T 2069/17 - Different technical fields

Key points

• This examination appeal concerns the inventive step of the ‘method for imaging a biological sample’ of claim 1.
• D3 is the closest prior art and discloses a method for imaging a biological sample. “Document D3 fails to disclose the features relating to the corrective optics, i.e. that corrective optics are removably inserted between the detector and the flow cell [...] The technical effect of this difference is that spherical aberration is compensated for and the problem to be solved is therefore to improve image quality.”
• “Document D6 discloses a microscope for imaging different layers of a sample in a sandwich configuration. D6 further identifies a change in optical medium as the cause for aberration [...] and states that corrective optics are inserted to compensate spherical aberration due to a change in the optical medium [.] Therefore, corrective optics have been employed in document D6 for the same purpose as in claim 1. It would be obvious to the person skilled in the art, namely when the same result is to be achieved as in claim 1, to apply corrective optics with corresponding effect in the imaging method disclosed in document D3, thereby arriving at a method for imaging a biological sample according to claim 1.”
• “The appellant argued that D6 disclosed a specific type of microscope which recorded the track of cosmic rays. Thus, the technical fields of D6 and D3 differed significantly and the skilled person would not consult document D6 when starting from a sandwiched flow cell as disclosed in D3.”
• “The board is of the opinion that document D6 relates to optical microscopes in general (see title and column 1, lines 10 to 16: "Field of the Invention") and offers a solution (insertion of corrective optics) for the correction of spherical aberration that occurs due to imaging of layers at different levels (see claim 1,  [...]). Therefore, the skilled person would consider document D6 and apply its teachings in order to solve the objective technical problem.”
• D6 is US 4,563,062.
• As a comment, I think that this is a case which illustrates that the credibility of the EPO depends on how good the technical members of the Board can assume the role of the notional skilled person. I don't know whether a skilled person working in the field of D3 (link) would consult D6. I note that the Board does not expressly identify the skilled person. I would say it is the skilled person working with the technology of D3. D3 is a patent application carefully drafted to not overly restrict the scope of application of the claimed device, though the focus of D3 appears to be DNA microarrays (‘Scientists use DNA microarrays to measure the expression levels of large numbers of genes simultaneously or to genotype multiple regions of a genome’; Wikipedia). So the skilled person would likely be an engineer involved in the design of microscopes for reading out such DNA microarrays. Perhaps this would be an optical engineer; perhaps it would be another kind of engineer. Similarly, D6 is a patent carefully stating the 'field of the invention' of the claimed optical system in the most general terms. In the very next paragraph, it acknowledges as prior art "an emulsion chamber is one of the known apparatus for recording the track of cosmic rays." At least prima facie, D6 does not seem to be the kind of handbook that illustrates basic principles of optical engineering in general. But perhaps an optical engineer would search broadly for any literature addressing the optical problem at issue, irrespective of the precise application (assuming that the skilled person of D3 is an optical engineer instead of a biologist). 

EPO T 2069/17 - link

Reasons for the Decision

1. Main request - Inventive Step - Article 56 EPC

1.1 Closest prior art

Document D3 represents the closest prior art and discloses a method for imaging a biological sample, where the biological sample comprises a flow cell (100) with a first biological sample (21) disposed on a first surface (20) and a second biological sample (11) disposed on a second surface (10) of the flow cell, such that the first and second surfaces face each other (see paragraphs [0024] to [0026] and figures 1 and 3). The biological samples are excited by a radiation source and radiation emitted from the two surfaces is detected (see paragraphs [0012] "Fluoreszenzmessungen" and [0036] "Fluoreszenzdetektion"). According to D3, the fluorescence measurements are performed at the flow cell through the first surface (see paragraphs [0035]), i.e. the flow cell is mounted as a whole on an imaging station such that the first surface (20) is disposed between the detector and the second surface (10). This is confirmed by the statement that the measuring time is reduced due to fluorescence measurements at the first and second surfaces (see paragraph [0012]).

T 1533/15 - Lateness alone can be sufficient

Key points

• In this opposition appeal, Board 3.3.02 applies the RPBA 2007 to hold inadmissible two test reports filed by Patentee, as well a large number of auxiliary requests.
• However, the Board first discusses admissibility of the appeal of the patentee. The OD gave a very short statement in its decision why the feature that the composition is "for use in coating a food or beverage can" did not make the claimed subject-matter novel over D2.
• The Board: “the patentee's statement [in its Statement of grounds] made it clear why it thought the opposition division's reasoning was wrong. This is all the more true since in view of the extremely short statement given by the opposition division to explain its conclusion about lack of novelty of claim 20 as granted (2.2 supra), the patentee could have only speculated what the reasoning behind this conclusion was. The reasons provided by the patentee in its statement of grounds of appeal were therefore considered sufficient by the board to meet the requirements of Rule 99(2) EPC.”
• The Board considers that the feature does not make the claim novel over D5. In particular, the composition does not need to be suitable as coating for a can; the patent itself indicates that the coating may contain additional components besides the claimed composition.
  
  Test reports filed one month before oral proceedings Board
• The Board decided to not admit D23. “D32a-c were filed on 10 December 2019, i.e. only one month prior to oral proceedings. On the basis of these new items of evidence, the patentee alleged a new fact [], namely, that the surfactant AOT-75 as contained in the latex polymer of D5's example 18, would render this latex polymer unsuitable for coating food and beverage cans. Therefore, the patentee's submission amounted to a new allegation of fact, based on new evidence, late-filed in appeal proceedings. It thus represented an amendment of the patentee's case, which can only be admitted at the board's discretion pursuant to Article 13(1) and (3) RPBA 2007. [....] Moreover, the patentee did not dispute that D32a-c were already known to it on 9 August 2019. The patentee could give no reasons why it waited until one month prior to oral proceedings to file these documents.
• As a comment, for the admissibility of new evidence (as D23 is), it does not matter if this is a new allegation of fact (although evidence is of course used to support factual allegations). Article 114(2) EPC expressly states that that the EPO ‘may disregard [late-filed] facts or evidence’. The new allegation of fact is the argument based on the surfactant AOT-75. It seems useful to distinguish between the evidence and the alleged fact: factual allegations and supporting evidence are not always introduced simultaneously. 
• The Board also did not admit another test report D33. “The board considered that D33 did not represent a timely reaction to test report D23 filed by the opponent. In fact, D23 had been filed on 14 March 2016 with the opponent's response to the patentee's statement of grounds of appeal. The patentee thus waited almost four years before submitting D33 only one month prior to oral proceedings.”
  
  Cancelling independent granted claim one month before oral proceedings Board
• The Board had found that independent product claim 20 as granted was not novel. The patent as granted had also method claims 1 and 14. The Board does not admit the auxiliary requests wherein claim 20 is deleted, under ARt. 13(1) RPBA 2007.
• “As stated by the Enlarged Board of Appeal (R 16/09, reasons, 2.2.4), lateness alone can outbalance the further criteria mentioned in Article 13(1) RPBA 2007 and become decisive when exercising the discretion to admit or not, inter alia, late-filed claim requests (R 16/09, reasons, 2.2.12; see also T 0253/10, reasons, 2.3). Hence, the very fact that auxiliary requests 1, 1A, 2A, 2C and 3A to 14A have been filed extremely late in the present appeal proceedings was sufficient reason alone not to admit these requests.”
• Before the OD and with the SoG, patentee had filed AR's wherein claims 1 and 14 were amended. “This led the opponent and the board to believe that those requests contained all the amendments the patentee considered to be necessary”
• “This belief was reinforced by the fact that until one month prior to oral proceedings before the board, the patentee never manifested any intention to go in a different direction, namely, to delete granted claim 20 while leaving claims 1 and/or 14 unamended”
• “This change of direction was further aggravated by the fact that the newly filed auxiliary requests were not convergent.”
• “The opponent (and the board) was thus confronted with a target that was moved almost at the end of the appeal proceedings. This implied high complexity both in procedural and technical terms which was a further reason for not admitting auxiliary requests 1, 1A, 2A, 2C and 3A to 14A into the proceedings.”
• “Moreover, the notice of opposition (page 11, point 2.16.2) already contained the opponent's novelty objection against granted claim 20 in view of D5's example 18. This objection was accepted by the opposition division, which also found the subject-matter of claim 20 to be not novel over said example 18. Consequently, the patentee could and should have filed auxiliary requests 1 and 1A already before the department of first instance. This was even more true when considering that during oral proceedings before the opposition division, the patentee was informed (minutes of oral proceedings before the opposition division, page 1, point 2, last paragraph) that remaining independent claims, i.e. inter alia claims 1 and 14, were found to be novel by the opposition division. At that point in time, the patentee could and should have filed requests not containing claim 20 anymore.”

EPO T 1533/15 - link

Reasons for the Decision

Applicable Rules of Procedure of the Boards of appeal

1. On 1 January 2020, the previously applicable Rules of Procedure of the Boards of appeal were replaced by new Rules of Procedure. The present decision has been issued after the new Rules of Procedure entered into force.

1.1 Hereinafter, the requirement that the statement of grounds of appeal and the reply thereto should contain the party's complete case will be addressed. This requirement is present in Article 12(2) of the previous Rules of Procedure (hereinafter Article 12(2) RPBA 2007) and Article 12(3) of the new Rules of Procedure (hereinafter Article 12(3) RPBA 2020) and is expressed with a substantially identical wording. According to Article 25(1) of the transitional provisions of the new Rules of Procedure, for any appeal pending on the date of entry into force like the present one, the new Rules of Procedure shall apply subject to certain exceptions dealt with in paragraph 25(2) and (3) RPBA 2020. Article 12(3) RPBA 2020 is not among those exceptions. Hence, Article 12(3) RPBA 2020 rather than Article 12(2) RPBA 2007 applies and will be referred to in the following.

1.2 In subsequent sections of the present decision, admittance of several submissions under the Rules of Procedure will be discussed, with these submissions having been filed after the summons to oral proceedings had been issued and before the entry into force of the new Rules of Procedure. For such a situation, Article 25(3) of the transitional provisions of the new Rules of Procedure applies. According to this provision, Article 13(2) of the new Rules of Procedure shall not apply and instead Article 13 of the previous Rules of Procedure shall continue to apply. This means that at least Article 13(1) and (3) of the previous Rules of Procedure (hereinafter Article 13(1) and (3) RPBA 2007) applies and will be relied upon by the board in the following sections addressing admittance.

T 0113/19 - From preferred minimum to maximum in claim

Key points

• In this opposition appeal, claim 1 includes the feature that the claimed material has a specific surface of "between 10 and 15 m²/g". The application as filed mentions that the inventive composition has a specific surface of at least 10 m²/g and that it is particularly desirable to have a specific surface of at least 15 m²/g. The Board considers that this preferred minimum of 15 m²/g provides basis for the claimed range wherein the value is maximum.
• The Board: “La demande divulgue donc un domaine de 10 à 15 qu'on peut qualifier de satisfaisant et un domaine au delà de 15 qui peut être qualifié de très satisfaisant. Il va de soi que l'homme du métier ne va pas écarter les compositions ayant une surface spécifique comprise entre 10 m²/g et 15 m²/g.”
• It is not relevant that the sole example is outside the now claimed range.

EPO T 0113/19 - link

Motifs de la décision

Le seul jeu de revendications du requérant 1 est admissible pour les raisons suivantes :


1. Article 123(2) CBE


La revendication 1 se fonde sur les revendications 1, 2 et 5 et la description, page 3, lignes 33 à 35 de la demande telle que déposée.


Le débat portait sur la plage "comprise entre 10 m**(2)/g et 15 m**(2)/g".


Les conditions énoncées à l'article 123(2) CBE sont remplies.


La demande telle que déposée ( ci-après "la demande") divulgue qu'il y a un besoin de catalyseurs présentant une grande stabilité de leur surface spécifique (page 1, lignes 19 à 21). Une composition ayant une surface spécifique après calcination 6 heures à 1150°C d'au moins 10 m**(2)/g est considérée comme répondant à cet objectif (voir page 1, lignes 26 à 28). Il est donc évident pour l'homme du métier qu'un des avantages de l'invention est de pouvoir obtenir une composition avec une telle surface spécifique. Il est spécifié à la page 2, ligne 25 de la demande qu'il est particulièrement désiré d'avoir une surface spécifique après calcination 6 heures à 1150°C d'au moins 15 m**(2)/g. Cela veut dire que l'homme du métier utilise de préférence des compositions ayant une telle surface spécifique élevée. Une telle composition est décrite dans l'exemple du brevet. L'homme du métier comprend, à la lecture de la demande telle que déposée, que les compositions ayant une surface spécifique d'au moins 10 m**(2)/g ont déjà la qualité requise, mais que celles ayant une surface spécifique allant au delà de 15 m**(2)/g sont encore meilleures. La demande divulgue donc un domaine de 10 à 15 qu'on peut qualifier de satisfaisant et un domaine au delà de 15 qui peut être qualifié de très satisfaisant. Il va de soi que l'homme du métier ne va pas écarter les compositions ayant une surface spécifique comprise entre 10 m**(2)/g et 15 m**(2)/g.


Ceci est aussi en accord avec la décision T 1170/02 qui explique que l'homme du métier, en s'appuyant sur les données figurant dans la demande initiale (point 4.5 des motifs) et notamment sur l'exemple du brevet (point 4.5.2 des motifs), aurait sérieusement envisagé d'opérer dans la nouvelle plage (combinaison du seuil inférieur de la plage générale et du seuil inférieur de la plage préférée). Cette argumentation a aussi été suivie dans la décision T 205/13 qui se fondait également sur le fait que des exemples étaient compris dans la nouvelle plage créée (point 5.2 des motifs). Dans le cas de la décision T 1389/08, la nouvelle plage était acceptée même s'il n'y avait pas d'exemple compris dans cette plage (point 5.2 des motifs).


Cette dernière décision confirme donc que le fait que le seul exemple soit en dehors de la nouvelle plage revendiquée ne veut pas dire que cette plage ne peut pas être déduite directement et sans équivoque de la demande telle que déposée. Dans la présente espèce, la revendication est seulement limitée à ce qui peut être considéré comme satisfaisant et exclut ce qui est encore mieux.


Toutes ces décisions concernent des combinaisons de plages ayant un seuil inférieur et un seuil supérieur. L'enseignement s'applique aussi à la présente espèce, car le point crucial est l'analyse de l'enseignement de la demande telle que déposée pour déterminer si la nouvelle plage en découle directement et sans équivoque, ou non.

Video oral proceedings and online communications

Readers of this weblog will likely be already aware that in-person oral proceedings with Examining Divisions have been abolished with immediate effect (Notice; Decision; news item of epi).

In-person oral proceedings will from now on only be held for exceptional cases such as the hearing of witnesses and the inspection of models. In-person oral proceedings are hence not suspended for a limited period because of the corona virus, but abolished completely for Examining Divisions.

According to Mr. Campinos, the measure contributes to “a more efficient, modern and sustainable European patent system” (letter of the President). Video interviews (i.e. with the primary Examiner) are also available.
The "epi" protested (letter) but as of yet to no avail, as regards examining divisions (the President's proposal to allow for video oral proceedings in opposition division was apparently not pushed through).

Update 04.04.2020: I would like to clarify that my view is that it is highly doubtful whether video oral proceedings are sufficient under Article 116 EPC. In addition to my comments below about the refund for withdrawing requests for oral proceedings in appeal, I consider the refund to be effectively a fee for the exercise of the right to oral proceedings under Article 116, which is in my view is an unallowable curtailment of Article 116. I also consider both legal measures to be steps on a slippery slope to hollowing out Article 116.

Clearly, established practices become flexible these times. Let's brainstorm about other changes that could finally be made now so to move to paperless and fully digital proceedings before the EPO:

• Issuing paper patent certificates only on request. Many offices already do this. The cost-saving could be shared with users by a freeze of the grant fee.
• Acknowledgement receipts should no longer assume the use of fax by applicants. The easiest thing would be a QR code on the letter that can be scanned by the recipient to acknowledge receipt (apparently, "a pilot on using email for notifications related to pending oral proceedings" is considered now, link).
• Let's also delete 'fax'  in Rule 41(2)(c) urgently where the Rule still says: “It is recommended that the fax and telephone numbers be indicated”.
• Online signing with an app. More specifically, it would be very desirable for the EPO to participate in the EU system of recognition of online signatures under the eIDAS regulation (Regulation (EU) 910/2014). National public bodies of EU Member States are required to recognize the national electronic signatures of citizens issued in other EU states under this system (I think this applies in fact to the Patent Offices of EU Member States as well). This allows businesses and citizens (and professionals) to use their national electronic signature throughout the EU in dealing with public bodies. Depending on the electronic signature systems offered in the various Member States, this can be e.g. a secure online app on mobile phones and other devices, thereby finally allowing for signing documents 'on the go'. The eIDAS system goes up to the highest security level 4. Hundreds of public bodies throughout the EU offer eIDAS login (or will offer so once the Regulation is actually implemented). 
• In fact, the EPO itself already  uses (and mandatorily prescribes) eIDAS signatures (https://www.epo.org/about-us/tenders/signatures.html
• Issuing Communications as character-coded text instead of 'dead image PDF'. Hence, Communications wherein you can copy/paste the text without having to run OCR first. If applicants are supposed to file their applications and amended claims in XML in the near future, perhaps the Office can show the example by moving first (I don't dare to ask for Communications in structured text or even in XML, that seems a distant dream). 

On the related topic of oral proceedings, it seems to me that the partial refund of the appeal fee in case of withdrawal of a request for oral proceedings can be further simplified. In particular, if an appellant expressly waives his right to oral proceedings with the Notice of appeal, a corresponding reduction of the appeal fee can be granted. This avoids that applicants file merely formal requests for oral proceedings only in order to benefit from the refund by withdrawing them in due time.
I think such a reduction can be especially advantageous if the Boards would make clear that they will not deal with such appeals out of turn (unless acceleration is requested). The reason is that many appeals appear to be filed only in order to have something pending for a few more years and the risk of a swift refusal of the appeal clearly outweighs any cost saving of the appeal fee. Hence, a confirmation that the appeal will not be dismissed 'out of turn' seems important to provide an effective incentive to appellants to not file merely precautionary requests for oral proceedings and in fact to waive the right to summons.

Furthermore, if applicants and representatives no longer have to travel to Munich or The Hague by the use of video oral proceedings, it seems reasonable to schedule in advance a maximum time (e.g. 2 hours) for video oral proceedings.  This allows for the more compact scheduling of video oral proceedings, especially in technical fields where applicants frequently don't show up at oral proceedings. In the exceptional case that during the video conference it turns out that more time is necessary for a fair discussion of the case, additional video oral proceedings can easily be scheduled for a later day. 

Comments are welcome (even slightly political ones)!

T 1426/14 - RE refused, renewal fee refunded

Key points

• The applicant had failed to pay the renewal fee with surcharge during his appeal against the refusal of the application. He requests re-establishment. The Board refuses the request due to lack of due care. As part of the RE request, the omitted act was completed as prescribed and hence the renewal fee with surchare was paid.
• The Board orders the refund of the renewal fee at issue (including the surcharge). 
• “Therefore [...]  the request for re-establishment of rights has to be refused. This means that the loss of rights communicated on 7 February 2019 has become final and the application is deemed to be withdrawn. Since the renewal fee for the 9**(th) year and the additional fee were paid after the loss of rights occurred, they were paid without legal basis and therefore have to be reimbursed.”
• As a comment, Rule 136(2) EPC prescribes that the renewal fee must be paid as part of the omitted act. Still, in line with G 1/18, it is correct to say that the renewal fee was “paid without legal basis” and is reimbursed.
• The Board is competent to decide on the RE request, instead of the examining division.
• “The noting of loss of rights was issued by the formalities officer on behalf of the examining division. At that time, however, the appeal proceedings were pending. Thus the loss of rights resulting from the failure to pay the renewal fees occurred in the course of the appeal proceedings. Given that with the commencement of the appeal proceedings, the competence to decide on the case has moved from the department of first instance to the Boards of Appeal [], the Board is competent to decide on the request for re-establishment of rights [].” This illustrates the devolutive effect of appeal.
• The order on the main appeal is that " The appeal proceedings are terminated"
• The renewal fees paid during the main appeal in the period 2014-2018 are not refunded (the file does not indicate such a refund, 09.11.2020) even though the Examining Division's refusal decision in 2014 is now final. 

About due care  for renewal fees and clients using payment service companies

• In case the applicant uses a payment service company and the European professional representative is instructed to pay no renewal fees: “However, in the present case, the representative was informed about the applicant's intentions and he could be sure that the applicant was aware of the running time limit. Once the applicant had clearly indicated that he had taken note and that he would pay, the representative had fulfilled his obligations and the responsibility shifted to the applicant.”
• “ All due care of an applicant in such a situation requires that he carefully studies the letters he receives from his consultants and gives the required instructions in good time.”
• “The Board does not concur with this view because that mistake [of the applicant] could have been avoided if the applicant had properly read the correspondence sent to him by his consultants [letter from professional representative], which is to be expected from a careful applicant taking part in business life.”

EPO T 1426/14 -  link

Reasons for the Decision

Board's competence to decide

1. According to Rule 136(4) EPC the department competent to decide on the omitted act shall decide on the request for re-establishment of rights. The noting of loss of rights was issued by the formalities officer on behalf of the examining division. At that time, however, the appeal proceedings were pending. Thus the loss of rights resulting from the failure to pay the renewal fees occurred in the course of the appeal proceedings. Given that with the commencement of the appeal proceedings, the competence to decide on the case has moved from the department of first instance to the Boards of Appeal (T 473/91, OJ EPO 1993, 630, Reasons 1.2), the Board is competent to decide on the request for re-establishment of rights (T 555/08, Reasons 2; see also T 936/90, Reasons 1; T 1381/11, Reasons 2; T 649/13, Reasons 3 and T 1201/10, Reasons 1).

T 0939/16 - AR's not decided on by the OD

Key points

• This decision concerns an opposition appeal. The decision touches upon numerous interesting aspects.
• Firstly, the admissibility of AR-1 to 3, which correspond to requests filed before the OD (one month before the oral proceedings before the OD). The OD had found the Main Request allowable and therefore the OD did not consider these requests. Article 12(4) RPBA 2007 applies. The Board considers that for such a scenario, Article 12(4) RPBA 2007 does not provide a ground for holding the requests inadmissible; the Board also sees no other grounds for excluding these requests. 
• I note that the Board does not assess whether the requests were late-filed or not before the OD.
  
• About admissibility of AR-8 filed at the end of the oral proceedings before the Board: this request can not be held inadmissible only because it was filed late in the procedure, because the matter of how a particular claim feature was to be interpreted, was only raised in the appeal proceedings during the oral proceedings before the Board. Importantly, the Board adds that an earlier discussion of precisely hat issue already before the OD is not relevant for the admissibility.  
• The Board: “Grundsätzlich sollte der Beschwerdegegnerin [patentee], die erst während der mündlichen Verhandlung mit diesem Einwand konfrontiert wurde, daher die Gelegenheit gegeben werden, diesen Einwand auszuräumen. Somit kann allein der Umstand der späten Einreichung eine Nichtzulassung des Hilfsantrags 8 nicht rechtfertigen.”
• However, AR-8 is not admitted because it prima facie raises issues of Article 123(2).
  
• For inventive step, the Board considers the minimum temperature recited in the claim (which is a distinguishing feature) to be an arbitrary choice (or arbitrary variation) which does not contribute to inventive step because choosing arbitrarily is routine.
• “Da insbesondere nicht gezeigt wurde, dass diesem Wert von 90 °C eine besondere Bedeutung zuzumessen ist, ist das Merkmal M2 weder zielgerichtet noch kritisch, sondern als rein willkürlich gewählt zu betrachten. Diese willkürliche Wahl einer hohen Temperatur bei der Polyesterschmelzstrangzerteilung stellt jedoch wegen ihrer Beliebigkeit lediglich eine Routinetätigkeit dar, die im Rahmen des handwerklichen Könnens des Fachmanns liegt, ohne dass es ein erfinderisches Zutun seinerseits bedürfte.” (emphasis added).
  
• The Board also notes that for the question whether the CPA document  D2 discloses a certain claim feature, the broadest technically meaningful interpretation of the claim feature is to be used.
• Was den Begriff "Dosiereinrichtung" gemäß Merkmal M7 betrifft, wurde von der Beschwerdegegnerin nicht gezeigt, dass dieser eine eindeutige Bedeutung hat. Somit ist dieser Begriff in seiner breitesten, technisch sinnvollen Bedeutung zu verstehen.
  [...] Schließlich teilt die Kammer die Meinung der Beschwerdegegnerin nicht, wonach dem Begriff "Dosiereinrichtung" im Hinblick auf die Gesamtoffenbarung der Patentschrift eine eingeschränkte Bedeutung zuzuordnen sei. Wie im vorherigen Absatz ausgeführt, muss diesem Begriff seine breiteste technisch sinnvolle Bedeutung gegeben werden.

EPO T 0939/16 -  link

Entscheidungsgründe

Entgegenhaltung D8 - Zulassung

1. Während der mündlichen Verhandlung vor der Kammer nahm die Beschwerdeführerin, bei der Erörterung der Frage der erfinderischen Tätigkeit Bezug auf die Entgegenhaltung D8, um ihre Argumentation zu stützen, dass das Merkmal M2 des erteilten Anspruchs 1 im Beispiel 3, Variante B, der D2 implizit offenbart sei.

1.1 Jedoch beantragte die Beschwerdegegnerin, die Entgegenhaltung D8 nicht ins Verfahren zuzulassen.

1.2 Was die Zulassung der D8 betrifft, ist zunächst zu klären, wann diese Entgegenhaltung im Verfahren zum ersten Mal herangezogen wurde, was zwischen den Parteien strittig war.

In diesem Zusammenhang brachte die Beschwerdeführerin vor, dass D8 bereits seit dem Beginn des Beschwerdeverfahrens im Verfahren sei, da sie einerseits in D2 zitiert und anderseits das Prioritätsdokument der D3 sei, wobei D2 und D3 zweifellos im Verfahren seien. Jedoch spielt die Tatsache, dass D8 in D2 zitiert ist, oder dass D3 im Verfahren ist, für die Frage, ob das Dokument D8 bereits im Verfahren ist, keine Rolle, und dies, unabhängig davon, ob D8 das Prioritätsdokument von D3 ist oder nicht. Es ist lediglich zu klären, wann die Entgegenhaltung D8 per se zum ersten Mal von einer der Parteien herangezogen wurde. Diesbezüglich kam die Kammer in der mündlichen Verhandlung im Einklang mit den Parteien zu dem Ergebnis, dass die Entgegenhaltung D8 von der Beschwerdeführerin zum ersten Mal in der mündlichen Verhandlung vor der Kammer herangezogen wurde.

T 0136/16 - Do not wait for the Board's preliminary opinion

Key points

• In this opposition appeal, the opponent is the appellant. The Board disagrees with the narrow claim interpretation adopted by the OD, interprets claim 1 broadly and finds it to be not novel. The opponent had contested the narrow claim interpretation by the OD in detail in its Statement of grounds. After receiving the (probably negative) preliminary opinion of the Board, the patentee files two new auxiliary requests. The Board does not admit these requests: they should have been filed by the patentee as the respondent in its Statement of response (currently Art.12(1)(c)  RPBA 2020). 
• The Board notes that the patentee could not have assumed that the Board would follow the OD, in view of opponent's detailed arguments in its Statement of grounds: “Die Beschwerdegegnerin [patentee] hätte also bereits mit ihrer Erwiderung Anlass gehabt, die vorgenommene Änderung durchzuführen, die auf dem zuvor umfänglich diskutierten Sachverhalt, insbesondere Absatz 7 des Patents, beruht. Die Beschwerdegegnerin [patentee] hatte keinen Anlass davon auszugehen, dass die Beschwerdekammer in jedem Fall der Linie der Einspruchsabteilung und Beschwerdegegnerin [patentee] folgen würde. Dass die Vielzahl der vorgetragenen Angriffe ohne eine vorläufige Beurteilung der Kammer der Formulierung sinnvoller Hilfsanträge entgegengestanden hätte, überzeugt die Kammer im Hinblick auf die zentrale Bedeutung der Auslegung des Begriffs "Zugangsstockwerk" in nahezu allen vorgetragenen Einwänden nicht. Zudem sieht die Kammer unter diesen Umständen und entgegen der Meinung der Beschwerdegegnerin die Vorlage von Hilfsanträgen mit dieser Änderung erst zu diesem Zeitpunkt im Beschwerdeverfahren als der Verfahrensökonomie abträglich an.”
• The Board also reimbursed the appeal fee in full because of a substantial procedural violation by the OD. The OD had not admitted the inventive step attacks, presented by the opponent during the oral proceedings, which were based on the documents that were found to be not novelty destroying by the OD. The OD gave as reasons in the decision that no convincing reasons had been given why these new attacks were more relevant as the earlier presented inventive step attacks based on other documents, such that the attacks were not prima facie relevant. The Board concludes that the minutes do not show that the opponent was given an opportunity by the OD to present its arguments in favor of the prima facie relevance. The minutes of the oral proceedings before the OD do not show any discussion of prima facie relevance of the new attacks. This is a violation of the right to be heard and a substantial procedural violation. Moreover, the opponent's appeal is successful, such that the appeal fee is reimbursed. 

EPO T 0136/16 -  link

Sachverhalt und Anträge

I. Die Beschwerdeführerin (Einsprechende) hat Beschwerde gegen die Zurückweisung ihres Einspruchs gegen das europäische Patent Nr. 1 666 398 durch die Einspruchsabteilung eingelegt.

II. Aus dem Verlauf des Einspruchsverfahrens ist folgender Sachverhalt für die hier zu treffende Entscheidung über die Beschwerde relevant.

a) Der Einspruch war unter anderem gestützt auf die Einspruchsgründe nach Artikel 100 a) in Verbindung mit 54 und 56 EPÜ.

[...]

c) Neuheitseinwände wurden in der Einspruchsschrift auf Grundlage von E1 bis E3 erhoben, erfinderische Tätigkeit wurde nur ausgehend von E4 oder E6 als nächstliegendem Stand der Technik in Kombination mit E5 angegriffen.