to jump to AR-3 and to AR-10] does not discharge the opposition division to deal with all pending auxiliary requests, in particular it should have set out the reasons why the higher-ranking auxiliary requests 1, 2 and 4 to 9 failed to meet the requirements of the EPC. It goes without saying that a decision against any of these requests may not be taken until the patent proprietor has been informed, with respect to each of these requests, of the reasons for not allowing them (Art. 113(1) EPC)." This is a substantial procedural violation according to the Board. The case is remitted and the appea fees (of all appellants) are reimbursed.

EPO Headnote
The reasons for the failure of auxiliary requests which were skipped in the discussion during the oral proceedings before the opposition division in favour of more promising lower-ranking auxiliary requests and which were explicitly not withdrawn by the patent-proprietor have to be set out in the written decision.

EPO T 0899/17 - link

Reasons for the Decision

1. Procedural deficiency

1.1 According to Rule 111(2) EPC, decisions which are open to appeal shall be reasoned. Only if a decision is adequately reasoned a party adversely affected by a decision of the department of first instance or a board of appeal is able to examine whether the decision was justified or not. Pursuant to the established jurisprudence of the Boards of Appeal a decision of any of the departments of first instance of the EPO must contain, in logical sequence, those arguments which justify the order. In accordance with established case law (see e.g. T 0897/03, T 0278/00 and T 2282/17) a violation of Rule 111(2) EPC is considered a substantial procedural violation.

1.2 In the impugned decision the opposition division gave reasons for the failure of the main request, auxiliary request 3, auxiliary request 10 (old, though the latter was already replaced by auxiliary request 10 new) and the success of new auxiliary request 10. In the end of the written decision it said: "The proprietor maintained the remaining requests in the order they were filed". Those were auxiliary requests 1, 2 and 4 to 9, however any reasoning with regard to the failure of those (higher ranking) requests is missing in the decision.

1.3 After a proper discussion of the issues with the parties, the opposition division should have given reasons for all relevant requests on file pending before it, e.g. the main request (claims as granted) and auxiliary requests 1 to 10 (clearly no reasoning was required regarding lower-ranking auxiliary request 11 also on file). According to the minutes of the oral proceedings before the opposition division the main request was discussed and its subject-matter was not found patentable. On proposal of the patent proprietor the discussion went on with auxiliary request 3 (leaving out auxiliary requests 1 and 2), and then - again on the patent proprietor's proposal - with auxiliary request 10 (old) by skipping auxiliary requests 4 to 9, both requests discussed also not considered acceptable. Auxiliary request 10 was then replaced by a new auxiliary request 10 which the opposition division finally found to meet the requirements of the EPC. According to the minutes, at the end of the oral proceedings the patent proprietor explicitly declared that it would not withdraw any of the auxiliary requests filed during the written procedure (see p.9 of the minutes). This concerned auxiliary requests 1, 2, 4 to 9 (and 11).

1.4 Since auxiliary requests 1, 2 and 4 to 9 were still pending the opposition division should have given reasons why it found them not to fulfil the requirements of the EPC, notwithstanding the patent proprietor's proposal to proceed with the more distant auxiliary requests 3 and 10. However this does not discharge the opposition division to deal with all pending auxiliary requests, in particular it should have set out the reasons why the higher-ranking auxiliary requests 1, 2 and 4 to 9 failed to meet the requirements of the EPC. It goes without saying that a decision against any of these requests may not be taken until the patent proprietor has been informed, with respect to each of these requests, of the reasons for not allowing them (Art. 113(1) EPC). The opposition division should have followed the Guidelines Part E.X.2.9 according to which the reasons must set out the grounds for the non-allowability or non-admissibility of each request which ranks higher than the allowable request.This was not done here at least not in a written form.

2. Remittal to the department of first instance

2.1 Under Article 11 RPBA, a board may decide that a case is remitted to the department of first instance after it has found fundamental deficiencies in the first instance proceedings. Such decision is subject to the discretion of the board concerned. A board remits a case to the department of first instance unless special reasons present themselves for doing otherwise.

IP Memes - actually funny

Please pardon the horrendous layout #EPC #unescapabletrap #IP_meme #IP_memes pic.twitter.com/Nys3OefMRK

— IPmemes (Johnny Haypee) (@ip_memes) May 16, 2019

T 2086/16 - Disregarding applicant's arguments

Key points

• In this examination appeal, the ED had refused the application because claim 1 uses the term "Kamillenextrakts" which would be unclear. The Board finds that the term is clear. The Board then turns to the refund of the appeal fee.
• The applicant had submitted dictionary definitions. "Dies stellt die zentrale Argumentation der Beschwerdeführerin dar, die die Kammer auch als überzeugend ansah."
• The Examining Division however had not engaged with these arguments. " Mit diesen Argumenten hat sich die Prüfungsabteilung in ihrer Entscheidung in keinster Weise auseinandergesetzt". This is a substantial procedural violation and the appeal fee is refunded.
• The Board recalls that "Nach ständiger Rechtsprechung der Beschwerdekammern ist dem [Article 113(1) EPC]  nur Rechnung getragen, wenn eingegangene Äußerungen auch zur Kenntnis genommen und berücksichtigt werden. Daher müssen Entscheidungen des Amtes eine Auseinandersetzung mit den grundlegenden Argumenten der Parteien erkennen lassen"

EPO T 2086/16 -  link


1.6 In Anbetracht der obigen Ausführungen kommt die Kammer daher zu dem Ergebnis, dass das anspruchsgemäße Merkmal des Kamillenextrakts klar ist und stellt dementsprechend fest, dass die Ansprüche 1 bis 10 den Erfordernissen des Artikel 84 EPÜ genügen.

2. Zurückverweisung

Da die Prüfungsabteilung sich nur mit der Frage der Klarheit der Ansprüche befasst hat, nicht aber mit den übrigen Erfordernissen des EPÜ inklusive der erfinderischen Tätigkeit, verweist die Kammer in Ausübung ihres Ermessens nach Artikel 111 (1) EPÜ die Angelegenheit zur weiteren Entscheidung an die erste Instanz zurück.

3. Rückzahlung der Beschwerdegebühr

3.1 Gemäß Regel 103 (1) a) EPÜ wird die Beschwerdegebühr zurückerstattet, wenn die Rückzahlung wegen eines wesentlichen Verfahrensmangels der Billigkeit entspricht. Ein wesentlicher Verfahrensfehler liegt in der Versagung rechtlichen Gehörs. Artikel 113 (1) EPÜ bestimmt insoweit, dass Entscheidungen des Amtes nur auf Gründe gestützt werden dürfen, zu denen die Beteiligten sich äußern konnten. Nach ständiger Rechtsprechung der Beschwerdekammern ist dem nur Rechnung getragen, wenn eingegangene Äußerungen auch zur Kenntnis genommen und berücksichtigt werden. Daher müssen Entscheidungen des Amtes eine Auseinandersetzung mit den grundlegenden Argumenten der Parteien erkennen lassen (J 0007/82, T 0740/93, T 0177/98, T 0763/04, T 0740/94, T 2352/13).

T 0939/14 - Proof of secrecy agreement

Key points

• In this opposition appeal, the question is whether D10 was public. D10 is a service manual of a device. The manual was handed out to an employee of "Pacific Laser, Inc." during a course given by "Laser Alignment, Inc.". These are two independent companies. The question is whether there was a tacit or express secrecy agreement. The employee was heard as witness and testified that he was not aware of a secrecy agreement.
• The Board finds that the actual existence of a secrecy agreement does not matter. What is decisive is whether the receiver of the information assumes that he is obliged to keep the information confidential.
• The Board: "Was eine Geheimhaltungsverpflichtung anbetrifft, so kommt es im vorliegenden Fall nicht auf deren tatsächliches Bestehen, sei es aufgrund ausdrücklicher Vereinbarung oder implizit, an. Entscheidend ist vielmehr das Verständnis des Empfängers der Information. Geht er davon aus, dass er diese verbreiten darf, ist mit der Kundgabe an einen derartigen Empfänger die Information der Öffentlichkeit zugänglich gemacht worden."
• As a comment, the subjective state of mind of the person receiving the information may be difficult to proof. So if an employee says that he was not aware of an obligation to keep secret, even if there is a written secrecy agreement of his employer, then the document becomes public? I've not yet reviewed what established case law is on this specific point. The present Board's approach at first sight seems unusual. 

T 0939/14 - link

Sachverhalt und Anträge

Die Einspruchsabteilung begründete den Widerruf damit, dass der Gegenstand des Anspruchs 1 des Patents im Hinblick auf das Dokument

"[D10]: LB-400 Service Manual, Veröffentlichungsjahr 2001" (auf der Titelseite von D1 heißt es: "LB 400 Laser Beacon")

nicht neu sei. 

Entscheidungsgründe


Die Kammer weist zunächst darauf hin, dass - wie die Patentinhaberin zutreffend ausgeführt hat - eine Information als nach der Rechtsprechung der Beschwerdekammern als öffentlich zugänglich anzusehen ist, wenn auch nur ein einziges Mitglied der Öffentlichkeit in der Lage ist, sich Zugang zu dieser Information zu verschaffen, und wenn keine Geheimhaltungsverpflichtung besteht (siehe auch Beschwerdebegründung Nr. 2.2, Seite 3 oben mit Nachweisen). Das bedeutet, dass, wenn - wie oben festgestellt - dem Zeugen D10 ausgehändigt wurde, dieses Dokument öffentlich zugänglich war, wenn alleine er nicht zur Geheimhaltung verpflichtet war.

Hinzuzufügen ist: Was eine Geheimhaltungsverpflichtung anbetrifft, so kommt es im vorliegenden Fall nicht auf deren tatsächliches Bestehen, sei es aufgrund ausdrücklicher Vereinbarung oder implizit, an. Entscheidend ist vielmehr das Verständnis des Empfängers der Information. Geht er davon aus, dass er diese verbreiten darf, ist mit der Kundgabe an einen derartigen Empfänger die Information der Öffentlichkeit zugänglich gemacht worden.

Dabei ist es für die Zugänglichmachung an die Öffentlichkeit unschädlich, wenn der Empfänger sich veranlasst sieht, bestimmte Teile der Öffentlichkeit - z.B. Wettbewerber - von einer weiteren Vermittlung der Information auszunehmen. Es muss dem Empfänger einer - nicht vertraulichen - Information überlassen bleiben, an wen er sie weitergibt. Eine Beschränkung der Verwendung und Verbreitung ist aus diesem Grund nur relevant, wenn sie vom Informationsgeber auferlegt wird, nicht wenn der Empfänger sich selbst in der Verwendung oder Verbreitung einschränkt.

Die vorgenannten Voraussetzungen sind hier gegeben. Der Zeuge erklärte, während der fraglichen Schulung am 20. Juni 2002 sei von einer Geheimhaltungsverpflichtung betreffend das Service-Handbuch D10 nicht die Rede gewesen. Vom Bestehen eines eine derartige Verpflichtung enthaltenen Vertrages zwischen den Unternehmen Laser Alignment und Pacific Laser sei ihm nichts bekannt. Diese Aussage ist eindeutig, unabhängig davon, ob der Zeuge die Bedeutung der Begriffe "explizit" und "implizit" verstand (siehe Seite 16 des Protokolls). Der Zeuge bekundete ebenfalls, dass auch sein Arbeitsvertrag keine irgendwie geartete Geheimhaltungsverpflichtung enthalten habe (ebenda). Die Selbstbeschränkung in der Praxis von Pacific Laser der Weitergabe von in Handbüchern wie D10 enthaltenen Informationen an örtliche Wettbewerber ließ - wie der Zeuge bestätigt hat - die Weitergabe an sonstige Personen, insbesondere Mitarbeiter von Partnerunternehmen in anderen Teilen der USA, etwa an der Ostküste, unberührt.

Diese Ausführungen des Zeugen sind schlüssig - und seine Aussage damit glaubhaft -, auch wenn man die Einwände der Patentinhaberin berücksichtigt:

- Das Bestehen eines Geschäftsvertrags zwischen den Unternehmen Laser Alignment und Pacific Laser hat sie lediglich aus den Umständen gefolgert. Nach dem Vortrag der Einsprechenden ist es in den USA nicht üblich, in einer derartigen Situation einen förmlichen Vertrag zu schließen. Dem ist die Patentinhaberin nicht entgegengetreten.

Was eine implizite Geheimhaltungsverpflichtung anbetrifft, so weist die oben (unter Nr. 1.2 - Beweismaßstab) näher beschriebene Vertragsbeziehung kein enges Verhältnis wie etwa einen ausschließlichen Wartungsvertrag auf.

Zu dem Vermerk auf den Konstruktionszeichnungen in Abschnitt F des Handbuchs, welcher deren Weitergabe nur mit Zustimmung von Laser Alignment erlaubt, ist festzustellen, dass das Dokument D10 als Gesamtheit zu sehen ist. Der Einsprechenden ist dahingehend zu folgen, dass bei einer Absicht des Herstellers, den Inhalt des Handbuchs D10 einer Geheimhaltung zu unterwerfen, er einen entsprechenden Hinweis in deutlicher Weise auf der ersten Seite des Handbuchs angebracht hätte. Dem Hinweis auf den lediglich in einem Anhang zum Handbuch (Teil F) befindlichen Zeichnungen wird ein Service-Techniker keine Wirkung beimessen. Auf die zwischen den Beteiligten streitige Frage der Bedeutung der Schriftgröße dieses Hinweises kommt es daher nicht an.

Angesichts dieser objektiven Einschätzung der Bedeutung der Konstruktionszeichnungen kann die Schlüssigkeit der Zeugenaussage in diesem Punkt nicht in Zweifel gezogen werden. Der Zeuge hat sich während der Vernehmung auch gar nicht zu der Frage der Konstruktionszeichnungen geäußert, da sie ihm nicht gestellt wurde.

Schließlich liegt der Hinweis auf die Entscheidung im Fall T 2/09 - wie die Einsprechende zu Recht vertreten hat - offensichtlich neben der Sache. Dort wurde unter bestimmten Umständen eine Geheimhaltungsverpflichtung aus Eigeninteresse des Informationsgebers, also hier wäre dies Laser Alignment, angenommen und nicht des Informationsempfängers, hier wäre dies Pacific Laser, um dessen behaupteter Verpflichtung zur Geheimhaltung es vorliegend allein geht.

Nach Alledem stellen die soeben erörterten Einwände der Patentinhaberin die Schlüssigkeit der Zeugenaussage zur Frage einer Geheimhaltungsverpflichtung nicht in Frage.

1.6 Ergebnis

Die Kammer hält es damit als zumindest mit überwiegender Wahrscheinlichkeit für erwiesen, dass der Zeuge Steve Donovan

- am 20. Juni 2002 an einer Service-Schulung von Laser Alignment in Grand Rapids, Michigan, USA, teilgenommen hat,

- ihm dabei das Service-Handbuch D10 ausgehändigt wurde und

- er davon ausging, dass ihm von Seiten von Laser Alignment keine Geheimhaltungsverpflichtung auferlegt wurde.

Damit wurde der Inhalt von D10 am 20. Juni 2002 der Öffentlichkeit zugänglich gemacht und wurde somit Stand der Technik im Sinne von Artikel 54 (2) EPÜ 1973.

T 2824/18 - Rule 137(5) and unity

Key points

• In this appeal against a refusal, claim 1 as pending corresponds to claim 16 as originally filed. Claim 16 was not searched, claims 1-15 had been searched. The application was refused because the request did not meet the requirement of Rule 137(5) EPC according to the Examining Division.
• The Board finds that claim 16 as filed has unity of invention with claims 4 and 5 as filed, which were searched. 
• " Es ist nun für die Kammer nicht erkennbar, warum eine Getriebeeinrichtung, mit einer variablen Übersetzung (nach Anspruch 5), die gemäß Anspruch 16 mit einem Umlaufgetriebe realisiert werden soll, eine weitere Erfindung darstellen soll. Nach Ansicht der Kammer wird mit Anspruch 16 (wie ursprünglich eingereicht) lediglich eine besondere Ausführungsform einer Getriebeeinrichtung beansprucht." 
• The Board does not comment on whether Rule 137(5) EPC is the relevant legal basis at all. To cite the Guidelines, H-II 7.2 "If the application is restricted to an unsearched but originally claimed invention, it can be refused under Rule 64 in line with G 2/92 [...] Rule 137(5) cannot be invoked. It does not apply when the applicant has not paid the search fee in respect of a non-unitary invention relating to the originally filed claims." (see also my article in epi Information 2018/2).

EPO T 2824/18 -  link

Sachverhalt und Anträge

I. Die Beschwerde richtet sich gegen die Entscheidung der Prüfungsabteilung des Europäischen Patentamts, die am 6. Juli 2018 zur Post gegeben wurde und mit der die europäische Patentanmeldung Nr. 11708194.3 aufgrund des Artikels 97 (2) EPÜ zurückgewiesen worden ist.

II. Die Prüfungsabteilung hat im Wesentlichen festgestellt, dass mit den Änderungen des Anspruchs 1 gemäß Hauptantrag und Hilfsantrag 1 auf einen nicht recherchierten Gegenstand gewechselt wurde, insbesondere dass die Merkmale des Anspruchs 16 wie ursprünglich eingereicht zu einer weiteren - nicht recherchierten -Erfindung gehören und die dem geltenden Anspruch 1 gemäß Hauptantrag und Hilfsantrag 1 hinzugefügten Merkmale zweifelsfrei der Erfindung des ursprünglichen Anspruchs 16 zuzuordnen sind, siehe Punkt 32 der Entscheidung. Daher waren die Anträge gemäß Regel 137 (5) EPÜ nicht zuzulassen.

Entscheidungsgründe

1. Die Prüfungsabteilung hat im Wesentlichen festgestellt, dass die Merkmale des geltenden Anspruchs 1 zur Erfindung des ursprünglichen Anspruchs 16 gehören und damit zu der weiteren, nicht recherchierten Erfindung (Punkt 32 der Entscheidung).

T 0377/17 - Everybody has a secret recipe

Key points

• The patent is directed to a composition comprising concrete, which can be used as construction material. The patent does not contain a detailed example; the question is whether the patent provides a sufficient disclosure.
• The patentee argues that the skilled person who wants to reduce the claimed invention to practice would start from the recipe that is used in 'his' plant. 
• The patentee submits, in rough translation, that each manufacturer of concrete has his own recipe, which is known to the respective skilled person. These recipes form know-how, which is not publicly available and should also not made public, accordingly the patentee had refrained from giving a specific recipe in the patent at issue.
• The Board is not persuaded. "Ein solcher Ansatz steht jedoch nicht im Einklang mit der ständigen Rechtsprechung der Beschwerdekammern und insbesondere nicht mit den oben zitierten Entscheidungen, wonach die Offenbarung der Erfindung den Fachmann, allenfalls unter Zuhilfenahme des allgemeinen Fachwissens, in die Lage versetzen muss, die Erfindung nachzuarbeiten. Die Rezepturen der verschiedenen Porenbetonhersteller und insbesondere die Wirkstoffgehalte und Reaktivitäten der verwendeten Rohstoffe gehören jedoch gerade nicht zum allgemeinen Fachwissen, da, wie die Beschwerdeführerin vorträgt, diese Informationen nicht öffentlich zugänglich sind; sie sind vielmehr geheimes Knowhow der jeweiligen Unternehmen." 
• I recall this scenario from another case (about biotechnology). Each manufacturer in the field at issue had his own well-guarded bacteria for making the compound X with a high yield, but none of them was publicly available.

EPO T 0377/17 -  link

II. Anspruch 1 in seiner erteilten Fassung (Hauptantrag im Beschwerdeverfahren) hat folgenden Wortlaut:

"1. Hydrothermal gehärtetes Porenbetonmaterial in Form von als geschnittene Formkörper vorliegenden Porenbetonsteinen, aufweisend ein Feststoffsteggerüst, das Mikroporen aufweist und aus einem Schaum resultierende oder durch einen Treibprozess erzeugte Poren umgibt, wobei das Feststoffsteggerüst aus Calziumsilikathydrat-Phasen ausgebildet ist, über 50 Masse-% 11 Å-Tobermorit aufweist und bis zu 10 Masse-% Restquarzkörner enthält, wobei das Porenbetonmaterial eine Steindruckfestigkeit von mindestens 2,5 N/mm**(2)und eine Wärmeleitfähigkeit von höchstens 0,09 W/mK aufweist und die Rohdichte zwischen 300 und 400 kg/m**(3) beträgt."

T 2300/16 - Rule 137(5) case

Key points

• The Examining Division had refused the application on the ground that the amended claims did not comply with Rule 137(5) EPC. The Board does not agree.
• " According to [Rule 137(5) EPC], amended claims may not relate to unsearched subject-matter which does not combine with the originally claimed invention or group of inventions to form a single general inventive concept." The Board focuses on the "single general inventive concept" part of Rule 137(5) EPC.
• The Board: "It follows from the above that the [added] "road selection feature" combines with the [...] "forecasting feature" [of the original claims] to form a single general inventive concept. In fact, rather than introducing a different general inventive concept, the amendment made aims at restricting the invention to a particular aspect of said general inventive concept, namely using the reliable forecasting for selecting a road to be followed which allows making a more efficient use of the automotive vehicle (e.g. by allowing an optimized fuel consumption) during a journey." 
• "In view of the above and since the Examining Division has not given other grounds for the refusal apart from the non compliance with Rule 137(5) EPC, the contested decision must be set aside." 
• The Board's decision seems entirely correct to me. 

EPO T 2300/16 -  link

Reasons for the Decision

1. Rule 137 was amended by decision of the Administrative Council of 25 March 2009 and the amended Rule applies to European patent applications for which the European search report or the supplementary European search report was drawn up on or after 1 April 2010 (see OJ EPO 2009, 299, in particular Article 1, point 7, and Article 2(2) of the decision). In the present case the International Search Report (which takes the place of the European search report, see Article 153(6) EPC) was drawn up on 24 February 2010, and therefore the amended Rule does not apply. It is thus the text of Rule 137 EPC in force before the above-mentioned decision of the Administrative Council that applies. Paragraph (4) of this Rule contains the same provisions of amended Rule 137(5) EPC, and therefore the correct legal basis for the Examining Division's refusal is Rule 137(4) EPC in force before the decision of the Administrative Council.

2. According to Rule 137(4) EPC, amended claims may not relate to unsearched subject-matter which does not combine with the originally claimed invention or group of inventions to form a single general inventive concept.

3. The Examining Division's objection is exclusively concerned with the feature added to the characterizing portion of claim 1, according to which a road to be followed is selected by onboard computation means based on the forecasting of the magnitude of the data associated to a given journey. According to the Examining Division, the originally claimed invention was concerned with providing reliable forecasting, whilst the added feature is concerned with selecting a road to be followed (see point 2.5 of the contested decision).

4. The Board does not agree with the Examining Division's conclusions for the following reasons.

It is clear from the wording of the claim that the added feature concerning the selection of a road to be followed is not to be taken in isolation from the forecasting of the magnitude of the data associated to a given journey, since the selection of the road is based thereupon. Therefore, the "road selection feature" combines with the "forecasting feature". The question is whether they combine to form a single general inventive concept.

Turning to the disclosure of the application as filed, it is apparent that the originally claimed invention relates to a method for forecasting the evolution of the magnitude of a data associated to a journey of an automotive vehicle via a mathematical model. The method of originally filed claim 1 foresees, inter alia, running the vehicle on a reference trip (feature b of claim 1) and adjusting a mathematical function based on measurements made during the reference trip (feature e of claim 1). Accordingly, the Examining Division is correct in stating that the originally claimed invention is concerned with "reliable forecasting", since the "adjusting" feature results in a reliable, or rather a more accurate, forecasting, see also page 2, lines 23 to 26 of the description of the application as filed.

The further question that arises is what is the purpose of said reliable forecasting. In accordance with the disclosure of the application as filed, the reliable forecasting serves to "efficiently use computerized systems in order to select the best running conditions for a vehicle" (page 2, lines 3 to 5). The "best running conditions" are, in particular, those that allow optimizing fuel consumption by forecasting the fuel consumption (see page 2, lines 26 to 28; see the examples 1 to 3): an accurate forecasting of the fuel consumption enables the onboard computation means to efficiently select a road to be followed and/or a gear to be used during a given journey (see page 2, lines 26 to 28).

Although in accordance with the disclosure of the application as filed the "forecasting feature" and the "best running conditions" are not exclusively related to fuel consumption (see page 9, lines 13 to 17: forecasting of engine load or pollutant emissions being other possibilities), and fuel consumption is not exclusively related to the selection of a road to be followed (see page 2, line 28 and page 9, lines 18 to 20: a gear to be used or a driving strategy can instead be selected for a given journey), it is apparent that the general inventive concept is to use the reliable forecasting in order to make a more efficient use of the automotive vehicle during a journey.

It follows from the above that the "road selection feature" combines with the "forecasting feature" to form a single general inventive concept.

In fact, rather than introducing a different general inventive concept, the amendment made aims at restricting the invention to a particular aspect of said general inventive concept, namely using the reliable forecasting for selecting a road to be followed which allows making a more efficient use of the automotive vehicle (e.g. by allowing an optimized fuel consumption) during a journey.

5. In view of the above and since the Examining Division has not given other grounds for the refusal apart from the non compliance with Rule 137(5) EPC, the contested decision must be set aside.

6. Since, however, novelty and inventive step (in particular) were not addressed in the decision under appeal, the board exercises its discretion under Article 111 (1) EPC to remit the case to the Examining Division for further prosecution.| |

Order

For these reasons it is decided that:

1. The decision under appeal is set aside.

2. The case is remitted to the Examining Division for further prosecution.

T 1662/14 - Article 54(3) doc claims priority from CIP

Key points

• This opposition appeal deals with priority and Art.54(3) in a situation that is suitable for as inspiration for EQE Paper D.
• D2 is an Article 54(3) document if it's priority to D3 is valid. D3 is, however, a continuation in part from D11; D3 was also granted.
• The question is if D2 is the 'first filing' or not. D11 is a non-published US application of the predecessor in title of the applicant of D2 and has the same technical content as the original application from which the opposed European patent is granted. D11 as said is also the parent of D3. 
• " Hence, D11 has left some rights outstanding within the meaning of Article 87(4) EPC. This was not in dispute between the parties. It follows that D11 - not D3 - is the first application within the meaning Article 87(1) EPC in respect of the invention it discloses. As a consequence, D2 cannot validly claim priority from D3 for that invention." 
• The Board  "the disclosure of D2 contains more specific elements in that respect. In other words, D2 discloses a system comprising additional technical features not disclosed in D11"  
• " Hence, the priority claim of D2 is valid in respect of such a system [with additional features', for which D3 is the first application [and not D11]. That specific system belongs to the state of the art for the patent in suit according to Article 54(3) EPC." 
• " The main request is not allowable for lack of novelty of the subject-matter of claim 1 over D2 (Article 52(1) EPC in conjunction with Article 54(1) and (3) EPC)." 
• " Claim 1 of the fifth auxiliary request comprises an undisclosed disclaimer. The criteria to be fulfilled for an undisclosed disclaimer to be allowable under Article 123(2) EPC are set out in decision G 1/03 (point 2.1 of the Order), as confirmed in decision G 1/16 (Order). As far as the present case is concerned, such a disclaimer may be allowable to restore novelty by delimiting a claim against the state of the art under Article 54(3) EPC."
• " The disclaimer of the fifth auxiliary request, however, does not restore novelty over D2. [...] Since the undisclosed disclaimer does not restore novelty over D2, it does not fulfil the criteria set out in G1/03. Hence, the fifth auxiliary request is not allowable either for non-compliance with Article 123(2) EPC." 
• The Art.54(3) document D2 entered the EP phase as EP1519767 and became deemed withdraw in 2006 due to non-payment of the renewal fee. 
• For the aficionados, the Board actually applies Article 54(3) EPC 1973, as the Board states that "D2 is an international application which entered the European phase with publication No. EP-A-1 519 767, designating all contracting states designated in the patent in suit." See also my explanation of  Article 54(3) EPC 1973 in the post about T2333/15.

EPO T 1662/14 -  link

4. The state of the art

4.1 The assessment of novelty hinges on the question of whether D2, or at least part of its subject-matter, is state of the art according to Article 54(3) EPC for the patent in suit.

4.2 D2 is an international application which entered the European phase with publication No. EP-A-1 519 767, designating all contracting states designated in the patent in suit.

D2 has a publication and a filing date both after the date of filing of the patent in suit. However, it claims priority from D3, a US application of the predecessor in title of the applicant of D2 with the same technical content as D2, which was filed before the date of filing of the patent in suit.

T 1248/12 - Data privacy is not a technical problem

Key points

• This examination appeal concerns a patent application for a computer-implemented "privacy-preserving data mining protocol". This involves collecting data from sources, e.g. patient records, and aggregating the data together, as well as removing individually identifiable information. For details, I must refer to the - somewhat unusual - claim 1 below ("the Board had doubts whether claim 1 defined the data processing performed by the various processors in a sufficiently clear manner").
• Turning to inventive step, "it is established case law that non-technical features cannot contribute to inventive step. Therefore, non-technical features may legitimately be part of the problem to be solved (T 641/00 - Two identities/COMVIK), for example in the form of a requirement specification given to the skilled person to implement."  
• According to the Board, "de-identifying data, by removing individually identifiable information, and by aggregating data from a plurality of sources, is not technical. It aims to protect data privacy, which is not a technical problem. The problem of data privacy is not synonymous with data security. Data privacy concerns what information to share and not to share (and making sure that only the information that is to be shared is shared), whereas data security is about how to prevent unauthorised access to information."
• As a comment, a feature is indeed excluded under the Comvik approach if it "contributes only to the solution of a non-technical problem, e.g. a problem in a field excluded from patentability" (GL G-VII,5.4). However, I'm as of yet not convinced that features which are more elegant than "removing individually identifiable information" (e.g. adding carefully calibrated noise data) should be excluded for inventive step. 
• As a further comment, the Board could have explained in more detail why data privacy is not a technical problem. The Board's observation that it is not synonymous with data security, is, of course, correct as such but does not fully exclude that it is a technical problem; clearly, data security is not the only technical problem. In the same way, the observation that "data privacy concerns what information to share and not to share" does not seem to provide fully conclusive reasoning, in particular, it seems to assume some rule or case law stating that considerations about sharing information are never technical (i.e. the major premise in the syllogism is stated at least not explicitly). 

EPO T 1248/12 -  link

VI. Claim 1 of the main request reads:

A Privacy Preserving Data-Mining Protocol, operating between a secure "aggregator" data processor and at least one of "source-entity" data processor, wherein the "aggregator" and the "source-entity" processors are interconnected via an electronic data-communications topology, and the protocol includes the steps of:

A) on the side of the "aggregator" processor:
(i) from a user interface--accepting a query against a plurality of the predetermined attributes and therewith forming a parameter list,
(ii) via the topology--transmitting the parameter list to each of the "source-entity" processors,
(iii) via the topology--receiving a respective file from each of the "source-entity" processors,
(iv) aggregating the plurality of files into a data-warehouse,
(iv[sic]) using the parameter list, extracting query relevant data from the data-warehouse,
(vi) agglomerating the extract, and
(vii) to a user interface--reporting the agglomerated extract; and
B) on the side of each processor of the at least one "source-entity" processors:
(i) accumulating data-items wherein some of the data-items have privacy sensitive micro-data,
(ii) organizing the data-items using the plurality of predetermined attributes,
(iii) via the topology--receiving a parameter list from the "aggregator" processor,
(iv) forming a file by "crunching together" the data-items according to the parameter list,
(v) filtering out portions of the file which characterize details particular to less than a predetermined quantity of micro-data-specific data-items, and
(vi) via the topology--transmitting the file to the "aggregator" processor.

IX. Claim 1 of the third auxiliary request adds to the second auxiliary request:

"which may include specific individuals' names or IDs" at the end of feature A)(i);
"including de-identified results" after the word "file" in feature A)(iii);
"wherein 'crunching together' includes de-identifying results by aggregating results to a tabular report" at the end of feature B)(iv).

3. Main request, inventive step

3.1 The examining division found that the data mining protocol in claim 1 was an administrative scheme, which, when considered on its own, constituted excluded subject-matter according to Article 52(2) and (3) EPC. The examining division could not identify any technical problem solved by the data mining. In the examining division's opinion, the aim of the data processing was rather to comply with legal requirements.

3.2 The Board shares the examining division's view that de-identifying data, by removing individually identifiable information, and by aggregating data from a plurality of sources, is not technical. It aims to protect data privacy, which is not a technical problem. The problem of data privacy is not synonymous with data security. Data privacy concerns what information to share and not to share (and making sure that only the information that is to be shared is shared), whereas data security is about how to prevent unauthorised access to information.

3.3 It is established case law that non-technical features cannot contribute to inventive step. Therefore, non-technical features may legitimately be part of the problem to be solved (T 641/00 - Two identities/COMVIK), for example in the form of a requirement specification given to the skilled person to implement.