T 0225/19 - The SME appel fee declaration lacks legal basis

 Key points

• An appeal is filed by the joint proprietors, a university and a GmbH, paying the appeal fee at the reduced rate. The opponents dispute the admissibility of the appeal asserting that the GmbH is at least 75% owned, indirectly, by a large USA company. 
• This Board concludes that the 'SME Declaration' for the reduced appeal fee, prescribed in  EPO Notice OJ 2018, A5, lacks legal basis as a requirement for the reduced appeal fee (see also J8/18). As far as I know, this is the first time the Board explicitly says so. 
• This Board: “Der Beschluss des Verwaltungsrats vom 13. Dezember 2017 [OJ 2018, A4) zur Änderung der GebO bzw. der dadurch neugefasste Artikel 2 (1) Nr. 11 der GebO enthalten keine Rechtsgrundlage für die in Nr. 3 und 4 der Mitteilung verlangte Erklärung.” (emphasis added). 
• “Daraus folgt, dass die Mitteilung [OJ 2018, A5] durch das in deren Nr. 3 und 4 genannte Erfordernis einer Anspruchserklärung sowie den Hinweis auf die möglichen Rechtsfolgen in Nr. 11 der Mitteilung den Beschluss des Verwaltungsrats vom 13. Dezember 2017 (CA/D 17/17, supra) nicht nur auslegt und erläutert, sondern das zusätzliche, durch keine Rechtsgrundlage gestützte Erfordernis einer mit der Gebührenzahlung abzugebenden Erklärung aufstellt.”
• I note that in T 1060/19 the Board had assumed that the provisions of the Notice were binding, only to reject an argument of a party based on the principle of protection of legitimate expectations. Perhaps the intent of the additional requirement in the Notice was to protect parties. But in the end, the additional requirement in the Notice lacks any legal basis.
• However, the Board is competent to examine the entitlement to the fee reduction and obliged to examine this entitlement of a party when disputed by the other parties. Both the declaration and any evidence are still accepted after the appeal period.
• In this case, the evidence was not accepted and the Board decides that the appeal is deemed not to have been filed. The decision does not mention any request for re-establishment.

T 0225/19 - https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t190225du1.html

EPO Headnote

Auch wenn eine Erklärung nach Nr. 3 und 4 der Mitteilung des EPA vom 18. Dezember 2017 nicht schon bei Zahlung der ermäßigten Beschwerdegebühr verlangt werden kann, ist die Kammer jedoch befugt und verpflichtet, die Voraussetzungen für die wirksame Einlegung und die Zulässigkeit der Beschwerde in jedem Verfahrensstadium zu prüfen. Eine Überprüfung durch die Kammer ist insbesondere dann geboten, wenn das Vorliegen der Voraussetzungen nach Regel 6 (4) und (5) EPÜ für die Zahlung der ermäßigten Beschwerdegebühr von anderen Verfahrensbeteiligten bestritten wird. Dabei werden eine entsprechende Erklärung und Belege auch noch nach Ablauf der Beschwerdefrist akzeptiert (vgl. Nr. 2 und 3 der Entscheidungsgründe).

T 1503/17 - Other decisions not binding

 Key points

• If, say, the patent in the parent case is revoked due to legal problems with the priority claim, can you relitigate the matter in a divisional application?
• The present Board, in an unrelated case, has to decide on the admissibility of a late-filed request.
• “At the oral proceedings before the Board the appellant-opponent [sic, I think patentee was intended] also referred to an interpretation (of "endless belt") in an (unidentified) decision by this Board, in a related case, as justifying the late filing. Leaving aside the fact that the Board is in any case not bound by a decision in a different (even if related) case, Art 23(3) EPC, the Board is unable to see how claim interpretation in another case can have any bearing on the justification for a late filing in the present appeal, since they are distinct and independent proceedings.”

T 1503/17 

https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t171503eu1.html

"At the oral proceedings before the Board the appellant-opponent also referred to an interpretation (of "endless belt") in an (unidentified) decision by this Board, in a related case, as justifying the late filing. Leaving aside the fact that the Board is in any case not bound by a decision in a different (even if related) case, Art 23(3) EPC, the Board is unable to see how claim interpretation in another case can have any bearing on the justification for a late filing in the present appeal, since they are distinct and independent proceedings."

T 1556/14 - Decision on cost apportionment

 Key points

• In this post a decision of a Board of Appeal, but not on the appeal. The OD had decided to maintain the patent in amended form, both Patentee and Opponent 1 appealed. With letter 09.08.2019, patentee withdrew its appeal, disapproved the text and requested revocation of the patent. The Board held oral proceedings on 12.08.2020 in the absence of the opponents (but in the presence of patentee) revoking the patent. 
• “By letter dated 15 August 2019, appellant II (Opponent 1) requested that costs be awarded against appellant I (Patentee) for the time spent preparing for the oral proceedings and for non-refundable travel costs (apportionment of costs).”
• As held in T765/89, the Board has “inherent original jurisdiction to consider requests made to it in matters arising out of or in connection with the former appeal procedure”
• The Board: “Where [a request for cost apportionment] cannot be submitted before termination of the proceedings, for example when the only appeal is withdrawn and the timing of that withdrawal or other related circumstances are the alleged grounds for requesting apportionment of costs, the request must be accepted as being admissible despite being submitted after termination of the proceedings. Decision T 765/89, to which [opponent 1] referred, seems to concern such a situation.”
• The Board: “in the case in hand the board is not convinced that appellant II was unable to file a request for apportionment of costs prior to the termination of the proceedings on 12 August 2019. Appellant II's representative was made aware of appellant I's letter of 9 August 2019 at 20:30 that day. It decided not to attend the oral proceedings and could therefore also have decided to file a request for apportionment of costs over the weekend, even if it had not been possible to consult appellant II. ”
• The present Board: “Under Rule 88(1) EPC, apportionment of costs is to be dealt with in the decision on the opposition. The rule implies that the request for apportionment is submitted before that decision is taken”. 
• The request for cost apportionment is rejected as inadmissible.
• Opponent 1 received Patentee's letter on Friday 9 August at 20:30 (the EPO at 21:13 CEST through online filing, link). The oral proceedings were held on Monday 12 August closing at 09:10 according to the minutes of the oral proceedings. I'm not sure what the Board means with filing a request 'over the weekend' and if any request filed on Monday 08:30 using e.g. fax would have effectively reached the Board before Monday 09:10. 
• I note that the minutes of the oral proceedings do not appear to acknowledge the withdrawal of Patentee's appeal by letter of Friday 20:30, e.g. Patentee is simply referred to as Appellant I in the minutes.
  
• T 765/89: “In the exercise of its inherent original jurisdiction to consider requests made to it in matters arising out of or in connection with the former appeal procedure, the Board still has to decide on the Respondents' requests to impose on the Appellants the costs for the preparations made in view of oral proceedings”. 
• 
  
• Of note: “In the case in hand the board ordered oral proceedings to be held on 12-14 August [sic!] 2019”. 

EPO  T 1556/14.

https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t141556eu2.html

(decision text omitted)

T 2620/18 - More about the SME appeal fee; debit order correction

 Key points

• The appellant paid the appeal fee on 08.10.2018 at the SME rate without being an SME.
• The Board finds that the difference with the normal rate it is not a small amount lacking under Article 8 Rfees.
• The appellant requests correction under Rule 139. The Board considers it proven that the reduced fee rate was paid by mistake, basically because of the 'design choices' of the Online Filing Software (so this applies to selecting the wrong fee level by mistake in OLF).
• “wie von der Beschwerdeführerin vorgetragen, sind die Texte in den Textfeldern [in OLF] für die ermäßigte und die volle Beschwerdegebühr sehr ähnlich. Sie beziehen sich beide auf Regel 6 (4) und (5) EPÜ, einmal in positiver Weise, einmal in negativer Weise:” 
• I wonder if the EPO will ever change the Online Filing Software on this point. Until that time it seems very reasonable that the Board acknowledges that the two texts chosen by the EPO for identifying the fee levels are very similar. 
• “ Dabei ist zu berücksichtigen, dass der ermäßigte Gebührenbetrag mit dem vor dem 1. April 2018 geltenden "einheitlichen" Betrag für die Beschwerdegebühr übereinstimmte. Es erscheint daher glaubhaft, dass die Texte in den Boxen flüchtig gelesen wurden und sich der Leser am bisher geltenden, bekannten Gebührenbetrag von 1880 EUR orientierte und irrtümlich davon ausging, dass die volle Gebühr bezahlt wurde, obgleich dies ab dem 1. April 2018 lediglich der ermäßigte Betrag war.”
• However, the Board considers that the request for correction was not made timely, because it was made 8 weeks after paying the wrong appeal fee (payment 09.10.2018; request correction 07.12.2018) whereas the error had been noticed on 25.10.2018 and a debit order for the appeal fee at the normal rate had been filed on 25.10.2018 as well.
• This seems highly fact-specific.
• I note that GL A-X, 7.1.1 (2019) state that “ Payment is a matter of fact whereby a certain amount is transferred to and put at the disposal of the EPO. It is not, therefore, a procedural declaration which may be corrected pursuant to Rule 139. The same applies to debit orders.”
• The breakthrough decision was T 0317/19 as far as I know.

T 2620/18 - link

Decision text omitted.

T 1421/20 - Fast decision, first level of convergence

 Key points

• An appeal against a refusal decision. Statement of grounds filed 21.04.2020, forwarded to the Board under Art. 109 on about 21.06. Summons 23.06, preliminary opinion 26.06. Oral proceedings 02.11.2020, appeal dismissed (application filed already on 22.10.2003, on the other hand, so the EPO still needed 17 years to finally refuse it). 
• This is the first decision I know wherein the new 'first level of convergence' is applied, i.e. Article 12(4) RPBA 2020.
• “although the amendments carried out in the Auxiliary Requests 0a, 0b and 0c [filed with the Statement of grounds] may address the [clarity] objections raised by the examining division in the decision under appeal, they introduce new [clarity] issues that lead to new objections. Therefore, the board, exercising its discretion under Articles 12(2) and (4) RPBA 2020, decides not to admit the Auxiliary Requests 0a, 0b and 0c into the procedure.”
• The Board does not need to discuss whether these AR's should have been filed during the first instance proceedings. I guess that if the clarity objections of the Examining Division were first raised in the appealed decision, this would be an error under Article 113 EPC, but that would be something for the applicant to argue.
• The Board analyses the new clarity issues in detail in the appeal decision.
• Note that the requirement of “does not give rise to new objections” is in the second stage of convergence, Art.13(1)(s.4), clause (v)(b).
• The Board finds that Auxiliary Request 0a' and AR12 are not novel. The other requests are not admitted.
  
  
• “Auxiliary Requests 0b', 0b'-1 and 0c' [...] were filed with appellant's letter of 1 October 2020, i. e. after the board had issued summons to oral proceedings. They were incontestably late filed and constituted an amendment to the appellant's case. The appellant argued that these requests should exceptionally be admitted into proceedings because it could not predict that board would regard clear the feature that the examining division had considered not clear.”
• The Board does not admit them. “the board considers that the appellant could and should have filed these requests during the first instance proceedings. Moreover, the board regards that it could not deal with requests comprising such features without undue burden, since it was not even certain that appropriate prior art was readily available in the file”
  
  
• Perhaps even more relevant is the fate of AR1-5. “Although it is true that Auxiliary Requests 1 to 5 were underlying the decision under appeal, it is also true that they were replaced (i. e. withdrawn) in the beginning of the appeal and were, thus, not part of the appellant's case. The board regards, thus, their reintroduction with the appellant's letter of 1 October 2020 as an amendment to the appellant's case, which is to be admitted into the procedure under Article 13 RPBA 2020.The board notes further, that the examining division had rejected these requests for lack of clarity and no other opinion on them was given in the decision under appeal with respect to the other patentability requirements. Since the board did not agree with the lack of clarity objections of the examining division, these requests had to be assessed with respect to the other patentability requirements according to the EPC. Moreover, by replacing them in the beginning of the appeal, the appellant did not give the board the chance to examine them and form at least a preliminary opinion on them.” The Board is not prepared to examine novelty and inventive step, neither to remit the case, and does not admit these requests.
• Finally, AR-6 to 11 were held inadmissible by the Examining Division under Rule 137(3) EPC as being late-filed and prima facie unclear. The appellant does not contest this decision and the Board does not admit the requests on appeal.

T 1421/20 - link

T 1854/19 - Implicitly overruling the Administrative Council

 Key points

• This is a follow-up case to G 3/19 (Pepper). In pepper, the Enlarged Board gave a new interpretation of Article 53(b) EPC which corresponds to Rule 28(2) EPC in excluding ‘essentially biological plants’ from patentability (but in fact appears to exclude more from patentability than Rule 28(2) EPC). The Enlarged Board said in G 3/19 that “this negative effect does not apply to European patents granted before 1 July 2017 and European patent applications which were filed before that date and are still pending”; the ‘negative effect’ is that of Article 53(b) EPC for the types of plant-related subject-matter recited in G 3/19 hn.1. 
• However, the Administrative Council decided that Rule 28(2) EPC “shall apply to European patent applications filed on or after this date [01.07.2017], as well as to European patent applications and European patents pending at that time”, Article 3 of the Decision Administrative Council 29.06.20147 OJ 2017 A56.
• The Enlarged Board in G 3/19 has not said (or at least not explicitly) that Rule 28(2) is invalid, neither that said Article 3 of the AC Decision is invalid.
• Therefore, G3/19 strictly speaking leaves open the question of whether Rule 28(2) is to be applied to applications filed before 01.07.2020
• The present Board: “In view of the provisions set out by the Enlarged Board of Appeal for European patent applications pending before 1 July 2017, the new interpretation of Article 53(b) EPC - announced in opinion G 3/19 [...]- has no retroactive negative effect on the subject-matter of the main request (see opinion G 3/19, points XXVIII and XXIX). This implies that the opinion does not acknowledge the retroactive effect, as provided for in Article 3 of the Decision of the Administrative Council of 29 June 2017 [OJ 2017 A56] that introduced Rule 28(2) EPC.”
• This Board finds that “the subject-matter of the set of claims of the main request is not excluded from patentability” because of the filing date of the present application and because " Article 53(b) EPC, as interpreted by decisions G 2/12 and G 2/13 is applicable to the present application”. Strictly speaking, the present Board still does not say that Rule 28(2) is not applicable to this application but this is unambiguously implied by finding that the subject-matter is not excluded from patentability. 
• So this Board finds that the Enlarged Board implicitly overruled the Administrative Council in G3/19.
• I note that said Article 3 of said Decision of the AC is not strictly speaking a provision of the Implementing Regulation, so it is not clear if Article 164(2) applies. 

EPO T 1854/19 - - link

Reasons for the Decision

1. The appeal complies with Articles 106 to 108 and Rule 99 EPC and is therefore admissible.

Main request - claims 1 to 14

Exceptions to patentability (Article 53(b) EPC)

2. In view of the provisions set out by the Enlarged Board of Appeal for European patent applications pending before 1 July 2017, the new interpretation of Article 53(b) EPC - announced in opinion G 3/19 of 14 May 2020 and being consequential to the introduction of Rule 28(2) EPC on 1 July 2017 - has no retroactive negative effect on the subject-matter of the main request (see opinion G 3/19, points XXVIII and XXIX). This implies that the opinion does not acknowledge the retroactive effect, as provided for in Article 3 of the Decision of the Administrative Council of 29 June 2017 that introduced Rule 28(2) EPC.

3. Thus, Article 53(b) EPC, as interpreted by decisions G 2/12 and G 2/13 (OJ EPO, 2016, A27 and A28) is applicable to the present application and the subject-matter of the set of claims of the main request is not excluded from patentability.

4. The board thus considers the appeal allowable.

T 0492/18 - No hybrid vico appeal oral proceedings yet

 Key points

• "[The opponents] further request participation at the oral proceedings of a member of the opponent's patent department by means of the video messaging tool "Skype", at least periodically, where the video connection would be provided through the computer of the professional representative being present in the oral proceedings."
• The Board refuses the request. 
• "The possibility of holding oral proceedings by VICO is predicated on the Boards' ability to offer the necessary technical facilities. In the opinion of the Board, these technical facilities must be under the continued control and supervision of the Board. To the extent it is technically feasible, the Board must be in the position to control who is participating in the oral proceedings, and to establish that all participants can be seen and heard properly by all persons attending, while also ensuring that it is clear to all who is attending the oral proceedings. These conditions are seen as necessary for the oral proceedings held by VICO to be perceived as equivalent to usual oral proceedings held at the premises of the office with the parties being physically present. Additionally, at the time of deciding, the technical facilities of the Boards of Appeal are primarily geared towards all parties participating remotely."
• The Boards are working hard to introduce 'hybrid' oral proceedings where some participants attend the oral proceedings in person and others attend through video. It is proposed that the Chair may even order that a party or representative must use video conferencing (i.e. is prohibited from showing up in person, it seems); see proposed Article 15a(2) RPBA. 
• Comments can be submitted until 27 November, see here.
• Parties and representatives are of course prohibited from live streaming oral proceedings using their laptop since sound recording is prohibited (link); I think streaming comprises recording and transmission. The reasons for the prohibition are frankly not clear to me.

EPO T 0492/18 - link

decision text omitted.

T 0074/17 - Harmless error and much more

Key points

• Today's post can be filed under ‘advanced appellate procedure’ and deals with ‘harmless error’, though that is the term in US law. “In United States law, a harmless error is a ruling by a trial judge that, although mistaken, does not meet the burden for a losing party to reverse the original decision of the trier of fact on appeal, or to warrant a new trial.” (wikipedia)
• In EPO terms, a substantial procedural violation of the first instance department is only a ground for setting aside the impugned decision (and remitting the case) if it has a causal link with the order of the decision.
• In this case, the OD does not admit patentee's Main Request and patentee files a new Main Request. Patentee then complains in appeal that the OD's decision to hold the (first) Main Request inadmissible was a substantial procedural violation requesting remittal of the case.
• The Board does not agree or more precisely, considers the question irrelevant. “Daraus folgt nach Auffassung der Kammer, dass ein behaupteter Verfahrensmangel nur dann in einer Beschwerde berücksichtigt werden kann, wenn er sich auf die beschwerdefähigen Teile einer Entscheidung ausgewirkt hat, d.h. wenn er die Partei beschwert hat.” 
• The Board explains that the OD's conclusion that the (first) Main Request was not admitted, was not yet the final decision. The Board, in German: “Jedoch war das Einspruchsverfahren nach der Verkündung der Nichtzulassung des ersten Hauptantrags noch nicht beendet. Durch die Rücknahme konnte die erst lediglich als verfahrensführende Entscheidung wirkende Nichtzulassung eine materielle Rechtswirkung nicht mehr entfalten in dem Sinne, dass die abschließende Zwischenentscheidung der Einspruchsabteilung keine Entscheidung mehr über den ersten Hauptantrag, d.h. weder über dessen Nichtzulassung noch über die Nichtgewährbarkeit enthalten müsste. ”
• The Board indicates that there could be an exception if the OD presses the patentee to give up the inadmissible main request. 
• The Board appears to indicate that a request must be maintained as higher ranking than the requests decided on by the OD. “Dementsprechend muss die Kammer feststellen, dass der erste Hauptantrag durch seine Ersetzung durch den zweiten Hauptantrag implizit zurückgezogen wurde, oder jedenfalls nicht höherrangig war als alle in der Entscheidung behandelten weiteren Anträge.”
  
• Hence, this also deals with the implicit withdrawal of a request.
  
  A number of rules can  be inferred from the decision:
• Filing a new main request implies withdrawal or at least the non-maintenance of the previous main request.
• A conclusion of an OD that a request is not admissible is not a decision not to admit. If the request is subsequently withdrawn but the  OD nevertheless includes the reasons for inadmissibility on the written decision, these reasons are obiter and still not a 'decision not to admit' in the sense of Art. 12(6)(s.1).
• A withdrawal of a request during the first instance proceedings may be non-prejudicial for admissibility of the request in appeal if the withdrawal was made under pressure.
• Non-maintenance in the sense of Art. 12(6)(s.2) refers to maintaining as higher ranking than the requests decided on (found allowable) by the OD.
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
• The Board's reference to Art. 107 [see the full decision text] is not entirely clear to me. Typically, Article 107 (adversely affected) is analysed only with respect to the order of the decision - the opponent can not appeal if the OD revokes the patent finding the claims to be novel but not inventive. 
• A number of requests are not admitted, the other requests involve added subject-matter. The patent is revoked. 
• "Diese Hilfsanträge 1, 4, 7 und 8 scheinen dem Hauptantrag und den Hilfsanträgen IV, VIII und IX zu entsprechen, die mit Schreiben vom 5. September 2016 eingereicht, aber in der mündlichen Verhandlung vor der Einspruchsabteilung nicht weiterverfolgt wurden. Eine Nicht-Weiterverfolgung kommt einer impliziten Rücknahme gleich. " (see Art. 12(6)(s.2) RPBA 2020)

EPO T 0074/17 -  link

3. Hauptantrag - Antrag auf Zurückverweisung und wesentliche Verfahrensmängel

3.1 Nach ständiger Rechtsprechung der Beschwerdekammern setzt eine zulässige Beschwerde eine Beschwer der beschwerdeführenden Partei durch die angefochtene Entscheidung voraus, Artikel 107 EPÜ, siehe weiter Rechtsprechung der Beschwerdekammer (RSBK), 9. Auflage, 2019, V.A.2.4.2.a). Dieser Grundsatz gilt für alle Arten von Beschwerden und auch für solche, deren Gegenstand ein wesentlicher Verfahrensmangel des Verfahrens vor der Abteilung ist, deren Entscheidung angefochten wird. Das Vorliegen einer Beschwer ist jedoch auf der Grundlage der der Entscheidung zugrunde liegenden Anträge und der Ergebnisse der Entscheidung zu beurteilen (RSBK V.A.2.4.2.a). Es ist auch ständige Rechtsprechung, dass ein Verfahrensmangel nur dann als wesentlicher anerkannt wird, wenn er in einem kausalen Zusammenhang mit der Entscheidung steht, in dem Sinne, dass das Ergebnis der Entscheidung von dem behaupteten Verfahrensmangel abhängig sein muss (RSBK V.A.9.5.2).

T 0421/14 - Post hoc inventive

 Key points

• Claim 1 is directed to "a sustained release aminopyridine composition for increasing the walking speed of a patient with multiple sclerosis, said composition to be administered as a stable dose treatment twice daily in a therapeutic dose of 10 milligrams of aminopyridine."
• This claim is considered to be insufficiently disclosed, but the claim restricted to  4-aminopyridine is considered to be sufficiently disclosed.
• The Board does not hold some documents filed with the SoG inadmissible under "Article 12(4), first clause, RPBA [2007]". As a comment, is it hence safe to say that the RPBA provisions have ‘clauses’.
  
  
• There is a question of whether some conference papers were public or not. The Board finds that the stricter standard of proof "beyond all reasonable doubt" does not apply because "C30 and C31 alleged to be public prior disclosures are the patent proprietor's (respondent's) own documents."
  
  
• About inventive step  based on post-hoc statistical analysis in the medical field
  “C27 reports on the [patentee's] MS-F201 trial, which was designed as a preliminary study with 36 subjects to explore the safety and efficacy of escalating doses of sustained-release 4-aminopyridine from 10 mg bid to 40 mg bid. C27 […] reports that the 4-amino-pyridine-treated group as a whole showed improvement in walking speed, including statistically significant improvement in the lower dosage range from 10 mg bid to 25 mg bid; however, no separate individual analysis is provided as to how each dose of drug affected walking speed from baseline compared with placebo.
• "the board is satisfied that the technical effect of applying the 10 mg bid dosage regime is acceptable efficacy combined with a favourable safety profile"
• The  Board: “The board considers that, on the basis of the information presented in C27, it would have appeared realistic to the skilled person to investigate the dosages of 10, 15 and 20 mg bid, with the primary endpoint being an improvement in average walking speed, since this was known to have been recommended by a panel of expert MS neurologists and by a relevant regulatory authority (FDA) and these dosages had been found to be of interest in a preliminary study”
• " it actually turned out to be exceptionally difficult in this case to provide the required proof of efficacy - as shown in Example 5 of the patent which presents data obtained in the MS-F202 study"
• "Failure of a phase 2 trial such as MS-F202 would not have caused the person skilled in the art to simply set up, in spite of this result, a larger-scale trial with the same outcome variables, and nor is this suggested in C27. "
• "Only by developing, post hoc, a new statistical technique […] was the [patentee] able to prove that the 10 mg bid dosage regime is effective at increasing walking speed."
• This is basically the reason why the Board acknowledges inventive step.
  
  
• Regarding novelty of 2nd medical use claims: Since the therapeutic efficacy of sustained-release 4-aminopyridine administered at 10 mg bid is a functional technical feature of claims 1 and 5 of the main request (see point 3.3 above), this feature must be taken into account in the assessment of novelty and inventive step. This means that a prior-art disclosure can only be novelty-destroying if it discloses this therapeutic efficacy. It is not sufficient in this case that 4-aminopyridine may have been known to have a therapeutic benefit for improving walking speed and that a prior-art document discloses its administration as a sustained-release dosage form at 10 mg bid in a clinical study. The issue is rather whether the therapeutic efficacy of the 10 mg bid dosage is specifically disclosed in the prior art.

EPO T 0421/14 -  https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t140421eu1.html

Decision text omitted.

Related case T 0799/16

T 1121/17 - Broadening claims before grant

 Key points

• The Board recalls that the prohibition of broadening the scope of the claims applies only after grant, in this examination appeal.
• Article 123(2) EPC reads: “may not be amended in such a way that it contains subject-matter which extends beyond the content of the application as filed” but this does not refer to the scope of the claims of the application as filed.
• In this case, the Examining Division had cited the Guidelines (now H-IV 3.4) "Therefore in a claim directed to such an openly defined composition, the restriction of the breadth of a component present therein may have the effect of broadening the scope of protection of that claim, with the consequence that in opposition/appeal proceedings such amended claim may extend the protection conferred by the granted patent (Art. 123(3))”, however, conveniently changing the part in italics into “with the consequence that such amended claim contains subject-matter which extends beyond the content of the application as originally filed, contrary to the requirements of Article 123(2) EPC.”
• I suppose we can only speculate what the Examiner was thinking.
• In any case, the Board allows the appeal and also examines Art. 84 and Art. 83, finding that the amended claims overcome those grounds for refusal.
• The Board remits the case. “no search report was established for the present application. Instead, the EPO, acting as International Search Authority under the PCT, issued a "Declaration of non-establishment of International Search Report" under Article 17(2)(a) PCT for reasons including those which eventually led to the refusal of the application. The declaration indicated that a search may be carried out during examination before the EPO should the problems which led thereto be overcome.”
• “Upon remittal, the examining division may have to carry out a search, as indicated in this declaration under Article 17(2)(a) PCT.”
• The application was filed in 2012. 
• Broadening claim amendments can sometimes be held inadmissible under Rule 137(3) when filed after the Rule 161 response or after the Rule 70a response, as the case may be. Broadening claim amendments may also be unallowable under Rule 137(5)  second sentence if the claims are not searched by the EPO under Rule 63 (not sure how this works for Euro-PCT applications and cases wherein the Board indicates an additional search by the examining division) . 

https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t171121eu1.html

Decision text omitted.

Visser PDF Supplement

The next paper edition of Visser’s Annotated EPC will be published in Spring 2021 (because the EPO Guidelines will then also be updated)

We've therefore made available a free supplement setting out the main legal changes between the 2019 edition and 31.10.2020. This PDF supplement can be used by EQE candidates wishing to update their 2019 edition to 31.10.2020 which is the legal cut-off date for the EQE 2021 Pre-Exam and the optional legal date for the Main Exam. The supplement can of course also be used by practitioners.

 

T 2337/19 - Computer-aided dental methods

 Key points

• Let's simulate the surgical method?* Claim 2  in machine translation is directed to: "Method for creating a virtual articulator for a jaw and the associated dentition". 
• The applicant in this case has actually a fair point that the refusal under Art. 84 and Art. 83 is not justified 
• The application was not searched under. R.63 and was then refused by the examining division. The Board notes that: " Die von der Prüfungsabteilung erhobenen Einwände basierend auf Artikel 83 und 84 EPÜ wurden im Prüfungsverfahren zwar weitgehend im Hinblick auf die Möglichkeit einer sinnvollen Recherche diskutiert. Sie treffen jedoch gleichermaßen auf die Frage zu, ob die Anmeldung in der vorliegenden Fassung die Erfordernisse des EPÜ erfüllt oder ob sie zurückzuweisen ist"
• The Board considers that the term 'virtual' is clearly defined in the application.
• The application provides an enabling teaching, taking into account a referenced old publication and the general developments in software technology.
• About the requirement of support under Article 84 - should the claims be restricted to the particular examples, the Board notes the following.
• “Es ist aber legitim, den Anspruch so allgemein zu formulieren, dass er alle sinnvollen Messtechniken umfasst, solange die Beschreibung zumindest ein konkretes Beispiel liefert, welche Technik für die Realisierung der Erfindung geeignet ist. Auch hier ist es wiederum nicht erforderlich, jede erdenkliche Technik detailliert zu beschreiben, um eine Stützung des Anspruchs durch die Beschreibung zu erreichen.”
• The impugned decision is set aside and the case is remitted.

(*note: not sure if this is an accurate summary of the claimed invention).

T 2337/19 

https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t192337du1.html

Text omitted.

T 1631/17 - Surgical method

 Key points

• The claim of the granted is directed to a method of making dental replacement parts. According to the Board, the claim has an implicit surgical method and this forms a ground for revocation under Article 53(c) EPC.
• The present Board: "Zwar stellt Art. 84 EPÜ keinen Einspruchsgrund dar, der einen Widerruf des Patents rechtfertigen könnte. Wenn aber wesentliche Merkmale der Erfindung im Anspruch fehlen, müssen diese bei der Interpretation des Anspruchs im Hinblick auf Artikel 53(c) EPÜ mitgelesen werden. Dabei ist es gleichbedeutend, ob das wesentliche Merkmal von Anfang an nicht im Anspruch enthalten war, oder ob es nachträglich gestrichen wurde."
• The Board, in translation: "Hence, it must be considered whether the claimed invention is fully and comprehensively defined by the wording of claim 1".
• As a comment, here it is apparently  not the 'invention as defined in the claim' that is examined, but the 'claimed invention' which appears to be something different.
• The Board studies the description and finds an essential method step which is also important for novelty and inventive step (but is not recited in the claim), "weil dieser Schritt genau den Beitrag darstellt, der über den Stand der Technik hinausgeht"
• "as beanspruchte Verfahren kann nicht durchgeführt werden ohne die unmittelbare Durchführung des Zwischenschrittes der Präparation der Zähne, weil sonst die zweite Abformung nicht erstellt werden könnte. Ohne diesen Verfahrensschritt wäre die Erfindung im Sinne der G 1/07 daher auch nicht vollständig und umfassend beschrieben. Er ist also ebenfalls implizit im beanspruchten Verfahren enthalten."
• "Naturgemäß wird die Präparation der Zähne direkt am Patienten durchgeführt und stellt einen chirurgischen Verfahrensschritt dar, weil dabei invasiv und in erheblichem Maße Körpergewebe entfernt wird."
• Hence, the claimed method is excluded from patentability under Article 53(c).

T 1631/17 - https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t171631du1.html

V. Die unabhängigen Verfahrensansprüche haben folgenden Wortlaut:

a) Hauptantrag (erteilte Fassung)

"Verfahren zum Herstellen von Zahnersatzteilen, bei dem in eine erste Abformung eines Teils des menschlichen Gebisses erhärtbares Zahnersatzmaterial eingegeben wird, in dieses Material ein aus einer zweiten Abformung hergestelltes Positivmodell hineingedrückt wird, und das nach dem Hineindrücken übrig gebliebene Zahnersatzmaterial zum Bilden des/der Zahnersatzteile erhärten gelassen wird, wobei als zweite Abformung die Abformung eines menschlichen Gebisses verwendet wird, das zur Anbringung des/der Zahnersatzteile präpariert ist, dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass als erste Abformung die Abformung eines menschlichen Gebisses verwendet wird, in dem fehlende Zahnsubstanz ergänzt ist."

Entscheidungsgründe

1. Explizite Verfahrensschritte

Es ist unbestritten, dass der Wortlaut von Anspruch 1 keinen expliziten Verfahrensschritt beinhaltet, der im Sinne von Artikel 53(c) EPÜ als chirurgisch anzusehen wäre.

2. Implizite Verfahrensschritte

2.1 Es ist nicht notwendig, dass ein Anspruch explizit einen chirurgischen Verfahrensschritt aufweist, damit er von der Patentierbarkeit ausgeschlossen ist. Hierfür genügt es, dass das beanspruchte Verfahren einen solchen Schritt umfasst (siehe G 1/07, Gründe 4.1 - 4.3).

Die Große Beschwerdekammer führte unter Punkt 4.3.1 folgendes aus:

"Nach Artikel 84 EPÜ in Verbindung mit Regel 43 EPÜ müssen die Patentansprüche den Gegenstand angeben, für den Schutz begehrt wird. Das heißt, der Anspruch sollte alle wesentlichen Merkmale ausdrücklich angeben, die zur Definition der Erfindung erforderlich sind. Außerdem muss der Anspruch klar sein (G 1/04, a. a. O., Nr. 6.2 der Entscheidungsgründe). Ob ein Schritt, der einen von der Patentierbarkeit ausgeschlossenen chirurgischen Verfahrensschritt darstellt oder umfasst, durch eine positive Formulierung wie "vorher verabreicht" oder durch einfaches Weglassen aus dem Anspruch ausgeklammert werden kann, hängt nach Artikel 84 EPÜ davon ab, ob die beanspruchte Erfindung auch ohne diesen Schritt durch die übrigen Anspruchsmerkmale vollständig und umfassend beschrieben ist. Dies muss jeweils im Einzelfall entschieden werden."

Zwar stellt Art. 84 EPÜ keinen Einspruchsgrund dar, der einen Widerruf des Patents rechtfertigen könnte. Wenn aber wesentliche Merkmale der Erfindung im Anspruch fehlen, müssen diese bei der Interpretation des Anspruchs im Hinblick auf Artikel 53(c) EPÜ mitgelesen werden. Dabei ist es gleichbedeutend, ob das wesentliche Merkmal von Anfang an nicht im Anspruch enthalten war, oder ob es nachträglich gestrichen wurde.

Es ist deswegen zu klären, ob die beanspruchte Erfindung durch den Wortlaut des Anspruchs 1 vollständig und umfassend definiert wird oder nicht. Dafür ist unter anderem die Beschreibung zu Rate zu ziehen.

2.2 Die Erfindung betrifft ein Verfahren zur Herstellung von Zahnersatzteilen. Ziel der Erfindung ist es, ein Verfahren zu schaffen, mit dem die Herstellung von Zahnersatzteilen wesentlich einfacher ist als bei existierenden Verfahren, die dem Oberbegriff des vorliegenden Anspruchs 1 entsprechen (siehe die Beschreibung des im Streitpatent als nächstliegender Stand der Technik zitierten Dokuments WO98/35630). Das dort beschriebene Verfahren beinhaltet ein erstes Abformen der Zähne im Originalzustand, das Präparieren der Zähne und ein zweites Abformen der präparierten Zähne sowie die Herstellung des Zahnersatzes mit Hilfe dieser beiden Abformungen.

Gemäß den Absätzen [0008] und [0026]-[0029] der Beschreibung beginnt das erfindungsgemäße Verfahren damit, dass die erste Abformung von einem Gebiss genommen wird, in dem zunächst provisorisch die fehlende Zahnsubstanz ergänzt wurde. Dies entspricht dem kennzeichnenden Teil des Anspruchs und wird vor der Präparation der Zähne durchgeführt.

Die Zahnsubstanz wird also zuerst (provisorisch) ergänzt, dieses "fertige" Gebiss wird abgeformt und erst danach werden die Zähne für die zweite Abformung präpariert. Dadurch kann die gewünschte äußere Form des Zahnersatzes direkt vom Zahnarzt am Patienten gestaltet und die Herstellung der Zahnersatzteile durch den Zahntechniker wesentlich vereinfacht werden.

Daraus ergibt sich, dass das Ergänzen der fehlenden Zahnsubstanz ein wesentliches Merkmal der Erfindung darstellt. Im vorliegenden Fall insbesondere auch deshalb, weil dieser Schritt genau den Beitrag darstellt, der über den Stand der Technik hinausgeht. Dieser Verfahrensschritt muss daher bei der Auslegung des Anspruchs mitgelesen werden.

Das beanspruchte Verfahren beginnt daher implizit, d.h. nicht ausdrücklich aber zwangsläufig, bereits mit dem Ergänzen der fehlenden Zahnsubstanz.

2.3 Die Präparation der Zähne, die nach der ersten Abformung stattfindet (siehe Absatz [0027] der Beschreibung) liegt damit auch zeitlich und räumlich innerhalb des beanspruchten Verfahrens. Das beanspruchte Verfahren kann nicht durchgeführt werden ohne die unmittelbare Durchführung des Zwischenschrittes der Präparation der Zähne, weil sonst die zweite Abformung nicht erstellt werden könnte. Ohne diesen Verfahrensschritt wäre die Erfindung im Sinne der G 1/07 daher auch nicht vollständig und umfassend beschrieben. Er ist also ebenfalls implizit im beanspruchten Verfahren enthalten.

2.4 Naturgemäß wird die Präparation der Zähne direkt am Patienten durchgeführt und stellt einen chirurgischen Verfahrensschritt dar, weil dabei invasiv und in erheblichem Maße Körpergewebe entfernt wird. Außerdem ist nicht in Frage gestellt worden, dass die Präparation der Zähne einen chirurgischen Schritt darstellt.

2.5 Anders als von der Beschwerdeführerin vorgetragen, kann also das Verfahren nicht ausschließlich im Labor, in Abwesenheit des Patienten stattfinden. Ohne die Herstellung der Abformungen - die am Patienten stattfindet - kann das labortechnische Verfahren nicht durchgeführt werden.

2.6 Folglich umfasst das beanspruchte Verfahren einen chirurgischen Schritt und ist deswegen infolge von Artikel 53 (c) EPÜ von der Patentierbarkeit ausgeschlossen.

 

T 0978/17 - Combining claims 1, 2 and 3

 Key points

• The opponent filed a new document D85 with its Statement of grounds. The Board decides to admit the document under Art. 12(4) RPBA 2007. The question was whether the document should have been filed earlier.
• The patentee had filed 15 auxiliary requests during the first instance proceedings and then a further auxiliary request 17 during the oral proceedings adding a feature not present in the higher-ranking requests.
• According to the Board, the opponent was not obliged to prepare for the case that the patentee added the feature, even though AR-17 is merely a combination of claims 1, 2 and 3 as granted.
• “jedoch sind die Einsprechenden nicht verpflichtet, innerhalb der Einspruchsfrist alle möglichen Anspruchskombinationen mit ihren Entgegenhaltungen abzudecken. Die Patentschrift hat 13 abhängige Ansprüche, wobei nicht alle auf einen einzigen Anspruch rückbezogen sind. Es ergibt sich somit eine Vielzahl von Anspruchskombinationen, die von den Einsprechenden im Vorfeld nicht zumutbar abgedeckt werden konnten.”
• Therefore, D85 is admtited. The patent is revoked inter alia based on lack of inventive step over D3 in combination with D85.

T 0978/17
https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t170978du1.html

5. Zulassung von D85

5.1 Die Einsprechende 3 hat das Dokument D85 erstmals mit ihrer Beschwerdebegründung eingereicht, sodass sich die Frage stellt, ob dieses gemäß Artikel 12 (4) RPBA 2007 vom Verfahren auszuschließen sei.

5.2 In Reaktion auf die Einspruchsschrift und den Prioritätseinwand hat die Patentinhaberin im Einspruchsverfahren fünfzehn Hilfsanträge eingereicht, von denen keiner die mit dem Hilfsantrag XVII vorgenommene Änderung enthielt. Erst während der mündlichen Verhandlung im Einspruchsverfahren hat die Patentinhaberin in Reaktion auf einen Klarheitseinwand das Merkmal "parallel" zum Anspruch 1 eines weiteren Hilfsantrags hinzugefügt.

T 2092/18 - A remittal is an attractive thing

 Key points

• There is still not much case law about Art. 11 RPBA 2020 in cases where one of the parties protests against a remittal. The idea behind Article 11 RPBA 2020 is that the Boards remit a case only if there are "special reasons" for doing so. Though more precisely, the Board's own idea (fist public draft) was that remittal would be the default but after a public consultation the BOAC decided that "The Board shall not remit a case to the department whose decision was appealed for further prosecution, unless special reasons present themselves for doing so".
• In this case, the OD had revoked the patent on the ground of Article 123(2) and Rule 80. The Board reverses, such that novelty and inventive step need to be considered. 
• The Board decides to remit the case, despite the protest of the patentee.
• "The Board holds that the special reasons under Article 11 RPBA 2020 are immediately apparent in the present case as the contested decision does not deal with the issues of novelty and inventive step (Article 54 and 56 EPC) for any of the requests that were considered. "
• "The appellant requested to not remit the case to the Opposition Division to discuss novelty and inventive step since it would be a financial burden". The Board is not persuaded by this argument.

EPO T 2092/18 - link

4. Remittal to the Opposition Division

The impugned decision is only based on Article 123(2) EPC for the subject-matter of claim 1 and Rule 80 EPC for claims 1 and 3 of all the requests then pending before the Opposition Division.

Under Article 111(1) EPC the Board of Appeal may either decide on the appeal or remit the case to the department which was responsible for the decision appealed.

Under Article 11 RPBA 2020 the Board may remit the case to the department whose decision was appealed if there are special reasons for doing so.

T 0689/15 - New line of reasoning is exceptional

 Key points

• In this examination appeal, an auxiliary request was filed after the preliminary opinion of the Board, after the summons, on 23 July, in advance of oral proceedings scheduled for 17 September.
• “Therefore the board is not convinced that the arguments set out in its [preliminary opinion] differ from the arguments set out in the decision under appeal to such an extent that they present a whole new line of reasoning […] Hence the board sees no exceptional circumstance leading to the amendment which would justify admitting the auxiliary request into the appeal proceedings. Therefore the auxiliary request is not admitted into the appeal proceedings (Article 13(2) RPBA 2020).” 
• emphasis added. 

EPO T 0689/15 - link

4. Admission of the auxiliary request into the appeal proceedings

4.1 According to Article 13(2) RPBA 2020, "[a]ny amendment to a party's appeal case made ... after notification of a summons to oral proceedings shall, in principle, not be taken into account unless there are exceptional circumstances, which have been justified with cogent reasons by the party concerned".

The following explanatory remarks are given with respect to Article 13(2) RPBA 2020 in Rules of Procedure of the Boards of Appeal, Supplementary publication 2, OJ EPO 2020.

The basic principle of the third level of the convergent approach is that, at this stage of the appeal proceedings, amendments to a party's appeal case are not to be taken into consideration. However, a limited exception is provided for: it requires a party to present compelling reasons which justify clearly why the circumstances leading to the amendment are indeed exceptional in the particular appeal ("cogent reasons"). For example, if a party submits that the board raised an objection for the first time in a communication, it must explain precisely why this objection is new and does not fall under objections previously raised by the board or a party.

4.2 None of the arguments set out in the appellant's letter dated 23 July 2020 (see point XIII(f) above) is a cogent reason within the meaning of Article 13(2) RPBA 2020 since they do not relate to any exceptional circumstances.

4.3 The board is not persuaded that, in the present case, a redefinition of the problem to be solved constitutes an exceptional circumstance within the meaning of Article 13(2) RPBA 2020.

The application was refused inter alia because the subject-matter of claim 1 of the then first auxiliary request lacked inventive step over the combined disclosures of documents D1 and D2 (Article 56 EPC 1973).

In its preliminary opinion, the board agreed with the examining division that document D1 was the closest prior art for the assessment of inventive step (see communication of the board under Article 15(1) RPBA 2020, point 3.1).

The board tended to share the appellant's view that D1 did not disclose: determining whether the client's stored content had reached the allocated storage limit; delivering content to the allocated storage space if the storage limit had not been reached; and delivering content from the allocated storage space to the client while continuing to deliver content to the storage space if the storage limit had been reached (see communication of the board under Article 15(1) RPBA 2020, point 3.3).

However, in contrast to the examining division and the appellant, the board was of the preliminary opinion that D1 disclosed that limited storage capacity was allocated to each (entitled) user (see communication of the board under Article 15(1) RPBA 2020, point 3.4). The examining division reasoned that the "circular buffer" known from document D2 by definition had a limited storage capacity (see decision under appeal, point 10.4). The board was of the preliminary opinion that this was also the case for rented storage capacity and hence document D1 implicitly disclosed limited storage capacity.

Thus the board identified one difference with respect to document D1 (see communication of the board under Article 15(1) RPBA 2020, point 3.3), whereas the examining division identified two differences: the limited storage capacity and the difference acknowledged by the board. As a result, the board defined an objective technical problem (how to find an alternative to deleting retained content "due to an expired term or time") which was not as broad as the objective technical problem defined by the examining division in point 10.3 of the decision under appeal ("How to prevent the storage requirement in the server to grow above the storage capacity").

In points 3.6 and 3.7 of its communication under Article 15(1) RPBA 2020, the board in essence confirmed the examining division's reasoning set out in point 10.4 of the decision under appeal that the person skilled in the art would implement the storage space management known from document D2 in the method known from document D1.

In summary, the board's assessment of inventive step in its preliminary opinion was based on the same documents as cited in the decision under appeal (documents D1 and D2), and the board identified the same closest prior art (document D1). While the board was of the preliminary opinion that document D1 implicitly disclosed limited storage capacity, the examining division was of the opinion that limited storage capacity was obvious in view of the disclosure of document D2. The board confirmed the examining division's assessment that the person skilled in the art would implement the storage space management known from document D2 in the method known from document D1.

4.4 Therefore the board is not convinced that the arguments set out in its communication under Article 15(1) RPBA 2020 differ from the arguments set out in the decision under appeal to such an extent that they present a whole new line of reasoning (see point XIII(g) above). Hence the board sees no exceptional circumstance leading to the amendment which would justify admitting the auxiliary request into the appeal proceedings. Therefore the auxiliary request is not admitted into the appeal proceedings (Article 13(2) RPBA 2020).

5. Since neither of the appellant's requests is allowable, the appeal is to be dismissed.

Order

For these reasons it is decided that:

The appeal is dismissed.

T 1610/15 - Withdrawal request oral proceedings

 Key points

• R. 103(4)(c) provides that the appeal fee is reimbursed at 25% "if any request for oral proceedings is withdrawn within one month of notification of the communication issued by the Board of Appeal in preparation for the oral proceedings, and no oral proceedings take place".
• In this case, the Board addresses the question whether this means that also the respondent must withdraw its request for oral proceedings within said time limit.
• The Board, in translation of the headnote: "According to the wording of Rule 103 (4) (c) EPC, it is not a prerequisite that all requests for oral proceedings must be withdrawn within one month of the notification of a communication issued by the Board of Appeal in preparation for the oral proceedings. Rather, it is sufficient that a request for oral proceedings is withdrawn in due time so that the first requirement for a partial reimbursement of the appeal fee under Rule 103 (4) c) EPC is met."
• As a comment, I think that it is required that the party benefiting from the partial reimbursement withdraws its own request for oral proceedings in due time
  
  
• The application was filed in 2006. The opposition was filed in 2010. The appeal decision was issued in October 2020 so more than 10 years after filing the opposition. The case is remitted because the OD had only dealt with Article 123(2). The Board sees a 'special reason' for remittal in this fact, in combination with the parties not having commented on novelty and inventive step in the appeal submissions. 
• 
  
• About Article 123(2): "nach Ansicht der Kammer [ist] die Frage, ob unter einen geänderten Anspruch denkbare, aber nicht ursprünglich offenbarte Ausführungsformen fallen, in der Regel kein geeigneter Maßstab für die Prüfung von Änderungen hinsichtlich der Erfordernisse des Artikels 123 (2) EPÜ"
• The Board also comments on admissibility of the appeal.
• About transitional provisions: "Für die Beurteilung der Zulässigkeit der vorliegenden Beschwerde gelten die Rechtsvorschriften des EPÜ, denn die Zulässigkeit einer Verfahrenshandlung ist auf der Grundlage des zum Zeitpunkt dieser Handlung herrschenden Rechts zu beurteilen".
• Which makes sense. However, note that the RPBA 2020 are also applied to submissions filed before 01.01.2020, arguably retroactively.  

Entscheidungsgründe

1. Anzuwendendes Recht

Die dem Streitpatent zugrundeliegende Anmeldung wurde am 14. März 2006 eingereicht. Deshalb sind im vorliegenden Fall in Anwendung von Artikel 7 der Akte zur Revision des EPÜ vom 29. November 2000 (ABl. EPA 2007, Sonderausgabe Nr. 1, S. 196) und des Beschlusses des Verwaltungsrats vom 28. Juni 2001 über die Übergangsbestimmungen nach Artikel 7 der Akte zur Revision des EPÜ vom 29. November 2000 (ABl. EPA 2007, Sonderausgabe Nr. 1, S. 197) die Artikel 54 (1) und (2), 56, 100, 111 und 113 EPÜ 1973 weiterhin anzuwenden.

Für die Beurteilung der Zulässigkeit der vorliegenden Beschwerde gelten die Rechtsvorschriften des EPÜ, denn die Zulässigkeit einer Verfahrenshandlung ist auf der Grundlage des zum Zeitpunkt dieser Handlung herrschenden Rechts zu beurteilen (vgl. J 10/07, T 1366/04, T 1279/05).

T 1953/16 - Reviewing the first instance procedure

 Key points

• The opponent files new documents with its Statement of grounds. The Board applies the 'should have been filed' rule of Art. 12(4) RPBA 2007 and reviews the first instance procedure in some detail.
• I think we will see this more often in the future.
• “The opponent's main justification for filing documents D15, D16 and D17 was that the patent proprietor with letter of 14 April 2016, of which the opponent was notified only on 3 May 2016, had introduced a new argument shortly before the oral proceedings before the opposition division which took place on 24 May 2016. According to the opponent, the new argument concerned the structure of the compressor as a whole of D1 and not the rotor in an isolated manner, as had previously been argued by the patent proprietor [].”
• The Board: “Irrespective of the question whether the available period before oral proceedings (21 days) could be regarded as sufficient for carrying out an additional search, the board does not agree with the opponent that the patent proprietor with letter of 14 April 2016 introduced a new argument, which justified the filing of documents D15, D16 and D17 for the first time in the appeal procedure. ”
• The Board cites the Rule 79 response "on page 3 in the fifth paragraph" and analyzes this in detail: "The mention of the compressor contained in the reply [of Patentee] is brief and the specific problems involved in implementing the invention in the compressor of D1 are indeed not further explained. Nevertheless, contrary to the opponent's allegation, the patent proprietor's argument was directed to the structure of the compressor as a whole, not only to the rotor, and the above statement was sufficient for the opponent to realise at the very beginning of opposition proceedings that the patent proprietor was thereby casting doubt on the suitability of document D1 in the assessment of an inventive step"
• It does not help that the OD's preliminary opinion was favorable for opponent.
• The Board leaves open whether the documents at issue are admissible in reply to AR-1 filed shortly before the oral proceedings before the OD, because the Main Request is considered to be inventive (disregarding D15, D16 and D17)
• This indicates that it does not make sense to decide on the admissibility of documents in advance. In other words, a document can be admissible only in connection with some but not all of the claim requests.

EPO T 1953/16 -  link

3. Admittance of documents D15, D16 and D17 into the appeal procedure (Article 12(4) RPBA 2007)

3.1 Documents D15, D16 and D17 were filed for the first time with the opponent's statement setting out the grounds of appeal on 27 October 2016. The patent proprietor has requested that the new documents under Article 12(4) RPBA 2007 not be admitted into the proceedings.

3.2 According to Article 12(4) RPBA 2007 the board has the discretionary power to hold inadmissible evidence which could (and should) have been presented or was not admitted in the first instance proceedings. The provision expresses the principle that each party should submit all facts, evidence, arguments and requests that appear relevant as early as possible so as to ensure a fair, speedy and efficient procedure (e.g. T 162/09, point 7 of the reasons and T 724/08, point 3.4 of the reasons). According to the established case law of the Boards of Appeal, the filing of new documents for the first time in the appeal proceedings requires a sound and plausible reason in the specific case, in particular exceptional circumstances that justify the late filing of the respective documents. It follows that, in principle, documents could be admitted in the case of e.g. a normal reaction to a late turn of events in the opposition (oral) proceedings, an exceptional interpretation by the opposition division at a late stage or in the decision, or evident non-allowability in view of the newly cited documents and/or objections (see the Case Law of the Boards of Appeal, 9th edition 2019, V.A.4.11.3).

T 0100/18 - What's an appeal case amendment?

 Key points

• The patentee submits a letter as respondent after the period for filing its Appeal Reply Brief (I'm just making up a word for 'the response under Art. 12(1)(c) RPBA 2020'). The question is whether this letter is admissible under Art. 13(1) RPBA 2020. The letter contains new arguments but does not extend beyond the requests, facts, arguments and evidence 'die der angefochtenen Entscheidung zugrunde liegen'. Therefore it is not a change of the basis of the appeal proceedings ('nicht um eine Änderung des dem Verfahren zugrunde liegenden Sachverhalts'). The Board admits the letter observing that Article 12(3) RPBA 2020 sets out requirements for the Statement of grounds and the Appeal Reply Brief, but does not define the term 'amendment of a party's appeal case'.
• As a comment, it seems that if this line of reasoning is followed, the initial appeal submissions do not limit the appeal case for what is covered by Art. 12(2) but not included in the initial appeal submissions.
• As an example, the OD considers the claims as granted to be novel over D1 and over D2 and rejects the opposition. The opponent appeals and discusses only D1 in the SoG. Under the present decision, the opponent can re-introduce the novelty attack based on D2 after the SoG but before the summons without running the risk that the attack based on D2 is inadmissible under Art. 13(1) RPBA. I'm not sure if this is correct.
• Nevertheless, I expect we will see quite some case law about what the term 'amendment to a party’s appeal case'amendment to a party’s appeal case’ in Art. 13(1) RPBA 2020 means.
  The present Board takes an interesting position.
  
  
  

EPO T 0100/18 - https://www.epo.org/law-practice/case-law-appeals/recent/t180100du1.html

Entscheidungsgründe

1. Änderungen des Vorbringens der Beschwerdegegnerin [patentee]

Artikel 12(1) VOBK 2020 listet die dem Beschwerdeverfahren zugrunde liegenden Elemente auf. Darunter befindet sich insbesondere die angefochtene Entscheidung.

Der Brief vom 18. August 2020 wurde nach der Frist zur Erwiderung auf die Beschwerde eingereicht. Er ist daher nicht Teil des Beschwerdeverfahrens gemäß Artikel 12(1)c) VOBK 2020. Da jedoch sein Inhalt nicht über die Anträge, Tatsachen, Argumente und Beweismittel hinausgeht, die der angefochtenen Entscheidung zugrunde liegen, erfüllt das dortige Vorbringen die Erfordernisse nach Artikel 12(2) VOBK und ist auf das vorrangige Ziel des Beschwerdeverfahrens, nämlich die gerichtliche Überprüfung der angefochtenen Entscheidung, gerichtet. Es handelt sich bei dem im Schreiben vom 18. August 2020 enthaltenen Vortrag somit nicht um eine Änderung des dem Verfahren zugrunde liegenden Sachverhalts. Der von der Beschwerdeführerin genannte Artikel 12(3) VOBK 2020 nennt zwar Anforderungen an Beschwerdebegründung und Beschwerdeerwiderung, er definiert jedoch nicht, was als Änderung des Beschwerdevorbringens anzusehen ist. Der im Schreiben vom 18. August 2020 enthaltene Vortrag wird daher zugelassen.

Die in der mündlichen Verhandlung vorgelegten Fotos stellen dagegen eine Änderung des Vorbringens der Beschwerdegegnerin dar, die gemäß Artikel 13(2) VOBK 2020 grundsätzlich unberücksichtigt bleiben, es sei denn, der betreffende Beteiligte hätte stichhaltige Gründe dafür aufgezeigt, dass außergewöhnliche Umstände vorlägen. Der Wunsch die bereits im Patent bzw. im Stand der Technik durch Zeichnungen offenbarte Lehre zusätzlich durch Fotos zu illustrieren, stellt jedoch keine derartigen außergewöhnlichen Umstände dar, so dass die Kammer die Fotos nicht in das Beschwerdeverfahren zulässt.

T 2422/18 - The SME appeal fee rate trap

 Key points

• The appellant-opponent pays the appeal fee at the reduced rate for SME's by mistake on 27.09.2018. On 13.12.2019, the Board enquires about the missing SME declaration. 
• Fact is that the appellant is not an SME and does not qualify for the reduced appeal fee rate. 
• The appellant/opponent submits the following about re-establishment: " Ein Antrag auf Wiedereinsetzung könne nicht gestellt werden, da dies aufgrund des Ablaufs der einjährigen Ausschlussfrist gemäß Regel 136 (1) EPÜ ausgeschlossen sei." 
• This is not untrue of course, but re-establishment is in any case excluded for the filing of  a Notice of appeal by an opponent, Art. 122(1) and G 1/86.
• The appellant tries to invoke the principle of legitimate expectations.
• The Board does not accept this, because the debit order in Form 1038E was for the reduced appal fee. " Darüber hinaus war die nicht ausreichende Gebührenzahlung im vorliegenden Fall nicht als Mangel ersichtlich, da sowohl der Betrag als auch der unter der Rubrik ,,Gebühren" aufgeführte Text im Begleitschreiben für nachgereichte Unterlagen darauf hindeuteten, dass es sich bei der Beschwerdeführerin um eine natürliche Person oder eine in Regel 6 (4) EPÜ genannte Einheit handelte. Allein schon aus diesem Grund kann sich die Beschwerdeführerin nicht auf den Grundsatz des Vertrauensschutzes stützen."
• I note that the reduced amount of EUR  1880 was also mentioned in the Notice of appeal.
• Moreover, because the SME declaration can be late-filed in appeal, there was no clear error in the debit order that the EPO should have noticed.
• I note that in view of T 0160/19, the 'SME Declaration' for the reduced appeal fee appears to lack any legal basis in the EPC or in the Rfees although so far the Boards have stopped short of saying that.
• The Bord confirms that the underpayment is also not a small amount in the sense of Rfees8 following T 3023/18.
• As a comment, note that in case of a fee increase and the old amount is paid within six months from the fee increase, the deficit can be made up within two months from an invitation by the EPO; EUR 1880 was the amount of the appeal fee until 01.04.2018 (OJ 2016 SE2; OJ 2018 A4 Art.3(5).

EPO T 2422/18 -  link

Sachverhalt und Anträge

I. Die Beschwerde der Einsprechenden richtet sich gegen die am 20. Juli 2018 zur Post gegebenen Entscheidung der Einspruchsabteilung, gemäß derer das Patent in geändertem Umfang den Erfordernissen des Übereinkommens genügt.

II. Die Beschwerdeschrift wurde am 27. September 2018 eingereicht. An demselben Tag entrichtete die Beschwerdeführerin eine Beschwerdegebühr in Höhe von 1880 EUR. Dies entsprach einer reduzierten Gebühr, die für natürliche Personen und Einheiten im Sinne der Regel 6 (4) und 6 (5) EPÜ i.V.m. Artikel 2 (1) Nr. 11 der Gebührenordnung (Amtsblatt EPA 2018, A4)) zutrifft. Derjenige, der eine solche Gebührenermäßigung in Anspruch nehmen möchte, muss erklären, dass er eine natürliche Person oder eine Einheit im Sinne von Regel 6 (4) EPÜ ist (Mitteilung des EPA vom 18. Dezember 2017 über die ermäßigte Beschwerdegebühr (Artikel 108 EPÜ) für eine Beschwerde, die von einer natürlichen Person oder einer in Regel 6 (4) EPÜ genannten Einheit eingelegt wird, Amtsblatt EPA 2018, A5) . Die Beschwerdeführerin hatte solch eine Erklärung (nachfolgend "die Erklärung") nicht eingereicht.

III. Am 13. Dezember 2019 wurde die Beschwerdeführerin von der Geschäftsstellenbeamtin der Beschwerdekammer über die reduzierte Beschwerdegebühr und das Fehlen der Erklärung informiert. In ihrem Schriftsatz vom 17. Dezember 2019 erklärte die Beschwerdeführerin, dass es sich bei der Einsprechenden nicht um eine Einheit im Sinne der Regel 6 (4) EPÜ handele und die Erklärung daher nicht nachgereicht werden könne. Bei der Entrichtung der reduzierten Gebühr habe es sich um ein Versehen gehandelt, und der Restbetrag von 375 ¤ werde per beiliegender Einzugsermächtigung eingezahlt. Die Beschwerdeführerin beantragte mit Verweis auf den Vertrauensschutz, dass die Beschwerde als zulässig erachtet werden solle. Ein Antrag auf Wiedereinsetzung könne nicht gestellt werden, da dies aufgrund des Ablaufs der einjährigen Ausschlussfrist gemäß Regel 136 (1) EPÜ ausgeschlossen sei.

T 2415/16 - Withdrawal appeal during oral proceedings

 Key points

• Both the opponent and the patentee appeals. In the course of the oral proceedings, the Board indicates that the patentee's appeal is not allowable. The patentee then withdraws its appeal. The Board revokes the patent (as requested by the opponent as appellant) and orders the 25% refund of the appeal fee for the patentee.

EPO T 2415/16 -   link

IX. Verfahrensabschließend beantragte die Einsprechende 
die Aufhebung der angefochtenen Entscheidung und den Widerruf des Streitpatents. 
Das Begehren der Patentinhaberin beschränkte sich nach der Rücknahme ihrer Beschwerde im Termin zur mündlichen Verhandlung auf die Zurückweisung der Beschwerde der Einsprechenden, hilfsweise, bei Aufhebung der angefochtenen Entscheidung, die Aufrechterhaltung des Patents in geänderter Fassung auf der Basis eines der Anspruchssätze, eingereicht mit ihrer Beschwerdebegründung als Hilfsantrag 1 und mit Schriftsatz vom 9. Juli 2020 als Hilfsanträge 2 und 3.

4. Die Beschwerde der Einsprechenden ist begründet, da das Streitpatent nach keinem der Anträge der Patentinhaberin aufrechterhalten werden kann.

5. Nach Rücknahme der Beschwerde durch die Patentinhaberin im Termin zur mündlichen Verhandlung vor Verkündung der Entscheidung ist nach Regel 103 (4) a) EPÜ die von der Patentinhaberin gezahlte Beschwerdegebühr in Höhe von 25 % zurückzuzahlen.

Entscheidungsformel

Aus diesen Gründen wird entschieden:

1. Die angefochtene Entscheidung wird aufgehoben.

2. Das Patent wird widerrufen.

3. Die von der Patentinhaberin gezahlte Beschwerdegebühr wird zu 25% zurückgezahlt.

T 0241/18 - Losing an attack in the Statement of grounds

 Key point

• The opponent - appellant submitted an inventive step attack in a letter filed shortly before the hearing before the Board. The attack had been advanced in the notice of opposition and was pursued at the oral proceedings before the OD. However, the attack was not invoked in the Statement of grounds, such that submitting it with said letter is a change of the opponent's appeal case under Art. 13 RPBA 2020.
• The attack is not admitted because "has not been shown, nor even been argued that there are any exceptional circumstances which would occasion or justify the new - in the appeal proceedings - attack on inventive step." 

EPO T 0241/18 - link

1.2 In the letter of 25 August 2020 the appellant attacked inventive step on the basis of a combination of D3 and D4. This attack had been advanced in the notice of opposition (page 7, last two paragraphs) and was pursued at the oral proceedings before the opposition division (minutes, paragraph 8.2; Reasons for the Decision, section 4, page 8 second-fifth paragraphs).

However this objection was not invoked in the statement of grounds of appeal. Indeed, D4 was not invoked in any manner in the submissions on inventive step.

Raising this objection therefore constitutes an amendment to the appellant's case, made after issue of the summons to the oral proceedings on 15 January 2020. This is after entry into force of RPBA 2020, meaning that pursuant to Article 25(1) and (3) RPBA 2020, Article 13(2) RPBA 2020 applies.

It has not been shown, nor even been argued that there are any exceptional circumstances which would occasion or justify the new - in the appeal proceedings - attack on inventive step.

Accordingly pursuant to Article 13(2) RPBA 2020 the amendment to the appellant's case represented by the new attack on inventive step is not taken into account.