T 1444/15 - Re-establishment renewal fee

Key points

• The Board refuses re-establishment of rights for failure to pay a renewal fee. 
• " In the present case, neither the appellant's European professional representative nor his US representative were responsible for ensuring renewal fee payments. It was agreed that the responsibility rested upon the applicant [a natural person who is also the sole inventor] who employed the services of CPA to monitor the time limits and to effect payment.
• " Despite not being responsible for the payment of renewal fees, both the appellant's European professional representative and his US representative informed the appellant of an impending loss of rights with respect to the present application after having received the EPO communication [...]. Considering their "secondary responsibility", the Board is satisfied that the appellant's representatives acted with all due care required by the circumstances." 
• The Board does not excuse the applicant's failure to provide CPA with instructions to pay the fee. 

EPO T 1444/15 - link

4. In the present case, neither the appellant's European professional representative nor his US representative were responsible for ensuring renewal fee payments. It was agreed that the responsibility rested upon the applicant and inventor who employed the services of CPA to monitor the time limits and to effect payment.

All due care by the appellant's representatives

5. Despite not being responsible for the payment of renewal fees, both the appellant's European professional representative and his US representative informed the appellant of an impending loss of rights with respect to the present application after having received the EPO communication dated 5 December 2012 (see Annex C to document D1). Considering their "secondary responsibility", the Board is satisfied that the appellant's representatives acted with all due care required by the circumstances.

T 1207/15 - The phrase "maintaining patent unamended"

Key points

• In this decision, the order of the Board is that "The patent is maintained unamended" .
• However, article 101(2) EPC, second sentence, says that the OD "shall reject the opposition" . Article 101(3) EPC speaks only of "decide to maintain the patent as amended" . Article 111(1) EPC gives the Board "any power within the competence of the [first instance department]" , not more. 
• In my view, " maintaining a patent unamended"  is an informal way of referring to "rejecting the opposition"  under Article 101(2) EPC. 
• However, it appears to be the new standard phrase (see e.g. also T 2215/14; T2456/12).
• So, requesting that the patent is "maintained unamended"  is is not sloppy. (edit 14.10.2018). 
• Edit 14.10.2018: a kind reader has pointed out that the Board use the phrase already for a long time, e.g. in T 323/03 and T97/96 and, as "the European patent is maintained as granted", in T 857/00.

EPO T 1207/15 - link

Order

For these reasons it is decided that:

1. The decision under appeal is set aside.

2. The patent is maintained unamended.

T 0181/17 - Inventive step attack after novelty attack

Key points

• In this opposition appeal, the Board does not admit the inventive step based on D17. " The board notes that, over the course of the appeal proceedings, the opponent has submitted four substantive written submissions, all of which referred to D17, but only in the context of novelty. Introducing an attack based on D17 as the closest prior art at such a late stage in the proceedings confronts both the board and the patent proprietor with a completely new case." 
• The opponent argued that, since D17 had been used to attack novelty, it could have been expected that this document would also be used for an inventive-step attack. This does not convince the board. In view of the duty of a party to present its complete case, there is no obligation on the board (or on the patent proprietor) to speculate on other attacks. Novelty and inventive step are different grounds of opposition, and documents useful in attacking novelty are not necessarily the same as those that qualify as the closest prior art. Thus, the attack based on D17 as the closest prior art is not admitted into the proceedings in accordance with Article 13(1) Rules of Procedure of the Boards of Appeal." 
• The Board also confirms that in a claim for "method for the production of a composition according to any one of the preceding claims", the reference to the composition can provide for novelty (over a prior art document disclosing all the method steps, but not the product). The Board cites T 304/08. The Guidelines F-IV 4.13 were amended last year (2017) in order to omit the reference to T 304/08. The Guidelines now say the opposite at F-IV 4.13: "Consequently, a prior disclosure of the same method, which is suitable for producing said specific product but does not indicate that the specific product is produced with it, anticipates a claim to the method for the production of that specific product."

EPO T 0181/17 - link

6. Novelty of method claim 20

6.1 Claim 20 relates to a "[m]ethod for the production of a composition according to any one of the preceding claims, comprising the steps of: [...]". The opponent argued, citing T 304/08, that such a claim must be read as being directed to a process suitable for the production of one of the claimed composition.

6.2 In decision T 304/08, the board examined a claim directed to a "method for reducing malodor associated with a disposable absorbent product intended for the absorption of body fluids, said method comprising the steps of: [...]". The intention of such a claim was to protect a specific purpose (namely, reducing malodor associated with a disposable absorbent product intended for the absorption of body fluids). To sum up, the activity claim examined in T 304/08 was aimed at achieving an effect and not at producing a product.

6.3 However, claim 20 is directed to a different type of activity claim, namely to the production of a product. In particular, claim 20 relates to a production process resulting in the product of claim 1 (and its dependent claims 2 to 19). Thus, a product having the features of claim 1 must be the result of the method of claim 20, which means that not only the features of steps (i) to (iv) but also the features of the product of claim 1 are features limiting the subject-matter of method claim 20.

T 1571/15 - Seriously contemplating in ranges

Key points:

• Claim 1 is for a nickel metal alloy defined by its elemental composition. D1 and D2 both disclose overlapping ranges. Is claim 1 novel?
• The Board finds that D1 does not anticipate claim 1. " The appellant [opponent] argued that the person skilled in the art would seriously contemplate working over the whole range of the broad composition of D1, [] However, this argument disregards the fact that D1 discloses a preferred composition range, []. Since the exemplary composition [] also falls within said preferred range and there is no pointer to work outside this range, the person skilled in the art would not seriously contemplate working outside the preferred composition of D1. The contents of [ Co, Ti, Mo, and Ta]  of the preferred composition of D1 fall outside the claimed range. Therefore, the claimed contents of Co, Ti, Mo, and Ta are not disclosed in D1." 
• Hence, it seems that in this technical field, the novelty destroying teaching is given by the examples and the preferred embodiment, rather than by the broad ranges of the (independent) claims. 

EPO T 1571/15 - link

IV. Claim 1 of the main request (patent as granted) reads as follows:

"A Ni-base superalloy consisting of:

by weight %, Co: 9 to 11%, Cr: 9 to 12%, Mo: up to 1%, W: 6 to 9%, Al: 4 to 5%, Ti: 4 to 5%, Nb: up to 1%, Ta: up to 3%, Hf: 0.5 to 2.5%, Re: up to 3%, C: 0.05 to 0.15%, B: 0.005 to 0.015%, Zr: up to 0.05%, and the balance of Ni and inevitable impurities."

Reasons for the Decision

1. Main request - novelty

[...]

1.1 D1 relates to an Ni-base superalloy and discloses a broad composition in claim 1 (see table above) and a narrower ("typical", see page 3, lines 17-18) composition in claim 5. The overlap between the composition as claimed and the broad composition of D1 is narrow, in particular in respect of Co, Ti, Ta and Mo.

The appellant argued that the person skilled in the art would seriously contemplate working over the whole range of the broad composition of D1, because this broad composition was the same, but for the elements Hf and B, as that of the commercial alloy Rene N4, which was the starting point of D1. However, this argument disregards the fact that D1 discloses a preferred composition range, namely the composition of claim 5 and page 3, line 20 - page 4, line 7. Since the exemplary composition (last paragraph on page 9) also falls within said preferred range and there is no pointer to work outside this range, the person skilled in the art would not seriously contemplate working outside the preferred composition of D1. The contents of Co (7.00-8.00%), Ti (3.35-3.65%), Mo (1.30-1.60%), and Ta (4.60-5.00%) of the preferred composition of D1 fall outside the claimed range. Therefore, the claimed contents of Co, Ti, Mo, and Ta are not disclosed in D1.

In respect of the Ti content, the appellant also argued that the person skilled in the art would have contemplated working in the centre of the broad range of D1 (3.0-5-0%), which falls within the claimed range for this element. However, while it is true that the person skilled in the art may seriously contemplate working in the centre region of a prior art range when no other pointer (for instance in the form of examples of preferred ranges) to another region is present, this is no longer true if, as in the present case, such a pointer is present and is directed to another region. Therefore, the argument of the appellant is not persuasive.

Hence, the subject-matter of claim 1 is novel over D1, because this document does not disclose a composition with Co, Ti, Mo and Ta contents as claimed.

T 0923/13 - Error in claim, and basis

Key points

• The opponents submit that dependent claim 5 lacks basis. Patentee submits that the feature at issue is clearly an error. "It would have been immediately clear to the skilled reader that the inserted sentence made no sense at this position of the claim. At the same time, the skilled reader would "mentally" place the sentence [at another place in the claim]."
• The Board: "The board is not convinced [by patentee's argument]. In order for a correction to be allowable under Rule 139, second sentence, EPC, it must be established: [that is is obvious that an error is present, and also is obvious what was intended]." 
• "The board agrees with the appellant that the skilled reader would recognise that the added sentence does not make any sense in its present position in the claim, but it disagrees with the appellant's assertion that it would be immediately evident what the correct context for the sentence would be." Therefore, claim 5 lacks basis.
• As a comment, there was in fact no request for correction of the patent under Rule 139. The Board seems correct in that Rule 139 applies by analogy, because G 1/10, r. 8 held that then "all concerned should read the patent as if corrected". 

EPO T 0923/13 - link

Reasons for the Decision

MAIN REQUEST (granted claims)

1. Amendments (Article 100(c) EPC)

1.1 Respondents 02 and 03 [opponents] argued that granted claim 1 extended beyond the content of the application as filed because: [...]

They further argued that granted claim 5 extended beyond the content of the application as filed because:

(d) it included the feature "... a strip tape covers a discontinuous section of the thermoplastic material innermost layer is laminated by an extrusion-laminating method and between two edges of the packaging material in liquid tight..." (emphasis added by the board), whereas according to Figure 2 of the application as filed what was disclosed was a strip tape which was sealed to the packaging material wrap by a strip tape applicator.

1.5 Lastly, concerning amendment (d), the board agrees with the respondents that the pre-grant amendment to claim 5 finds no support in the application as filed.

1.5.1 According to the appellant, the amendment did not add subject-matter because it resulted from an obvious error. It would have been immediately clear to the skilled reader that the inserted sentence made no sense at this position of the claim. At the same time, the skilled reader would "mentally" place the sentence after the first occurrence of the word "layer" in the characterising part of the claim.

1.5.2 The board is not convinced. In order for a correction to be allowable under Rule 139, second sentence, EPC, it must be established:

- (i) that it is obvious that an error is in fact present in the document filed with the EPO, the incorrect information having to be objectively recognisable by the skilled person using common general knowledge, and
- (ii) that the correction of the error is obvious in the sense that it is immediately evident that nothing else would have been intended than what is offered as the correction (see Case Law of the Boards of Appeal of the EPO, 8th edition 2016, II.E.4.2).

1.5.3 The board agrees with the appellant that the skilled reader would recognise that the added sentence does not make any sense in its present position in the claim, but it disagrees with the appellant's assertion that it would be immediately evident what the correct context for the sentence would be.

Firstly, there are several layers in the laminate that could be extrusion-laminated, and the skilled person has no reason to assume that it can only be the innermost layer. Other layers are equally possible, and even the strip tape itself, at least according to the respondents. Secondly, the board cannot accept the appellant's argument that it can only be the "innermost layer" because the same amendment has been made to claim 1. In fact, claim 1 has also been amended such that the parameters relate to the innermost layer, as discussed under (b) above. This amendment has not been made in claim 5. Thus, there is no conformity in the amendment of claim 1 and the alleged correct position of the relevant wording in claim 5. Therefore, the board is not convinced that the skilled reader would draw any conclusion by analogy by only considering part of the amendment to claim 1, while ignoring the rest.

1.6 In summary, amendment (a) to claim 1 and amendment (d) to claim 5 are not supported by the disclosure of the application as filed. The ground under Article 100(c) EPC thus prejudices the maintenance of the patent on the basis of the main request.

T 1351/12 - Lack of reasoning

Key points

• The Board fins a substantial procedural violation in a lack of reasoning of the Examining Division.
• The appellant [applicant] correctly noted that the examining division had not appreciated that claim 1 of auxiliary request 3 before it (the present main request) was different from claim 1 of auxiliary request 2 in that it specified the breakthrough event as being selected from the group consisting of diarrhoea, [other diseases]. The subject-matter that was assessed in view of the requirements of Article 83 EPC in paragraph 9 of the decision was therefore only that of claim 1 of auxiliary request 2.
• The reasoning of the examining division or parts of it might have been envisaged to also apply to claim 1 of auxiliary request 3. It cannot be inferred from the decision, however, whether this is the case and, if so, which arguments would apply correspondingly.
• As a result the appealed decision, contrary to Rule 111(2) EPC, is not reasoned to the extent that it refused the application with claims according to auxiliary request 3.

EPO T 1351/12 - link

Reasons for the Decision

1. The appeal is admissible.

The decision under appeal - lack of reasoning

2. The appellant [applicant] correctly noted that the examining division had not appreciated that claim 1 of auxiliary request 3 before it (the present main request) was different from claim 1 of auxiliary request 2 in that it specified the breakthrough event as being selected from the group consisting of diarrhoea, enterocolitis, dermatitis, hypophysitis, panhypopituitarism, rash and pruritis. The subject-matter that was assessed in view of the requirements of Article 83 EPC in paragraph 9 of the decision was therefore only that of claim 1 of auxiliary request 2. The reasoning of the examining division or parts of it might have been envisaged to also apply to claim 1 of auxiliary request 3. It cannot be inferred from the decision, however, whether this is the case and, if so, which arguments would apply correspondingly.

3. As a result the appealed decision, contrary to Rule 111(2) EPC, is not reasoned to the extent that it refused the application with claims according to auxiliary request 3.

4. The failure in the decision to provide adequate reasoning under Rule 111(2) EPC for the rejection of auxiliary request 3 is to be considered as a substantial procedural violation and a fundamental deficiency in the first instance proceedings in the sense of Article 11 RPBA.

J 0016/17 - Anonymous decision and the rule of law

Key points

• In this case, the decision of (the formalities officer of) the examining division rejecting the request for re-establishment, did not contain the name of the person(s) taking it, contravening Rule 113(1) EPC. 
• The Legal Board considers this to be substantial procedural violation, and the requirement to be not a mere formality.
• " The requirement [that] decisions [must] state the name of the employee responsible, is not just a mere formality but an essential procedural step in the decision-taking process. The name and the signature serve to identify the decision's authors and express that they unconditionally assume responsibility for its content. This requirement is aimed at preventing arbitrariness and abuse and ensuring that it can be verified that the competent body has taken the decision. It therefore constitutes an embodiment of the rule of law. " 
• " It was not sufficient either that at the bottom of the decision it was at least stated that it stemmed from the "Examining Division": Rule 113(1) EPC expressly requires the name of "the employee responsible" and not of the "department responsible". Furthermore, stating only the department responsible would also not fulfil the purpose of the requirement to state the person's name, i.e. to identify the person responsible and at the same time to verify whether the person was also competent to take the decision. This becomes particularly apparent in the present case in which the competence to take the decision on requests under Article 122 and Rule 136 EPC was entrusted to formalities officers under Rule 11(3) EPC in conjunction with Article 1 No. 11 and Article 3 of the decision of the President of the EPO, OJ EPO 2014, A6. Indeed, in the present case it is unclear who took the decision under appeal, i.e. the examiners of the examining division or the formalities officer on behalf of the examining division." 
• The RE request is rejected as inadmissible, because the omitted act (payment of the renewal fee) was effect too late (and weeks after the written RE request). The professional representative explained that: "the appellant submitted had made an error of law in that he had paid the missing fees only on 15 March 2017 on the assumption, by analogy with the corresponding provisions for annuities in his national (Albanian) legislation, that the relevant time limit would actually end on the last day of the month in which the payment fell due, i.e. on the last day of March 2017. " 

EPO J 0016/17 - J16/17 - link



EPO Headnote
The requirement laid down in Rule 113(1) EPC, according to which decisions from the European Patent Office must be signed by and state the name of the employee responsible, is not just a mere formality but an essential procedural step in the decision-taking process. The name and the signature serve to identify the decision's authors and express that they unconditionally assume responsibility for its content. This requirement is aimed at preventing arbitrariness and abuse and ensuring that it can be verified that the competent body has taken the decision. It therefore constitutes an embodiment of the rule of law. As a consequence, a violation of the requirement pursuant to Rule 113(1) EPC amounts to a substantial procedural violation and renders the decision erroneous (Reasons, point 2.3).

Reasons for the Decision

1. The appeal complies with the requirements of Articles 106 to 108 and Rule 99 EPC and is therefore admissible.

2. Form of the decision under appeal - Rule 113 EPC

2.1 Apart from the subject of re-establishment of his rights, the appellant did not invoke any further deficiencies in connection with the impugned decision. However, according to Article 114(1) EPC the EPO "shall examine the facts of its own motion" and "shall not be restricted in this examination to the ... arguments provided by the parties and the relief sought". Hence, the boards may verify ex officio whether or not procedural violations have occurred in first-instance proceedings, particularly when inalienable rights constituting an embodiment of the rule of law are concerned, as is the case here (see point 2.3 below).

T 0265/14 - Withdrawing appeal after second Communication

Key points

• The appeal fee is also reimbursed at 50%, if the appeal is withdrawn in the period for filing response to a second communication from the Board (and no date for oral proceedings has been set).

EPO Headnote (translation)
1. Rule 103 (2) (b) EPC should not be construed to definitively preclude reimbursement at 50% of the appeal fee after expiry of a period for replying under Rule 100 (2) EPC.

2. If the board sets a new period for filing comments, it opens up a new possibility to withdraw the appeal with a reimbursement of the fee within this period.

3. The case of issuing a second communication under Rule 100 (2) EPC is therefore to be treated as equivalent to summoning oral proceedings after the expiry of the time-limit set in a first communication, which is also has a possibility of reimbursement under Rule 103 (2) (a).


EPO Headnote

1. Regel 103(2)b) EPÜ ist nicht so auszulegen, dass eine Rückzahlung der hälftigen Beschwerdegebühr nach Verstreichenlassen einer Stellungnahmefrist gemäß Regel 100(2) EPÜ endgültig ausgeschlossen wäre. 2. Setzt die Kammer eine erneute Stellungnahmefrist, eröffnet sie vielmehr eine neue Möglichkeit, innerhalb dieser Frist mit gebührenreduzierender Wirkung die Beschwerde zurückzunehmen. 3. Der Fall des Erlasses eines zweiten Bescheides nach Regel 100(2) EPÜ ist daher der Anberaumung einer mündlichen Verhandlung nach Verstreichen der in einem ersten Bescheid gesetzten Frist gleichzusetzen, die ebenfalls eine erneute Rückzahlungsmöglichkeit nach Regel 103(2)a) EPÜ nach sich zieht. EPO T 0265/14 - link

T 2398/12 - Prototype lost with EPO

Key points

• " In the impugned decision, the opposition division held, inter alia, that the subject-matter of claim 1 was new and involved an inventive step with respect to an alleged prior use at the CeBIT trade fair 2001 referred to as D1. Evidence for the prior use was provided inter alia by a model inspected at the oral proceedings before the opposition division and a video, referred to as D14, of a television program covering the trade fair. The opposition division accepted that the model was the computer mouse shown in D14." 
• " The board [in the appeal] requested that it be provided with the model [i.e. the prototype shown at the oral proceedings before the OD]. EPO records from the post room show that a package did arrive by post at the EPO, including a letter from the appellant listing the items said to be enclosed. However, neither the model nor the other items ever arrived within the Boards of Appeal Unit, a separate department located in another building.

• VI. In a communication accompanying a summons to attend oral proceedings, the board drew attention to the missing items, which, despite an internal investigation, had not been found at the EPO. The board stated that, as regards the model, the board was limited to the facts established by the opposition division as a result of their taking of evidence (cf. the minutes of the oral proceedings before the opposition division) and any observations by the board which could be unequivocally deduced from the video showing the model (i.e. D14).
• " It was accepted by the opposition division that the prototype of a computer mouse which the appellant presented at the oral proceedings before the opposition division (to be referred to as "the model") corresponded to the one exhibited at the CeBIT trade fair 2001, as shown in the video D14. The allegation of a public prior use referred to as D1 and assessed by the opposition division is essentially based on this model. The model however is not available for assessment by the board (see points V and VI above).

• 1.5 Although this is obviously highly regrettable, not least in respect of the examination of the appeal, the board considers that what actually happened to the missing items is primarily a matter between the appellant and the EPO departments which handle the incoming mail rather than the board. The board's task is to decide on the merits of the appeal on the basis of the requests, facts, evidence and arguments available to it." 

EPO T 2398/12  - link

Summary of Facts and Submissions

I. This case concerns the appeal of the opponent (henceforth, appellant) against the decision of the opposition division rejecting its opposition against the European patent No. 1 615 096.

The patent proprietor is respondent.

II. The patent had been opposed on the ground for opposition pursuant to Article 100(a) EPC (lack of novelty and lack of inventive step). In the impugned decision, the opposition division held, inter alia, that the subject-matter of claim 1 was new and involved an inventive step with respect to an alleged prior use at the CeBIT trade fair 2001 referred to as D1. Evidence for the prior use was provided inter alia by a model inspected at the oral proceedings before the opposition division and a video, referred to as D14, of a television program covering the trade fair. The opposition division accepted that the model was the computer mouse shown in D14.

T 1481/14 - No cut-off effect of grant

Key points

• In this opposition appeal case, the patentee reintroduces in claim 1 a feature that was omitted in claim 1 as granted, compared to claim 1 as filed in which the feature was present.
• The opponent argues that this violates a " caesure effect" (Zäsurwirkung) of the grant.
• The Board does not agree with the opponent. "The granting of a patent, however, does not necessarily constitute an automatic and final caesura, which precludes any return of coated objects", following T 975/03.
• Perhaps the matter was stated most clearly in English in T 81/03: "the Board agrees with the patent proprietor that there is no basis in the EPC for the idea that amendments after grant must be based on subject-matter contained in the patent specification. " I suppose that the "Zäsurwirkung"  is a rule of German national patent law, that amendments after grant need to have basis in the patent specification (i.e. in the patent as granted). 

EPO T 1481/14 - link


3.4 Änderung a)


3.4.1 Bei dieser Änderung handelt es sich um die Wiedereinführung des im Prüfungsverfahren gestrichenen Begriffs "genau" aus dem ursprünglichen Anspruch 1, um einen Einwand der Einspruchsabteilung unter Artikel 123 (2) EPÜ auszuräumen (siehe Gründe Nr. 7).
3.4.2 Die Beschwerdegegnerin 1 argumentiert, dass die Aufnahme des Wortes "genau" eine unzulässige Zwischenverallgemeinerung des in Absatz 15 der Patentschrift offenbarten Ausführungsbeispiels der Erfindung darstelle, bei dem das genau dosierte Pulver in fluidisierter Form dem sekundären freien Plasmastrahl zugeführt wird. Aufgrund des Weglassens dieser weiteren Merkmale gehe der Gegenstand von Anspruch 1 über die technische Lehre in den ursprünglichen Anmeldungsunterlagen hinaus. Die Kammer ist von dieser Argumentation nicht überzeugt. Diese weiteren Merkmale sind in den ursprünglichen Anmeldungsunterlagen nicht als erfindungswesentlich dargestellt. Insbesondere war das Merkmal, wonach dem Plasmastrahl das Pulver "in genau dosierter Menge" zugefügt wird, in Anspruch 1 in der ursprünglich eingereichten Fassung enthalten, ohne diese weiteren Merkmale.




3.4.3 Um ihren Standpunkt zu stützen, argumentiert die Beschwerdegegnerin 1 [opponent], dass wegen einer angeblichen Zäsurwirkung aufgrund der Patenterteilung Anspruch 1 wie ursprünglich eingereicht als Stütze für diese Änderung nicht herangezogen werden dürfe. Die Erteilung eines Patents bildet jedoch nicht zwangsweise eine automatische und endgültige Zäsur, die jedwede Wiederaufnahme gestrichener Gegenstände ausschließt (siehe dazu Rechtsprechung der Beschwerdekammern, 8. Auflage, 2016,, Kapitel II.E.2.3.2; siehe auch Günzel B., "Materielle Zäsurwirkung der Patenterteilung gemäß dem Europäischen Patentübereinkommen", GRUR, 2001, Seite 932). Eine Zäsurwirkung kann allenfalls in den Beschränkungen gesehen werden, die nach Regeln 80 und 138 und Artikel 123 (3) EPÜ für weitere Änderungen des Patents gelten. Nach ständiger Rechtsprechung kann hingegen die Streichung eines den Schutzbereich beschränkenden Merkmals aus einem Anspruch, die gegen Artikel 123 (2) EPÜ verstößt, im Einspruchsverfahren rückgängig gemacht werden, auch wenn dieses Merkmal im Patent nicht mehr enthalten ist (siehe u. a. T 942/01, Gründe Nr. 1; T 975/03, Gründe Nr. 2).

T 1029/14 - What is a new ground?

Key points

• In appeal, the opponent argues lack of inventive step over D1. D1 was cited for novelty in the opposition procedure. The attack is  not admitted, because it was late filed. 
• However, the Board adds that  " It is further questionable, whether the line of attack starting from D1 as the closest prior art can be discussed at all in the appeal proceedings without the agreement of the patent proprietor. The appellant argues that the objection concerning inventive step starting from D1 does not constitute a fresh ground of opposition and can be examined in appeal proceedings without the agreement of the patentee, since D1 has been used to attack novelty. "
• " In decision T 131/01 the Board held that in a case where the ground of lack of novelty has been substantiated, a specific substantiation of the ground of lack of inventive step is neither necessary - given that novelty is a prerequisite for determining whether an invention involves an inventive step and such prerequisite is allegedly not satisfied - nor generally possible without contradicting the reasoning presented in support of lack of novelty. Therefore it held that the objection of lack of inventive step is not a fresh ground for opposition [].
  However, in T 131/01 the opponent had already indicated in the notice of opposition that the claimed subject-matter lacks an inventive step in the event that it is found to be novel []. Therefore T 131/01 differs from the present case, where the appellant had made no suggestion in opposition proceedings that the claimed subject-matter would be obvious when starting from D1, should it be found to be novel." 
• "The Board concludes that in the presence case, the objection concerning inventive step starting from D1 has to be considered to constitute a fresh ground of opposition in line with the finding in T 448/03 which cannot be discussed without the consent of the proprietor, which was not given in the present case." 
• As a comment, case T 448/03  has not been cited before in a decision and is not in the Case Law Book. T 131/01 is cited numerous times. 

EPO T 1029/14 - link

3.6 Claim 1 of the contested patent therefore fulfils the requirements of Article 54 EPC.

4. Admissibility of the new ground of opposition

4.1 During opposition proceedings the appellant, then opponent, crossed on Form 2300 the box for the ground of opposition pursuant to Article 100(a) in combination with Article 56 EPC. However, lack of inventive step was neither substantiated in the notice of opposition nor later discussed during the opposition proceedings (see impugned decision, point 3.4 of the reasons).

4.2 The first time that the appellant argued that the subject-matter of claim 1 lacks an inventive step was during appeal proceedings.

The appellant submits two lines of objection:

a) In the statement setting out the grounds of appeal it is argued that the subject-matter of claim 1 is obvious when starting from document D2 as the closest prior art. 

b) In the letter dated 5 April 2018 it is argued that the subject-matter of claim 1 is obvious when starting from document D1 as the closest prior art.

4.3 Concerning a)

4.4 Concerning b)

4.4.1 In the statement setting out the grounds of appeal D1 is not mentioned at all in the context of inventive step.

The objection concerning inventive step based on D1 was presented for the first time in the letter submitted on 5 April 2018, i.e. two working days before the oral proceedings before the board of appeal took place. Therefore the objection has been raised only at an extremely late stage of the proceedings and represents a complete change of the appellant's case for which not even the provisional opinion expressed in the annex to the summons does not provide any justification.

T 0590/18 - Paper debit orders

Key points

• In this opposition appeal, the appellant filed a paper debit order for the appeal fee after 01.12.2017, i.e. when paper debit orders were no longer allowed. 
• The Opposition Division informs the appellant (opponent) that the debit order is not processed. As a comment, I don't think that the OD has any competence in the file after the decision, the case is at the Boards. The EPO accounting department is as such not an organ in the sense of the EPC. If a party and the EPO disagree about whether a debit order is valid, the decision is taken not by the accounting department but by the competent body (e.g. the Examining Division), in my view.
• In response, the appellant argues that even on 15.03.2018, the EPO referred to paper debit orders (Form 1010) in the "Guide for applicants" on the EPO website. The appellant argues legitimate expectations. The appellant also argues that on 26.02 of the appeal period expiring 28.02, there were internet problems. Therefore a paper debit order was filed on (the morning of) 27.02. The appellant first argued that the internet problems were on 28.02 (or actually on 18.02). The appellant acknowledged that is was familiar with the Decision abolishing paper debit orders. 
• The Board observes correctly that the debit order was not processed. The Board in the next sentence says that the payment could be considered made (implicitly: based on the principle of legitimate expectations) if the EPO website had (implicitly: misleadingly) referred to paper debit orders. As a comment, the Board does not here decide itself whether the debit order was invalid (in my view, the Board is the only competent body to do so, T152/82 r.8, the actual processing of the debit order by the EPO accounting department being legally irrelevant; if only because the right to be heard and to oral proceedings does not apply to the accounting department - alternatively the Board needs to decide whether the filed paper debit order makes the appeal admissible (not deemed not filed under Article 108), as in T152/82).
• The Board rejects the argument based on legitimate expectations, because the representative knew the new ADA rules, and because there was still sufficient time to effect payment on (the afternoon of 27.02) and 28.02.
• The appellant had also argued that the Decision of the President changing the ADA was invalid. The Board rejects this arguments, noting that the ADA are established under Rfees5(2) which give the President the authority to set up additional payment methods.
  " Innerhalb dieses Systems stellt sich die Möglichkeit zur Einreichung der Beschwerdegebühr mittels eines Abbuchungsauftrags als zusätzliche, vom EPÜ nicht zwingend geforderte Zahlungsart dar. Aus dieser Feststellung folgt ohne Weiteres, dass ein solcher vom Präsidenten des Amtes zusätzlich eröffneter Zahlungsweg durch eine Entscheidung des Präsidenten des Amtes auch wieder geschlossen oder - wie im vorliegenden Fall geschehen - in der Weise modifiziert werden kann, dass nur noch in einer bestimmten Form übermittelte Abbuchungsaufträge anerkannt werden." 
• As a comment, from the fact that the ADA could be abolished by the President, in my view does not follow that the ADA are outside the rule of law, or that the President can set the ADA (and carry out debit orders) in any way. In particular, I don't think that the ADA (and the processing of debit orders) can be capricious, nefarious, or discriminatory. Based on this understanding that the rule of law sets limits to the ADA, the question arises if prescribing a very specific format without a possibility for a correction of an otherwise perfectly clear debit order is within those limits. The Board does not decide on that issue in this case.
• The Board rejects the appellant's argument that the EPO should accept paper debit orders, because the ADA are at the President's discretion under Rfees5(2).
• As a further comment, the appeal is stated to be against the "decision" (of the OD) to not accept the debit order for the appeal fee. The dictum is that the appeal fee is considered to be not timely paid. The question now is if the Board is going to decide on the appeal against the decision of the OD maintaining the patent in amended form (and finds the appeal to be "not be deemed to have been filed" under Article 108 for failure to pay the appeal fee). 

EPO Headnote

1. Durch einen nach dem 1. Dezember 2017 in Papierform (EPA Form 1010) erteilten Abbuchungsauftrag kann die Zahlung der Beschwerdegebühr allenfalls dann bewirkt werden, wenn sich die Beschwerdeführerin mit Erfolg darauf berufen kann, sie habe in einem aktuellen Internet-Auftritt des Amtes noch nach Inkrafttreten der Änderung einen eindeutigen Hinweis auf die Möglichkeit der Zahlung der Beschwerdegebühren mittels des Formulars EPA-Form 1010 gefunden, auf die Richtigkeit dieses Hinweises vertrauen durfte und auch tatsächlich darauf vertraut hat.

2. Ein solches Vertrauen wird nicht begründet durch das Auffinden der pdf-Version einer vor Inkrafttreten der Änderung publizierten Broschüre.

3. Der Begründung schutzwürdigen Vertrauens steht die Kenntnis der Beschwerdeführerin von der Änderung der Zahlungswege entgegen.

EPO T 0590/18 -  link

Sachverhalt und Anträge

I. Gegen die Entscheidung der Einspruchsabteilung vom 18. Dezember 2017, das Europäische Patent Nr. 1 849 951 in geändertem Umfang, das heißt auf der Basis des ersten Hilfsantrags, aufrechtzuerhalten, haben beide Parteien Beschwerde eingelegt. Die Beschwerdeschrift der Beschwerdeführerin (Einsprechenden) trägt das Datum 26. Februar 2018. Sie ist ausweislich des Posteingangsstempels am 27. Februar 2018 beim Europäischen Patentamt (im Folgenden: Amt) eingegangen.

In ihrer Beschwerdeschrift hat die Beschwerdeführerin (Einsprechende) unter anderem das Folgende ausgeführt: "Die amtliche Beschwerdegebühr in Höhe von 1.880,00 ¤ wird gemäß beigefügtem Formblatt 1010 entrichtet". Das Formblatt trägt ebenfalls das Datum 27. Februar 2018 und ist auch an diesem Tag beim Amt eingegangen. Dementsprechend hat sie auf dem der Beschwerdeschrift beigefügten Formblatt EPA Form 1010 angekreuzt, die Beschwerdegebühr solle von dem dort genannten Konto abgebucht werden. Auf diesem, beim Amt geführten Konto mit der Nr. 28 000 799 war zum maßgeblichen Zeitpunkt eine ausreichende Deckung vorhanden.

II. Mit Bescheid vom 8. März 2018 teilte die Einspruchsabteilung der Beschwerdeführerin (Einsprechenden) mit, das Amt akzeptiere seit dem 1. Dezember 2017 nur noch Abbuchungsaufträge / automatische Abbuchungsaufträge, die in einem elektronisch verarbeitbaren Format (XML) eingereicht werden. Abbuchungsaufträge, die unter anderem per Post auf dem Formblatt EPA Form 1010 eingereicht werden, seien nun ungültig und würden nicht mehr ausgeführt. Den auf dem Formblatt EPA Form 1010 erteilten Abbuchungsauftrag der Beschwerdeführerin (Einsprechenden) hat das Amt deshalb nicht ausgeführt. Das Amt hatte auf die Änderung der Möglichkeiten zur Zahlung der Beschwerdegebühr im Amtsblatt am 18. Oktober 2017 hingewiesen (ABl. EPA 2017, Zusatzpublikation 5).

III. Gegen die Entscheidung, den auf dem Formblatt EPA-Form 1010 erteilten Abbuchungsauftrag nicht zu akzeptieren, wendet sich die Beschwerdeführerin (Einsprechende) in ihrem Schriftsatz vom 16. März 2018.  [i.e. the impugned "decision"  is that of 08.03.2018, not the decision of 18.12.2017 to maintain the patent in amended form] [...]

Entscheidungsgründe

1. Der Antrag ist zulässig.

Die Kammer hält an ihrer bereits in der Mitteilung vom 18. April 2018 zum Ausdruck gebrachten Auffassung fest, wonach das Schreiben des Amtes vom 8. März 2018 als Mitteilung über den Verlust des Beschwerderechts im Sinne von Regel 112(1) EPÜ und der Antrag der Beschwerdeführerin vom 16. März 2018 als ein solcher nach Regel 112(2) EPÜ anzusehen ist.

2. Der Antrag auf Feststellung der fristgerechten Zahlung der Beschwerdegebühr war zurückzuweisen.

2.1 Dem Hauptantrag der Beschwerdeführerin (Einsprechenden) auf Feststellung, dass die von ihr eingelegte Beschwerde zulässig ist, kann auf der Grundlage der mündlichen Verhandlung vom 4. Juli 2018 nicht stattgegeben werden. Die Ladung zur mündlichen Verhandlung erfolgte ausweislich der Mitteilung der Kammer gemäß Regel 100(2) EPÜ ausdrücklich nur zum Zwecke der Erörterung der Frage, ob dem Antrag der Beschwerdeführerin (Einsprechenden) auf Feststellung der fristgerechten Zahlung der Beschwerdegebühr stattgegeben werden kann. Die Frage, ob ihre Beschwerde auch zulässig ist, geht darüber hinaus.

T 1093/17 - Appeal against adapted description

Key points

• In T 128/13, the Board had remitted the case back "to maintain the patent with claims 1 and 2 of the first auxiliary request [...]  and a description, and if need be, the drawings to be adapted thereto".  The OD thereafter took a (further) interlocutory decision fixing the text (including the description) in which the patent can be maintained in amended form. The opponent appealed against this decision.
• The opponent initially had objections under Article 123(2) EPC, which were given up. It had also argued objections under A83 and A84 because none of the examples of the patent was according to the amended claims.
• Both parties had requested a cost order against the other party because of an abuse of procedure of the other party.
• " Regarding the late filing of an adapted description by the [patentee] in the oral proceedings before the Board [in the first appeal] the present Board notes that the then Board explicitly stated that the Board "will not outright refuse that an amended description be submitted". [The] then Board explicitly ordered that the description be adapted to the allowable set of claims. Hence, the Board in the proceedings for T 128/13 did not see any procedural abuse in the late filing of an adapted description, and neither does the present Board.
• In arguing against a proposed adapted description in the subsequent opposition proceedings, the [opponent] is within its rights pursuant to Articles 101(1) and 113(1) EPC. It was obviously adversely affected by the impugned decision posted on 28 February 2017, and so it is within its rights to lodge an appeal against said decision pursuant to Article 107 EPC."

EPO T 1093/17 -  link

Summary of Facts and Submissions

I. The appellant (opponent) lodged an appeal within the prescribed period and in the prescribed form against the interlocutory decision of the Opposition Division maintaining European patent No. 1 409 344 in amended form.

The appeal follows a previous appeal in the present case on which decision T 128/13 dated 8 December 2015 has already been taken, with the order "to maintain the patent with claims 1 and 2 of the first auxiliary request filed with letter dated 6 November 2015 and a description, and if need be, the drawings to be adapted thereto". The order and the ratio decidendi of T 128/13 are res judicata for the present decision, which accordingly deals only with adapting the description and, if need be, the drawings to the claims already allowed.

T 1065/16 - Admissibility and allowability of ground at once

Key points

• During the oral proceedings before the OD, the opponent had sought to introduce A83 as new ground of opposition. The OD had admitted the new ground. However, at the end of the discussion about admissibility of the ground, the Chairman had announced the OD's conclusion on that the A83 was both admissible and allowable, i.e. that the claims were insufficiently disclosed.
• This is a violation of the right to be heard. The Board however examines A83 itself and finds the claims to be sufficiently disclosed. The case is remitted for further prosecution, and the appeal fee is reimbursed.

EPO T 1065/16 - link

Entscheidungsgründe

1. Die Beschwerden sind zulässig.

HAUPTANTRAG

2. Rechtliches Gehör (Artikel 113 (1) EPÜ)

2.1 Zu Beginn der mündlichen Verhandlung am 16. Februar 2016 vor der Einspruchsabteilung beantragte die Beschwerdeführerin II [opponent] die Frage der Ausführbarkeit von Amts wegen zu prüfen. Daraufhin beantragte die Beschwerdeführerin I [patentee] die Zulässigkeit dieses Antrags zu prüfen, siehe Punkt VI oben.

T 0848/13 - No transfer of opposition

Key points

• The Board finds that there was no transfer of opposition in a legal situation that is quite specific for German law. The first opponent had become the limited partner of a new legal entity (a KG) which had taken over the business of the first opponent. The KG was the new opponent, according to opponent, due to said transfer. 
• The Board notes that there is no universal succession because the first opponent continues to exists as legal entity.
• For a transfer of opposition, evidence needs to be filed with the EPO, in analogy with Rule 22(3) EPC. In particular, it needs to be shown that the business of the first opponent, relating to the opposed patent, was transferred to the new entity, also for the case of the German reorganisation procedure at issue. Such evidence is lacking in the specific documents filed in this case.

EPO  T 0848/13 -  link


VII. Mit Schreiben vom 11. Mai 2018 teilte die Einsprechende I mit, dass ihre Gesellschaft unter dem neuen Namen "LLA Lucht GmbH" weitergeführt werde und dass die neugegründete Firma "LLA Instruments GmbH & Co. KG", deren Kommanditistin die "LLA Lucht GmbH" sei, im Zuge der Gesamtrechtsnachfolge den Betrieb der "LLA Instruments GmbH" übernommen habe. Die Einsprechende I ist der Ansicht, dass die Einsprechendenstellung infolgedessen automatisch auf die "LLA Instruments GmbH & Co. KG" übergegangen sei. Die Verfahrensbevollmächtigten seien im Übrigen sowohl zur Vertretung der bisherigen Einsprechenden I als auch der "LLA Instruments GmbH & Co. KG" ermächtigt.


Entscheidungsgründe

1. Die Beschwerde ist zulässig.

2. Übergang der Einsprechendenstellung

Die bisherige Einsprechende I (vormals: ,,LLA Instruments GmbH"), die ausweislich des vorgelegten Handelsregisterauszugs (Anlage Bf5, HRB 50441) nunmehr firmiert als "LLA Lucht GmbH", hat die Beschwerde form- und fristgerecht eingelegt und begründet. Ein Übergang der Einsprechendenstellung auf die "LLA Instruments GmbH & Co. KG" ist nicht hinreichend nachgewiesen worden.

Ein Übergang der Einsprechendenstellung kommt im Falle einer Universalsukzession in Betracht oder, wenn der Teil des Geschäftsbetriebs der ursprünglichen Einsprechenden, der den Einspruch betrifft, auf einen Dritten übertragen wird (G 4/88, OJ EPO 1989, 480, Entscheidungsgründe 4., 6.; T 2357/12, Entscheidungsgründe, 2.-4.).

a) Die bisherige Einsprechende I besteht ausweislich der Angaben der Einsprechenden I auch nach Gründung der "LLA Instruments GmbH & Co. KG" fort und ist Kommanditistin dieser neugegründeten Gesellschaft. Die erfolgte Unternehmensumwandlung ist demzufolge nicht als Verschmelzung oder Aufspaltung nach dem hier anwendbaren deutschen Umwandlungsgesetz (UmwG)(§ 1 (1) Nr. 1; § 2°ff UmwG bzw. § 1 (1) Nr. 2, § 123 (1) UmwG einzuordnen, da diese Umwandlungsarten die Auflösung des übertragenden Rechtsträgers vorsehen würden. Das Fortbestehen des übertragenden Rechtsträgers kommt nach dem deutschen Umwandlungsgesetz indes in Betracht bei einer Abspaltung bzw. Ausgliederung nach § 1 (1) Nr.°2 UmwG in Verbindung mit § 123 (2) bzw. (3) UmwG.

b) Wenn das übertragende Unternehmen - wie hier - fortbesteht, ist bei der Prüfung der Übertragung der Einsprechendenstellung Regel 22 EPÜ und damit insbesondere auch Regel 22 (3) EPÜ entsprechend anwendbar. Ein Übergang der Einsprechendenstellung wird gegenüber dem Europäischen Patentamt daher gemäß Regel 22 (3) EPÜ erst und nur insoweit wirksam, als er durch Vorlage von Dokumenten nachgewiesen wird. Eine Ausnahme von Regel 22 (3) EPÜ wäre nur geboten, wenn anderenfalls ein rechtliches Vakuum entstehen würde (T 0006/05, Reasons 1.6.3; T 0015/01, OJ EPO 2006, 153, Reasons 10., 12.).

Ob Regel 22 (3) EPÜ anwendbar ist oder nicht, richtet sich nicht danach, ob die erfolgte Unternehmensübertragung nach nationalem Recht als Gesamt- oder Sonderrechtsnachfolge qualifiziert wird (vgl. T 2357/12, Reasons 10.-12.), sondern danach, ob eine Ausnahme von dieser Regel zur Vermeidung eines rechtlichen Vakuums geboten ist. Da bei der Unternehmensübertragung unter Fortbestehen des übertragenden Rechtsträgers (wie z.B. im Fall der Abspaltung oder Ausgliederung nach dem deutschen Umwandlungsgesetz), kein rechtliches Vakuum entsteht, ist Regel 22 (3) EPÜ anwendbar.

c) In den Fällen, in denen die Vermögensübertragung, wie bei einer Abspaltung oder Ausgliederung nach dem deutschen Umwandlungsgesetz (§ 123 (2) bzw. (3) UmwG), nur einen Teil oder auch mehrere Teile des Vermögens des übertragenden Unternehmens betreffen kann, kommt ein Übergang der Einsprechendenstellung nur in Betracht, wenn der übertragene Vermögensbestandteil gerade den Geschäftsbereich betrifft, auf den sich der Einspruch bezieht. Es genügt daher nicht, den Umwandlungsvorgang an sich zu belegen, sondern es ist in entsprechender Anwendung von Regel 22 (1) EPÜ zusätzlich nachzuweisen, dass der (die) den Einspruch betreffende(n) Teil(e) des Geschäftsbetriebs übertragen wurde(n).

d) Die Einsprechende I hat die von ihr behauptete Übertragung ihres gesamten Geschäftsbetriebs auf die neugegründete ,,LLA Instrument GmbH & Co KG" mit den vorgelegten Unterlagen nicht hinreichend nachgewiesen. Aus der Anlage Bf6 ergibt sich lediglich, dass die Einsprechende I Kommanditistin der "LLA Instruments GmbH & Co. KG" ist. In dem als Bf7 vorgelegten Schreiben wird die Übertragung des Betriebs der bisherigen Einsprechenden auf die ,,LLA Instrument GmbH & Co KG" lediglich für die Zukunft in Aussicht gestellt. Bei dem als Anlage Bf8 vorgelegten Schreiben handelt es sich nur um ein informelles Schreiben der neugegründeten Kommanditgesellschaft ("LLA Instruments GmbH & Co. KG") an ihre Geschäftspartner, das keine Rückschlüsse auf die tatsächlich erfolgten Übertragungen bzw. deren Umfang zulässt. Die Einsprechende hat daher weder nachgewiesen, dass ihr gesamter Geschäftsbetrieb noch der den Einspruch betreffende Teil tatsächlich auf die neugegründete "LLA Instruments GmbH & Co. KG", übertragen worden ist.

In entsprechender Anwendung von Regel 22 (3) EPÜ entfaltet der behauptete Rechtsübergang somit mangels hinreichender Nachweise gegenüber dem Europäischen Patentamt keine Wirkung. Demzufolge ist und bleibt die bisherige Einsprechende I, die als Rechtsperson fortbesteht und auch weiterhin von ihren Verfahrensbevollmächtigten vertreten wird, als Beschwerdeführerin Beteiligte des Beschwerdeverfahrens.

T 2466/13 - Transfer of priority and partial priority

Key points

• In this opposition case, the patent claims the priority of a Spanish utility model, which was published in the priority year.
• For one priority, a valid transfer of priority was required. There was a written assignment signed before the PCT filing date. The opponent has doubts about the assignment, pointing to 1) lack of original documents 2) possibly incorrect signatures and 3) the authority of the persons signing. The Board dismisses these objections without much difficulties.
•  In present claim 1, some features of claim 1 of the priority document are omitted. Therefore, for the requirement of 'same invention', the question is whether the description of the priority document directly and unambiguously discloses these features as optional. The Board decides that this is not the case.
• Therefore, there is a case of partial priority: for the embodiments of present claim 1 with the features at issue, priority is valid. For the other embodiments not having the features, priority is invalid. The priority application was published in the priority year and is cited for inventive step (hence, no 'shield theory' ; but the decision does not discuss that theory). The embodiments without the features lack inventive step over the priority application as published. 
• An Auxiliary Request was allowable. Concerning the opponent's objections to the adaption of the description, the Board agrees that the description can have an effect on the scope of protection under Art. 69 EPC in national proceedings. However, any objections of added subject-matter can be made in those national proceedings, according to the Board. 

EPO T 2466/13 -  link

Motifs de la décision

1. Droit applicable

La demande de brevet sur la base de laquelle le brevet a été délivré, a été déposée le 18 juin 2003. Par conséquent, en application de l'article 7 de l'Acte portant révision de la CBE en date du 29 novembre 2000 (JO OEB, édition spéciale 4/2007, 235) et de la Décision du Conseil d'administration du 28 juin 2001 relative aux dispositions transitoires au titre de l'article 7 de l'acte de révision de la Convention sur le brevet européen du 29 novembre 2000 (JO OEB, édition spéciale 4/2007, 237) l'article 56 CBE 1973 et l'article 123 CBE (2000) lui sont applicables.

Le brevet ayant été délivré sur la base d'une demande internationale, la validité de la revendication de priorité est régie par l'article 4 de l'Acte de Stockholm de la Convention de Paris pour la protection de la propriété industrielle, ensemble l'article 8, alinéa 2) a) PCT.

2. Validité de la revendication de priorité

La division d'opposition a estimé que la requête principale et les requêtes subsidiaires 1 et 2 qui lui avaient été soumises ne concernaient pas la même invention que le modèle d'utilité espagnol U 200201600 du 24 juin 2002 (numéro de publication : ES 1 052 377 ; ci-après "Prio00"), mais qu'elles revendiquaient valablement la priorité du modèle d'utilité espagnol U 200201601 du 24 juin 2002 (numéro de publication : ES 1 052 378 ; ci-après "Prio01").

La requérante a contesté la validité de la revendication de la priorité du document Prio01 à deux titres : elle a mis en cause la validité formelle de la cession et fait valoir que la demande Prio01 ne concernait pas la "même invention" que la revendication 1 de la requête principale.

2.1 Validité formelle du transfert

2.1.1 Niveau de preuve requis

Selon la jurisprudence des chambres de recours, lorsque toutes les preuves d'un usage antérieur public se trouvent en la possession de l'opposante qui est seule à en avoir connaissance, si bien que la titulaire du brevet ne peut que difficilement ou même ne peut absolument pas se les procurer, il revient à l'opposante de produire la preuve incontestable ("au-delà de tout doute raisonnable") de l'utilisation antérieure alléguée.

T 0558/14 - Rule 137(5) misapplied?

Key points

• The Board rejects a request under Rule 137(5) EPC. The reasons are that the search report was established only for the first invention because of a finding of lack of unity of invention during the search and no additional search fees were paid. The first invention had a certain feature, which is omitted in the claims of the request at issue.
• However, Rule 137(5) EPC does not simply forbids claims relating to unsearched subject-matter. Rule 137(5) EPC only forbids claims that are both (1) unsearched and (2) lacking unity of invention with the 'originally claimed invention'. The Board recites criterium (2) but does not apply it. 
• In fact, in my view, the Board misapplies Rule 137(5) EPC, and should have rejected the request based on G 2/92 (see my recent article in epi Information). G 2/92 is about giving a sanction to not paying additional search fees when invited to do so. Rule 137(5) EPC is intended to only cover cases wherein EPO does not issue an invitation to pay additional search fees (because the subject-matter is put in the description, rather than in the claims). 

EPO T 0558/14 - link

Entscheidungsgründe

1. Die Beschwerde ist zulässig.

2. Hauptantrag

2.1 Die Prüfungsabteilung hatte in der angefochtenen Entscheidung festgestellt, dass die Ansprüche nicht einheitlich im Sinne von Artikel 82 EPÜ seien. Da nur die im Recherchebericht als erste Erfindung bezeichnete Erfindung recherchiert worden sei, die Ansprüche gemäß Hauptantrag vom 3. August 2011 sich jedoch auf eine andere Erfindung bezögen, sei die Anmeldung zurückzuweisen.

2.2 Regel 137(5) EPÜ sieht vor, dass sich geänderte Patentansprüche nicht auf nicht recherchierte Gegenstände beziehen dürfen, die mit der ursprünglich beanspruchten Gruppe von Erfindungen nicht durch eine einzige allgemeine erfinderische Idee verbunden sind. Sie dürfen sich auch nicht auf nicht recherchierte Gegenstände beziehen.

2.3 Im vorliegenden Fall wurde während der Recherchephase die mangelnde Einheitlichkeit der Ansprüche (Artikel 82 EPÜ) gerügt und mangels Zahlung weiterer Recherchegebühren nur die im Recherchebericht als erste angegebene Erfindung recherchiert. Als erste Erfindung wurde dabei eine Superabsorberzusammensetzung gesehen, die dadurch gekennzeichnet ist, dass die Feinstteilchen organische Feinstteilchen sind.

2.4 Im anschließenden Prüfungsverfahren wurde der Einwand der mangelnden Einheitlichkeit weiter aufrechterhalten und die Anmelderin aufgefordert, die Ansprüche auf den im Recherchebericht als erste Erfindung genannten Gegenstand zu beschränken.

2.5 Die Ansprüche gemäß Hauptantrag vom 3. August 2011 beziehen sich jedoch auf Superabsorberzusammensetzungen, wobei die Feinstteilchen ein mindestens zweiwertiges Metallkation aufweisen. Die Ansprüche sind folglich nicht auf die erste Erfindung beschränkt und betreffen nicht recherchierte Gegenstände.

2.6 Die Kammer ist daher der Auffassung, dass der Hauptantrag zurückzuweisen ist, da die Ansprüche nicht den Erfordernissen der Regel 137(5) EPÜ genügen.

3. Hilfsanträge 1 bis 3

3.1 Der Gegenstand der Ansprüche gemäß der Hilfsanträge 1 bis 3 bezieht sich auf Superabsorberzusammensetzungen, in welchen die Feinstteilchen ein mindestens dreiwertiges Metallkation aufweisen (Hilfsantrag 1), bevorzugt einen mittleren Teilchendurchmesser von 200µm bis 400µm aufweisen (Hilfsantrag 2), oder organische oder anorganische Feinstteilchen sind (Hilfsantrag 3). Somit ist auch im Falle der Hilfsanträge 1 bis 3 der dort beanspruchte Gegenstand nicht auf die recherchierte erste Erfindung, nämlich auf Superabsorberzusammensetzungen, in welchen die Feinstteilchen organische Feinstteilchen sind, beschränkt.

3.2 Daher ist die Kammer der Auffassung, dass auch die Hilfsanträge 1 bis 3 unter Regel 137(5) EPÜ nicht zulässig sind.

4. Hilfsantrag 4

4.1 Zu einem sehr späten Zeitpunkt des Verfahrens, nämlich während der mündlichen Verhandlung vor der Kammer, hat die Beschwerdeführerin erstmals den neuen Hilfsantrag 4 vorgelegt. Es bleibt daher zu entscheiden, ob die Kammer unter Artikel 12 und 13 der Verfahrensordnung der Beschwerdekammern (VOBK) diesen Hilfsantrag in das Beschwerdeverfahren zulassen kann.

4.2 Gemäß Artikel 12(4) VOBK hat die Kammer die Befugnis, Anträge nicht in das Beschwerdeverfahren zuzulassen, die schon durch den Verlauf des Verfahrens in der ersten Instanz veranlasst gewesen wären.

4.3 Im vorliegenden Fall war die Beschwerdeführerin bereits zu Beginn des Prüfungsverfahrens in einer schriftlichen Mitteilung vom 24. Januar 2011 darauf hingewiesen worden, dass die damals vorliegenden Ansprüche mehrere Erfindungen beinhalte (Artikel 82 EPÜ) und die Recherche nur für die im Recherchebericht als erste genannte Erfindung durchgeführt worden sei. Die Beschwerdeführerin wurde aufgefordert, ihre Ansprüche auf die recherchierte Erfindung beschränken, damit hierfür eine Sachprüfung durchgeführt werden könne. Daher war der Beschwerdeführerin von Beginn des Prüfungsverfahrens klar, welche Einwände gegen die Anmeldung vorlägen und wie diese zu beheben seien.

4.4 Die Beschwerdeführerin hat jedoch ohne Angabe von weiteren Gründen diese Handlung, nämlich die Beschränkung auf "organische Feinstteilchen", erstmals durch Vorlage des Hilfsantrages 4 in der mündlichen Verhandlung vor der Kammer nachgeholt.

4.5 Da diese Handlung in jedem Falle schon zu Beginn des Prüfungsverfahrens angezeigt und auch angefordert war, ist eine erstmalige Vorlage am Ende des Beschwerdeverfahrens in jedem Fall verspätet. Daher übt die Kammer ihr Ermessen pflichtgemäß dahingehend aus, den verspätet eingereichten Hilfsantrag 4 nicht in das Verfahren vor der Kammer zuzulassen.

Entscheidungsformel

Aus diesen Gründen wird entschieden:

Die Beschwerde wird zurückgewiesen.

T 0506/16 - No correction of patent

Key points

• In response to the 2nd Rule 71(3), the applicant had filed " Claims pages 1 and 3 containing part of claim 1 and claims 7 to 13" to correct typographical errors. 
•  A third communication under Rule 71(3) EPC was issued . On its cover page the text forming the basis for the intention to grant was said to be claims "1-13 received on 12-08-2014 with letter of 12-08-2014". The text attached to this communication contained only two pages with claims, i.e. a first page ("page 1") containing part of claim 1 and a second page ("page 3") containing claims 7 to 13. The claim set no longer contained claims pages 2 and 4, i.e. no longer contained the final 15 lines of claim 1, claims 2 to 6 and claim 14." 
• The application proceeds to grant accordingly, i.e. without claims 2-6. The applicant then files requests to correct the missing claims 2-6,  for correction of a printing error in the patent specification, and under Rule 140.
• These requests are not successful. 
• " It is true that the facts of the case at hand differ from those of the above case leading to the referral in G 1/10 [because in the present case, the Examining Division made the error]. The board however sees no convincing reason why the conclusions drawn in G 1/10 are not applicable in the present case." 
• " The board also agrees with the examining division in that Rule 139 EPC is only applicable to documents filed with the EPO and does not extend to documents issued by it, e.g. the decision to grant. " 
• " in the present case there is no printing error or error in publication, because the English text of the printed patent specification uncontestedly corresponds to the documents attached to the third (and last) communication under Rule 71(3) EPC, i.e. they correspond to the so-called "Druckexemplar" .
• " According to G 1/10 (supra, Reasons 10 and 11), the obligation to check the text in which the patent is to be granted lies with the applicant, and if it does not draw the examining division's attention to any errors, then the appellant alone bears the responsibility for any errors remaining in the text, regardless of who is responsible for the error." 

EPO T 0506/16 - link

Summary of Facts and Submissions

I. The appeal of the patent proprietor (appellant) lies from the decision of the examining division in the matter of European patent No. 2 396 848 to

• - reject as inadmissible the request for correction of the granted patent under Rule 139 EPC,
• - refuse the request for correction of printing errors in the patent specification,
• - refuse the request for correction of the granted patent under Rule 140 EPC, and
• - reject as inadmissible the request to consider the decision to grant null and void and to issue a further communication under Rule 71(3) EPC.

II. With a letter dated 8 November 2013, the appellant (the then applicant) filed inter alia a main request comprising 15 claims on a total of four pages and a first auxiliary request comprising 14 claims on a total of four pages.

III. On 14 and 15 November 2013 telephone consultations took place between the applicant's representative and the first examiner of the examining division.

T 1467/13 - Deleting features in appeal

Key  points

• The Board does not admit Auxiliary Requests filed with the appeal, wherein features were deleted compared to the Main Request before the OD (the patentee had not requested maintenance of the patent as granted before the OD). Hence, deleting the features in appeal, goes against the review function of the appeal. The Board also sees  no justification for the AR's in any objection made during the appeal.
•  "Auch sieht die Kammer keinen Zusammenhang zwischen dieser Streichung und den (späteren) Einwänden der Beschwerdegegnerin. Dieser Gegenstand liegt also ohne ersichtliche Rechtfertigung außerhalb des von der Patentinhaberin erstinstanzlich abgesteckten Rahmens des Verfahrens. Er hätte folglich im Prinzip in Anlehnung an den Grundsatz des Artikels 12(4) VOBK im Verfahren vor der ersten Instanz eingeleitet werden sollen." 

EPO T 1467/13 -  link

3. Hilfsanträge 9-13, 21-25 - Zulässigkeit - Artikel 12(4) VOBK

Die Hilfsanträge 9-13 und 21-25 wurden erstmals im Beschwerdeverfahren eingereicht.

3.1 Die Aufgabe des Beschwerdeverfahrens besteht darin, ein gerichtliches Urteil über die Richtigkeit einer davon strikt zu trennenden früheren Entscheidung der ersinstanzlichen Stelle zu fällen (G9/91, ABl. 1993, 408; G10/91 ABl.1993, 420; T34/90 ABl.1992, 454; T534/89, ABl.1994, 464). Somit dient das Beschwerdeverfahren in erster Linie zur Überprüfung der erstinstanzliche Entscheidung. Die Einleitung einer neuen Prüfung eines neuen Gegenstands ist im Allgemeinen nicht Zweck des Beschwerdeverfahrens. So hat nach Art. 12(4) VOBK die Kammer das Befugnis u.a. Anträgen, die bereits im erstinstanzlichen Verfahren hätten vorgebracht werden können, nicht zuzulassen, und berücksichtigt sie das Vorbringen einer Partei, wenn und soweit es sich auf die Beschwerdesache bezieht.

Die Patentinhaberin hat im vorliegenden Fall erstinstanzlich den Antrag auf Aufrechterhaltung des Patents in der erteilten Fassung bewusst nicht weiterverfolgt. Stattdessen wurde die Aufrechterhaltung auf Grundlage von einem neuen Hauptantrag und Hilfsanträgen 1 bis 8 angestrebt, die den nun vorliegenden Haupt- und Hilfsanträgen 1 bis 8 entsprechen. So hat die Patentinhaberin den Rahmen des Verfahrens erstinstanzlich abgesteckt. Die mit der Beschwerdegründung eingereichten Hilfsanträge 9-13 und später eingereichten Hilfsanträge 21-25, die darauf fortbauen, sind gegenüber dem Haupt- und Hilfsanträgen 1 bis 8 durch Streichung des das Merkmals wonach der Tabak ausschließlich vor dem Dosiersystem gesichtet wird geändert wurden. Da dieses Merkmal in allen Anträgen, die der Einspruchsabteilung vorgelegen hat, anwesend war, kann ihre Streichung in den Hilfsanträgen 9 bis 13 und 21 bis 25 nicht durch die Entscheidung veranlasst sein. Auch sieht die Kammer keinen Zusammenhang zwischen dieser Streichung und den (späteren) Einwänden der Beschwerdegegnerin. Dieser Gegenstand liegt also ohne ersichtliche Rechtfertigung außerhalb des von der Patentinhaberin erstinstanzlich abgesteckten Rahmens des Verfahrens. Er hätte folglich im Prinzip in Anlehnung an den Grundsatz des Artikels 12(4) VOBK im Verfahren vor der ersten Instanz eingeleitet werden sollen.

3.2 Laut der Beschwerdeführerin-Patentinhaberin sollten diese Hilfsanträge aber als Rückfallposition hinsichtlich mangelnder Klarheit bezüglich der Formulierung des Merkmals d) von Anspruch 1 des Hauptantrags herangezogen und somit als eine normale und zulässige Entwicklung des Verfahrens angesehen werden. Die Kammer stellt jedoch fest, dass Merkmal d) als ein neues Merkmal in den ungefähr einen Monat vor der erstinstanzlichen mündlichen Verhandlung eingereichten Hauptantrag eingefügt wurde. Der Einwand der mangelnden Klarheit wurde dann erstmals schriftlich von der Einsprechenden und danach in der mündlichen Verhandlung durch die Einspruchsabteilung erhoben, diskutiert und entschieden. Insofern die Hilfsanträgen 9 bis 13 und 21 bis 25 somit als Reaktion auf diesen erstinstanzlich geltend gemachten Klarheitsmangel zu betrachten sind, hätte die Patentinhaberin sie , nach Auffassung der Kammer, spätestens in der mündlichen Verhandlung vor der Einspruchsabteilung vorlegen müssen.

3.3 In Anbetracht des Vorstehenden beschließt die Beschwerdekammer, die Hilfsanträge 9-13 und 21-25 auf der Grundlage des Artikels 12(4) VOBK nicht in das Verfahren zuzulassen.