Opposition Division in T 0844/18 - Crispr patent (priority)

Key points

• The appeal in the case of the Crispr/CAS patent EP 2771468 has file number T 0844/18 and is pending [note: decision now issued]. EP '468 was revoked by the OD for lack novelty caused by invalid priority (from a US provisional) 
• The OD's written decision of 26.03.2018 is available here. 
• The relevant facts are that the US provisional(s) were filed with the inventors as applicants. The PCT application was filed by research institutes as employers. However for some of the inventors named in the US provisional, neither that inventor nor his employer was a (co-)applicant of the PCT application, and there was no transfer of priority right from the inventor to the PCT applicants. The question is whether this makes the priority invalid.
• The OD does not deviate from EPO's established practice and considers the priority invalid, thereby rejecting three main arguments of patentee.
• According to the OD, the EPO is competent to examine the validity of priority, also concerning entitlement to priority. The patentee had challenged this competence of the EPO.
• Furthermore the PCT application must be filed by all applicants of the US provisional (or their successors in title), not by one or more of them, to validly claim priority. The patentee had challenged this based on A87 using "any person".
• And finally, the question of who is an "applicant" of a US provisional for the purpose of Article 87 EPC is not determined by US national law. Patentee had invoked US law and had submitted that under US national law, the inventors that were omitted as applicant of the PCT application were properly disregarded as "applicant" of the US provisional under US law, because they had not contributed to the invention of the PCT application. 

• EPO T 0844/18  (EPO T 844/18) - The OD's written decision of 26.03.2018 is available here. The file is here.

Note 13.09.2019: the interested reader may also follow T2360/19 ; EP14170383; also about a Crispr patent and priority. Written decision OD of 28.08.2019 that priority was invalid.

T 1897/17 - Appeal deemed not filed, or inadmissible

Key points

• In this case, the Notice of appeal was filed late (and the appeal fee was paid together with the Notice. The Board refuses the request for RE. For the RE case, the Board notes: "there is no need to examine if the accident of Mr von M.'s son and the resulting needs of his daughter - with the consequence that Mr von M. left the office immediately - could be considered a further issue in the context of all due care taken. " 
• The present Board decides that the consequence is that the appeal is rejected as inadmissible (and not deemed not filed, so no refund of the appeal fee).
• " The board does not concur with the majority interpretation in decisions of the Boards of Appeal that an appeal is 'deemed not to have been filed', if the notice of appeal or the payment of the appeal fee were received outside the two-month time limit of Art. 108 EPC" 
• The Board acknowledges that this point was referred to the Enlarged Board in G 1/14 (T 1553/13) and G 2/14 (T 2017/12). However, in neither cases did the Enlarged Board decide on the issue. The present Board notes that subsequently, T 1325/15 and T 2406/16 followed the majority view, based on R 4/15 finding that a petition for review is in such cases deemed not filed.
• The present Board maintains that the sanction is that the appeal is inadmissible.
• " Consequently, R. 101 (1) EPC and R. 77 (1) EPC can be seen as the implementing provisions envisaged by the travaux préparatoires (as cited in T 2017/12 "Ob in der Ausführungsordnung zu diesem Abkommen eine entsprechende Bestimmung aufgenommen werden soll, wird später zu entscheiden sein."), confirming and supplementing the (ordinary) meaning of Art. 108 EPC, second sentence and Art. 99 (1) EPC, second sentence respectively, by explicitly stating the procedural consequence arising from the late-filing of the respective fee, i.e. to reject the appeal or opposition as inadmissible. The travaux préparatoires do not cover Art. 112a EPC as this article was only introduced into the EPC 2000." 
• The present Board is also not persuaded by R 4/15, because R 4/15 " 'did not elaborate on the reasons for why late payment of the fee for petition for review should result in the pe­ti­tion for review being deemed not to have been filed, as opposed to being found inadmissible" .
• The present Board does  not refer questions to the Enlarged Board, which I believe the Board could have done of own motion. Update 02.07.2018: the President did refer a point of law to the Enlarged Board in view of T1897/17, pending as referral G1/18.

EPO T 1897/17 -  link

Reasons for the Decision

1. An applicant can be reinstated into the time limit of filing a notice of appeal if the applicant was unable to ob­serve this time limit despite all due care requi­red by the circumstances having been taken (Art. 122 (1) in con­junc­tion with Art. 108 EPC).

2. It not only rests with the appellant to exercise all due care, but with all persons acting on its behalf. Notably, also an appellant's professional represen­tative including the representative's assistants have to exercise all due care. All of these persons' acts are finally attributed to the appellant (Case Law III.E.5.5). All due care by the representative includes, among other duties, the reasonable instruc­tion and continuous supervision of assistants (Case Law III.E.5.5.4.(a) and (b)).

3. Based on the appellant's assertion of the facts, which are supported by the documentary evidence, all persons in the patent attorney's firm involved in the present case wor­ked under the guidance and super­vision of a qua­lified European Patent Attorney. No circumstances have come to light which could cast any doubt on the re­liability of any of these persons, in particular on Mr von M., the person res­ponsible for the prepa­ra­tion of the notice of appeal in the case at hand.

4. In accordance with established case law, one of the criteria to establish whether "all due care required by the circumstances" has been taken, is that the repre­sentative must be able to communicate effectively with his or her client. Specifically, to exercise due care, a professional representative that has been instructed to file an appeal, has to take all necessary measures to obtain any additional instructions needed to dis­charge his or her duty (Case Law III.E.5.5.2(a)). In addition thereto, the representative has to commence work on a file reasonably clear of a deadline, to be sure to complete all necessary steps in good time (Case Law III.E.5.5.2(d)).

5. In the present case, neither of these criteria have been satisfied.

T 0198/16 - Debit order and RE

Key points

• The Board decides that the following is not a debit order, or sufficient to effect payment with (non-automatic) debiting: a remark in the Notice of appeal that "The appeal fee is paid via the enclosed EPO form 1010." (where no such form is enclosed). 
• The Board:  "Equalling the intention to pay to a payment is detached from the reality of business transactions and is therefore unacceptable. The long standing case law of the boards of appeal on this matter can therefore not be followed. " 
• The Board: " An intention to make a payment remains a (mere) intention and not a payment, no matter whether or not the EPO has access to sufficient funds of the person or entity intending to pay which would, as a matter of fact, make it possible for the EPO to avail itself of those funds. The reason is that the EPO is simply not entitled to do so under its own rules." As a comment, this argument does not convince me: a formally valid debit order neither is a payment (e.g. consider insufficient funds). And the sentence in a Notice of appeal is not an intention (a mental state of the payer), but a communication of that intention to the EPO. A further question is what the "rules" are: the text of the ADA, or the interpretation thereof in the established case law?
• I wonder if the phrase "and a debit order is auxiliary herewith given" would have saved the applicant in this case. 

As a comment, note that the current text of the ADA in any case requires that a debit order is in XML, which excludes PDF, according to the wording of ADA 5.1.2. 

• The second topic is re-establishment.
• The Board has an extensive analysis of what the date is of removal of the cause of non-compliance, for the starting of the 2 month period for filing the RE request. 
• The Board considers that the current case law under which the date of removal of the cause of non-compliance is the date when party should have discovered the error, wherein "should"  means a party showing due care in the entire period after the missing the time limit and the date of removal of the cause of non-compliance. The reason is that this case law doubles the "due care" requirement.
• The Board: " The above shows that the current practice of applying the due-care requirement in the context of removal of the cause of non-compliance with a period within the meaning of Rule 136(1) EPC, may well be seen as extending the meaning of the due-care requirement []. This approach to the "removal" criterion, which cannot be based on the letter of the law, is therefore doubtful."
• However, the Board does not answer how the date of removal of non-compliance needs to be decided, because it does not allow the request for RE in any case. The Board assumes that the RE request was timely filed in favour of the applicant (even though if late filed, the RE fee was reimbursed, according to the present Board citing R4/15). 
• About the allowability of the request for RE: "Different from an isolated mistake made by an assistant, a mistake made by a representative, whether isolated or not, is not excusable" (citing R 18/13, par 19, which is in fact restricted to time limit monitoring).
• The request for RE is refused as due care was not shown.
• The appeal is deemed to have not been filed and the appeal fee is reimbursed. 
• For some reason, the Board deals with the debit order issue in a quote from the preliminary opinion, giving two paragraphs "3.2"  in the same decision. 

EPO T 0198/16 - link


EPO Headnote
1. The intention to authorise debiting of the deposit account does NOT already allow the EPO to act on such authorisation and carry out such intent where the EPO, under the deposit account system, already holds such money in trust (deviation in particular from T 1265/10, at point 15), (see point 3.4.3 of the quotation from the summons under point 1 of the Reasons).

2. A representative must give express and clear instructions to an assistant to the effect that the appeal fee has to be paid. It is not enough to rely on the assistant's deducing the duty to file the payment form from the notice of appeal, which includes the sentence: "The appeal fee is paid via the enclosed EPO form 1010."

Reasons for the Decision

1. Main request for a communication confirming timely payment of the appeal fee

As to this point, the appellant's submissions made in the reply to the annex and during the oral proceedings did not make the board deviate from its preliminary opinion as comprehensively expressed in the annex, section C. Legal assessment, point 3, up to the side note in point 3.4.3 starting with the clause "As an aside ...", with the exception of two paragraphs of the quoted section of point 3.4.1 that are struck through. The corresponding text is set forth verbatim below. (As for the two struck-through paragraphs, see the explanation following the quotation.)

[beginning of quotation]

"3. Whether the appeal is deemed not to have been filed for failure to pay the appeal fee within the time limit for filing an appeal

3.1 The issue

The notice of appeal against the decision of the examining division of 19 October 2015 was received on 24 December 2015 and, therefore, within the two-month appeal period set out in Article 108, first sentence, EPC, which expired on 4 January 2016 (see Rules 126(2) and 134(1) EPC). Pursuant to Article 108, second sentence, EPC, however, 'Notice of appeal shall not be deemed to have been filed until the fee for appeal has been paid'.

The question is whether, in the circumstances of the present case, the sentence 'The appeal fee is paid via the enclosed EPO form 1010' (the form had not been enclosed) in the notice of appeal must be considered to constitute a valid order for payment of the appeal fee by debit from a deposit account with the EPO. If so, the appeal fee would have been paid on 24 December 2015, and the appeal would be deemed to have been filed on that day (subject to the account containing sufficient funds). Otherwise, in the absence of any payment received within the time limit that expired on 4 January 2016, the appeal would be deemed not to have been filed, as indicated in the Registry's communication of 19 April 2016.

T 1213/13 - Death of opponent

Key points

• The opponent-appellant died during the appeal procedure. The Boards sends a notification to enquire whether there are any heirs. No response is received. The Board declares to close the appeal procedure. 

EPO T 1213/13 - link

Exposé des faits et conclusions

I. Le requérant (opposant) a formé un recours contre la décision de la division d'opposition rejetant l'opposition contre le brevet européen N**(o) 1 870 510.

II. Suite à une citation à une procédurale orale, la chambre de recours a été informée par télécopie du décès du requérant par Mme C., pacsée avec le défunt, domiciliée à la même adresse. La copie d'un acte de décès a été transmise simultanément.

III. La procédure orale a été annulée.

IV. Une notification de la chambre conformément à la règle 100(2) CBE, envoyée à l'adresse du requérant (et à l'intimée-titulaire), visait à établir si le requérant décédé a laissé des héritiers habiles à lui succéder qui entendaient continuer la procédure de recours. Selon la chambre, à défaut d'héritier intéressé et à défaut de réponse dans le délai suivant la notification, la procédure devrait être close.
V. Aucune réponse fut reçu.

Motifs de la décision

1. La chambre constate que le requérant, i.e. la seule partie à la procédure aux prétentions de laquelle la décision attaquée n'a pas fait droit (article 107 CBE), est décédé.

T 0843/15 - Presented PowerPoint not prior art

Key points

• The Board decides that a process scheme illustrated on sheet 15 of a PowerPoint is not prior art. It is not disputed that the PowerPoint was used for public presentation at a conference (before the priority date). 
• Machine translation:  "Given the time allotted to the presentation [20 minutes] and the fact that there is a lot of information in the slide show, it is not clear that the speaker did not deviate, during his presentation, from the elements he intended to present and / or that he has presented elements in such a way that the public has not been able to take note of them." 
• The Board also notes that the process scheme at issue was on one of the last sheets of the slide show and that the process scheme was merely an example and not the focus of the presentation.

EPO T 0843/15 - link

Motifs de la décision

1. Document D22 - Recevabilité

1.1 L'intimée a déposé le document D22 deux semaines avant la procédure orale devant la division d'opposition. La requérante demande que ce document soit considéré comme introduit tardivement et qu'il ne soit pas accepté dans la procédure.

1.2 La Chambre tient à rappeler que la division d'opposition, appliquant le critère de la pertinence de prime abord, a décidé d'admettre dans la procédure le document D22 qui avait été déposé tardivement (point 2.2 des motifs de la décision ; point 3.2 du procès-verbal de la procédure orale).

1.3 La Chambre est d'avis que, dans cette décision, la division d'opposition a exercé correctement son pouvoir d'appréciation conféré par l'article 114(2) CBE. Comme le document D22 a été admis à juste titre dans la procédure d'opposition et la décision attaquée se fonde sur ce document, il doit être pris en compte dans la procédure de recours (voir aussi T 1652/08, point 3.5 des raisons ; T 2513/11, point 4.3 des raisons).

2. Mise à disposition du public du contenu de D22

2.1 L'intimée soutient que le document D22 est la copie d'un diaporama PowerPoint qui aurait été projeté publiquement au cours de la conférence IMechE "Carbon Capture: Technology Options and Making Plant Carbon Capture Ready" qui s'est tenue le 5 juin 2007 à Londres, avant la date de priorité du brevet (1er août 2008).

2.2 La division d'opposition a décidé que la divulgation au public du contenu de D22, en particulier du schéma d'installation OC2 à la page 15 de D22 (reproduit ci-dessous), était établie. Elle s'est ensuite appuyée sur le schéma OC2 pour décider que l'objet revendiqué n'était pas inventif.

FORMULE/TABLEAU/GRAPHIQUE

2.3 Toutefois, pour les raisons suivantes, la Chambre estime que l'intimée n'a pas prouvé de manière suffisante que le schéma OC2 a été rendu accessible au public le 5 juin 2007.

2.3.1 En raison du caractère éphémère d'une divulgation orale à une conférence, il est admis, et l'expérience montre que l'on ne saurait simplement partir du principe qu'une divulgation orale concorde exactement avec son support écrit. Si un conférencier fait une présentation orale en s'appuyant sur un diaporama, comme c'est ici le cas, ce document peut établir une présomption du contenu de la présentation, mais ce document, en soi, ne suffit pas à garantir que le contenu du diaporama a bien été présenté intégralement et, si oui, de façon intelligible. Pour déterminer quelles informations ont été réellement divulguées au public au cours d'une divulgation orale, il est donc généralement nécessaire de produire des éléments de preuve supplémentaires, tels que des déclarations ou des notes écrites du public ou un polycopié distribué au public (cf. La Jurisprudence des Chambres de recours de l'OEB, 8ème édition, 2016, chapitre III.G.3.3.2, en particulier T 1212/97 et T 2003/08).

2.3.2 Dans le cas d'espèce, pour prouver la divulgation du contenu du diaporama D22, l'intimée a fourni une copie du programme de la conférence (D23) et une déclaration écrite du conférencier (D24). La question est donc de savoir si les documents D22, D23 et D24 permettent de prouver de manière suffisante que le public a pu appréhender les caractéristiques du schéma OC2 le 5 juin 2008, comme le prétend l'intimée.

T 0903/16 - Known embodiments are disclosed

Key points

• In this examination appeal, the application was filed with only method claims. Later a device is claimed. The ED refused the application under Art. 123(2) EPC.
• " [T]he Examining Division apparently considered that the devices disclosed in the application were not declared to belong to the invention, and for this reason claiming them constituted an infringement of Article 123(2) EPC." 
• The Board explains that the ED's approach is wrong. " [The crucial consideration is whether the subject-matter as such is clearly and unambiguously derivable from the application as filed[]. The fact that in the application the disclosed range of devices is stated to be within the means known to one skilled in the art may be considered when examining other EPC requirements, e.g. novelty and inventive step, but it has no bearing on the question of disclosure for the purposes of Article 123(2) EPC." 

EPO T 0903/16 -  link

3. Added subject-matter - main request

The Examining Division argues in the appealed decision that the original disclosure does not "indicate, define or imply" that the devices described therein could be new and inventive (see reasons 21.3): "To then claim such devices is considered an infringement of Article 123(2) EPC". On the face of it, the Examining Division apparently considered that the devices disclosed in the application were not declared to belong to the invention, and for this reason claiming them constituted an infringement of Article 123(2) EPC.

According to established case law, the requirements laid down in Article 123(2) EPC are understood to mean that an amendment may only be made within the limits of what a skilled person would derive directly and unambiguously, using common general knowledge, and seen objectively and relative to the date of filing, from the whole content of the description, claims and drawings as filed (see see Case Law of the Boards of Appeal of the European Patent Office (CLBA), 8th edition 2016, Chapter II.E.1.2.1, with further reference to the "gold standard" cited in decision G 2/10). The question of whether or not the amended subject-matter in the documents originally filed is declared to be new and inventive, or whether such an assessment of novelty and inventiveness can merely be implied from the wording used in the application, is not relevant to the requirement of Article 123(2) EPC. Accordingly, the crucial consideration is whether the subject-matter as such is clearly and unambiguously derivable from the application as filed, i.e. in the present case of a device claim - the subject-matter of the claim being a device - whether the device with the claimed combination of features is clearly and unambiguously described in or derivable from the application as filed. The fact that in the application the disclosed range of devices is stated to be within the means known to one skilled in the art may be considered when examining other EPC requirements, e.g. novelty and inventive step, but it has no bearing on the question of disclosure for the purposes of Article 123(2) EPC.

The Board holds that the subject-matter of the claims is clearly and unambiguously derivable from the disclosure of the handheld blow dryer on page 16, lines 4-30. In lines 19-20 of page 16 it is further explicitly mentioned that the blow dryer can have a comb device attached to it, such as the device with reference numeral 60. The comb device with reference numeral 60 is further described on page 14, line 15, to page 15, line 5. Thus the further details of the attached comb device included in the dependent claims find their basis in this part of the description as originally filed.

From the above the Board concludes that the amended set of claims has a clear basis in the application as filed and is compliant with Article 123(2) EPC.

T 2536/17 - Commenting on admissibility

Key points

• In this examination appeal, the ED had allowed interlocutory revision, but had refused the requested reimbursement of the appeal fee. So, the Board decides on the reimbursement. The Board orders the reimbursement because of a substantial procedural violation.
• After an Rule 71(3) Communication, the applicant had filed amended claims under Rule 71(6). The ED did not admit these requests under Rule 137(3), and refused the application.
• The Board finds this a substantial procedural violation. The  ED should have given the applicant the opportunity to comment on the reasons for not admitting the filed requests, so as to not violate Article 113 EPC. 

EPO T 2536/17 -  link

Sachverhalt und Anträge

III. Im Rahmen des Prüfungsverfahrens hatte die Prüfungsabteilung am 20. Januar 2017 eine Mitteilung nach Regel 71 (3) EPÜ auf der Grundlage des Hilfsantrags II vom 18. Februar 2016 erlassen. Die Gründe der Ablehnung des Hauptantrags und des Hilfsantrags I wurden angegeben.

Mit Eingabe vom 19. Mai 2017 beantragte die Anmelderin Änderungen gemäß Regel 71 (6) EPÜ und reichte einen geänderten Hauptantrag und Hilfsanträge I bis IV ein. Auf Seite 2 dieser Eingabe wurde unter anderem folgendes angegeben: [...]

Daraufhin beschloss die Prüfungsabteilung die Zurückweisung der Anmeldung mit Entscheidung vom 20. Juli 2017. Die Prüfungsabteilung erachtete alle am 19. Mai 2017 eingereichten Anträge gemäß Regel 137 (3) EPÜ als formal nicht zulässig, einschließlich des Hilfsantrags IV, der dem Hilfsantrag II, auf der die Mitteilung nach Regel 71 (3) EPÜ basierte, entsprach. Für die Prüfungsabteilung eröffnete die Einreichung fünf neuer, einen anderen Schutzumfang definierender Anspruchssätze eine völlig neue Diskussion und stellte die Ergebnisse des bisherigen Verfahrens infrage.

Weiterhin wurde folgendes ausgeführt: "Da keine Einigung auf eine zu erteilende Fassung erzielt wurde und auch nicht mehr erzielt werden kann (Art. 113 (2) EPÜ), da der Anmelder die Erteilung des Hilfsantrags II vom 18. Februar 2016 abgelehnt hat und neue Anträge nach [sic] nicht mehr zulässig sind (R. 137(3) EPÜ), wird die Anmeldung gemäss RL C-V, 4.7.3 i.V.m. Art. 97(2) EPÜ zurückgewiesen."

Gegen diese Entscheidung richtete sich die Beschwerde, der abgeholfen wurde. In der Beschwerdebegründung machte die Beschwerdeführerin bezüglich der Rückzahlung der Beschwerdegebühr geltend, dass von der Prüfungsabteilung übersehen wurde, dass mit dem Hilfsantrag IV hilfsweise eine Erteilung auf der Basis der Regel 71 (3) EPÜ-Mitteilung vom 20. Januar 2017 beantragt wurde. Daher sei die Zurückweisung nicht gerechtfertigt. Das Übersehen des Hilfsantrags IV sei ein Verfahrensmangel, der den Antrag auf Rückzahlung der Beschwerdegebühr rechtfertige. [...]

Entscheidungsgründe

1. Die Prüfungsabteilung hat der Beschwerde abgeholfen. Die vorliegende Entscheidung betrifft ausschließlich den Antrag auf Rückstattung der Beschwerdegebühr, dem die Prüfungsabteilung in ihrer Abhilfeentscheidung nicht stattgegeben hat.

2. Der Antrag auf Rückzahlung der Beschwerdegebühr ist zulässig.

Er wurde aufgrund von Regel 103 (1) EPÜ zusammen mit der Beschwerde gestellt, noch bevor der Beschwerde in der Sache abgeholfen wurde (vgl. T 242/05 vom 20. September 2006). Da im Rahmen der Abhilfeentscheidung die beantragte Rückzahlung der Beschwerdegebühr nicht gewährt wurde, ist zur Entscheidung die Beschwerdekammer zuständig, die über die Beschwerde in der Sache zu entscheiden gehabt hätte (Regel 103 (3) Satz 2 EPÜ; G 3/03, ABl. EPA 2005, 344, Nr. 5 der Entscheidungsgründe), hier also die Technische Beschwerdekammer 3.2.01.

3. Der Antrag ist auch begründet.

Gemäß Regel 103 (1) a) EPÜ wird die Rückzahlung der Beschwerdegebühr angeordnet, wenn der Beschwerde abgeholfen oder ihr durch die Beschwerdekammer stattgegeben wird und die Rückzahlung wegen eines wesentlichen Verfahrensmangels der Billigkeit entspricht.