Showing posts with label skilled person. Show all posts
Showing posts with label skilled person. Show all posts

09 October 2020

T 0984/15 - The skilled person for inventive step

 Key points

  • In this opposition appeal, the Board deals with the 'obviousness stage' of the problem solution approach to inventive step.
  • The opponent argued that the skilled person was “an expert in the field of telecommunications engineering, who typically is a graduate engineer in electrical engineering, physics or informatics with a focus on telecommunications and has several years of practical experience in the field of communication networks, e.g., in a development department of a company specialized in this field. Thus, the skilled person has a fundamental theoretical understanding and a broad knowledge regarding the implementation of such theoretical knowledge. ”
  • The patentee argued that “the relevant skilled person would be an engineer in telecommunications who is familiar with existing wireless communications systems and who might have some knowledge of new technologies, but no detailed knowledge of the upcoming LTE standard”
  • The Board “the board recalls that the technical field and general knowledge associated with the notional skilled person within the meaning of Article 56 EPC should be defined on the basis of the objective technical problem to be solved by that skilled person in the framework of the problem-solution approach. This is because the skilled person under Article 56 EPC is the person qualified to solve the established objective technical problem”
  • The Board: “In view of this objective technical problem, the notional skilled person, for the purpose of assessing inventive step under Article 56 EPC, is a telecommunications engineer working in the field of 3GPP-based mobile networks. The board does not agree with the quite limited set of skills attributed to the skilled person by the [patentee and rather concurs with the [opponent]  that the skilled person could even be a member of the 3GPP RAN Working Group 2.”







EPO T 0984/15 -  link



2.2 The person skilled in the art


2.2.1 In the case at hand, it is particularly important to establish which attributes can be ascribed to the notional person skilled in the art within the meaning of Article 56 EPC.

2.2.2 As to the relevant person skilled in the art, the appellant [opponent] indicated in their statement of grounds of appeal the following (see section IV.19; board's emphasis):

"The patent opposed thus is directed to a person of average skill in the art, i.e. an expert in the field of telecommunications engineering, who typically is a graduate engineer in electrical engineering, physics or informatics with a focus on telecommunications and has several years of practical experience in the field of communication networks, e.g., in a development department of a company specialized in this field. Thus, the skilled person has a fundamental theoretical understanding and a broad knowledge regarding the implementation of such theoretical knowledge. An implementation may comprise, e.g., development and/or testing of hardware and/or software. The skilled person is also able to work with and understand the telecommunication standards, in particular the technical specifications of the 3rd Generation Partnership Project. He is aware of the interrelation of various documents belonging to the same technical sphere of a standard. He can be a member of the 3GPP RAN (Radio Access Network) Working Group 2 dealing with the Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (E-UTRA), in particular handover mechanisms between various radio access technologies."

08 April 2020

T 2069/17 - Different technical fields

Key points

  • This examination appeal concerns the inventive step of the ‘method for imaging a biological sample’ of claim 1.
  • D3 is the closest prior art and discloses a method for imaging a biological sample. “Document D3 fails to disclose the features relating to the corrective optics, i.e. that corrective optics are removably inserted between the detector and the flow cell [...] The technical effect of this difference is that spherical aberration is compensated for and the problem to be solved is therefore to improve image quality.”
  • “Document D6 discloses a microscope for imaging different layers of a sample in a sandwich configuration. D6 further identifies a change in optical medium as the cause for aberration [...] and states that corrective optics are inserted to compensate spherical aberration due to a change in the optical medium [.] Therefore, corrective optics have been employed in document D6 for the same purpose as in claim 1. It would be obvious to the person skilled in the art, namely when the same result is to be achieved as in claim 1, to apply corrective optics with corresponding effect in the imaging method disclosed in document D3, thereby arriving at a method for imaging a biological sample according to claim 1.”
  • “The appellant argued that D6 disclosed a specific type of microscope which recorded the track of cosmic rays. Thus, the technical fields of D6 and D3 differed significantly and the skilled person would not consult document D6 when starting from a sandwiched flow cell as disclosed in D3.”
  • “The board is of the opinion that document D6 relates to optical microscopes in general (see title and column 1, lines 10 to 16: "Field of the Invention") and offers a solution (insertion of corrective optics) for the correction of spherical aberration that occurs due to imaging of layers at different levels (see claim 1,  [...]). Therefore, the skilled person would consider document D6 and apply its teachings in order to solve the objective technical problem.”
  • D6 is US 4,563,062.
  • As a comment, I think that this is a case which illustrates that the credibility of the EPO depends on how good the technical members of the Board can assume the role of the notional skilled person. I don't know whether a skilled person working in the field of D3 (link) would consult D6. I note that the Board does not expressly identify the skilled person. I would say it is the skilled person working with the technology of D3. D3 is a patent application carefully drafted to not overly restrict the scope of application of the claimed device, though the focus of D3 appears to be DNA microarrays (‘Scientists use DNA microarrays to measure the expression levels of large numbers of genes simultaneously or to genotype multiple regions of a genome’; Wikipedia). So the skilled person would likely be an engineer involved in the design of microscopes for reading out such DNA microarrays. Perhaps this would be an optical engineer; perhaps it would be another kind of engineer. Similarly, D6 is a patent carefully stating the 'field of the invention' of the claimed optical system in the most general terms. In the very next paragraph, it acknowledges as prior art "an emulsion chamber is one of the known apparatus for recording the track of cosmic rays." At least prima facie, D6 does not seem to be the kind of handbook that illustrates basic principles of optical engineering in general. But perhaps an optical engineer would search broadly for any literature addressing the optical problem at issue, irrespective of the precise application (assuming that the skilled person of D3 is an optical engineer instead of a biologist). 


EPO T 2069/17 - link

Reasons for the Decision


1. Main request - Inventive Step - Article 56 EPC

1.1 Closest prior art

Document D3 represents the closest prior art and discloses a method for imaging a biological sample, where the biological sample comprises a flow cell (100) with a first biological sample (21) disposed on a first surface (20) and a second biological sample (11) disposed on a second surface (10) of the flow cell, such that the first and second surfaces face each other (see paragraphs [0024] to [0026] and figures 1 and 3). The biological samples are excited by a radiation source and radiation emitted from the two surfaces is detected (see paragraphs [0012] "Fluoreszenzmessungen" and [0036] "Fluoreszenzdetektion"). According to D3, the fluorescence measurements are performed at the flow cell through the first surface (see paragraphs [0035]), i.e. the flow cell is mounted as a whole on an imaging station such that the first surface (20) is disposed between the detector and the second surface (10). This is confirmed by the statement that the measuring time is reduced due to fluorescence measurements at the first and second surfaces (see paragraph [0012]).

18 December 2019

T 1462/14 - The skilled person vs a lawyer

Key points

  • In this examination appeal, a feature is omitted in claim 1 of the main request compared to claim 1 as filed. The issue is whether this amendment complies with Art. 123(2) EPC.
  • The Board: "The mere fact that the conditions defining the essentiality test, referred to in the guidelines for examination are met, is not conclusive."
  • " Contrary to the general statement later incorporated into the Guidelines for Examination, the original English text of the decision [T331/87] did not state that meeting the three conditions would be sufficient for the amendment to be allowable; but rather that such an amendment may not violate Article 123(2) EPC" (italics in present decision; as a comment I refrain from discussing the meaning of the phrase "may not").
  • The requirement of G 2/10 refers to the skilled person. 
  • "Many of the appellant's arguments rely on the knowledge to be attributed to the skilled person, as opposed to that of a lawyer.  In the appellant's view, the skilled person would have recognised that the claimed circuit could be used in various environments.[...] Contrary to a lawyer's, the skilled person's understanding would not be limited to the literal content of a written disclosure." 
  • The Board is not persuaded. "The Board notes that the skilled person is a notional entity that has been elaborated by the jurisprudence of the boards of appeal in order to serve as an objective reference when deciding on various issues under the EPC. The jurisprudence makes it clear that this notional person cannot be equated with any real person in the technical field of the invention. Neither an inventor, nor an opponent, nor an examiner, nor a member of a board of appeal, can be equated with the skilled person. This also applies to a representative, independently of any qualification."
  • " The question to be answered is thus whether this fictional skilled person would have derived from the application as a whole that the disclosed circuit is not limited to the field of contactless communication devices." 
  • " The Board thus has no doubt that the skilled person would have construed the invention as a voltage supplying circuit to be used in the context of contactless communication devices only." 
  • As an obiter, the Boards add that  "[t]he Board finds further support for this view in the following observations. Rule 42 EPC specifies the requirements which apply to the patent description. A distinction is made therein between the technical field of the invention (Rule 42(1)(a) EPC), the disclosure of the invention (Rule 42(1)(c) EPC) and the possibility of incorporating examples when describing in detail at least one way of carrying out the invention (Rule 42(1)(e) EPC)."
  • The Board then discusses that para. [0006] at issue is the disclosure of the invention under Rule 42(1)(c) rather than an example under Rule 42(1)(e) EPC. " The reading in accordance with Rule 42(1) EPC confirms thus that contactless communication devices define the field of the invention and not a possible example of its use."
  • This raises the question of whether the "fictional skilled person"  reads a patent application with detailed knowledge of Rule 42 EPC.


T 1462/14 - link

Reasons for the Decision
Main request - Added subject-matter
1. Claim 1 of the main request specifies that the claimed circuit comprises first and second input terminals. The indication in original claim 1 according to which the circuit comprises an input "configured for coupling to an antenna and for receiving an alternating voltage from the antenna" has been deleted.
Essentiality test
5. The mere fact that the conditions defining the essentiality test, referred to in the guidelines for examination are met, is not conclusive.
6. The conditions defining the essentiality test were first defined in the context of case T 331/87, "Removal of a feature", OJ EPO 1991, 22. Contrary to the general statement later incorporated into the Guidelines for Examination, the original English text of the decision did not state that meeting the three conditions would be sufficient for the amendment to be allowable; but rather that such an amendment may not violate Article 123(2) EPC (see T 331/87 point 6, and also T 1852/13, points 2.2.3 and 2.2.7; Case Law of the Boards of appeal, Section II.E.1.4.4 c), 9th edition 2019).
7. As underlined in decision T 1852/13, the correct approach is the so-called "gold standard" as summarised in G 2/10, "Disclaimer/SCRIPPS", OJ EPC 2012, 376: "... any amendment to the parts of a European patent application or of a European patent relating to the disclosure (the description, claims and drawings) is subject to the mandatory prohibition on extension laid down in Article 123(2) EPC and can therefore, irrespective of the context of the amendment made, only be made within the limits of what a skilled person would derive directly and unambiguously, using common general knowledge, and seen objectively and relative to the date of filing, from the whole of these documents as filed" (G 2/10, point 4.3).
Gold standard - the skilled person
8. The definition of the invention, contained in paragraphs [0006] and [0007] of the published application, albeit imperfect, confirms that the claimed invention is to be used with antennas.
9. The patent application as originally filed is, in effect, devoid of ambiguity as to the fact that the claimed circuit is to be used in the context of contactless communication devices, the communication being established by means of antennas.
10. The appellant's reference to paragraph [0014] of the published application, in particualar to the statement that "In some implementations, LC circuit 110 comprises antenna 112", is not persuasive. Indeed, it would be misleading to say that, in other implementations, there may be no antenna. The whole sentence reads "In some implementations, LC circuit 110 comprises antenna 112 (e.g., a coil) coupled in parallel to capacitor 114." What is optional is not the antenna, but the specific arrangement consisting of the antenna in parallel to the capacitor.
11. Many of the appellant's arguments rely on the knowledge to be attributed to the skilled person, as opposed to that of a lawyer.
12. In the appellant's view, the skilled person would have recognised that the claimed circuit could be used in various environments. It was thus not limited to the field of contactless communication devices. Similarly, the skilled person would have also recognised that the claimed circuit could be used with a signal already rectified or provided by a DC source. Contrary to a lawyer's, the skilled person's understanding would not be limited to the literal content of a written disclosure.
13. The Board concurs that literal support is not required under Article 123(2) EPC: what is relevant is the actual teaching conveyed by the original disclosure, i.e. the technical information that the skilled person, reading the original disclosure, would have derived from its content (description, claims and drawings) considered in its entirety. This approach might lead to the identification of subject-matter which has not been explicitly stated as such in the application as filed, but nevertheless derives directly and unambiguously from its content (cf. T 667/08, point 4.1.4). What the skilled person will derive from the content of an application or other written disclosure depends, however, on both his skills and inabilities.
14. The Board notes that the skilled person is a notional entity that has been elaborated by the jurisprudence of the boards of appeal in order to serve as an objective reference when deciding on various issues under the EPC. The jurisprudence makes it clear that this notional person cannot be equated with any real person in the technical field of the invention.
15. Neither an inventor, nor an opponent, nor an examiner, nor a member of a board of appeal, can be equated with the skilled person. This also applies to a representative, independently of any qualification.
16. The question to be answered is thus whether this fictional skilled person would have derived from the application as a whole that the disclosed circuit is not limited to the field of contactless communication devices. In other words, it should be established whether the reference to an antenna would have been construed by the skilled person as referring to a mere example of use of the claimed circuit.
17. As stressed above, the original application is consistent as to the fact that the claimed voltage supply circuit is to be used in association with an antenna input i.e. in the context of contactless communication devices. The wording of original claim 1 is corroborated by the statement in the description regarding the definition of the invention (cf. paragraphs [0006], [0007]). Nothing in the description suggests that some other applications might have been envisaged. In particular, paragraph [0014] does not suggest it.
18. The Board thus has no doubt that the skilled person would have construed the invention as a voltage supplying circuit to be used in the context of contactless communication devices only.
19. The Board finds further support for this view in the following observations.
20. Rule 42 EPC specifies the requirements which apply to the patent description. A distinction is made therein between the technical field of the invention (Rule 42(1)(a) EPC), the disclosure of the invention (Rule 42(1)(c) EPC) and the possibility of incorporating examples when describing in detail at least one way of carrying out the invention (Rule 42(1)(e) EPC).
21. In the present case, the subject-matter is defined in paragraph [0001] as relating "generally to electronic interfaces, and more particularly to contactless interfaces..." in accordance with Rule 42(1)(a) EPC. As underlined above, the disclosure of the invention is disclosed in paragraphs [0006] and [0007] in relation with an inductive antenna in accordance with Rule 42(1)(c) EPC. In accordance with Rule 42(1)(e) EPC, the detailed description of the invention incorporates examples of the contactless interface, switching regulator circuit and timer for switch control.
22. The reading in accordance with Rule 42(1) EPC confirms thus that contactless communication devices define the field of the invention and not a possible example of its use.
23. It follows that the deletion of the reference to the antenna leads to a non-allowable generalisation of the claimed subject-matter, contrary to Article 123(2) EPC.
Subsidiary set of claims - Added subject-matter
24. The independent claim of the auxiliary request differs from claim 1 of the main request in that the features considered to be missing in claim 1 of the main request have been reintroduced.
25. The Board is satisfied that overcomes the objection under Article 123(2) EPC.
26. Since the decision to refuse the application relied exclusively on this objection, the case is remitted to the Examining Division for further prosecution.
Order
For these reasons it is decided that:
The case is remitted to the department of first instance for further prosecution on the basis of the set of claims 1 to 3 according to the subsidiary set of claims filed on 30 September 2019.

13 December 2018

T 0867/13 - Plausibility, or derived from the patent

Key points

  • This opposition appeal clearly was a good fight about a pharmaceutical patent. 
  • The CPA D67 "reports that a phase II clinical trial in infantile Pompe patients with recombinant human acid alpha-glucosidase (rhGAA) produced in the milk of transgenic rabbits "has finalised with positive results"" 
  •  The subject-matter of claim 1 differs from the disclosure of document D67 in that the human rhGAA used for the treatment of GSD-II is produced in Chinese hamster ovary (CHO) cells.
  • The Board concludes that this was an obvious alternative, no improvement being shown in the patent. Some post-published data allegedly showing the improvement is disregarded because " no improvement over the treatment known from document D67 is derivable from the patent". (the opponent had indeed used the term 'plausibility' on this point).
  • The Board rejects the argument that the skilled person would not look for further improvements after the success of D67. "it is established case law that it is the normal task of a skilled person working in a certain field not to remain inactive but to seek alternatives, to be constantly occupied with the elimination of deficiencies, with the overcoming of drawbacks and with the achievement of improvements of known devices and/or products " 
  • The Board concludes that the use of CHO cells was obvious in view of D73f which teaches  that "although no efficacy data is yet available for the two ongoing clinical trials of rhGAA replacement therapy, "pre-clinical data suggest that enzyme replacement therapy will be successful" (one of these clinical trials using CHO cells, as D73f mentions).



EPO T 0867/13 -  link

Thus, no improvement over the treatment known from document D67 can be derived from paragraphs [0008], [0009] and [0043] of the patent.

8.3 Paragraph [0013] of the patent discloses that CHO-cell-derived rhGAA is preferred and further that it "is assumed that the glycosylation differs from that of GAA that is produced in transgenic mouse and rabbit milk (...)". In the board's judgement, it does not follow directly and unambiguously from this statement that the assumed difference in glycosylation leads to an improved treatment if CHO-cell-derived rhGAA is used rather than transgenic rabbit-milk-produced rhGAA.
8.4 Documents D60a and D103 - both published after the priority date - relate to effects seen in Pompe mice (document D60a; see left-hand column, second paragraph under the heading "Results", and right-hand column, first paragraph under the heading "Conclusions") and GAA knockout mice (see document D103, page 452, right-hand column, fourth and fifth paragraphs, and Figures 3 and 4). However, these results obtained in mice do not establish that CHO-cell-derived rhGAA is better than rabbit-milk-derived rhGAA at effecting glycogen clearance in humans. Moreover, the alleged effect - an improved treatment for GSD-II - could only be taken into account when determining the problem underlying the invention for the purpose of assessing inventive step, if it can be deduced by the skilled person from the patent considered in relation to the closest prior art (see also Case Law of the Boards of Appeal, 8th edition 2016, I.D.4.4.2 and I.D.4.4.6). In the present case, no improvement over the treatment known from document D67 is derivable from the patent (see points 8.1 to 8.3).
8.5 In the board's judgement, the subject-matter of claim 1 can thus not be considered to provide an improved treatment over the treatment disclosed in document D67.

21 November 2018

T 0588/15 - The gender of the skilled person

Key points

  • " The skilled person, with their mind willing to understand, always seeks a technically meaningful interpretation of the claim. Where they experience difficulties they will read the claim in the context of the whole specification, including the claims, description and drawings." 



EPO T 0588/15 -  link



3.3 The skilled person, with their mind willing to understand, always seeks a technically meaningful interpretation of the claim. Where they experience difficulties they will read the claim in the context of the whole specification, including the claims, description and drawings.

19 July 2018

T 1516/14 - Superfluous feature

Key point

  • Claim 1 as granted specifies a feature that can be read in two ways. The first way is not supported by the other claims. The second way is inherently true, namely that the scalding medium has a dew point not exceeding the wet bulb temperature. Does this lead to insufficient disclosure?
  • The Board finds it does not. " In the Board's view the skilled person approaches a claim from a purely technical viewpoint, not the patent technical or patent legal viewpoint of the patent professional. That a feature may not contribute to an invention because it merely expresses the technically obvious does not make it illogical or not credible in a purely technical sense. Naturally, from the point of view of an opponent or a diligent examiner patentability cannot credibly rely on such a feature, but that is not relevant to the question under consideration." 
  • "  As already explained, the dew point temperature of a fluid-vapour/gas medium never exceeds the wet bulb temperature. Therefore, far from the skilled person being unable to carry out the aspect of the invention defined by this particular feature, they can but achieve this feature when composing a partially or almost fully saturated scalding medium as the claim requires. Therefore, this aspect of the invention is sufficiently disclosed." 

EPO T 1516/14 - link

"1. Device  for scalding poultry , comprising:
- a conditioning space for composing a scalding medium,
- a processing space  provided with transport means  which define a transport path ...  and ... the device  is for scalding poultry  comprising a full plumage,
characterized in that
the conditioning space  is for composing a partially or almost fully saturated scalding medium with a dew point lying in the range of [49-61]°C and not exceeding the wet bulb temperature, and ...".

Reasons for the Decision
3.4 The Board does not share the respondent-opponent's view that the skilled person would reject the second reading of the relevant claim feature (dew point not exceeding wet bulb temperature) as being illogical or not credible, as it does not contribute anything to the invention.
In the Board's view the skilled person approaches a claim from a purely technical viewpoint, not the patent technical or patent legal viewpoint of the patent professional. That a feature may not contribute to an invention because it merely expresses the technically obvious does not make it illogical or not credible in a purely technical sense. Naturally, from the point of view of an opponent or a diligent examiner patentability cannot credibly rely on such a feature, but that is not relevant to the question under consideration.
In the Board's view the the skilled person, exactly because they are first and foremost interested in making technical sense of a claim, will on first reading always reject a technically non-sensible reading in favour of a sensible one if they have to choose between different possible readings. According to established jurisprudence (see Case Law of the Boards of Appeal, 8th edition, 2016 (CLBA), II.A.6.1, and the decisions cited therein), when considering a claim, the skilled person thus rules out interpretations which are illogical or which do not make technical sense. For them, a reading that results in a technical impossibility (scalding medium must be both saturated and non saturated) is technically non-sensible, i.e. technically illogical or not credible. It may be that when they read the claim in the light of the whole disclosure they may revise that first reading, because for example the description clearly supports the technically non-sensible reading. That is not the case here, where as stated there is no support anywhere else in the patent for the technically non-sensible reading that scalding temperature does not exceed wet bulb temperature.
In particular, from their technical knowledge of psychrometry, the skilled person is familiar with the well established and generally known meanings of the terms "dew point" and "wet bulb temperature" and they know from their general knowledge that the dew point temperature never exceeds the wet bulb temperature, because it is an inherent psychrometric condition of a fluid-vapour/gas medium. Therefore, in the Board's view, the second reading of the relevant claim feature makes perfect technical sense as always true and is both technically logical and credible, whereas the first reading clearly is not.
In the present case, as already explained, the above interpretation makes perfect technical sense and is logical, indeed it cannot be otherwise. Thus it will not be rejected by the skilled person as being an impossible interpretation of the relevant feature.
3.5 In conclusion the above feature is to be interpreted according to the second reading, namely as defining that the dew point of the partially or almost fully saturated scalding medium has a dew point lying in the range of [49-61]°C and that this dew point does not exceed the wet bulb temperature (of the scalding medium).
3.6 The Board must therefore examine, based on this interpretation, whether the invention is sufficiently disclosed. Article 83 EPC requires that the European patent application shall disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by a person skilled in the art. In accordance with established jurisprudence, as summarised in G 2/93, point 4, "in order to meet the requirements of Article 83 EPC, a European patent application [European patent in Article 100(b)] must therefore contain sufficient information to allow a person skilled in the art, using his common general knowledge, to perceive the technical teaching inherent in the claimed invention and to put it into effect accordingly."
3.7 Thus, the consideration as to whether or not a particular feature distinguishes the claimed subject matter from the prior art, or indeed whether or not it is merely a statement of something that is inherently true, plays no role in assessing sufficiency of disclosure. Nor is it for the Board to speculate as to why a particular feature was added to the claim in examination proceedings. The subjective intentions of the patentee are relevant for the purposes of interpreting the claims only to the extent that these intentions are explicitly formulated in and therefore derivable from the patent specification itself. In short, the Board must assess whether the skilled person can carry out the invention from the information in the patent and the skilled person's general knowledge alone.
3.8 As already explained, the dew point temperature of a fluid-vapour/gas medium never exceeds the wet bulb temperature. Therefore, far from the skilled person being unable to carry out the aspect of the invention defined by this particular feature, they can but achieve this feature when composing a partially or almost fully saturated scalding medium as the claim requires. Therefore, this aspect of the invention is sufficiently disclosed.


3.4 The Board does not share the respondent-opponent's view that the skilled person would reject the second reading of the relevant claim feature (dew point not exceeding wet bulb temperature) as being illogical or not credible, as it does not contribute anything to the invention.
In the Board's view the skilled person approaches a claim from a purely technical viewpoint, not the patent technical or patent legal viewpoint of the patent professional. That a feature may not contribute to an invention because it merely expresses the technically obvious does not make it illogical or not credible in a purely technical sense. Naturally, from the point of view of an opponent or a diligent examiner patentability cannot credibly rely on such a feature, but that is not relevant to the question under consideration.
In the Board's view the the skilled person, exactly because they are first and foremost interested in making technical sense of a claim, will on first reading always reject a technically non-sensible reading in favour of a sensible one if they have to choose between different possible readings. According to established jurisprudence (see Case Law of the Boards of Appeal, 8th edition, 2016 (CLBA), II.A.6.1, and the decisions cited therein), when considering a claim, the skilled person thus rules out interpretations which are illogical or which do not make technical sense. For them, a reading that results in a technical impossibility (scalding medium must be both saturated and non saturated) is technically non-sensible, i.e. technically illogical or not credible. It may be that when they read the claim in the light of the whole disclosure they may revise that first reading, because for example the description clearly supports the technically non-sensible reading. That is not the case here, where as stated there is no support anywhere else in the patent for the technically non-sensible reading that scalding temperature does not exceed wet bulb temperature.
In particular, from their technical knowledge of psychrometry, the skilled person is familiar with the well established and generally known meanings of the terms "dew point" and "wet bulb temperature" and they know from their general knowledge that the dew point temperature never exceeds the wet bulb temperature, because it is an inherent psychrometric condition of a fluid-vapour/gas medium. Therefore, in the Board's view, the second reading of the relevant claim feature makes perfect technical sense as always true and is both technically logical and credible, whereas the first reading clearly is not.
In the present case, as already explained, the above interpretation makes perfect technical sense and is logical, indeed it cannot be otherwise. Thus it will not be rejected by the skilled person as being an impossible interpretation of the relevant feature.
3.5 In conclusion the above feature is to be interpreted according to the second reading, namely as defining that the dew point of the partially or almost fully saturated scalding medium has a dew point lying in the range of [49-61]°C and that this dew point does not exceed the wet bulb temperature (of the scalding medium).
3.6 The Board must therefore examine, based on this interpretation, whether the invention is sufficiently disclosed. Article 83 EPC requires that the European patent application shall disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by a person skilled in the art. In accordance with established jurisprudence, as summarised in G 2/93, point 4, "in order to meet the requirements of Article 83 EPC, a European patent application [European patent in Article 100(b)] must therefore contain sufficient information to allow a person skilled in the art, using his common general knowledge, to perceive the technical teaching inherent in the claimed invention and to put it into effect accordingly."
3.7 Thus, the consideration as to whether or not a particular feature distinguishes the claimed subject matter from the prior art, or indeed whether or not it is merely a statement of something that is inherently true, plays no role in assessing sufficiency of disclosure. Nor is it for the Board to speculate as to why a particular feature was added to the claim in examination proceedings. The subjective intentions of the patentee are relevant for the purposes of interpreting the claims only to the extent that these intentions are explicitly formulated in and therefore derivable from the patent specification itself. In short, the Board must assess whether the skilled person can carry out the invention from the information in the patent and the skilled person's general knowledge alone.
3.8 As already explained, the dew point temperature of a fluid-vapour/gas medium never exceeds the wet bulb temperature. Therefore, far from the skilled person being unable to carry out the aspect of the invention defined by this particular feature, they can but achieve this feature when composing a partially or almost fully saturated scalding medium as the claim requires. Therefore, this aspect of the invention is sufficiently disclosed.
[...]
5. Request of the respondent-opponent for referral of a question to the Enlarged Board of Appeal
5.1 Article 112 EPC provides for the possibility of referring questions of law to the Enlarged Board "in order to ensure uniform application of the law or if a point of law of fundamental importance arises" (paragraph (1)).
In the present case the respondent-opponent has asked for referral of a question concerning the assessment of sufficiency of disclosure under Article 83 EPC. The question can be summarised as: whether the assessment for the clear and complete disclosure of an invention, so that it can be carried out, under Article 100 (b) EPC (Article 83 EPC), may be reduced to the assessment of merely an internal logic and/or the correct syntax of a claim, so that the overall teaching of the patent as a whole, in particular the problem to be solved, can be disregarded?
5.2 As already explained, the jurisprudence concerning how sufficiency of disclosure is to be assessed (see point 3.6 above) is well established and is uniformly applied. Nor does the Board depart from this in the present case. In particular, the Board does not rely solely on internal logic or syntax of the claim to arrive at its conclusion.
5.3 In the present case, the Board has established that the invention as claimed in the independent claim 1 can be carried out by analysing the features of claim 1 in the context of the whole patent. In so doing the Board has moreover approached the claim as does the skilled person to make technical sense of it, using the general knowledge of the skilled person. Therefore, the question proposed for referral is not relevant to the case in hand.
5.4 In the light of the above, the Board concludes that there is no justification for referring the question posed to the Enlarged Board of Appeal.
6. Remittal
6.1 In accordance with Article 111(1) EPC, second sentence, the Board of Appeal may either exercise any power within the competence of the department which was responsible for the decision appealed or remit the case to that department for further prosecution.
Since the main purpose of the appeal proceedings is to give the losing party a possibility to challenge the decision of the opposition division on its merits (see G 10/91, point 18), remittal in accordance with Article 111(1) EPC is normally considered by the Boards in cases where the opposition division issues a decision solely upon a particular issue and leaves other substantive issues undecided.
6.2 As explained above, the only reason for rejecting the main request was the consideration of the opposition ground of insufficient disclosure. The decision did not consider the opposition grounds of novelty and inventive step raised under Article 100(a) EPC having regard to various documents and an alleged public prior use (see notice of opposition, pages 5 to 8), all these objections being maintained in appeal proceedings.
6.3 Although both parties have requested that the Board deal with all outstanding issues, in both cases this was conditional on the Board finding in favour of the respective party and without consideration of the arguments and evidence adduced against inventive step. The Board can of course not honour both requests. Both parties do in fact request remittal if the arguments and evidence against inventive step are to be examined. At the oral proceedings before the Board the respondent opponent expressly stated that he would not withdraw them. Consequently, the parties' relevant request is for remittal.
6.4 Furthermore, examination of novelty and inventive step involves consideration of various prior art documents and an alleged public prior use, potentially with the hearing of a witness. This would go far beyond the primary purpose of these appeal proceedings, essentially, that of reviewing the impugned decision's finding that the invention according to claims 1 and 13 as granted was insufficiently disclosed. The Board therefore sees no reason to depart from the parties' relevant request for remittal.
6.5 For these reasons, the Board decided not to deal with the issues of novelty and inventive step of the patent as granted, but to remit the case to the opposition division for further prosecution.
Order
For these reasons it is decided that:
1. The decision under appeal is set aside.
2. The case is remitted to the department of first instance for further prosecution.

07 June 2017

T 0015/15 - Skilled person and new technology

Key points

  • The Board comments on the skilled person in this case. 
  • " [W]here a new technology is about to spread into a traditional field, it is common practice to group people from both technical fields into a development team. The Board is thus of the opinion that the skilled person in the present case consists of a team of an orthodontist and an expert in CAD/CAM technology. This conclusion is drawn from the situation in the field before the filing/priority date, without considering any specific invention. "
EPO T 0015/15 - link

4.4 The skilled person
In the early nineties, use of computers in planning and manufacturing was spreading into basically every industry and field of technology. As evidenced by e.g. E30, column 2, line 64-68 or E12, page 540, first paragraph of the introduction, the field of dentistry and orthodontics was no exception. Thus, also the specialist in the field of dentistry and orthodontics was aware of the new technology and its potential for improved quality and cost efficiency.
In such a situation, where a new technology is about to spread into a traditional field, it is common practice to group people from both technical fields into a development team. The Board is thus of the opinion that the skilled person in the present case consists of a team of an orthodontist and an expert in CAD/CAM technology. This conclusion is drawn from the situation in the field before the filing/priority date, without considering any specific invention. There is thus no element of hindsight involved.

04 September 2015

T 0601/09 - Skilled person and inventor

EPO T 601/09

For the decision, click here.

Key point

  • The opponent tried the argument that the skilled person would have consulted D3, because D3 has the same inventor as the present application. That argument does not work. The skilled person is not the same as the inventor (cf. e.g. T39/93).


Entscheidungsgründe
[...]

3.6 Als Begründung dafür, dass die gemäß Streitpatent angebotene Lösung nahegelegen habe, führte die Beschwerdeführerin die Druckschriften (3) und (4) an.
3.6.1 Druckschrift (3) betrifft ein Verfahren zur Reaktivdestillation, [...]
Die Beschwerdeführerin brachte vor, Herr Kaibel sei sowohl im Streitpatent als auch in Druckschrift (3) als Erfinder genannt. Daher sei auch Druckschrift (3) im gleichen technischen Gebiet angesiedelt wie das Streitpatent, so dass der Fachmann auch die Lehre der Druckschrift (3) zur Lösung seiner technischen Aufgabe herangezogen hätte.
Ob der Fachmann eine Druckschrift zur Lösung des Problems herangezogen hätte, hängt jedoch nicht vom Wissen des Erfinders ab, sondern von dem des Fachmannes. Dieser verfügt jedoch lediglich über durchschnittliches Wissen und Können in seinem begrenzten technischen Gebiet, wogegen den Erfinder zusätzlich die Fähigkeit zu problemlösendem Denken auszeichnet. Somit ist der Erfinder nicht mit dem Fachmann gleichzusetzen (siehe z.B. T 39/93, ABl. EPA 1997, 134, Punkt 7.8.4). Das Argument der Beschwerdeführerin kann daher nicht durchgreifen.