T 0875/16 - Optical control of hair growth

 Key points

• This decision concerns an opposition appeal with claim 1 directed to “Use of a device (1) to reduce growth of hairs on human skin (12), which device comprises a pulsed source of [550 - 1200 nm light]”. The Board considers sufficiency of disclosure.
• The Board finds the embodiment with the flash lamp to be insufficiently disclosed due to claim specifying a short pulse duration. There is also an embodiment with laser light were the pulse duration is not really an issue. 
• The Board: “while the skilled person would have faced fewer difficulties when reproducing the invention with a laser source, it would still have to be determined, for the wavelengths actually generated, the parameters of efficacy required for the energy density and duration of pulsation”
• The patentee then essentially argues that every combination of energy density and duration within the specified range would give the effect of reduced hair growth to at least some degree.
• The Board: “This approach is, however, [...] not persuasive. It relies on an effect - a degree of reduction in growth - that is not specified and for which there is no indication, in the patent specification, as to how it is to be measured. It follows that any degree of reduction would be covered by the claim's wording. The lack of indication as to the criterion to apply when measuring said reduction in hair growth is particularly problematic, since it constitutes the technical contribution of the invention over known devices (see paragraphs [0002], [0012] of the patent specification). In the absence of any such indication as to the degree of reduction to be achieved and as to the means to compare said reduction in growth with known epilation techniques, the skilled person is not even in a position to verify whether an effect in the sense of the present invention is achieved in the first place. ”
• The Board: “The possibility of assessing whether the claimed effect is obtained is, however, a prerequisite under Article 83 EPC.”

T 0875/16 

https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t160875eu1.html

34. The patentee submitted that the objection under Article 83 EPC could not apply, since the patent specification contained a further embodiment with a laser. The alleged shortcoming regarding the pulse duration did not affect this embodiment.

35. This submission is not persuasive. Firstly, the argument put forward by the patentee does not challenge the analysis made above with regard to the use of flash lamps. While it is established case law that non-working embodiments may be of no harm when the patent specification contains sufficient information for finding appropriate alternatives over the claimed range without unreasonable efforts (cf. G 1/03, OJ 2004, 413, point 2.5.2), this does not apply where only two embodiments were envisaged and where the problematic embodiment is presented as the preferred one.

36. Secondly, while the skilled person would have faced fewer difficulties when reproducing the invention with a laser source, it would still have to be determined, for the wavelengths actually generated, the parameters of efficacy required for the energy density and duration of pulsation.

T 0944/15 - Examining the invention not the claims

Key points

• In this examination appeal, claim 1 is directed to “A data processing method for controlling a process of monitoring the position of at least a part of a patient's body during a radiation treatment by means of a computer”.
• The Board considers the claim to be unclear. The Board also rejects the claim as being an unallowable medical method under Article 53(c) EPC, even though the Board agrees that “the claim is restricted to a method implemented on a computer”.
• The Board: “However, there is a distinction to be made between what the invention for which a patent shall be granted or shall not be granted is, as in Articles 52 and 53 EPC, and the claimed scope of protection”.
• As a comment, I think the Board could also have referred to ‘the claimed subject-matter’, the case is not about Art.69 EPC.
• The Board: “[The claims] do not, in themselves, define what the invention is. Instead, it is the corresponding teaching in the application which does that.”
• According to the Board this is in line with G1/08 r.6.4.2.1.
• The Board: “It is, therefore, not the claimed scope, but the corresponding teaching of the invention which is decisive for establishing what the invention is, and, for the purpose of Article 53(c) EPC, whether or not a claimed invention only concerns the operation of a device without any functional link to the effects of the device on the body (G 1/07 4.3.2).”
• “the Board first notes that it sees no technical effect in the claimed data processing steps: the result is just data stored in memory, with no influence on the computer's functioning or structure.”
• “In summary, in the light of the disclosure of the invention, the skilled person cannot conceive of the invention without the steps of initiating the monitoring [of the patient during radiation therapy] and using the result [in the therapy, e.g. stopping the radiation exposure], which create a functional link to the method of treatment.”
• “In conclusion, paraphrasing G 1/07, the claimed method is not merely directed to the control of the device, because the teaching of the invention is not complete without the steps of initiating the monitoring and using the result; their necessary consideration as part of the teaching of the invention means that claim 1 of the main request defines a method of treatment excluded under Article 53(c) EPC.”
  
  
• In AR-4, the claims are directed to a computer program. Is this claim also excluded under Art.53(c)?
• The Board, after considering that the travaux préparatoires are not helpful: “It is, then, the task of the Office to consider, according to the case at hand, the nature and the patentability of an invention related to a computer program. When the computer program is related to a method of treatment or surgery, these considerations extend to whether it is to be excluded as such a method or allowed as a product for use in one.”
• The Board: “ As the method is excluded, so the computer program should also be excluded: even if indirectly conferred, a protection for a method of treatment goes against the ratio legis of Article 53(c) EPC (G 1/07, point 3): ... that medical practice must not be hindered by patent protection ... Any factor which could interfere with this, such as licence fee considerations, should therefore be carefully ruled out which might however prove difficult, if patents were granted on medical methods.”
• “All of the above reasons lead to the conclusion that, the computer program of claim 1 of the fourth auxiliary request is an invention only by virtue of the property that, when running, it implements a method of treatment excepted from patentability under Article 53(c) EPC. It is, for that reason, excluded from patentability.”
• “the Board disagrees with the statement in the Guidelines for Examination (November 2019) at G.II, 4.2.1, to which the appellant referred.”
• The attempted disclaimers are not allowed either.
• The appeal is dismissed.
  
  
• The Boards full legal reasoning is very detailed. I'm not sure why the Board didn't give the decision a headnote / catchword / publication code A, B or C.

EPO T 0944/15

https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t150944eu1.html

Main request, Article 53(c) EPC

14. The appellant referred to T 0641/00, "Two identities/COMVIK", OJ 2003, 352 and argued that the claim scope was clearly restricted to something that happened only in a computer. It was the prerogative of the applicant to define the scope of protection and thereby the invention. Here, the invention was a data processing method confined to the computer, i.e. a computer-implemented method, and was technical because it processed technical data. So it was an invention that could be completely defined by what happened in the computer.

T 2284/15 - Solving a technical problem and Art.83

Key points

• This opposition appeal decision contains a number of interesting points. The patent was granted with claim 1 directed to an instrument and second independent claim 2 also directed to an instrument (same preamble, different characterizing feature) (translated English claims, see link). The Board finds claim 1 to be insufficiently disclosed. The amendment in claim 1 of AR-1 does not help

Sufficiency of disclosure

• The claim specifies an instrument characterized in that “a control circuit (17) controls the opening period of the valve (16) as a function of at least one or a combination of the following parameters, namely the parameters of working pressure, striking frequency or pressure in the back-pressure chamber (8).”
• The Board finds that the example in the specification is not according to the claim and that the specification does not provide a teaching of how to solve the technical problems mentioned in the specification. The patentee argues that the skilled person can still provide for a control circuit that controls the opening as some arbitrary function (‘Abhängigkeit’) of the parameters mentioned in claim 1, and that this still gives an instrument according to claim 1. In particular, claim 1 does not specify any technical effect of the control circuit.
• The opponent does not dispute that the skilled person can provide for some arbitrary ‘Abhängigkeit’ (so the skilled person had no difficulty to reduce the claimed subject-matter to practice). However, the opponent submits that the subject-matter does not solve the (a?) technical problem, which would violate Article 83 EPC.
• As a comment, I think this just boils down to an objection of lacking essential features, but the present Board does not discuss it in that way.
• The Board agrees with the opponent. “dass das Lösen einer technischen Aufgabe eine fundamentale Eigenschaft einer Erfindung ist.” “Dass die Fachperson auf Basis der Beschreibung oder ihres Fachwissens zu einer willkürlichen, beliebigen Ausführungsform des beanspruchten Gegenstands kommen kann, bedeutet daher nicht, dass ihr ein Weg zur Ausführung der Erfindung gezeigt wird, wenn damit die technische Aufgabe nicht gelöst wird.”
• The Board notes that G 1/03 stated that “If an effect is expressed in a claim, there is lack of sufficient disclosure. Otherwise, i.e. if the effect is not expressed in a claim but is part of the problem to be solved, there is a problem of inventive step”. According to the present Board, this remark in G1/03 was restricted to the context of disclaimers for chemical Markush formula's (paraphrasing the present decision). The present Board: “Diese Überlegungen der Großen Beschwerdekammer können nicht ohne weiteres auf den gegenständlichen Kontext übertragen werden. ”
• The present Board: “Dass ein technischer Effekt nicht im Anspruch definiert wird, bedeutet daher nicht zwangsläufig, dass kein Einwand unter Artikel 83 EPÜ erhoben werden kann.” (the objection being based on the patent’s alleged failure to teach how to achieve that effect).
• I'm not sure if this concerns the objective technical problem or the so-called subjective technical problem.
• The present Board: “Wird kein klarer Weg zur Ausführung der Erfindung aufgezeigt, der die technische Aufgabe löst, oder sind die Ansprüche oder Ausführungsformen unklar, so können eventuell unter Artikeln 83, 84, oder 100 b) EPÜ Einwände erhoben worden.”
• I note that there is also some case law stating that an unclarity in a claim does not automatically to an objection under Article 83 EPC.
• See e.g. also T1137/16.

• Article 123(2)
  
• In AR-2, the patentee cancels claim 1 entirely. The Board finds this request to prima facie violate Article 123(2) because claim 5 as filed was directed to “The instrument of claim 1 to 4”. According to the Board, the instrument of claim 5 therefore has the features of each and every of claims 1 - 4 as filed (claims as filed). By cancelling independent claim 1, the (renumbered and adapted)  claim 5 would specify fewer features, i.e. involve an unallowable intermediate generalization. The request is therefore not admitted under Article 12(4) RPBA 2007.
• “Die Streichung des Anspruchs 1 stellt zudem, prima facie, eine unzulässige Verallgemeinerung dar. Die unmittelbare Bedeutung von nach Anspruch 1 bis 4 (Anspruch 5 in der ursprünglichen Fassung) muss so verstanden werden, dass alle in den Ansprüchen 1 bis 4 definierten Merkmale zu Anspruch 5 gehören; andernfalls hätte die gleiche Formulierung wie bei den anderen ursprünglichen Ansprüchen verwendet werden sollen, d.h. nach einem der Ansprüche ... [e.g. claim 6 as filed recited “Instrument nach einem der Ansprüche 1 bis 5”]. Die nunmehrige Fassung des Anspruchs 4 (nach Anspruch 1 bis 3, also ursprüngliche Ansprüche 2 bis 4) definiert nicht mehr die Merkmale des ursprünglichen Anspruchs 1. Die Berücksichtigung dieses Antrags verbietet sich auch unter diesem Gesichtspunkt.”
  
  
• Scope of opposition
• Only claim 1 was opposed, independent claim 2 was not opposed (scope of opposition). According to established case law, the Board is not competent to examine claim 2 at all.
• However, the patentee's request AR-3 restricting to claim 2 and deleting the offending dependent claim is not admitted under Article 13(2) RPBA because there are no special circumstances.
• In connection with AR-2, which was also not admitted as being prima facie lacking basis in the application as filed, the Board observes “Dass dieser Teil des Patents nicht angegriffen wurde, ändert nichts an der Tatsache, dass der Antrag - in einer der Rechtssicherheit zuwiderlaufenden Weise - verspätet gestellt worden ist.”

T 2284/15 - link

Entscheidungsgründe

Berücksichtigung des letzten Schriftsatzes der Patentinhaberin

1. In diesem Schriftsatz wird lediglich die Position der Beschwerdeführerin unter anderen Gesichtspunkten zusammengefasst. Neues, zu überprüfendes Tatsachenvorbringen enthält er nicht. Es handelt sich also nicht um Änderungen des Beschwerdevorbringens, dessen Zulassung im Ermessen der Kammer stünde (Artikel 13 VOBK 2020), sondern um Argumente, die auch in der mündlichen Verhandlung hätten vorgetragen werden können (vgl. T 1794/12).

2. Die Kammer schließt sich auch der Ansicht der Beschwerdeführerin an, wonach die Beschwerdegegnerin ausreichend Vorbereitungszeit hatte, zum Inhalt des Schriftsatzes angemessen Stellung zu nehmen.