T 1984/15 - (No) German-type disclaimers

Key points

• The patentee adds a disclaimer in opposition and submits that it is an undisclosed disclaimer in view of D3, a prior right under Art.54(3).
•  However, the patentee also argues that the disclaimer provides for an inventive step over D10 (a normal prior art document).
• The Board notes that therefore the disclaimer is unallowable under Art. 123(2).
• The Board adds that: “Da durch die Einführung eines Disclaimers in den Anspruch der beanspruchte Gegenstand grundsätzlich nicht erfinderisch gegenüber einem Stand der Technik nach Artikel 54 (2) EPÜ gemacht werden kann (siehe oben), muss ein Disclaimer in Bezug auf einen solchen Stand der Technik bei der Beurteilung der erfinderischen Tätigkeit folglich unberücksichtigt bleiben. ”
• The Board: “Der Wortlaut von Anspruch 1 des zweiten Hilfsantrags ohne den Disclaimer ist, wie oben festgestellt, identisch zum Wortlaut von Anspruch 1 des Hauptantrags. Da aber Anspruch 1 des Hauptantrags gegenüber D10 nicht auf einer erfinderischen Tätigkeit beruht (siehe oben), kann auch der Gegenstand von Anspruch 1 des zweiten Hilfsantrags gegenüber D10 aus den oben schon angeführten Gründen nicht auf einer erfinderischen Tätigkeit beruhen. Der zweite Hilfsantrag ist mithin auch aus diesem Grund nicht gewährbar.”
• Underlining added. I'm not sure if the holding regarding 'disregarding the disclaimer for inventive step' is established case law at the EPO.
• I understand that disregarding a disclaimer for the assessment inventive step is an approach used by the German courts.

T 1984/15

https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t151984du1.html

Zweiter Hilfsantrag

6. Der unabhängige Anspruch 1 hat folgenden Wortlaut (Hervorhebung hinzugefügt):

"Druckfarbe oder Drucklack für Lebensmittel-Verpackungen, umfassend ein Bindemittel mit einem Harzbestandteil und einem Lösungsmittelbestandteil, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass der Lösungsmittelbestandteil des Bindemittels ein ein- oder mehrkomponentiges gesättigtes Lösungsmittel für Harz ist, wobei der Lösungsmittelbestandteil des Bindemittels im Wesentlichen mehrfachbindungsfrei ist, und das Lösungsmittel oder die Komponenten des Lösungsmittels eine Jodzahl kleiner 10 haben, wobei das Lösungsmittel oder die Komponenten des Lösungsmittels ein Lebensmittel oder Lebensmittel-Zusatzstoff sind, die ausgewählt sind aus Monoglyceriden und Diglyceriden von Fettsäuren verestert mit Genusssäuren wie Essigester (E 472a), Milchsäureester (E 472b), Zitronensäureester (E 472c) oder Weinsäureester (E 472d), mit der Maßgabe, dass das Lösungsmittel oder die Komponenten des Lösungsmittels keine Triglyceride mit gesättigten Monocarbonsäureresten vom Typ-C(O)-Alkylgesättigt sind."

Der oben nicht durch Fettdruck wiedergegebene Teil von Anspruch 1 des zweiten Hilfsantrags ist wortidentisch zu Anspruch 1 des Hauptantrags. Anspruch 1 des zweiten Hilfsantrags unterscheidet sich also nur durch den oben durch Fettdruck hervorgehobenen Zusatz von Anspruch 1 des Hauptantrags.

T 1897/16 - The proprietor may strongly disagree

 Key points

• The board, when deciding on the admissibility of an auxiliary request filed during the oral proceedings before the Board under Art.13(2) RPBA 2020: “The representative of the proprietor expressed the view that the conclusion of the Board with respect to auxiliary requests 2 and 3 was surprising and shocking for a physicist. However, the conclusion was reached after an exchange of arguments between the parties. In the end the Board found the arguments of the opponent to be more convincing. The proprietor may strongly disagree with the Board, but that is not an exceptional circumstance either.”

T 1897/16 -

https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t161897eu1.html

The representative of the proprietor expressed the view that the conclusion of the Board with respect to auxiliary requests 2 and 3 was surprising and shocking for a physicist. However, the conclusion was reached after an exchange of arguments between the parties. In the end the Board found the arguments of the opponent to be more convincing. The proprietor may strongly disagree with the Board, but that is not an exceptional circumstance either.

The technical problems at the beginning of the oral proceedings referred to by the proprietor essentially concerned the provision of the English interpretation channel and were solved immediately after they had been notified to the Board and before continuing the oral proceedings. No further technical problems occurred in the course of the rest of the oral proceedings. The proprietor has furthermore not explained how the alleged technical shortcomings could be causal for the need to file auxiliary request 4 only at the end of the oral proceedings rather than at an earlier stage of the appeal proceedings. The Board also notes that the proprietor only mentioned the alleged technical shortcomings after all the auxiliary requests on file had been discussed. Neither before the oral proceedings (which were also requested by the proprietor) nor during the discussions, the proprietor expressed concerns with using video-conference technology for conducting oral proceedings, including the use of a headset in order to facilitate the work of the interpreters.

Therefore, the Board does not consider these technical problems as exceptional circumstances within the meaning of Article 13(2) RPBA 2020, either.

Consequently, the Board decided that auxiliary request 4 was not to be taken into account under Article 13(2) RPBA 2020.

T 1045/16 - Budapest Treaty deposit

Key points

• The patent a melon plant “comprising an introgression from a plant of melon accession PI313970”. The patentee argues that these melons plants were publicly available and “ould be ordered directly from the website of the US National Plant Germplasm System”. The Board considers the invention to be insufficiently disclosed. 
• Rule 31 EPC specifies that “If an invention involves the use of or concerns biological material which is not available to the public and which cannot be described in the European patent application in such a manner as to enable the invention to be carried out by a person skilled in the art, the invention shall only be regarded as being disclosed as prescribed in Article 83 if: [a valid deposit under the Budapest Treaty was made of a sample of the biological material”.
• The patentee does not dispute that the deposit with the US National Plant Germplasm System is not a deposit under the Budapest treaty as it is not a recognized institute. The patentee argues that the deposit makes the material available to the public in the sense of Rule 31 EPC.
• The Board does not accept this argument. “To be considered "available to the public" in the sense of Rule 31(1) EPC, a biological material must therefore be available in a manner that allows the skilled person to be certain that they can obtain it at least over the term of the patent. By way of illustration, examples of such biological material are brewers yeast and Escherichia coli in general, or indeed melon plants in general. Non-examples are specific, non-generic strains of microorganism or indeed accessions of plants only available from a non-Budapest Treaty institution.”
• I add from the decision that “It was common ground that, to carry out the invention in the sense of Article 83 EPC, the person skilled in the art required access to propagating material (e.g. seeds) containing the CYSDV-resistance-conferring QTL and marker, identical to or derived from melon accession PI313970 (the "relevant biological material"), see Section X., above. It was further not in dispute that there was no deposit of such material with a recognised depositary institution as set out in Rule 31(1)(a) EPC.”
  
  
• As a comment, I note that one opponent had submitted that PI313970 “originates from India ... the patent is a misappropriation of genetic material as provided by seed banks and originally stemming from India” (https://register.epo.org/application?documentId=ESSUE2GM3432900&number=EP06835672&lng=en&npl=false, p. 7, bottom). 
• The OD decision states, p.11, that PI313970 was originally isolated in India in 1961.
• 
  

T 1045/16 

https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t161045eu1.html

Reasons for the Decision

1. The appeal complies with Articles 106 to 108 and Rule 99 EPC and is admissible.

Admissibility of the opposition of opponent 2

2. In the board's view, the opponents comprised in the joint opposition are the legal and natural persons indicated in bold in the notice of opposition of opponent 2, dated 3 February 2012, at pages 1 to 2. It is apparent that Christoph Then, whose name is indicated in bold in the notice of opposition, is one of the joint opponents and, at the same time, the common representative of them. Therefore, the Board agrees with the assessment of the opposition division that the identity of the persons participating in the joint opposition is clear, and the opposition is admissible.

Main request - claim 1

Disclosure of the invention (Article 83 EPC/Rule 31 EPC)

3. The requirements of Article 83 EPC are met if the European patent discloses the claimed invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by a person skilled in the art. Special provision is made in Rule 31 EPC for inventions which involve the use of or concern biological material which is not available to the public and which cannot be described in the European patent application in such a manner as to enable the invention to be carried out by a person skilled in the art. In such cases, Rule 31(a) EPC provides that the invention is regarded as being disclosed as prescribed in Article 83 EPC only if a sample of the biological material has been deposited with a recognised depositary institution on the same terms as those laid down in the Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms for the Purposes of Patent Procedure of 28 April 1977 not later than the date of filing of the application.

T 0772/18 - Displayed information in car

Key points

• The Board decides that the feature of displaying to the driver the information that the fuel consumption deviates from a reference fuel consumption, does not contribute to inventive step, because this information does not credibly support the driver in performing a technical task through constant and/or guided human-machine interaction. 
• The Board does not expressly mention it, but this is an example of the ‘broken technical chain fallacy’, see T1670/07.

EPO Headnote (translation)

The information that a fuel consumption deviates from a reference fuel consumption or the cause of such a deviation (for example acceleration, air resistance, etc.) may be considered technical information. However, the board is of the opinion that such information does not credibly support the driver in performing a technical task through constant and / or guided human-machine interaction (as in T 336/14, reasons 1.2.4 and 1.2.5, or T 1000/09, reason 7, explained).

On the one hand, the information only displayed to the driver does not contain any specific instructions on how he should control the vehicle, for example to optimize fuel consumption, and on the other hand, the real fuel consumption is not shown either, which is why this information does not contribute to the inventive step (see Reasons, Point 2.6).

EPO Headnote 

Die Information, dass ein Kraftstoffverbrauch von einem Referenzkraftstoffverbrauch abweicht bzw. die Ursache einer solchen Abweichung (zum Beispiel Beschleunigung, Luftwiderstand, etc.), mag zwar als eine technische Information gelten. Die Kammer ist jedoch der Auffassung, dass eine solche Information den Fahrer nicht durch eine ständige und/oder geführte Mensch-Maschine-Interaktion glaubhaft bei der Ausführung einer technischen Aufgabe unterstützt (wie in T 336/14, Entscheidungsgründe 1.2.4 und 1.2.5, oder T 1000/09, Entscheidungsgrund 7, erläutert).
Zum einen beinhaltet die dem Fahrer lediglich angezeigte Information keine konkreten Hinweise, wie er das Fahrzeug steuern sollte, um zum Beispiel den Kraftstoffverbrauch zu optimieren, und zum andern wird auch nicht der reale Kraftstoffverbrauch abgebildet, weshalb diese Information nicht zur erfinderischen Tätigkeit beiträgt (siehe Gründe, Punkt 2.6).

https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t180772du1.html

2.4 Die Kammer stimmt der Beschwerdeführerin zu, dass D2 nicht die Berechnung einer Referenzenergie und einer entsprechenden Kraftstoffverbrauchscharakteristik offenbart. Allerdings kann sie hierin keine Lösung eines technischen Problems erkennen, insbesondere nicht - wie von der Beschwerdeführerin behauptet - das Erkennen eines sparsamen Fahrverhaltens und die Optimierung eines Kraftstoffverbrauchs (zu verstehen im Kontext einer Mensch-Maschine-Interaktion, s. T 336/14, Leitsatz).

T 2320/16 - Answering G1/21 already

 Key points

• Board 3.3.02 explains why (in their view) “Oral proceedings by videoconference are consistent with the right to oral proceedings pursuant to Article 116 EPC”.
• The Board: “a prerequisite of oral proceedings is that the parties can see the members of the board and vice versa. This distinguishes oral proceedings pursuant to Article 116 EPC from a telephone conference in which the board members and parties are not visible to each other. At the same time, it must be possible in real time for the board to interrupt or question the parties where necessary. This distinguishes oral proceedings from an exchange by letter, fax or E-mail, where an exchange of views in real time, i.e. essentially simultaneously, is not possible. Apart from the above constraints, the form in which the parties orally present their arguments - with or without physical presence - is not predetermined by Article 116 EPC”
• The respondent points to the travaux préparatoires IV/6514/61-D where a remark was made about the travel costs associated with oral proceedings. The present Board: “This meeting took place in Brussels on 13 November 1961. The cited passage demonstrates that at that time, the holding of oral proceedings was associated with the need for travel. Thus, the assumption was that oral proceedings would take place in-person. However, it cannot be deduced from this conclusion that oral proceedings by videoconference in its present-day form would not have been found acceptable by the legislator. It is not surprising that in 1961 only in-person proceedings were contemplated. Although the board is not aware of whether a videoconference was technically possible on that date, it can be stated with certainty that the technology was not sufficiently accessible, reliable, cost-efficient and of sufficient quality to the extent that its consideration as a feasible alternative to in-person oral proceedings could reasonably have been contemplated. Indeed, as set out above, requests for oral proceedings by videoconference before the Boards of Appeal before mid-2020 were generally refused on the grounds that an appropriate technical set-up was lacking. Thus, this argument is not decisive in determining whether oral proceedings by videoconference are consistent with Article 116 EPC.”

T 2320/16 

https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t162320eu1.html

Reasons for the Decision

1. Article 116 EPC - the legal basis for oral proceedings by videoconference

Hereinafter, the term "in-person oral proceedings" refers to oral proceedings in which both the party or parties and the board (or department of the EPO) are physically present in the same room on the premises of the EPO. Furthermore, in addressing the question of whether oral proceedings by videoconference are consistent with the right to oral proceedings pursuant to Article 116 EPC, it is assumed that said proceedings are publically accessible as required by Article 116(4) EPC.

1.1 Introduction

The respondent submitted that the oral proceedings, held on 4 February 2021 by videoconference (using the "Zoom" videoconferencing platform) did not constitute oral proceedings pursuant to Article 116(1) EPC, but rather was at best to be considered as a case management discussion.

Article 116 EPC comprises four paragraphs, the first of which reads as follows:

"Oral proceedings shall take place either at the instance of the European Patent Office if it considers this to be expedient or at the request of any party to the proceedings. However, the European Patent Office may reject a request for further oral proceedings before the same department where the parties and the subject of the proceedings are the same." (emphasis added by the board)

For the purposes of this discussion, it is sufficient to note that similarly to paragraph (1), paragraphs (2)-(4) of Article 116 EPC also refer to "oral proceedings ... before [a department of the EPO]".

1.2 History of oral proceedings by videoconference at the EPO: the practice before the first instance

Oral proceedings by videoconference first became available in examination proceedings and were announced as a new service, on request, with the publication of "Information concerning interviews and oral proceedings to be held as a video conference" (OJ EPO 1997, 572). In order to avail of the service, applicants (or their representatives) were required to file a waiver declaration according to which the "right to oral proceedings being held in the traditional form at the EPO premises" was irrevocably renounced. Later, updated information concerning oral proceedings by videoconference was published (OJ EPO 2006, 585; OJ EPO 2012, 354; OJ EPO 2018, A96). The updated information differed from the initial announcement in 1997 inter alia in that the practice of requiring a waiver declaration was abandoned, and it was stated that "[o]ral proceedings held by videoconference are equivalent to oral proceedings held in the traditional manner on the premises of the EPO. Consequently a request for further oral proceedings before the same department (whether by videoconference or any other form) may be rejected where the parties and the subject of the proceedings are the same (Article 116(1) EPC)".

T 1099/16 - Second use claim

 Key points

Non-medical second use claim

• Claim 1 of the patent is a use claim of certain compounds (melamine derivatives) as "as an adhesion enhancer in [a polymer jacket of] an elevator load bearing member". Inventive step is to be decided. The closest prior art is D7 disclosing the use of different compounds as flame retardant in a polymer jacket of an elevator load bearing member. The melamine derivatives of claim 1 are well-known flame retardant. “The use of any of the specific melamine derivatives instead of melamine in a polymer jacket of D7 for their well known flame retardant effect would thus not appear to involve an inventive step.” The question is whether the use feature "as an adhesion enhancer" provides for inventive step. The opponent bascially considers the effect of enhanced adhesion not credible but faces the procedural problem that Art.100(b) is a fresh ground of opposition. 
• “the use of these melamine derivatives [the compounds] as an adhesion enhancer is not known in the prior art, as also acknowledged by the [opponent]. Their use as an adhesion enhancer could thus be considered to involve an inventive step, on the proviso that this use were acknowledged to be a limiting functional feature of the claim within the meaning of G2/88”
• “The Board considers that [G2/88 hn.3] establishes two conditions for interpreting a claimed new purpose (reflecting a new technical effect) as a functional technical feature of the claim which may serve to distinguish the subject-matter over the prior art. Besides the condition that the technical effect has not been made available to the public before the relevant priority date of the application at issue, it is also required that the technical effect in which the claimed use resides, is "described" in the patent”
• “The present decision thus hinges on the interpretation of the expression "described in the patent" used in G 2/88. The two extremes which are conceivably covered by this expression appear to be, on the one hand, i) that the new technical effect must be described in the patent to such an extent that the skilled person understands that the effect is indeed achieved or that the effect is at least plausible, as essentially argued by the appellant as being the relevant standard, or, on the other hand, ii) that the wording of the technical effect is only required to be supported, e.g. merely stated in the description. ... Option ii) resembles the condition of support of the claims by the description according to Article 84 EPC.”
• I'm not sure if all  Boards would agree that merely formal support is sufficient under Art.84.
• The Board notes that there is not much case law on this point. The Board concludes that the question is “merely whether it has been described in the sense that a skilled person can recognize what technical effect is underlying the new purpose claimed” instead of considerations of whether the technical effect is sufficiently credibly or plausibly described in the patent.
• The Board finds that the patent describes the technical effect in that limited sense for the purposes of G2/88. Up to that point the Board does not actually decide that the effect is plausible (if I see it correctly). However, because G2/03, r.2.5.2 said that “if an effect is expressed in a claim, there is lack of sufficient disclosure” and because Art.100(b) is a fresh ground in appeal (and the patentee does not consent) (G10/91) the Board does not need to decide on the actually contested point.

Admissibility appeal

• In the case of an appeal against the rejection of an opposition, there is no reason that an appellant-opponent must rebut all issues decided by the opposition division against it. As long as the appellant sets out reasons in the appeal grounds concerning at least one of the opposition grounds considered in the impugned decision which, if found convincing by the Board, could result in setting aside the decision, the requirement of Rule 99(2) EPC is generally considered to be met.

Request for extended composition of the Board

• The appellant had requested an extended panel (Art. 21)(4)(a) EPC). The Board refuses the request.
Further, if consideration of the technical issues might have arisen beyond these legal issues, the Board cannot see that the underlying matter would have required particular knowledge of molecular chemistry. The technical concepts of adhesion and polarity of molecules belong to common technical university education, not least in the field of mechanical engineering. No reason is evident why the Board's technical competence would be unable to deal with any technical matters arising in this case. Additionally it is noted, as also held by the Enlarged Board of Appeal in R 3/12 (unpublished), Reasons 2.4, that, for the sake of argument, even if the Board's decision were finally based on an imperfect understanding of the technical issues, this would have no implications for the technical qualifications of the Board members in the sense of Article 21 EPC, since this provision only implies a prescribed course of technical education of the members rather than providing a guarantee of an unquestionable understanding of a specific case. There is also no particular case law deriving from the Boards of Appeal in the field of chemistry which the present Board would not be aware of or be unable to apply where fitting. Consequently it was concluded that the nature of the appeal did not require the Board to be complemented by additional Members.

T 1099/16 - 

https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t161099eu1.html

EPO Headnote

In order to decide whether a claim to the use of a known compound for a particular purpose, based on a technical effect which is described in the patent, should be interpreted as including that technical effect as a functional technical feature according to G 2/88, the Board finds that G 2/88 does not require the technical effect to be described in the patent in a manner sufficiently clear and complete to make the actual achievement of that technical effect credible (Reasons 17).
This finding applies even to a case where the ground for opposition under Article 100(b) EPC cannot be considered in the appeal proceedings (Reasons 24).
If, for the assessment of inventive step, it has to be determined whether the purpose defined in the claim can be interpreted as a limiting functional feature, the question whether the technical effect is described in the patent merely involves considering whether a skilled person can recognise what technical effect underlies the new purpose claimed (Reasons 20).

Reasons for the Decision

Admissibility of the appeal

1. The admissibility of the appeal was challenged by the respondent based on an alleged failure of the statement of grounds of appeal to comply with Rule 99(2) EPC. For the reasons set out below, the Board concludes however that the requirements of Rule 99(2) EPC are met. The Board is also satisfied that all other requirements for the admissibility of the appeal have been met, noting that the respondent also did not raise any objections in that regard.

The appeal is thus admissible.

2. According to Rule 99(2) EPC the appellant shall indicate in the statement of grounds inter alia the reasons for setting aside the decision impugned.

T 3077/19 - Accidental anticipation and disclaimer

 Key points

• In this opposition appeal, claim 1 as granted includes a disclaimer. The Board first decides that it is an undisclosed disclaimer.
• “Document E4 is prior art under Article 54(2) EPC. E4 deals with a blanket for protecting a car, including features to prevent the theft of the blanket. It is not disputed that E4 anticipates on page 2, lines 9-23, and Figures 1-2, the subject-matter of claim 1 if its disclaimer is disregarded. However, the technical field of E4 (car blankets) is so remote and the disclosure of E4 so unrelated from the claimed blanket for therapeutic treatment that the person skilled in the art would never have taken it into consideration when making the invention. Hence, E4 represents an accidental anticipation. An undisclosed disclaimer to restore novelty over E4 may thus be allowable.”
• However, “the undisclosed disclaimer removes more than necessary to restore novelty over E4. The undisclosed disclaimer is thus unallowable. Claim 1 contains subject-matter which extends beyond the content of the application as filed.
• Also some remarks about apportionment of costs under Art. 104 and the late submission of Art.100(c) EPC as ground during the first instance proceedings (the cost apportionment is not awarded; the OD had admitted the ground).

T 3077/19 

https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t193077eu1.html

Reasons for the Decision

1. The invention

The invention relates to a weight blanket for the therapeutic treatment of a person. The blanket comprises means for increasing the blanket's weight including at least one linked object, such as a chain, which is completely enclosed inside the blanket. By applying pressure to the body, such blankets provide a feeling of safety and helps relieve complaints such as unrest and sleep problems (paragraphs [0002]-[0003] of the description).

2. New ground for opposition under Article 100(c) EPC

The ground for opposition under Article 100(c) EPC was introduced into the opposition proceedings by a discretionary decision of the Opposition Division.

A board of appeal should only overrule how a department of first instance exercised its discretion if it concludes that the department of first instance did so according to the wrong principles, without taking into account the right principles or in an unreasonable way, and thus exceeded the proper limits of its discretion (Case Law of the Boards of Appeal of the European Patent Office, 9th edition 2019, IV.C.4.5.2 and V.A.3.5.5).

As indicated in point 11.2.1 of the impugned decision, the Opposition Division considered the ground of opposition under Article 100(c) EPC to be prima facie relevant and thus made use of its discretion. The Opposition Division even went on to revoke the patent based on this ground.

Furthermore, there is no indication that the Opposition Division exercised its discretion according to the wrong principles, without taking into account the right principles or in an unreasonable way. Hence, there is no reason to overrule the discretionary decision of the Opposition Division and disregard this ground for opposition.

T 0895/18 - Full examination of Art.123(2)

 Key points

• The patentee appeals. The Notice of opposition was based on inventive step and insufficient disclosure. The OD revoked the patent because of insufficient disclosure. The OD added that “Objections of added subject-matter raised by the opponent at the oral proceedings in respect of the auxiliary requests were not to be followed, because the subject-matter was derivable from the structure of dependency of the claims and from the [examples]”.  
• The main request at issue in appeal is one of the auxiliary requests filed before the OD.
• The patentee argues that by analogy with G3/14 about clarity, the examination of Art.123(2) of this request should not concern the amendments made already in the grant proceedings.
• The Board finds that this argument “fails since it disregards the fact that in contrast to added subject-matter/extension beyond the content of the application as originally filed lack of clarity is not one of the grounds of opposition according to Article 100 EPC”.
• The Board notes that G 10/91, r.19 held that: "In order to avoid any misunderstanding, it should finally be confirmed that in case of amendments of the claims or other parts of a patent in the course of opposition or appeal proceedings, such amendments are to be fully examined as to their compatibility with the requirements of the EPC (e.g. with regard to the provisions of Article 123(2) and (3) EPC)."
• Established case law is that said statement of the Enlarged Board “ clearly means that only the amendments made during opposition or appeal proceedings, not those made before grant, must be examined in accordance with Article 102(3) EPC for compliance with the requirements of the EPC, including Article 123(2) EPC.” ( T 693/98, r.2) (CLBA IV.C.3.4.3)
• The present Board: “This law [G10/91, r.19] thus requires that, in case of amendments in opposition or appeal proceedings, full examination of the amendments (and therefore in particular of the claims resulting from the amendments) is to be undertaken on appeal. There is no stipulation that the ground of Article 100(c) EPC has to have been invoked in the notice of opposition.
• As a comment, the Board's remark in brackets seems to be the whole point in dispute and seems controversial to me. The Enlarged Board said "such amendments are to be fully examined", not "the amended claims are to be fully examined" in G10/91, r.19.
• As held in T301/87, r.3.8: “it would seem to be somewhat absurd if the making of a minor amendment could enable objections outside Article 100 EPC to be raised which have no connection with the amendment itself.”

• In the present case, the OD did assess the request at issue for Art.123(2), but it's not clear to me from the decision of this entailed the pre-grant amendments (the OD introducing Art.100(c) as ground of own motion under R.81(1) (which would be surprising as the OD found Art. 100(c) to be complied with while R.81(1) requires “may be examined by the Opposition Division of its own motion if they would prejudice the maintenance of the European patent”) of if the OD carried out the limited examination of the amendments in line with T693/98 such that further Art.100(c) objections would (arguably) be a fresh ground of opposition in appeal. 
• 
  
  
• As to the substance, the patentee tried the argument that: “The application was "typical" of many [applications] which are drafted in the "USA style" and should therefore be read accordingly as disclosing also combination of features of [the] dependent claims even if [the dependent claims as filed] are not dependent on each other”. The argument did not fly. The Board indicates that it must apply Art.123(2) EPC and “no different criterion can be used in view of a deliberately selected drafting style”.
• 
  

T 0895/18 - 

https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t180895eu1.html

3. Main request filed with the statement of grounds of appeal

3.1 Article 123(2) EPC - Extent of scrutiny and general considerations

The appellant [patentee] raised three aspects in this respect which in the following are paraphrased in italics:

3.1.1 In the present case examination for compliance with Article 123(2) EPC should be restricted to those amendments made in the opposition procedure, analogously to the approach taken in respect of amendments introducing a lack of clarity. Therefore it was requested that the analysis of compliance with the requirements according to Article 123(2) be based on the patent as granted rather than on the application as originally filed.

The argument in support of a form of "parallelism" between treatment of unclear features and added subject-matter/unallowable amendments introduced pre-grant proposed by the appellant (see section XV.(b).(i), above) fails since it disregards the fact that in contrast to added subject-matter/extension beyond the content of the application as originally filed lack of clarity is not one of the grounds of opposition according to Article 100 EPC.

G 1/21 - Referral - Vico oral proceedings (T 1807/15)

 Key points

• The Board in case T1807/15 referred the following question to the Enlarged Board of Appeal:
• “Is the conduct of oral proceedings in the form of a videoconference compatible with the right to oral proceedings as enshrined in Article 116(1) EPC if not all of the parties to the proceedings have given their consent to the conduct of oral proceedings in the form of a videoconference?”
• The referral is pending as G 1/21 (see here, also for the composition of the Enlarged Board, including R. Arnold (GB) as external member). Summons were already issued for video conference oral proceedings to be held on 28.05.2021 (link). Wit the further notice that if parties do not consider oral proceedings before the Enlarged Board to be necessary, “a decision on the points of law referred to the Enlarged Board could be promptly issued”.
• The EPO President was invited to submit comments in writing by 27 April 2021 (link).
  
  
• The referring Technical Board of Appeal: “Analysing the term "oral proceedings" semantically in isolation from any context would, in the Board's opinion, lead to a very broad interpretation that would also encompass entirely informal discussions. Pursuant to the aforementioned provisions of the Vienna Convention, however, the term should be interpreted in the context of Article 116 EPC and associated provisions of the EPC. ”
• “To ascertain the authentic meaning of this term, it needs to be borne in mind that when the EPC was drawn up there were no suitable technical options for adequately replacing traditional oral proceedings. Therefore, in the absence of any technical alternatives, oral proceedings inevitably came to mean in-person proceedings, i.e. proceedings that were (generally) open to the public and which the parties attended in person in a courtroom before the responsible department to present oral arguments. As such, the legislator of the EPC 1973 had absolutely no reason to further define the format of the oral proceedings, as this was specified by the very term "oral proceedings".”
• “there are also no indications that the meaning of this term changed when the EPC was revised in 2000”
• “this EPO notice [OJ EPO 1997, 572] demonstrated the thinking at that time and at the time of the Diplomatic Conference in 2000, i.e. that videoconferences did not meet the statutory requirements for oral proceedings under Article 116 EPC and applicants thus had to waive their right to traditional oral proceedings held on EPO premises. ”
  
  
• “With the entry into force of new Article 15a RPBA, therefore, the question would be whether this new provision could justify re-interpretating the term "oral proceedings" in Article 116 EPC. The legislative intention behind the new RPBA Article could justify a dynamic interpretation since it conflicts with the original aim of Article 116 EPC, i.e. establishing a right to present oral arguments at an in-person oral proceedings. In this respect, however, the issue is whether secondary legislation based on Rule 12c(2) EPC could lead to restrictions of procedural rights enshrined in the Convention. In that regard it is to be noted that the purpose of the RPBA was originally meant to be to govern the details of the proceedings before the Boards of Appeal "insofar as they do not affect the rights or obligations of any person concerned in the proceedings .. and which could easily be revised .." (cf. BR/90 e/71, page 104; BR/91 e/71, point 31; BR/125 e/71, point 178). This concept might have changed by legislative practice over decades, but the question remains as to whether fundamental procedural rights could be restricted by secondary legislation. In that regard, the appellant referred to Article 164(2) EPC, which was to be taken as a limitation of the legislative powers of the Administrative Council (cf. G 2/07, Reasons, point 2.2).”

https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t151807eu1.html

Online file

Reasons for the Decision

1. Under Article 112(1)(a) EPC, to ensure uniform application of the law, or if a point of law of fundamental importance arises, a Board of Appeal shall, during proceedings on a case and either of its own motion or following a request from a party to the Appeal, refer any question to the Enlarged Board of Appeal if it considers that a decision is required for the above purposes.

2. According to the case law of the Enlarged Board, a point of law is of fundamental importance if the answer to it goes beyond the individual case at issue and will be relevant in a potentially large number of cases (G 1/12, Reasons, point 11).

2.1 In the Board's view it appears self-evident that the point of law addressed in the question below is of fundamental importance for an indefinite number of cases. Oral proceedings before the Boards of Appeal began to be held by videoconference in response to the coronavirus pandemic. In 2020 videoconferences were held only with the consent of all parties to the proceedings. On 15 December 2020, however, the following information was provided on the EPO's website, in a communication headed "Oral proceedings before the Boards of Appeal - continuation of the measures adopted due to the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic and revised practice on oral proceedings by VICO" (see https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-Appeals/communications/2020/20201215.html): "From 1 January 2021 boards may conduct oral proceedings by VICO even without the agreement of the parties concerned, as has now been made clear in the new Article 15a RPBA adopted by the Boards of Appeal Committee. Since the new provision merely clarifies an existing possibility, boards may adapt their practice as regards dispensing with the need to obtain the agreement of the parties concerned even before the date of its entry into force." The entry into force of Article 15a RPBA is still subject to approval by the Administrative Council (see Article 23(4), second sentence, EPC).

T 1193/18 - Does not distinguish yet makes inventive

 Key points

• A little puzzle: in this case the Board considers the claims of AR-12 to lack inventive step over D3 as the closest prior art. The patentee then adds a feature to claim 1 that is (undisputed) also disclosed in D3. The Board finds the claim to be inventive with this added feature.
  
  
• The reasons are as follows. In AR-12, the Board found the technical effect claimed in the description to be not plausibel over the entire range claimed. The opponent had submitted examples of products falling under the broad claim but not having the improved storage stability. Therefore, the claimed subject-matter was an obvious alternative in view of D3. 
• The added feature is that the composition comprises 40-80 w/v% glycerol. This feature “does not further distinguish the claimed subject-matter from D3” but the examples prepared by the opponent are outside this range (they have a lower glycerol concentration). 
• “In view of all the experimental data provided by the parties, the Board considers that this effect can furthermore be extrapolated to the entire claimed scope, given that all the examples on file which fall under the present scope exhibit good stability data.”
• “even if there is no evidence of an improvement over D3, the achievement of a good storage stability remains a property of the present process which cannot be ignored”
• “the objective technical problem to be solved by the process of claim 1 of auxiliary request 18 lies in the provision of an alternative process for the preparation of oral levothyroxine compositions having good storage stability.”
• The solution (other features of the claim) is non-obvious. 

T 1193/18 - 

https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t181193eu1.html

decision text omitted.

T 0996/18 - Art. 123(2) ex officio in opposition appeal

 Key points

• In this opposition appeal, the headnote in machine translation reads: “Claims which the patent proprietor has changed by adding features from the description but which have not been examined in opposition proceedings must be examined ex officio in appeal proceedings to determine whether they comply with Article 123(2) EPC (Article 114( 1) EPC, Rule 100(1) EPC).”
• The Board adds to that headnote that otherwise, under certain circumstances, an item would be granted that would only be subject to the disposition of the parties because it would not have been subjected to an examination by the Office at any time (still in translation).
• The opponent(s) had only invoked lack of novelty and lack of inventive step in the opposition. The OD had rejected the opposition. The Board finds the main request and AR-1 and AR-2 to lack an inventive step. The Board then turns to AR-4 filed with the Statement of grounds. Therein claim 1 is amended inter alia by adding a feature taken from the description. The opponent has no objection under Article 123(2) EPC (r.5.1.1). 
• As a comment, if the amendment had been limiting to one of the dependent claims, then Art. 123(2) would (possibly) be a new ground of opposition in appeal and G10/91 r.18 states that such grounds can only be considered with the consent of the patentee. The present decision applies G10/91, r.19: “in case of amendments of the claims ... in the course of opposition or appeal proceedings, such amendments are to be fully examined as to their compatibility with the requirements of the EPC (e.g. with regard to the provisions of Article 123(2) and (3) EPC).”
• The fact that the feature is taken from the description, not from a granted claim, makes that it is the amendment that is fully examined.
• As to the Board raising new objections ex officio in inter partes appeals, see also recent decision T1370/15; as well as T2154/15 explaining that Art. 12 and 13 RPBA 2020 “exclusively rule on the parties' procedural possibilities and not on the board's powers”.

EPO T 0996/18 

epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t180996du1.html

5.1.1 Die Beschwerdeführerinnen haben zu Hilfsantrag 4 keine Einwände unter Artikel 123 (2) EPÜ vorgebracht.

Für Ansprüche, die der Patentinhaber durch die Aufnahme von Merkmalen aus der Beschreibung geändert hat, die jedoch im Einspruchsverfahren nicht überprüft wurden, ist im Beschwerdeverfahren von Amts wegen zu prüfen, ob sie im Einklang mit Artikel 123 (2) EPÜ stehen (Artikel 114 (1) EPÜ, Regel 100 (1) EPÜ und G 10/91 EPA Abl. 1993, 420, Gründe, 19). Anderenfalls würde unter Umständen ein Gegenstand gewährt, der allein der Disposition der Parteien unterläge, weil er zu keinem Zeitpunkt einer amtlichen Prüfung unterzogen worden wäre.

Im vorliegenden Fall hat die Kammer die Einwände unter Artikel 123 (2) EPÜ erstmalig während der mündlichen Verhandlung vorgebracht. Um den Grundsatz des rechtlichen Gehörs (Artikel 113 (1) EPÜ) und der Waffengleichheit zu wahren, wurde der Beschwerdeführerin Gelegenheit geben, sich zu den Einwänden zu äußern und die Einwände durch das Einreichen eines neuen Hilfsantrags auszuräumen.

T 0941/16 - Three CDR's are not enough

 Key points

• For those working in the field of antibodies, the Board finds a claim for “an isolated monoclonal antibody or an antigen binding portion thereof ” specifying  some functional features and “at least three of the CDR sequences selected from the group consisting of the CDRs designated as CDR H1, H2, H3, L1, L2 and L3 as shown in Fig. 21” to be too broad and therefore insufficiently disclosed.
• The case is somewhat fact-specific, the difference in available evidence provides for a difference with T0617/07.
• See also brand new GL G-II 5.6.1.1: “Since the three CDRs of each of the variable domains of the light and heavy chains are normally responsible for binding to the antigen, the conventional antibody, ... needs to be defined by at least these six CDRs to fulfil the requirements of Art. 84.”(note, the present decision is about Art.83). (not sure how this new paragraph is supposed in Chapter G of the GL by the way).(see also new GL G-II 5.6.1.4 which more closely matches the claim at issue).
• This decision concerns the  Biogen type insufficiency, see CLBA II.C.5.4.
• The Board: “the issue is whether it is plausible, based on the evidence on file and taking common general knowledge into account, that a skilled person starting from the sequences of the murine scFv construct disclosed in Figure 21 of the patent application, and taking any arbitrary combination of three CDRs thereof in combination with three other structurally unrelated CDRs, will necessarily and reliably obtain antibodies showing the functional properties as defined in claim 1 by investing a reasonable amount of trial and error only”
• After a detailed review of various documents, the Board finds that “the presence of unmodified murine CDR H3 and CDR L3 in these humanised antibodies seems to be essential for retaining the functional properties defined in claim 1”.
• The Board: “In these circumstances, ... the general information in the patent application and the common general knowledge taken together, cannot be considered to provide the information necessary to allow the skilled person to reliably obtain substantially all of the claimed antibodies/fragments fulfilling the functional requirements of the claim. For particular combinations of CDRs (lacking an unmodified CDR H3 and CDR L3) it is not credible that a humanised antibody/fragment with the properties defined in claim 1 will be obtained. Readily performing the invention across the entire scope of the claim places an undue burden onto the skilled person.”

T 0941/16

https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t160941eu1.html

decision text omitted.

T 0346/16 - Fresh ground of opposition

Key points

• The OD did not admit the ground of Art. 100(b) in the proceedings (the opponent had invoked that ground in the first instance proceedings after the Notice of oppoisition).
• The Board first examines whether that decision to no admit the ground, was reasoned and based on the right principles. 
• The Board: “ It follows that in the appeal proceedings, the ground of Article 100(b) EPC is a fresh ground for opposition within the meaning of G 10/91, which may not be considered without the consent of the respondents as proprietors”. The consent was not given.
• The step of reviewing the first instance decision appears to be an application of Art. 12(6)(s.1), first and second clause by analogy (“(i) The Board shall not admit requests, facts, objections or evidence which were not admitted in the proceedings leading to the decision under appeal, (ii) unless the decision not to admit them suffered from an error in the use of discretion.”
• The Board also does not admit the new ground of Art. 100(c) EPC and the new objection against claim 1 based on that ground. Claim 1 was amended in the course of the opposition (or opposition appeal) proceedings. The Board: “this objection does not arise from the amendments made to claim 1 in the opposition proceedings. Therefore, it amounts to raising a new ground of opposition under Article 100(c) EPC in appeal proceedings. Since the respondents have also not consented to introducing this new opposition ground into the appeal proceedings, it cannot be considered further”

T 0346/16

https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t160346eu1.html

4. Fresh grounds of opposition - Articles 100(b) and (c) EPC

4.1 The opposition division decided not to admit the ground of Article 100(b) EPC into the proceedings, using its discretionary power under Article 114(2) EPC, because it was prima facie irrelevant.

4.2 The opposition division's decision was fully reasoned (see appealed decision, point 7 of the reasons) and was based on the right principles. Thus, the opposition division exercised its discretion correctly.

4.3 It follows that in the appeal proceedings, the ground of Article 100(b) EPC is a fresh ground for opposition within the meaning of G 10/91, which may not be considered without the consent of the respondents as proprietors (G 10/91, OJ 1993, 420)). Since this has not been given, this opposition ground cannot be considered further.

4.4 The appellant argued that claim 1 introduced added subject-matter because it failed to require that the transport vessel is equipped with side tanks and centre cargo compartments (paragraph 23 of the patent specification). However, this objection does not arise from the amendments made to claim 1 in the opposition proceedings. Therefore, it amounts to raising a new ground of opposition under Article 100(c) EPC in appeal proceedings. Since the respondents have also not consented to introducing this new opposition ground into the appeal proceedings, it cannot be considered further (G 10/91, OJ 1993, 420).

T 2210/19 - Obvious alternative

 Key points

• In this opposition appeal, “the [objective technical] problem can only be defined as the provision of a further process for producing a chromium catalysed ethylene copolymer powder”
• The Board: “ The skilled person, looking for a further process, would consider variations of the process already known from the closest prior art, taking into account the common general knowledge in the field and the knowledge made available in the prior art. That includes variations of any of the parameters of the process that can be expected to be suitable to carry out alternative processes without exercising any inventive activity. As the problem is simply the provision of a further process, no further motivation is needed by the skilled person to perform the modified process.”
• “The choice of a fluidisation gas velocity in the range of 1.5-10 cm/s at an activation temperature of 600°C, would therefore be in view of the teachings of D7 or D8, a common measure that a skilled person could take to merely provide a further activation process that ultimately would provide a further process for producing a chromium catalysed ethylene copolymer powder.”
• The claims are found to lack an inventive step.

EPO T 2210/19

https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t192210eu1.html

decision text omitted.

Requests for conversion

 Some examples of requests for conversion under Art. 135 EPC:

• EP2507021, 10795926.4 after withdrawal; into a utility model in Spain, in 2020. 
• EP3493667, after the application becoming deemed to be withdrawn, into a utility model in Portugal, in 2020.
• Total requests for conversion filed in 2019 with the EPO: 19.
• Search can be carried out using the Bulletin Search at https://data.epo.org/expert-services/index.html using "RCDT"  as event code; using e.g. " RCDT [2019, 2019]"  as a query.
  
  
• I have not yet found an example of a request for conversion in connection with Art. 77(3) in the national registers.
• J13/04 deals with payment of the filing fee and search fee for an EP application filed with a national patent office. 
• J1/12 for a deemed withdrawal under Art. 77(3), but the application in suit was not the application that was not forwarded to the EPO.
• J3/80 about a case wherein an application filed with a national patent office was forwarded late. The application file is not accessible because the application was not published. The PDF file of the decision is now published online based on OJ 1980, 92.
•  Using the details from the PDF decision, we know the applicant was Chubb Electronics Limited and the filing date was 28.08.1979 which leads us to some of  the  converted national patents and patent applications: GB2044971B; NL7915030A;

G 1/19 - Technical simulations

The Enlarged Board, in the headnote: 

1. A computer-implemented simulation of a technical system or process that is claimed as such can, for the purpose of assessing inventive step, solve a technical problem by producing a technical effect going beyond the simulation’s implementation on a computer.

2. For that assessment it is not a sufficient condition that the simulation is based, in whole or in part, on technical principles underlying the simulated system or process.

3. The answers to the first and second questions are no different if the computer-implemented simulation is claimed as part of a design process, in particular for verifying a design.

https://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/99f4b971c9e3eb2fc125869400340179/$FILE/G_1_19_decision_of_the_Enlarged_Board_of_Appeal_of_10_March_2021_en.pdf

https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/communications/2021/20210310.html

T 0407/15 - Transfer of priority

 Key points

• The present decision is about a transfer of priority.
• “[The priority applications] US applications 61/035 540 and 61/035 777 were filed jointly by three persons, who happen to be the inventors mentioned in relation to present application. ... As the applicants of the earlier US applications and later PCT application are not the same, a valid priority claim would require a transfer or rights from the original applicants jointly to the present applicant, before the filing date of the international application.”
• The Board: “Article 87 EPC does not require an express assignment in writing or exclude a transfer by operation of law or by conduct of the parties concerned implying such transfer (cf. T205/14, points 3.3 and 3.6 [vertabtim in 3.3, para 4.]). Independently, however, of the form that the transfer of the priority right might have taken, evidence of such a transfer must be provided in order for the Board to decide on the issue. The standard of proof applied is the balance of probabilities.”
• So: Article 87 EPC does not require an express assignment in writing.
• Article 87 EPC does not exclude a transfer by operation of law
• Article 87 EPC does not exclude a transfer by the conduct of the parties concerned implying such transfer 
• These three points apply independently of the country of filing the priority-founding application.
• Evidence of the transfer must be provided in order for the EPO to decide on the issue.
• The standard of proof applied by the EPO is the balance of probabilities
• These two points also apply independently of the country of filing of the priority-founding application.
• The present case is an appeal against a refusal decision. The Board does not restrict the sentence to examination appeals. 
• In the case at hand, the applicant /appellant “[d]espite having been invited to do so by the Board, [...] failed to provide any evidence that such a transfer took place and that it was entitled to claim these priority rights.”
•  The Application Data Sheet of the two US provisional applications indicated The University of Western Ontario [i.e. the same as the PCT applicant] as the assignee. 
• The Board: “this is, however, not sufficient to establish that the priority rights derived from either application have also been transferred to the applicant. This is a consequence of the fact that the filing of a first application gives rise to two different and independent rights, namely the right to the application in question, and the right of priority. While the sections of the priority documents referred to above appear to provide evidence of a transfer of the right to a patent, it is silent as to any right of priority based on said filings.”

T 0407/15

https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t150407eu1.html

Reasons for the Decision

Entitlement to priority

1. The application was initially filed as an international PCT application on 11 March 2009 by The University of Western Ontario. It claims priority rights from the earlier US applications 61/035 540 and 61/035 777 of 11 March 2008 and 12 March 2008, respectively. The application entered into the European phase on 9 September 2010. The entitlement to claim said priority rights is to be assessed on the basis of the relevant provisions of the EPC.

2. Article 87(1) EPC stipulates that

A person who has duly filed [...] an application for a patent [...], or his successors in title, shall enjoy, for the purpose of filing a European patent application in respect of the same invention, a right of priority [...].

It follows that the applicant who claims a priority right from an (earlier) application must be the same as or, alternatively, the successor in title to the applicant who filed said application.

T 0875/16 - Optical control of hair growth

 Key points

• This decision concerns an opposition appeal with claim 1 directed to “Use of a device (1) to reduce growth of hairs on human skin (12), which device comprises a pulsed source of [550 - 1200 nm light]”. The Board considers sufficiency of disclosure.
• The Board finds the embodiment with the flash lamp to be insufficiently disclosed due to claim specifying a short pulse duration. There is also an embodiment with laser light were the pulse duration is not really an issue. 
• The Board: “while the skilled person would have faced fewer difficulties when reproducing the invention with a laser source, it would still have to be determined, for the wavelengths actually generated, the parameters of efficacy required for the energy density and duration of pulsation”
• The patentee then essentially argues that every combination of energy density and duration within the specified range would give the effect of reduced hair growth to at least some degree.
• The Board: “This approach is, however, [...] not persuasive. It relies on an effect - a degree of reduction in growth - that is not specified and for which there is no indication, in the patent specification, as to how it is to be measured. It follows that any degree of reduction would be covered by the claim's wording. The lack of indication as to the criterion to apply when measuring said reduction in hair growth is particularly problematic, since it constitutes the technical contribution of the invention over known devices (see paragraphs [0002], [0012] of the patent specification). In the absence of any such indication as to the degree of reduction to be achieved and as to the means to compare said reduction in growth with known epilation techniques, the skilled person is not even in a position to verify whether an effect in the sense of the present invention is achieved in the first place. ”
• The Board: “The possibility of assessing whether the claimed effect is obtained is, however, a prerequisite under Article 83 EPC.”

T 0875/16 

https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t160875eu1.html

34. The patentee submitted that the objection under Article 83 EPC could not apply, since the patent specification contained a further embodiment with a laser. The alleged shortcoming regarding the pulse duration did not affect this embodiment.

35. This submission is not persuasive. Firstly, the argument put forward by the patentee does not challenge the analysis made above with regard to the use of flash lamps. While it is established case law that non-working embodiments may be of no harm when the patent specification contains sufficient information for finding appropriate alternatives over the claimed range without unreasonable efforts (cf. G 1/03, OJ 2004, 413, point 2.5.2), this does not apply where only two embodiments were envisaged and where the problematic embodiment is presented as the preferred one.

36. Secondly, while the skilled person would have faced fewer difficulties when reproducing the invention with a laser source, it would still have to be determined, for the wavelengths actually generated, the parameters of efficacy required for the energy density and duration of pulsation.

T 0944/15 - Examining the invention not the claims

Key points

• In this examination appeal, claim 1 is directed to “A data processing method for controlling a process of monitoring the position of at least a part of a patient's body during a radiation treatment by means of a computer”.
• The Board considers the claim to be unclear. The Board also rejects the claim as being an unallowable medical method under Article 53(c) EPC, even though the Board agrees that “the claim is restricted to a method implemented on a computer”.
• The Board: “However, there is a distinction to be made between what the invention for which a patent shall be granted or shall not be granted is, as in Articles 52 and 53 EPC, and the claimed scope of protection”.
• As a comment, I think the Board could also have referred to ‘the claimed subject-matter’, the case is not about Art.69 EPC.
• The Board: “[The claims] do not, in themselves, define what the invention is. Instead, it is the corresponding teaching in the application which does that.”
• According to the Board this is in line with G1/08 r.6.4.2.1.
• The Board: “It is, therefore, not the claimed scope, but the corresponding teaching of the invention which is decisive for establishing what the invention is, and, for the purpose of Article 53(c) EPC, whether or not a claimed invention only concerns the operation of a device without any functional link to the effects of the device on the body (G 1/07 4.3.2).”
• “the Board first notes that it sees no technical effect in the claimed data processing steps: the result is just data stored in memory, with no influence on the computer's functioning or structure.”
• “In summary, in the light of the disclosure of the invention, the skilled person cannot conceive of the invention without the steps of initiating the monitoring [of the patient during radiation therapy] and using the result [in the therapy, e.g. stopping the radiation exposure], which create a functional link to the method of treatment.”
• “In conclusion, paraphrasing G 1/07, the claimed method is not merely directed to the control of the device, because the teaching of the invention is not complete without the steps of initiating the monitoring and using the result; their necessary consideration as part of the teaching of the invention means that claim 1 of the main request defines a method of treatment excluded under Article 53(c) EPC.”
  
  
• In AR-4, the claims are directed to a computer program. Is this claim also excluded under Art.53(c)?
• The Board, after considering that the travaux préparatoires are not helpful: “It is, then, the task of the Office to consider, according to the case at hand, the nature and the patentability of an invention related to a computer program. When the computer program is related to a method of treatment or surgery, these considerations extend to whether it is to be excluded as such a method or allowed as a product for use in one.”
• The Board: “ As the method is excluded, so the computer program should also be excluded: even if indirectly conferred, a protection for a method of treatment goes against the ratio legis of Article 53(c) EPC (G 1/07, point 3): ... that medical practice must not be hindered by patent protection ... Any factor which could interfere with this, such as licence fee considerations, should therefore be carefully ruled out which might however prove difficult, if patents were granted on medical methods.”
• “All of the above reasons lead to the conclusion that, the computer program of claim 1 of the fourth auxiliary request is an invention only by virtue of the property that, when running, it implements a method of treatment excepted from patentability under Article 53(c) EPC. It is, for that reason, excluded from patentability.”
• “the Board disagrees with the statement in the Guidelines for Examination (November 2019) at G.II, 4.2.1, to which the appellant referred.”
• The attempted disclaimers are not allowed either.
• The appeal is dismissed.
  
  
• The Boards full legal reasoning is very detailed. I'm not sure why the Board didn't give the decision a headnote / catchword / publication code A, B or C.

EPO T 0944/15

https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t150944eu1.html

Main request, Article 53(c) EPC

14. The appellant referred to T 0641/00, "Two identities/COMVIK", OJ 2003, 352 and argued that the claim scope was clearly restricted to something that happened only in a computer. It was the prerogative of the applicant to define the scope of protection and thereby the invention. Here, the invention was a data processing method confined to the computer, i.e. a computer-implemented method, and was technical because it processed technical data. So it was an invention that could be completely defined by what happened in the computer.

T 1055/17 - Attacks under Art.12(4) RPBA 2007

Key points

• The Board holds an inventive step attack filed with the Statement of grounds inadmissible under Art. 12(4) RPBA 2007.
• Which is interesting because Art. 12(4) RPBA 2007 refers to "the power of the Board to hold inadmissible facts, evidence or requests".
• So, is an inventive step attack a fact, evidence, or a request?
• The new attack is based on D1. During the opposition proceedings, the parties considered D10 to be the closest prior art.
• "According to the minutes of the oral proceedings before the opposition division, the opponent explicitly renounced raising an objection starting from D1 as the closest prior art against this first auxiliary request".
• The Board considers the claims to be inventive.

T 1055/17 - https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t171055eu1.html

6. Inventive step

6.1 Consideration of the reasoning based on D1 as the closest prior art

6.1.1 Claim 1 at issue corresponds in substance to claim 1 of the first auxiliary request upheld by the opposition division, combining the features of granted claims 1, 4 and 5.

6.1.2 During opposition proceedings, the parties considered D10 the closest prior art with respect to this then pending first auxiliary request (point 16.4.1 of the impugned decision).

6.1.3 In its statement of grounds of appeal, the opponent used document D1 as the closest prior art.

6.1.4 While the opponent had cited both D1 and D10 as possible closest prior art for the main request pending before the opposition division (point 15.3.1 of the impugned decision), it decided to argue lack of inventive step of the then pending first auxiliary request only in view of D10 (point 16.4.1 of the impugned decision, as indicated). According to the minutes of the oral proceedings before the opposition division, the opponent explicitly renounced raising an objection starting from D1 as the closest prior art against this first auxiliary request (point 4.3 of the minutes of oral proceedings).

The first auxiliary request under consideration in the impugned decision had only been filed during the oral proceedings before the opposition division, but its claim 1 was identical to claim 1 of the first auxiliary request filed on 18 November 2016 in preparation for these oral proceedings, and was therefore known to the opponent.

6.1.5 Under these circumstances, the opponent's objection starting from D1 as the closest prior art should have been raised before the opposition division. In its statement of grounds of appeal, the opponent sets out why, in its opinion, D1 should be considered the closest prior art but does not provide any reason why this had not been raised during the opposition proceedings.

6.1.6 Hence, the board decided to disregard the reasoning based on D1, using its discretion under Article 12(4) RPBA 2007 in conjunction with Article 25(2) RPBA 2020.

T 2270/17 - Admissibility arguments inadmissible?

 Key points

• The Board, about the admissibility of the appeal of the opponent, recalls that an appeal of an opponent is admissible if the statement of grounds presents at least one aspect sufficiently that is suitable to take away the foundation of the impugned decision to maintain the patent or to maintain the patent in amended form (in translation from the German original).
• It is not necessary, for admissibility, to specifically indicate which Article of the EPC is invoked or to cite case law.
• It does not matter, for admissibility of the appeal, if other parts of the appeal are insufficient, because admissibility of the appeal can only be decided on in entirety (still my translation).
• In the present case, the appeal is admissible because of the inventive step attack based on D7 and D8, even though D7 and D8 are not admitted into the proceedings as these documents should have been filed in the first instance proceedings. Article 12(4) RPBA 2007 is applied after Rule 99(2) EPC.
• The Board explains that prima facie relevance does not mean that the documents are automatically admissible. “Das Kriterium der prima facie Relevanz führt im Rahmen von Artikel 12 (4) VOBK 2007 indes nicht stets zur Zulassung neuen Vorbringens. Insoweit ist das Regelungsziel von Artikel 12 (4) VOBK 2007 zu berücksichtigen. ... Diesem Ziel würde es zuwiderlaufen, wenn neues Vorbringen, das erstmals mit der Beschwerdebegründung oder -erwiderung erfolgt, stets zugelassen würde, wenn es prima facie relevant wäre. Nach der Rechtsprechung der Beschwerdekammern führt die prima facie Relevanz eines Dokuments daher nicht zwingend dazu, dass die Kammer ihr Ermessen dahingehend ausübt, dieses in das Verfahren zuzulassen”.
• The patentee had argued for the first time during the oral proceedings before the Board that the documents were filed in response to the written decision of the OD. The Board considers this argument to be not convincing and leaves open the question of whether the argument in favour of the admissibility is in itself late-filed and inadmissible (r.2.5). 

EPO T 2270/17

https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t172270du1.html

decision text omitted.

Entscheidungsgründe

1. Zulässigkeit der Beschwerde (Artikel 108, Satz 3 in Verbindung mit Regel 99 (2) EPÜ)

1.1 Die Beschwerde der Einsprechenden ist zulässig. Die Beschwerde wurde form- und fristgerecht eingelegt und hinreichend begründet.

1.2 Artikel 108 Satz 3 EPÜ verlangt, dass die Beschwerde zu begründen ist. Regel 99 (2) EPÜ präzisiert dies dahingehend, dass in der Beschwerdebegründung darzulegen ist, aus welchen Gründen die angefochtene Entscheidung aufzuheben oder in welchem Umfang sie abzuändern ist und auf welche Tatsachen und Beweismittel die Beschwerde gestützt wird. In der Beschwerdebegründung sind daher die Argumente des Beschwerdeführers so deutlich und genau vorzubringen, dass die Beschwerdekammer und der Beschwerdegegner ohne eigene Ermittlungen erkennen können, aus welchen Gründen die angefochtene Entscheidung falsch sein soll und auf welche Tatsachen die Argumente gestützt sind (Rechtsprechung der Beschwerdekammern, 9. Auflage, V.A.2.6.3 a), d), e) m.w.N.).

1.3 Wenn die Einsprechende Beschwerdeführerin ist, genügt es, wenn sie hinreichend zu einem Aspekt vorträgt, der geeignet ist, der angefochtenen Entscheidung betreffend die Aufrechterhaltung des erteilten Patents bzw. des Patents in geänderter Fassung, die Grundlage zu entziehen (T 767/14, Entscheidungsgründe 1.2). Wenn erkennbar ist, auf welche Rechtsgrundlage sich diese Ausführungen beziehen, ist - entgegen der Ansicht der Beschwerdegegnerin - weder die konkrete Benennung des entsprechenden Artikels des EPÜ noch die Zitierung von Rechtsprechung zwingend erforderlich. Ebenso wenig müssen die Ausführungen in der Beschwerdebegründung tatsächlich überzeugend sein, um die Zulässigkeitshürde zu überwinden.

1.4 Da für die Beschwerde der einsprechenden Partei bereits ein substantiiert vorgetragener Grund genügt, um die Aufrechterhaltung des Streitpatents in der ursprünglichen bzw. in der von der Einspruchsabteilung für gewährbar erachteten Fassung in Frage zu stellen, ist es für eine solche Beschwerde auch unerheblich, wenn der Vortrag zu anderen in der angefochtenen Entscheidung genannten Aspekten unzureichend ist. Eine lediglich zu Teilaspekten unzureichende Beschwerdebegründung steht der Zulässigkeit der Beschwerde der einsprechenden Partei nicht entgegen, da die Zulässigkeit der Beschwerde nur in ihrer Gesamtheit beurteilt werden kann (Rechtsprechung der Beschwerdekammern, 9. Auflage, V.A.2.6.8 m.w.N.).

1.5 Im vorliegenden Fall hat die beschwerdeführende Einsprechende zumindest zur fehlenden erfinderischen Tätigkeit ausgehend von Dokument D7 substantiiert vorgetragen. Sie hat insbesondere im Einzelnen dargelegt, welche Merkmale des Streitpatents dieses Dokument offenbart, welche Unterschiede hierzu bestehen, welche Aufgabe daraus folgt, welches Dokument der Fachmann zur Lösung dieser Aufgabe heranziehen würde und welche Merkmale das beizuziehende Dokument (D8) offenbart.

1.6 Der Umstand, dass es sich bei D7 und D8 um neue Dokumente handelt, die nicht Gegenstand des Einspruchsverfahrens waren, ist für die Frage, ob die Beschwerde im vorliegenden Verfahren hinreichend begründet wurde, unerheblich.

Eine Beschwerdebegründung kann nämlich auch dann zulässig sein, wenn sie sich im Zusammenhang mit einem bereits verfahrensgegenständlichen Einspruchsgrund auf neue Tatsachen und Beweismittel stützt, die geeignet wären, der angefochtenen Entscheidung die Grundlage zu entziehen (Rechtsprechung der Beschwerdekammern, 9. Auflage, V.A.2.6.5 a), b) m.w.N.). Die spätere, im Ermessen der Kammer stehende Entscheidung darüber, ob derartiges neues Vorbringen gemäß Artikel 12(4) VOBK 2007 vom Beschwerdeverfahren auszuschließen ist, hat insoweit keinen rückwirkenden Einfluss auf die Zulässigkeit der Beschwerde.

2. Zulassung der Dokumente D7, D8 und D9 in das Beschwerdeverfahren (Artikel 12 (4) VOBK 2007)

2.1 Die Beschwerdeführerin hat erstmals mit der Beschwerdebegründung die Dokumente D7, D8 und D9 vorgelegt und hierzu im Hinblick auf die erfinderische Tätigkeit vorgetragen.

2.2 Die Zulassung dieses neuen Vortrags richtet sich im vorliegenden Verfahren gemäß Artikel 25 (2) VOBK 2020 nach Artikel 12 (4) VOBK 2007. Nach der Rechtsprechung der Beschwerdekammern zu Artikel 12 (4) VOBK 2007 steht es im Ermessen einer Beschwerdekammer, neues Vorbringen vom Beschwerdeverfahren auszuschließen, wenn dieses schon im vorhergehenden Einspruchsverfahren hätte vorgebracht werden können und sollen.

2.3 Vorliegend hat die Einspruchsabteilung bereits in ihrer Mitteilung vom 29. November 2016 verdeutlicht, dass der Einspruchsgrund nach Artikel 100 a) EPÜ in Verbindung mit Artikel 56 EPÜ auf der Grundlage der bis zu diesem Zeitpunkt von der Einsprechenden vorgelegten Dokumente keinen Erfolg haben würde. Spätestens dann hätte für sie Veranlassung bestanden, eine zusätzliche Recherche durchzuführen und weitere Dokumente vorzulegen.

Vor diesem Hintergrund sind Gründe, die die verspätete Vorlage rechtfertigen könnten, nicht ersichtlich, zumal es sich bei den Dokumenten um ältere Patente handelt und D9 zudem ein eigenes Patent der Beschwerdeführerin ist.

Die Beschwerdeführerin hat in ihren schriftlichen Ausführungen auch nicht dargelegt, aus welchem Grund sie die neuen Dokumente erst im Beschwerdeverfahren vorgelegt hat. Obwohl die Kammer bereits in ihrer Mitteilung darauf hingewiesen hat, dass es im Rahmen von Artikel 12 (4) VOBK 2007 maßgeblich darauf ankommt, ob die Einreichung der neuen Dokumente schon im Einspruchsverfahren hätte erfolgen können und sollen, hat sich die Beschwerdeführerin in ihrem schriftlichen Vortrag darauf beschränkt, zur prima facie Relevanz der verspätet vorgelegten Dokumente vorzutragen.

Das Kriterium der prima facie Relevanz führt im Rahmen von Artikel 12 (4) VOBK 2007 indes nicht stets zur Zulassung neuen Vorbringens. Insoweit ist das Regelungsziel von Artikel 12 (4) VOBK 2007 zu berücksichtigen. Dieser soll gewährleisten, dass die Beschwerde der Überprüfung der erstinstanzlichen Entscheidung dient, indem der Rahmen des Einspruchsverfahrens weitestgehend den des Beschwerdevefahrens absteckt. Die Einordnung des Beschwerdeverfahrens als Überprüfungsverfahren lag auch schon der VOBK 2007 zugrunde und entspricht der ständigen Rechtsprechung der Beschwerdekammern (zur Einordnung des Beschwerdeverfahrens als Überprüfungsverfahren vgl. G 9/91, Entscheidungsgründe 18, Abl. 1993, 408; Rechtsprechung der Beschwerdekammern, 9. Auflage 2019, V.A.4.11.1). Dadurch soll verhindert werden, dass erstmals in der Beschwerdeinstanz ein völlig neuer Sacherhalt präsentiert wird, zu dem eine erstinstanzliche Entscheidung fehlt. Diesem Ziel würde es zuwiderlaufen, wenn neues Vorbringen, das erstmals mit der Beschwerdebegründung oder -erwiderung erfolgt, stets zugelassen würde, wenn es prima facie relevant wäre. Nach der Rechtsprechung der Beschwerdekammern führt die prima facie Relevanz eines Dokuments daher nicht zwingend dazu, dass die Kammer ihr Ermessen dahingehend ausübt, dieses in das Verfahren zuzulassen (T 724/08, Entscheidungsgründe 3.4). Wenn - wie vorliegend - keinerlei Gründe für die verspätete Vorlage ersichtlich sind und aufgrund der Mitteilung der Einspruchsabteilung zudem frühzeitig erkennbar war, dass die Patentfähigkeit des Streitpatents durch die im Verfahren befindlichen Dokumente nicht in Frage gestellt wird, kann eine Kammer diese Dokumente daher ungeachtet ihrer Relevanz vom Verfahren ausschließen (vgl. im Ergebnis ebenso: T 2471/13, Entscheidungsgründe 1.8;, T 1314/12, Entscheidungsgründe 8.1.5). Entgegen der Ansicht der Beschwerdeführerin widerspricht dieses Ergebnis einem fairen Verfahren nicht. Vielmehr dient es diesem, indem gewährleistet wird, dass die Parteien ihrer Beibringungspflicht im Einspruchsverfahren rechtzeitig nachkommen, so dass das Vorbringen in zwei Instanzen geprüft werden kann.

Vor diesem Hintergrund ist es entgegen der Auffassung der Beschwerdeführerin für die Ermessensentscheidung nach Artikel 12 (4) VOBK 2007 auch irrelevant, dass die Dokumente bereits zu Beginn des Beschwerdeverfahrens mit der Beschwerdebegründung vorgelegt wurden. Artikel 12 (4) VOBK 2007 soll nämlich in erster Linie die Funktion des Beschwerdeverfahrens als Überprüfungsverfahren absichern und betrifft daher gerade auch solches neues Vorbringen, das bereits mit der Beschwerdebegründung bzw. Beschwerdeerwiderung eingereicht wird. Vorbringen, das erst später, also nach der Beschwerdebegründung bzw. Beschwerdeerwiderung eingereicht wird, muss die zusätzlichen Voraussetzungen des Artikels 13 VOBK 2007 bzw. des Artikels 13 VOBK 2020 erfüllen, um zugelassen zu werden. Insoweit liegt entgegen der Auffassung der Beschwerdeführerin auch kein Widerspruch zwischen Artikel 12 und Artikel 13 VOBK vor. Der Maßstab des Artikels 12 (4) VOBK 2007 gilt nämlich erst recht auch für neues Vorbringen, das erst nach der Beschwerdebegründung bzw. Beschwerdeerwiderung eingereicht wird (T 1162/12, Entscheidungsgründe 1. m.w.N.). Unter Artikel 13 VOBK 2007 bzw. Artikel 13 VOBK 2020 ist das Vorliegen von prima facie Relevanz im Übrigen ebenfalls kein Aspekt, der automatisch zur Zulassung des verspäteten Vorbringens führt; vielmehr handelt es sich um ein zusätzliches Zulassungskriterium, bei dessen Fehlen - wegen der negativen Auswirkung auf die Verfahrensökonomie - in der Regel keine Zulassung erfolgt, ohne dass ein entsprechender Umkehrschluss im Hinblick auf die Zulassung zwingend wäre.

2.4 Die Beschwerdeführerin hat erstmals in der mündlichen Verhandlung vor der Beschwerdekammer ergänzend vorgetragen, dass die neuen Dokumente eine Reaktion auf die schriftliche Entscheidungsbegründung der Einspruchsabteilung gewesen seien, weil die Einspruchsabteilung unter Punkt 4.2 der Mitteilung zur Vorbereitung der mündlichen Verhandlung vom 29. November 2016 die vorläufige Meinung vertreten habe, dass weder das Dokument D2 noch das Dokument D3 die Merkmale bezüglich einer "Anlage" offenbarten, da dort keine zwei Anlagepositionen und keine drei Anlageelemente gemäß den Merkmalen 1.5 und 1.5.1 offenbart seien. Die Beschwerdeführerin habe demgegenüber die Auffassung vertreten, dass eine funktionelle und nicht nur eine strukturelle Anlage, im Sinne eines tatsächlichen physischen Kontakts, unter den Wortlaut des Anspruchs 1 falle. In der angefochtenen Entscheidung sei die Einspruchsabteilung, insbesondere auf Seite 7, nicht auf die Argumente der Beschwerdeführerin eingegangen und habe darüber hinaus weitere Unterscheidungsmerkmale genannt. Die Einreichung der Dokumente D7, D8 und D9 stelle somit eine Reaktion auf die Entscheidung der Einspruchsabteilung dar, in welcher eine "Anlage" im Sinne des Anspruchs 1 ausschließlich in struktureller Hinsicht interpretiert und das Argument der Beschwerdeführerin in Bezug auf eine funktionelle Auslegung des Begriffs nicht ausreichend berücksichtigt worden sei. Die Beschwerdeführerin habe daraufhin gezielt nach Dokumenten gesucht, die Anlagepositionen und Anlageelemente in einem strukturellen Sinne offenbaren. Dabei sei sie auf das Dokument D7 gestoßen, welches eine entsprechende strukturelle Anlage im Sinne eines tatsächlichen Kontakts des Anlageelements in der Anlageposition offenbare. Die Einreichung der neuen Dokumente stelle somit eine gerechtfertigte Reaktion auf die angefochtene Entscheidung dar.

2.5 Die Frage, ob dieser neue Vortrag als Änderung des Beschwerdevorbringens im Sinne von Artikel 13 (2) i.V.m. 25 (1) VOBK 2020 einzustufen ist und wegen Verspätung nicht in das Verfahren zugelassen werden sollte, kann dahinstehen, da der Vortrag jedenfalls nicht geeignet ist, die verspätete Vorlage der Dokumente zu rechtfertigen.

2.6 Die Kammer ist nicht überzeugt, dass die Einreichung der Dokumente D7, D8 und D9 als Reaktion auf die angefochtene Entscheidung gerechtfertigt ist.

Unter Punkt 4.2 der vorläufigen Meinung der Einspruchsabteilung war bereits ausgeführt worden, dass weder das Dokument D2 noch das Dokument D3 die Merkmale betreffend eine "Anlage" im Sinne des Anspruchs 1 offenbaren, da dort keine zwei Anlagepositionen und keine drei Anlageelemente beschrieben seien. Etwas anderes ergibt sich auch aus der angefochtenen Entscheidung nicht. Dort hat die Einspruchsabteilung unter Punkt 7 bis 9 ausgeführt, weshalb eine Kombination der Dokumente D2 und D3 den Gegenstand des Anspruchs 1 nicht nahelege. Insbesondere hat sie in diesem Zusammenhang ausgeführt, dass das Dokument D3 keine Anlagepositionen im Sinne des Anspruchs 1, sondern vielmehr Haltepositionen offenbare. Aus Seite 7 der Entscheidungsgründe der angefochtenen Entscheidung, auf welche die Beschwerdeführerin verwiesen hat, ergibt sich nichts anderes. Die Entscheidungsgründe stehen damit im Einklang mit den vorläufigen Ausführungen der Einspruchsabteilung und führen keine neuen Gesichtspunkte an.

2.7 Die angefochtene Entscheidung der Einspruchsabteilung enthält somit keine von ihrer vorläufigen Meinung abweichenden Feststellungen, die die Einreichung neuer Beweismittel und zugehörigen Tatsachenvortrags erst mit der Beschwerdebegründung rechtfertigen könnten. Vielmehr war bereits der der Ladung zur mündlichen Verhandlung beigefügten Mitteilung unmittelbar zu entnehmen, dass nach vorläufiger Ansicht der Einspruchsabteilung weder das Dokument D2 noch das Dokument D3 Anlageelemente oder Anlagepositionen im Sinne des Anspruchs 1 offenbart (siehe insbesondere die Merkmale 1.3, 1.5 und 1.5.1). Spätestens nach Kenntnisnahme der vorläufigen Meinung der Einspruchsabteilung hätte somit für die Beschwerdeführerin Veranlassung bestanden, eine zusätzliche Recherche im Hinblick auf die Merkmale "Anlagepositionen" und "Anlageelemente" durchzuführen und darauf basierend ergänzend vorzutragen.

2.8 Die Kammer hat daher ihr Ermessen dahingehend ausgeübt, die Dokumente D7, D8 und D9 gemäß Artikel 12 (4) VOBK 2007, Artikel 25 (2) VOBK 2020 vom Beschwerdeverfahren auszuschließen.