30 November 2018

T 1045/12 - Equally likely options

Key points
  • " The appellant further argued that the solution to the objective technical problem taught by D3 was one of several, equally likely options, the others being  [...]. In the presence of several, equally likely options, the board had to provide a reason why the skilled person would have selected the claimed option. The board is not persuaded by this argument because the fact that there are other options has no bearing on the obviousness of one specific option. Furthermore, if all options are equally likely, then the invention merely results in an obvious and consequently non-inventive selection among a number of known possibilities"
  • The Board then refers to " Guidelines for Examination, G VII 3.1 (i), November 2018" However, that paragraph is about common general knowledge and does not seem very relevant.
  • The Board gave this decision publication code [C] but did not highlight a particular paragraph. I find the paragraph about 'equally likely options' the most interesting. I am not sure why the Board refers to the Guidelines and not to the Case Law Book (e.g. I.D.9.18.9). 

EPO T 1045/12 -  link


4. Inventive step, Article 56 EPC 1973
4.1 According to the reasons for the appealed decision regarding the then third auxiliary request (the same as the previous version of the claims in these appeal proceedings), the subject-matter of claim 1 differed from the disclosure of D4 in that the controller responded to the user logging out by allowing data processing to finish if the log out took place during said data processing. No technical problem could be derived from the difference feature, as it was merely a security policy. The skilled person would have implemented the policy with "the tools at hand", for instance by applying the teaching of D3, relating to implementing this security policy in UNIX.

29 November 2018

T 1280/14 - Irreversibly divergent auxiliary requests

Key points

  • In this opposition appeal, the OD had allowed the Patentee's main request. The Board finds the main request not novel, the interesting point is the decision to not admit the auxiliary requests. 
  • During the oral proceedings before the OD, 15 AR's of Patentee were pending. The Opponent challenges admissibility of these AR's with the Statement of grounds, the Patentee resubmits the 15AR's with its reply, arranged in six "lines of defence". With the preliminary opinion, the Board doubts admissibility of these request, citing T1903/13 which states that the Boards have the power to not admit divergent auxiliary requests. At the beginning of the oral proceedings, the Patentee gives ups 13 out of the 15 AR's such that only AR 8 and AR 15 remain (corresponding to 'lines of defence' number 3 and 6).
  • The Board does not admit these twp request. The Patentee accepted/risked ('nahm damit billigend in Kauf') that the Board (and the Opponent) were unnecessarily preparing for auxiliary requests which were not relevant for the further proceedings. In this way, the Patentee caused the Opponent to incur high preparatory costs that could have been avoided. Hence, the Patentee has not acted in line with the prescribed procedural economy. 




EPO Headnote
Anwendung des Erfordernisses der Achtung der gebotenen Verfah­rens­ökonomie nach Artikel 13(1) VOBK wenn eine Patentinhaberin billigend in Kauf nimmt, dass sich die Beschwerdegegner und die Kammer unnöti­ger­weise auf Hilfsanträge vorbereiteten, auf die es im wei­teren Verfahren nicht ankommen kann, weil die Patent­inhaberin erst in der mündlichen Verhandlung eine Vielzahl von diver­gie­renden Verteidigungslinien, die von einer Hauptverteidigungs­linie abweichen und bereits in der vorläu­figen Stellungnahme der Kammer gerügt wurden, auf einige wenige der divergierenden Verteidigungslinien beschränkt.

EPO T 1280/14 -  link

Entscheidungsgründe
1. Zulässigkeit der Druckschrift D9
1.1 Es liegt gemäß Artikel 12(4) VOBK im Ermessen der Kammer, Beweismittel nicht zuzulassen, die bereits im erstinstanzlichen Verfahren hätten vorgebracht werden können. Unbeschadet dieser Befugnis, wird das gesamte Vorbringen der Beteiligten nach Absatz 1 von der Kammer berücksichtigt, wenn und soweit es sich auf die Be­schwerdesache bezieht und die Erfordernisse nach Absatz 2 erfüllt.
[...]
1.5 Die Druckschrift D9 ist deshalb im Verfahren (Artikel 12(4) VOBK).
2. Hauptantrag
2.4 Der Gegenstand des erteilten Anspruchs 1 (Hauptantrag) ist somit gegenüber dem in der Druckschrift D9 offen­barten Sicherheitsele­ment nicht neu (Artikel 100 a) und 54 EPÜ 1973).
3. Zulässigkeit des Hilfsantrags 1
3.1 Nach Artikel 13(1) VOBK steht es im Ermessen der Kam­mer, Änderungen des Vorbringens eines Beteiligten nach Einreichung seiner Beschwerdebegründung oder Erwiderung zuzulassen und zu berücksichtigen. Bei der Ausübung des Ermessens werden insbesondere die Komplexität des neuen Vorbringens, der Stand des Verfahrens und die gebotene Verfahrensökonomie berücksichtigt.

28 November 2018

T 0802/17 - Only one chance to file amended claims?

Key points

  • In this opposition appeal, the proprietor submits that the OD had committed a substantial procedural violation by not admitting a request filed during the oral proceedings. The OD had given the patentee the opportunity to file a request during the OP, which the patentee did, the OD had refused the opportunity to file a further request because this would not be "fair". 
  • The Board holds that this is not sufficient reasoning for the decision to not admit the request. 
  • The Board also holds that procedural economy cannot be a ground for the decision, because the OD had changed its preliminary opinion on Art.123(2) EPC during the oral proceedings to the disadvantage of the patentee. In particular, it was not clear whether the Patentee had to amend all pending request to address the Art. 123(2) EPC issue at once, or whether it was sufficient to do so only for the Main Request when that request was discussed. 
  • Therefore, there was a substantial procedural violation and the case is remitted. 



EPO T 0802/17 -  link



Entscheidungsgründe
Zurückverweisung an die Einspruchsabteilung - Art. 11 VOBK
1. Gemäß Artikel 11 VOBK (Verfahrensordnung der Beschwerdekammern) hebt die Kammer die angefochtene Entscheidung auf und verweist die Angelegenheit an die erste Instanz zurück, wenn das Verfahren vor der ersten Instanz wesentliche Mängel aufweist, es sei denn, dass besondere Gründe gegen die Zurückverweisung sprechen.

27 November 2018

T 1688/12 - Broadening effect of dependent claims

Key points

  • In this opposition appeal, the opponent based an Article 123(2) attack on the argument that by deleting dependent claim 9 and the corresponding paragraph of the description, a more narrow meaning was given to the subject-matter of the independent claims. In particular, claim 9 specified a feature in a rather broad way, thereby making claim 1 broader. By deleting claim 9, claim 1 hence was narrowed. 
  • The Board rejects the argument, on the ground that the mere circumstance that a dependent claim encompasses a large number of possible but further specified embodiments, does not mean that all the claims from which depends, are to be interpreted in such a way as to be consistent with all these unspecified embodiments. 


EPO T 1688/12 - link



Sachverhalt und Anträge

- Bezugnehmend auf den von der Einspruchsabteilung als gewährbar erachteten Antrag machte die Einsprechende geltend, dass die Streichung des ursprünglichen Absatzes [0021] (siehe EP 2 099 048 A1) sowie des ursprünglichen Anspruchs 9 gegen Artikel 123 (2) EPÜ verstoße. Aufgrund des Bezugs des ursprünglichen Anspruchs 9 auf den Anspruch 7 dürfe der ursprünglicher Anspruch 7 nur so ausgelegt werden, dass er nicht im Widerspruch zum Anspruch 9 steht. Dem Absatz [0021] sei entnehmbar, was mit dem Merkmal des Anspruchs 9 gemeint sei, wonach "der Kontaktestecker integraler Bestandteil einer elektrischen Steckverbindungen zwischen benachbarten Modulen ist". Die Kontaktestecker, die nach Anspruch 7 an beiden Seiten des Gehäuses des Relaismoduls angeordnet sind, seien nämlich integraler Bestandteil einer Backplane-Verbindung zwischen benachbarten Modulen. Das Merkmal "Gehäuse des Relaismoduls" von Anspruch 7 könne deshalb auch so ausgelegt werden, dass es auch das Gehäuse der Backplane-Verbindung umfasst. Mit der Streichung des Absatzes [0021] sowie des ursprünglichen Anspruchs 9 sei versucht worden, diese breitere Auslegung auszuschließen und darauf einzugrenzen, dass die Kontaktestecker an beiden Seiten des Gehäuses des Relaismoduls selbst angeordnet sind. Diese engere Auslegung sei ursprünglich nicht offenbart worden.

Entscheidungsgründe

4. Hauptantrag der Einsprechenden
4.1 Einwand nach Artikel 123 (2) EPÜ
4.1.1 Der Einwand unter Artikel 123 (2) EPÜ gegen den von der Einspruchsabteilung als gewährbar erachteten Anspruch 1 stützt sich auf das Argument, dass der ursprüngliche Anspruch 9 nur so auszulegen ist, dass die Kontaktestecker integraler Bestandteil einer Backplane-Verbindung zwischen benachbarten Modulen ist, sowie auf die Prämisse, dass der ursprünglicher Anspruch 7 nur so ausgelegt werden darf, dass er nicht in Widerspruch dazu steht. Absatz [0021] des Streitpatents, wird als Grundlage für diese Auslegung genannt. Dieser Absatz lautet wie folgt:
"Bei bekannten Modulreihen besteht häufig bereits eine mechanische und elektrische Verbindung zwischen den einzelnen Modulen durch die typische Realisierung eines so genannten "backplane" mittels Stecker/Buchse zwischen den einzelnen Modulen. Deshalb ist es vorteilhaft, wenn der Kontaktestecker integraler Bestandteil einer solchen elektrischen Steckverbindungen zwischen benachbarten Modulen ist."

26 November 2018

T 1868/16 - Plausibility strikes again (Everolimus)

Key points

  • In this opposition appeal, the Board gives useful guidance about requests for acceleration of proceedings.
  • More importantly, this valuable pharmaceutical patent is revoked essentially for insufficient disclosure of the second medical use due to lack of plausibility.
  • " It follows from the above that in the present case it has to be examined whether the suitability of everolismus for the treatment of patients with PNETs has been shown or at least made plausible in the application taking into account the common general knowledge of the person skilled in the art." 
  • The Board then analyzes what the patent application discloses.
  • " Paragraph [0052] provides nothing more than hypothetical statements indicating the possibility that some effects may be observed. The respondent's argument that the skilled reader would equate the expressions "may be observed" and "may be performed" with "had been observed" and "had been performed" and that the wording in paragraph [0052] was merely the inconsequential stylistic preference of the person drafting the application is not accepted." 
  • " The mere statement that chromogranin A reduction may be observed is not an indication that a clinical trial was on-going or that certain effects had actually been achieved. Moreover, in the absence of any information as to whether patients with PNETs have been treated or whether chromogranin A reduction actually correlates with tumour response in these patients, the mere statement that chromogranin A reduction may be observed is not sufficient to demonstrate the suitability of everolismus in the treatment of PNETs." 
  • " Paragraph [0053] of the patent in suit consists of a single sentence and states that "also synergistic effects of such combination are obtained" (i.e. the combination referred to in the preceding paragraph). Again this is a mere statement which is not supported by any factual evidence. " 
  • " It is the board's conviction that in these circumstances, where there existed no established relationship between mTOR inhibition and the treatment of PNETs, it was imperative to provide at least some technical evidence in the application as filed that allowed the skilled person to conclude that everolismus was suitable for the treatment of PNETs. A mere reference to the (desired) reduction of a biomarker that may be observed or a response evaluation that may be performed is not sufficient in this context." 
  • " The [patentee's] argument that it had been aware of intermediate results showing the suitability of everolismus in the treatment of PNETs, as the trial study reported in [D56] had already been on-going for several months before the earliest priority date, is not accepted. For sufficiency of disclosure, it is not relevant what the respondent was aware of, but decided not to disclose. " 
  • " Moreover, according to the [patentee's] own admission, the paragraphs on which it relied describe trials which had not yet been carried out and had not yet delivered any results. Indeed, the recruitment for a study of everolismus in monotherapy started well after the earliest priority date and the filing date of the patent in suit and results were apparently not available until several years later []. In the board's judgement, it is not justified to rely on knowledge which was acquired only after the relevant date to be used as a remedy for insufficiency of disclosure." 
  • Update 02.01.2018: the INN is "Everolimus" but the Board uses "everolismus". I've changed the title of this blog post to recite the INN.


EPO T 1868/16 -  link


Reasons for the Decision

3. Accelerated processing
3.1 As a preliminary remark which, however, is not relevant for the present decision, the board would like to note that it regards acceleration of the appeal proceedings as well as postponement of oral proceedings to be matters pertaining to the conduct of the appeal proceedings which lies within the sole competence of the board. It might therefore be questioned whether the grant or refusal of a request for acceleration or postponement is at all a decision within the meaning of Article 111 EPC for which the board has to give its reasons pursuant to Rule 102 g) EPC. Nevertheless, in the present case, the board agreed to respond to the respondent's request for being given the board's reasons on acceleration.

23 November 2018

T 2506/13 - Decision state of the file, procedural violation

Key points
  • Another decision according to the state of the file, another procedural violation for lack of proper reasoning.
  • The Board: "It is therefore not derivable from the impugned decision, which features of the independent claims according to, in total, four different pending requests, the examining division considered to be disclosed in combination in the prior art and which they regarded as distinguishing features."
  • "The board, and in fact any objective reader, is therefore not able to understand how the examining division arrived at their objective technical problem formulation "to adapt the general knowledge to a particular situation" without guess work. It is also not objectively determinable how the examining division arrived at their assessment of the solution."


T 2506/13 -  link








Reasons for the Decision


1. The appeal is admissible


2. Procedural violation


2.1 According to Rule 111(2) EPC, decisions which are open to appeal shall be reasoned.


2.2 In their decision according to the state of the file, the examining division makes reference to the communication of 27 May 2013. In said communication, the examining division argues, based on documents D3 to D10, what, in their own words, the skilled person's general knowledge was. It is not apparent from that communication which combination of features of the claims corresponds to what the examining division identifies to be general knowledge.


2.3 The examining division then goes on to say that




"the subject-matter of the claims differs from the prior art (the general knowledge of the skilled person as set out above) only by simple configuration features. The technical effect and problem solved by these features is to adapt the general knowledge to a particular situation. As adapting this knowledge to a particular situation belongs to the normal endeavours of the skilled person, the recognition of this problem as such does not involve an inventive step.

22 November 2018

T 0758/13 - Must restrict to illustrated embodiment

Key points

  • In this examination appeal, the Board finds claim 1 to lack support under Article 84 EPC.
  • "The wording [of the claim feature] is reflected in the description on page 6, lines 22 to 27" 
  • "However, in the detailed description of the embodiments, the rendering device consistently receives the first image component and the text component (typically the subtitles) as separate components." The Board then points to Figure 3.
  • "Summarising, the wording [of the feature] is partly repeated in the description, but the detailed description of the embodiments does not disclose the text component being an integral part of the first image component. Therefore, the board finds that this repetition of the wording of the claim does not provide support for claim 1 [...]" 
  • The Board also notes that according to some other feature of claim 1 "the text component is not an integral part of the first image component" but does not raise a clarity objection, nor explicitly identifies the relevance of this observation for the question of support. 
  • The Board refers to CLBA II.A.5.1. The decision indeed seems to be fully in line with that case law.
  • As a comment, assuming that the claim is novel and inventive by other features and that the skilled person has no difficulty in carrying out the invention (the Board makes no objection under Article 83)  the application is still refused because there is no drawing or detailed description of the feature. Even though the decision entirely leaves open the possibility that the skilled person would not need such a detailed description to carry out the invention. The feature at issue could even be entirely conventional.  The Board also does not say that the feature is an essential feature. 
  • As a further comment, it seems that the in the critical issue "the detailed description of the embodiments does not disclose the text component being an integral part of the first image component" the Board does not use "disclose"  in the sense of Article 123(2) - at least I assume that literally repeating the wording of the claim feature under the caption of "detailed description"  does not help. However, the Board leaves open what is necessary, perhaps because the Board does not identify any technical reason at issue for why the feature is problematic without detailed explanation in the description - at least I don't see such a reason explicitly in the Board's decision. 


EPO T 0758/13 -  link

Reasons for the Decision
1. The appeal is admissible.
2. Support by the description - second, third, fourth and fifth auxiliary requests (Article 84 EPC)
2.1 According to Article 84 EPC, the claims must be supported by the description. It is established case law that this means that the subject-matter of the claim must be taken from the description and it is not admissible to claim something which is not described (see Case Law of the Boards of Appeal of the European Patent Office, 8th edition 2016, II.A.5.1).
Purely formal support by the description through repetition of the mention of a claimed feature does not meet the requirements of Article 84 EPC (ibid., at II.A.5.2).
2.2 Claim 1 of each request specifies:
"a text component embedded in the first image component".
The technical meaning of this feature is that the text is an integral part of the first image component.
2.3 The wording quoted in point 2.2 above is reflected in the description on page 6, lines 22 to 27:
"the step of creating a three-dimensional image signal comprises including the text component in the first image component. The text component (for example a subtitle) [...] does not need to be transferred as a separate component. The receiving apparatus that is going to render the 3D image can still control the 3D display parameters in the region of the subtitle, even if that subtitle is embedded in the first image component of the signal".
According to the quoted passage, the rendering device receives the text component and the first image component as one single component.

21 November 2018

T 0588/15 - The gender of the skilled person

Key points

  • The skilled person, with their mind willing to understand, always seeks a technically meaningful interpretation of the claim. Where they experience difficulties they will read the claim in the context of the whole specification, including the claims, description and drawings." 



EPO T 0588/15 -  link



3.3 The skilled person, with their mind willing to understand, always seeks a technically meaningful interpretation of the claim. Where they experience difficulties they will read the claim in the context of the whole specification, including the claims, description and drawings.

20 November 2018

T 0287/16 - Contradictory passages in affidavit

Key points

  • In this opposition appeal, claim 1 is for a graphite sheet with two properties (thermal conductivity dispersion and roughness). The opponent alleges lack of novelty over a commercial product as prior use. There is no dispute that the graphite sheet was a public prior use, but opponent had measured the two properties only later. 
  • "the opposition division raised doubts as to whether the properties of the tested graphite sheets which form the basis for the results of D6 and D7 were identical to those of the graphite sheets available prior to the priority date of the patent in suit" 
  • The opponent then files an affidavit to declare " the manufacturing methods, [] have not changed to any material extent. In other words, no significant changes have occurred. (....)   the graphite sheets were created using the same method of manufacture".
  • The Board is not  convinced : "the cited passages are contradictory or at least ambiguous. The first of the cited passages permits some (minor) changes in manufacturing methods as well as in the properties of the final expanded graphite sheet compared with the graphite sheets publicly available before the priority date. No further details about the nature and degree of such changes, apart from the subjective statement that they were "no[t] significant", are given. In contrast thereto, [the second passage] stresses that the same method of manufacture (as in the past) was used and that therefore the product had the same physical properties, although this was relativised in the next sentence by a reference to a (quantitatively undefined) margin of error. " 
  • " Concerning document E6, this excerpt from a laboratory notebook contains a page dated 8 October 2006. A printed sheet seems to be glued onto that page, the printed sheet bearing a different date, i.e. 13 November 2006. The [opponent] has not provided a convincing reason as to why these two dates are different. " 


EPO T 0287/16 -  link


3.2 Prior use of HS-400
3.2.1 The opposition division found that the "HS-400 Heat Sink Material" having a thermal conductivity in a direction parallel to the surface of 370 W/mK and described in E5 was publicly available prior to the priority date of the patent in suit (see impugned decision, section 5). This finding is not contested.

19 November 2018

T 1985/16 - Number of inventive step attacks

Key points

  • In this opposition appeal, the opponent complains that the OD's decision contains no reasoning "as to why the [inventive step attack] submitted in writing [before the OD] and based on the combination of document D1 as closest state of the art with document D7 was not convincing." 
  • The Board agrees that the "decision contains no reasoning in respect of the line of argument of lack of inventive step presented in writing and based on the combination of [D1 with D7].
  • However, the decision contains a reasoning why the claims are not obvious over D13 with D7, and the opponent had acknowledged that D13 was more relevant than D1.
  • " Therefore, [the inventive step attack based on] D1 with [ D7]  can be considered to have been implicitly refuted in the decision under appeal in view of the reasoning concerning the combination of document D13 with document D7. The board also notes that during the oral proceedings the [opponent] did not identify the [inventive step attack based on D1] as the closest state of the art among the relevant ones, and in particular as going beyond the line of argument based on the combination of document D13 with document D7." 
  • "In view of the above considerations, the board is of the opinion that the lack of reasoning in the decision under appeal in respect of the combination [D1 with D7] did not amount to a procedural violation, at least not to a substantial procedural violation that would justify for reasons of equity the reimbursement of the appeal fee under Rule 103(1)(a) EPC." 



EPO T 1985/16 - link


7. Alleged procedural violations - Request for reimbursement of the appeal fee, and question of remittal of the case to the department of first instance
7.1 The appellant has requested the reimbursement of the appeal fee pursuant to Rule 103(1)(a) EPC and, in support of this request, has alleged a series of violations of the right to be heard (Article 113(1) EPC 1973 and Rule 111(2) EPC). The board has considered whether the alleged procedural violations would have justified the reimbursement of the appeal fee under Rule 103(1)(a) EPC and/or the remittal of the case under Article 111(1), second sentence, EPC together with Article 11 RPBA.
7.2 The procedural violations alleged by the appellant can be summarised as follows:
a) The appellant was not allowed to present during the first-instance oral proceedings arguments in support of the line of argument of lack of inventive step previously presented in writing and based on document D1 as the closest state of the art.
b) The decision contained no reasoning (Rule 111(2) EPC) as to why the line of argument submitted in writing and based on the combination of document D1 as closest state of the art with document D7 was not convincing.
c) During the first-instance oral proceedings the appellant was not allowed to present arguments in support of the admissibility of documents D3a to D3c, D8a to D8d, D9, D11, D12, and D14 to D24.
d) The sole reason given in the decision for the non-admission of documents D3a to D3c, D8a to D8d, D9, D11, D12 and D14 to D24 into the proceedings was that these documents did not appear to be more relevant than documents D1, D7 and D13, and therefore the decision was not properly reasoned (Rule 111(2) EPC).

16 November 2018

T 0861/16 - No silent approval of text during OP

Key points

  • In this opposition case, the OD had said during the oral proceedings that the description needed to be adapted. The patentee appeals against this. 
  • The minutes states that the OD had announced that the adapted text would be included in the Druckexemplar, and had asked the parties whether they wished to comment on that. The parties had no comments. 
  • However, the Board considers this silence to be not enough. In particular, if the OD makes amendments of own motion, the procedure of Rule 82(1) is to be followed and an invitation with a time limit of two months is to be sent, or alternatively an express approval of the text by the patentee during the oral proceedings. The principle of "qui tacet consentire videtur" (he who is silent is understood to consent) is not established in the EPC.
  • The decision of the OD hence involves a substantial procedural violation of Article 113(2) EPC. 
  • The headnote is, in translation" Since the principle of "qui tacet consentire videtur" is not established in the EPC, it is not sufficient to ask the proprietor if she whishes to comment on amendments of the description prepared by the Opposition Division. The OD must ensure that the proprietor agrees" . This is correct, for oral proceedings, Rule 82(1) EPC provides that silence of the patentee to the invitation, is deemed approval. 


EPO Headnote

Le principe de qui tacet consentire videtur n'étant pas établi dans la CBE, il ne suffit pas de demander à la titulaire si elle souhaite s'exprimer sur des modifications de la description préparée par la division d'opposition.
La division d'opposition doit s'assurer que la titulaire donne son accord (voir points 2.4 à 2.4.3).

EPO T 0861/16 - link


Motifs de la décision
1. Le recours est recevable.
1.1 La règle 99(2) CBE spécifie que dans le mémoire exposant les motifs du recours, le requérant doit présenter les motifs pour lesquels il y a lieu d'annuler la décision attaquée ou la mesure dans laquelle elle doit être modifiée, ainsi que les faits et les preuves sur lesquels le recours est fondé.

1.2 La mesure dans laquelle la requérante demande que la décision soit modifiée ressort toutefois clairement de la dernière page du mémoire de recours, dans lequel il est indiqué quels sont les passages de la description qui doivent être modifiés et de quelle manière.
2. Le recours est également fondé parce-que la décision est entachée d'un vice majeur de procédure.
2.1 Le texte du brevet tel que modifié est annexé à la décision contestée, laquelle toutefois ne traite pas les modifications de la description, sauf à la première page du formulaire OEB 2327, qui mentionne que la revendication 1 et la description colonnes 1 à 9 présentent des modifications proposées par la division d'opposition.
2.2 Le procès verbal mentionne (page 5, voir les trois paragraphes finals) que:
"La présidente indique que la description nécessite une adaptation, qui est discutée avec les deux parties pour un accord sur la version. Elle sera introduite par la division dans le druckexemplar et ainsi que les corrections de typographie nécessaires dans le texte de la requête subsidiaire";
et ensuite que:
"la présidente de la division d'opposition demande alors à chacune des parties si elle souhaite s'exprimer, ce à quoi les parties répondent par la négative".
2.3 Selon l'article 113(2) CBE, l'Office européen des brevets n'examine et ne prend de décision sur la demande de brevet européen ou le brevet européen que dans le texte proposé ou accepté par le demandeur ou par le titulaire du brevet.
En outre, selon la règle 82(1) CBE 2000 (correspondant à la règle 58(4) CBE 1973), relative au maintien du brevet européen sous une forme modifiée en procédure d'opposition, avant de prendre la décision de maintenir le brevet européen sous une forme modifiée, la division d'opposition notifie aux parties le texte dans lequel elle envisage de maintenir le brevet et les invite à présenter leurs observations dans un délai de deux mois si elles ne sont pas d'accord avec ce texte.
Comme énoncé dans la décision G 1/88 (point 5.2.2), la règle 58(4) CBE 1973 visait, et par analogie la règle 82(1) vise, à fixer la procédure à suivre dans le cas où la division d'opposition envisage un texte modifié sans avoir encore obtenu l'accord du titulaire du brevet à ce sujet. Si l'accord du titulaire est obtenu pendant la procédure orale, il n'est pas nécessaire d'obtenir une nouvelle fois, "conformément aux dispositions du règlement d'exécution", l'accord du titulaire du brevet, présenté comme absolument obligatoire à l'article 113(2) CBE, alors que cet accord a déjà été donné (voir G 1/88, point 5.2.3).
2.4 La question qui se pose dans le présent cas, dans lequel le texte du brevet n'a pas été proposé par la titulaire (par le biais du dépôt de pages de remplacement), est si on peut considérer que la titulaire a effectivement accepté aux sens de l'article 113(2) CBE le texte du brevet, en particulier le texte modifié de la description tel que proposé par la division d'opposition. La Chambre est d'avis que cela n'est pas le cas pour les raisons suivantes.
2.4.1 Le fait de mentionner pendant la procédure orale (voir le procès verbal, page 5) que la description nécessitait une adaptation, que l'adaptation avait été discutée avec les deux parties pour un accord, et qu'elle serait ensuite introduite par la division dans le druckexemplar ne peut impliquer, en l'absence d'une quelconque indication dans le procès verbal et dans la décision relative à qulles qu'étaient effectivement les modifications qui avaient été discutées et qui allaient être effectuées, que la titulaire était, lors de la procédure orale, en mesure de prendre connaissance de toutes les modifications que la division d'opposition allait elle même effectuer et de pouvoir ainsi donner ou non son accord.
2.4.2 Le fait que la division d'opposition avait préparé le texte de la description modifié, pour le présenter aux parties suite à la délibération sur l'activité inventive, comme le fait valoir la titulaire dans sa lettre du 1er décembre 2016, et qu'elle aurait alors "tenté de contester" mais que la division d'opposition aurait "indiqué que cette décision était déjà prise" ne se retrouve ni dans le procès-verbal ni dans la décision.
Indépendamment du fait que cela puisse correspondre effectivement au déroulement de la procédure orale, force est de constater que nulle part, ni dans le procès-verbal ni dans la décision, il est indiqué que la titulaire aurait donné son accord sur le texte modifié.
Le procès-verbal (page 5, avant-dernier paragraphe) indique que la présidente de la division d'opposition a demandé à chacune des parties si elle souhaitait s'exprimer sur les modifications de la description, ce à quoi les parties ont répondu par la négative.
L'intimée fait valoir dans sa lettre datée 20 septembre 2016 (voir page 4) que la titulaire avait donné son accord sur texte proposé par la division d'opposition. Cependant, elle ne présente aucun fait qui démontrerait que la titulaire avait donné son consensus explicite à un texte qui lui avait été présenté préalablement à la décision de la division d'opposition. Et même si l'intimée avait présenté de tels faits, il resterait des doutes concernant leur force probatoire vu qu'ils ne sont mentionnés ni dans le procès-verbal ni dans la décision.
2.4.3 En tout état de cause, on ne peut pas considérer que le fait que la titulaire ne se soit pas prononcée implique son accord sur le texte du brevet tel que modifié proposé par la division d'opposition. Le principe de qui tacet consentire videtur n'est pas établi dans la CBE et ne peut s'appliquer dans le cas en instance. La division d'opposition aurait dû s'assurer que la titulaire donne son accord (voir aussi, par analogie, le point 2.1 de G 1/88).
2.5 Faute d'un accord de la part de la titulaire à la version maintenue, la procédure devant la division d'opposition est entachée d'un vice majeur de procédure, Article 113(2) CBE.
3. La Chambre de Recours considère approprié de renvoyer le cas à la division d'opposition suite au vice de procédure, afin d'adapter la description et d'évaluer si éventuellement la décision concernant la brevetabilité serait influencée par le texte qui sera soumis ou approuvé par la titulaire, Article 111(1) CBE, Article 11 du règlement de procédure des chambres de recours (RPCR).
4. Au vu de ce vice substantiel de procédure, la chambre considère qu'il est équitable de rembourser la taxe de recours comme prévu par la Règle 103(1)a CBE.
Dispositif
Par ces motifs, il est statué comme suit
1. La décision attaquée est annulée.
2. L'affaire est renvoyée à la division d'opposition pour l'adaptation de la description.
3. La taxe de recours est remboursée.

15 November 2018

Publication codes

Just as a note, the following publications codes are/were used (as far as I know):
  • G - e.g. G2/88 - for decisions (and opinions) of the Enlarged Board of Appeal on referrals
  • R - e.g. R4/18 -  for decisions of the Enlarged Board of Appeal on petitions for review
  • J - e.g. J1/18 - for decisions of the Legal Board of Appeal
  • T - e.g. T3/16 - for decisions of the Technical Boards of Appeal
  • W - e.g. W2/10 - for decisions of a Technical Board of Appeal in a PCT protest procedure (concerning lack of unity of a PCT application in the international phase). The PCT protest procedure no longer involves the Boards of appeal, but the substantive case law on unity of invention remains relevant.
  • D - e.g. D1/79 - for decisions of the Disciplinary Board of Appeal (both on EQE matters and disciplinary cases).
Furthermore, these codes actually refer to cases. Hence, the codes can also be used to refer to pending proceedings (e.g. G1/18) (but also simply for parties in pending appeal procedures) and can also be used to refer cases terminated without a decision (e.g. G2/14, OJ 2015 A13).

Publication codes have also been used for the following publications, which are not decisions of the Boards of appeal:
  • L - e.g. L15/05 (OJ 2005 p.357) - These were publications in the OJ titled "Legal advice from the European Patent Office". All Legal Advices were abolished by Dec. Pres. OJ 2012 p.446 (which gives a non-exhaustive list of the Legal Advices).  The Legal Advice documents are not included in the EPO case law database.
  • V - e.g. V1/84 (OJ 1984 p.117). Some decisions of the Examining Divisions and Opposition Divisions were published in the OJ. Some of these published first instance decisions were given such a publication code, though not in the OJ but in some books. The reason is that these decisions were included in the EPO's internal case law database ‘Mimosa’ with such number, the letter ‘V’ stands for ‘Vorinstanz’ as explained in Singer/Stauder/Luginbuhl EPU 8th ed. Art.129 rdn. 9 fn.2. See also Watchorn&Veronese, PCT Procedures, 2016, p. 408; see V8/94, OJ 1995 p.388 in Vissers' AEPC, edition 2018, Art.52(2):2). There seems to be neither a public search function nor a list for this kind of publications, so the OJ reference is necessary to refer to them. 
  • DB - e.g. DB2/92 published in OJ 1994 p.750 for a decision of the Disciplinary Board of the EPO (i.e the Disciplinary Board, not the Disciplinary Board of Appeal). Another example is DB 03/15 in OJ 2019 A40.
  • CD - e.g. CD 07/2012 for a decision of a Disciplinary Committee of epi published in EPI Information 2017/4. 
The numbering is usually consecutive, but there are some exceptions.

There are a few J decision in the "900 series"; these concern decisions which have been published only in redacted form because they are excluded from file inspection. They deal with legal incapacity of a professional representative and the resulting interruption of proceedings (J900/85, J901/86, J902/87) or (the denied) legal incapacity of the applicant acting pro se (J903/87).
J900/85 is published in redacted form in OJ 1985 p.159 without a case number and the case is sometimes referred to as JXX/XX. The case number J900/85 was added as a fictitious number in the case law database (see here).
J901/86 was published as J../86 in OJ 1987 p.528
J902/87 was published as J../87 in OJ 1988 p.323
J903/87 as published as J../87  in OJ 1988 p.177

Decision G2301/15, G2302/15 and G2301/16 concern proceedings for removal from office of a Board member under Art. 23 EPC.

In addition, in the case of interlocutory decisions, these are given the same number as the main decision.
There appears to be no settled usage for differentiating between decisions in the same case. I have used a letter on this weblog (e.g. T 1627b/09). Visser uses e.g. G2/08a and G2/08b.
The most reliable and unambiguous identification of a decision is with the ECLI number (e.g. ECLI:EP:BA:2018:T193414.20181008); the ECLI is a case number developed in EU context (wiki). The number can be resolved e.g. as https://e-justice.europa.eu/ecli/ECLI:EP:BA:2018:T193414.20181008.
Three decisions or even more in total are also possible, e.g. T83/05 of 22.05.2007 (leading to G 2/07), of 08.07.2013 leading to G2/13 and finally of 10.09.2015 (order to maintain the patent in amended form); similarly T 1242/06.
ECLI numbers can be used to unambiguously identify not only interlocutory decisions but also in case of ancillary decisions (i.e. after the final decision) e.g. in T 1934/14 of  08.10.2018 (ECLI:EP:BA:2018:T193414.20181008).

An excellent explanation is also given on wikipedia (link)

In addition, the Boards give decisions a distribution key (see here):
A - publication in OJ
B - distributed to "board chairmen and members"
C - distributed to  "board chairmen"
D - no distribution

14 November 2018

T 2307/13 - Result to be achieved

Key points

  • [This post was prematurely published on 07.10.2018]
  • In this examination appeal, "claim 1 defines a semiconductor structure with a heterostructure comprising a layer of gallium nitride (GaN) and a layer of AlxGa1-xN, which has a standard deviation in sheet resistivity and/or electron mobility across the substrate within a specific range (less than 3 percent) but there is no indication of how these [advantageous] values for the standard deviation are to be achieved." This causes a problem under Art. 84 EPC. Note, claim 1 specifies also that the layer is " grown in an atmosphere that is predominately nitrogen with minimal hydrogen"; according to the applicant this gives the desired resistivity and electron mobility. 
  • For the non-chemistry readers, according to established EPO case law, for inventive step it is perfectly fine to define in claim 1 a product in terms of desired properties (T595/90) "if there is no known way or applicable (analogy) method in the art to make it and the claimed methods for its preparation are the first to achieve this and do so in an inventive manner" (which gives a patent protecting the all products with equal or even better properties, independent of the preparation method). Only before grant, the EPO may raise an objection under Art.84 EPC.
  • The Board notes that the preparation method of claim 14 corresponds to dependent claim 2, which would be a problem. I understand that the Board considers this to be lack of support for  the broader embodiment of claim 1. 
  • " The description does not provide any more information, either. In [the table] there are measurements of several semiconductor structures according to the claimed invention, which show different values for the standard deviation in sheet resistivity and in electron mobility across the substrate. There is, however, no indication of how the different values can be obtained, [i.e.] of the percentage of nitrogen in the atmosphere [] in particular, influence the consistency (uniformity) of sheet resistivity and electron mobility across the substrate. " 
  • The applicants points to GL F-IV,4.10 saying that " [claims which attempt to define the invention by a result to be achieved] may be allowed if the invention either can only be defined in such terms or cannot otherwise be defined more precisely without unduly restricting the scope" 
  • The Board: "The claimed inventions are, hence, merely characterised by the fact that they provide the desired technical effect. In the section of the Guidelines referred to by the Appellant, the sentence preceding the cited passage reads as follows: "As a general rule, claims which attempt to define the invention by a result to be achieved should not be allowed, in particular if they only amount to claiming the underlying problem." (underline by the Board). The Board is of the opinion that the present claims fall under the latter category."


EPO T 2307/13 - link

Reasons for the Decision
1. The appeal is admissible.
2. The invention
2.1 The invention relates to semiconductor structures comprising high electron mobility transistors (HEMTs) made of an heterostructure of epitaxial semiconductor layers consisting of Group III nitrides on a silicon carbide (SiC) substrate.
According to the description (paragraphs [0001]-[0011]), HEMTs made of heterostructures consisting of epitaxially grown layers made of Group III nitrides on substrates of silicon carbide (SiC) were known in the state of the art. In manufacturing such HEMTs, there had been a limitation on the size of the substrate (wafer) used. Good quality HEMTs were produced using substrates of maximum diameter of 2-3 inches (about 50 - 75 mm). With larger substrates, the forming of the heterostucture was less reliable, since uniform resistivity and electron mobility were not possibe to obtain throughout the whole area of the substrate. This led to unreliable, low(er) quality HEMTs. It was, hence not possible to obtain semiconductor structures with heterostructures made of Group III nitrides on substrates with at least 100 mm diameter that were of high quality and high consistency performance (paragraph [0011]).
On the other hand, the almost standard diameter of substrates for other types of semiconductor structures was 100 mm or more. Hence, it had been necessary to use specialized equipment when HEMTs were to be produced (paragraph [0008]).
The claimed invention consists of such a semiconductor structure comprising a SiC substrate with a diameter of at least 100 mm and a heterostructure of Group III nitrides which has essentially constant resistivity and/or electron mobility across the substrate and a method for manufacturing it.

13 November 2018

T 1861/11 - Consolidated proceedings

Key points


  • This decision deals with the refusal of two applications. The Board deals with them in consolidated proceedings under Article 10(2) RPBA.
  • The Board has an Art. 83 problem with the user interface invention at issue.
  • "The invention underlying both applications relates to user interfaces. When filing the present applications, the appellant chose to disclose the invention by means of a conceptual metaphor, a so-called "3D motion user interface" (610 in figure 6). The relevant disclosure is very brief and is limited to paragraphs [0036] and [0049] of the description and figure 6. ""
  • "In its preliminary opinion the board objected that an application relying to such an extent on abstract conceptual metaphors, without making it clear how these metaphors should be given a concrete technical implementation, was unlikely to be regarded as disclosing the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by a person skilled in the art (Article 83 EPC)." The Board remains of that opinion after the applicant's response.
  • The Board also does not accept the Auxiliary Request. "As a matter of principle, the board cannot accept that a deficiency in disclosure concerning the conceptual fundamentals of the invention can ever be remedied without violating the restrictions codified in Article 123(2) EPC. The remedy sought by the appellant [...] is effectively attempting to abandon altogether the conceptual fundamentals of the invention, when the sufficiency of their disclosure fails to satisfy the board. This is not only unacceptable, but would also clearly not overcome the outstanding objections of the board, as the amended claim still involves "switching" and "dragging" user interfaces" [these features being problematic under Art. 83].




EPO T 1861/11 -  link




Summary of Facts and Submissions
I. With the consent of the appellant, the board dealt with appeals T 1861/11 and T 1860/11 in consolidated proceedings (Article 10(2) RPBA).
II. The two appeals are against the decisions of the examining division to refuse the applications for lack of inventive step (Article 56 EPC).


VII. Claim 1 of the main request in T 1861/11 reads as follows:
"A method for operating a user interface (400, 300), suitable for an electronic device (200) having a touch display (210), the method comprising:
displaying a first user interface (400, 300) having a first plurality of finger-touchable icons;
detecting a touch of an input tool;
determining whether or not the touch is generated on a specific area (215, 230, 213) of the touch display; characterized in that the method further comprises:
determining whether or not the position of the touch on the touch display (210) is changed if the touch is generated on the specific area (215, 230, 213); and
if the position of the touch on the touch display (210) is changed, switching the first user interface (400, 300), which has the first plurality of finger-touchable icons, to a second user interface (300, 400), which has a second plurality of finger-touchable icons, according to a moving direction of the touch, wherein the second user interface (400, 300) and the first user interface (300, 400) are adjacent;
wherein when the first user interface (300, 400) is switched to the second user interface (400, 300), the second user interface (400, 300) is dragged out from a display edge (217) of the touch display (210, 710) opposite to the moving direction."






Reasons for the Decision
1. Main requests
1.1 The invention underlying both applications relates to user interfaces. When filing the present applications, the appellant chose to disclose the invention by means of a conceptual metaphor, a so-called "3D motion user interface" (610 in figure 6). The relevant disclosure is very brief and is limited to paragraphs [0036] and [0049] of the description and figure 6. Figure 6 depicts as a "3D motion user interface" an abstract three-dimensional object, seemingly a cube, and three axes of rotation, but no user interfaces. The only link between this abstract conceptual metaphor and user interfaces is the statement in paragraphs [0036] and [0049] that the user interfaces are located on its surfaces. The user interfaces may be on adjacent surfaces, which seems to be the case in claim 1 of the main requests. It is nowhere described, let alone shown in any of the figures, how the user interfaces are placed on the surfaces of the "3D motion user interface". Nor is it disclosed how the "3D motion user interface" depicted in figure 6 is displayed on the display of an actual electronic device.


12 November 2018

T 1653/12 - Impossible search

Key point

    • In this examination appeal, the Search Division had issued a declaration that a meaningful search was impossible (for the supplementary European search after EP entry).
    • The Board considers the claims as filed on EP entry to be insufficiently disclosed. 
    • The applicant had requested, as auxiliary request, "remittal for the establishment of a European search report". The Board notes, firstly, that a " further search report"  has no legal basis, but that a "additional search" may be possible. The Board notes that "the Examining Division affirmed the decision of the Search Division not to carry out a search and to issue a declaration under Rule 63 EPC instead. A remittal would be appropriate if the Examining Division's corresponding arguments [] are incorrect". (As a comment, I don't see why, if there is no auxiliary set of claims on file).
    •  The Board notes that (at the time of the search) there was a discrepancy between the wording of the claims and the description. " Hence, [the search division] was justified in sending out the invitation under Rule 63 EPC in order to clarify the subject-matter for the search." 
    • " The applicant's response to the invitation stated [] "Even if the Search Examiner's objections [would be justified] this would not obstruct him [from] searching for a) a magnetic detection device comprising fixed resistors having an electric resistance which is independent of the external magnetic field according to claim 1 and/or b) a magnetic device wherein the fixed resistors comprise the order of the layers claimed in claim 4.".
    • The Board: "Due to the "and/or" construction, this statement does not provide a basis for the Search Examiner to perform a meaningful search. This particular wording leaves it entirely open which of the two alternatives, i.e. the fixed resistors having an electric resistance independent of the external magnetic field or the resistors with the layers as claimed in claim 4 []  should be searched. Hence, it is plausible that a meaningful search could not be made, so that the reasoned declaration under Rule 63 EPC, which is considered as the European search report, was correct." 
    • As a comment, I suppose that the "and/or" is  not helpful, but I note that the Board does not give reasons why the search division could not search both embodiments. There may be lack of unity of invention, but that is Rule 64 not Rule 63. The fact that perhaps two alternatives need to be searched, as such does not mean that is it impossible to carry out a search for two subject-matters, in my view.



EPO T 1653/12 - link


Reasons for the Decision
Main request
1. Articles 83 and 84 EPC
1.1 The issue in dispute is the interpretation of the feature of pending independent claims 1 and 7 that "the first and the second fixed resistor having an electric resistance independent of the external magnetic field".
1.2 In the summons-communication (point 2.1), the Examining Division stated that the application did not "disclose any embodiment" of a resistor having an electric resistance independent of the external magnetic field and, hence, that the application did not meet the requirements of Article 83 EPC. In particular, the Examining Division pointed out that the appellant had acknowledged, in its letter date 26 August 2011, that the fixed resistors disclosed in the application (cf. Fig. 7 and 8, and page 31, line 2 to page 36, line 12) had an electric resistance that depended on the external magnetic field.
1.3 In the statement setting out the grounds of appeal, the appellant argued that the Examining Division erred in interpreting this feature with excessive strictness. [...]
1.7 The Board does not agree. As mentioned above, the wording of the claimed feature is clear as such, claiming explicitly that the fixed resistors have an electrical resistance independent of the external magnetic field and not a "small" dependency. No embodiment for such fixed resistors with no dependency of the electrical resistance on the external magnetic field is disclosed in the application. Hence, the skilled person does not know how to make fixed resistors with a layer structure as claimed with no magnetoresistive effect at all.
1.8 It is of no relevance whether the person skilled in the art might understand that it would be possible to use resistors with only a "small" dependency (no giant magnetoresistive effect) in combination with the claimed magnetoresistive elements in order to achieve a technical effect. That is not the subject-matter that is claimed.
1.9 Consequently, the main request does not comply with the requirements of Article 83 EPC.
1.10 Due to the contradiction between the claimed feature and the embodiments in the description, the claims also lack support in the description (Article 84 EPC).
First auxiliary request
[As an auxiliary request, the appellant requested remittal for the establishment of a European search report and examination according to Arts. 92 and 94 EPC.]
2. "Additional" search
2.1 According to Rule 63(2) EPC, last sentence, the declaration under Rule 63 EPC that was issued in February 2011 is considered as the European Search Report. There is no legal basis in the EPC for a further search report.
Hence, the Board interprets the first auxiliary request as that the application be remitted to the Examining Division in order that an "additional" search be carried out prior to further examination. The Board informed the appellant about this interpretation in the communication sent out with the summons. The appellant did not comment.
2.2 In the summons-communication, the Examining Division affirmed the decision of the Search Division not to carry out a search and to issue a declaration under Rule 63 EPC instead. A remittal would be appropriate if the Examining Division's corresponding arguments under section 6.2 of the summons-communication were incorrect.
This is also foreseen in section C-IV 7.2(i) of the Guidelines for Examination in the EPO (November 2017), which states that an additional search might be performed where, after a declaration taking the place of the search report under Rule 63 EPC has been issued, the deficiencies which rendered a meaningful search impossible under Rule 63 EPC have been successfully refuted by the applicant.
2.3 Due to the discrepancy between the wording of the claims and the description, the Search Division could not identify, on its own, whether the application was filed in order to claim "fixed resistors having an electric resistance independent of the external magnetic field", or the particular resistors depicted in Figs. 7 and 8 and described in the corresponding parts of the specification (page 31, line 2 to page 36, line 12), which do have an electrical resistance dependent on the external magnetic field. Hence, it was justified in sending out the invitation under Rule 63 EPC in order to clarify the subject-matter for the search.
2.4 The applicant's response to the invitation stated (paragraph bridging pages 1 and 2, emphasis by the Board): "Even if the Search Examiner's objections as regards Arts. 83, 84 EPC would be justified (which they are not, as will be shown further below), this would not obstruct him form [sic] searching for a) a magnetic detection device comprising fixed resistors having an electric resistance which is independent of the external magnetic field according to claim 1 and/or b) a magnetic device wherein the fixed resistors comprise the order of the layers claimed in claim 4.".
2.5 Due to the "and/or" construction, this statement does not provide a basis for the Search Examiner to perform a meaningful search. This particular wording leaves it entirely open which of the two alternatives, i.e. the fixed resistors having an electric resistance independent of the external magnetic field or the resistors with the layers as claimed in claim 4 (and depicted in Figs. 7 and 8) should be searched.
2.6 Hence, it is plausible that a meaningful search could not be made, so that the reasoned declaration under Rule 63 EPC, which is considered as the European search report, was correct.
2.7 Consequently, the position of the Examining Division as expressed in section 6.2 of the summons-communication was also correct.
2.8 The appellant discussed decision T 1242/04 "Bereitstellung produktspezifischer Daten / MAN", OJ EPO 2007, 421 in its statement of grounds (section II.2) and cited passages of that decision in order to support its position that a search in the present case should not have been considered impossible.
2.8.1 The Board notes that decision T 1242/04 dealt with former Rule 45 EPC 1973, which has a different wording from current Rule 63 EPC.
With the amendment of Rule 63 EPC, the provision was introduced that the Search Division "shall invite the applicant to file, within a period of two months, a statement indicating the subject-matter to be searched" (Rule 63(1) EPC) and that a reasoned declaration under Rule 63 EPC should only be issued "if the statement under paragraph 1 is not filed in due time, or if it is not sufficient to overcome the deficiency noted under paragraph 1" (Rule 63(2) EPC).
2.8.2 Since decision T 1242/04 dealt with a case, in which no invitation of the Search Division under Rule 63(1) EPC and no response thereto was present, the reasons of that decision are not directly applicable to the present case.
2.8.3 Further, T 1242/04 dealt with a case in which the reasons given by the Search Division for not carrying out a search were based on the assertion that the claimed invention lacked technical character. In that decision, however, contrary to the Search Division, the Board identified technical subject-matter and, in particular, it referred to original dependent claims 5 and 16, which "evidently" ("offensichtlich", cf. Entscheidungsgründe, section 8.6) contained technical features.
2.8.4 It should also be noted that the passage in T 1242/04 referred to by the appellant, when completely cited, reads, in the English translation, emphasis added:
"In the Board's view, Rule 45 EPC relates only to the practicability of a search and not to the potential relevance of its results in subsequent substantive examination. That is clear from the actual wording of the rule, which refers to the impossibility of carrying out a meaningful search in the event of serious violations of the provisions of the Convention, for example a fundamental lack of clarity or the absence of any technical character whatsoever." (cf. Reasons for the decision, section 8.3).
2.8.5 Hence, according to T 1242/04, fundamental clarity problems might make it impossible to carry out a meaningful search. The discrepancy between the claims and description is such a fundamental clarity problem.
2.8.6 In addition the appellant did not use its opportunity, as provided for by the amended Rule 63 EPC, to provide the Search Division with subject-matter on which a search could be carried out.
2.9 Consequently, the first auxiliary request, remittal for an "additional" search, is not allowable.
3. Reimbursement of appeal fee (Rule 103(1)(a)EPC)
3.1 According to Rule 103(1)(a) EPC, the appeal fee shall be reimbursed in full in the event that the Board of Appeal deems an appeal to be allowable, if such reimbursement is equitable by reason of a substantial procedural violation.
3.2 The Board does not deem the appeal to be allowable, hence the request for reimbursement of the appeal is refused.
Order
For these reasons it is decided that:
The appeal is dismissed.

09 November 2018

T 0969/14 - Partial transfer of priority?

Key points

  • In this opposition appeal case, the question is whether the priority is valid. The priority application D16 was filed by Chiesi, the application that became the patent in suit was filed by Vectura. The question is therefore whether Vectura " owned the priority right resulting from D16" 
  • There is an assignment D22 from Chiesi to Vecture of " rights to the ownership of application 3 (D16)" . However, there is a further assignment D23 "in which Vectura re-assigned to Chiesi the right to claim priority from application 3 (D16) in worldwide patent applications insofar and only insofar as said worldwide patent applications shall claim the Programme 2 formulations." The "Programme 2 formulations" are embodiments of the invention.
  •  The Board first notes that in G1/15 the Enlarged Board has ruled that entitlement to partial priority may not be refused for a generic "OR"  claim. 
  • The Board: "Once it is acknowledged that partial priority rights exist, they must also be transferable separately. This, however, has consequences for the remaining priority right, because the assignor is left with a limited right." 
  • The patentee had argued that according to   T 15/01 there is no exhaustion of priority rights. The Board: "However, an applicant can only claim a right which he owns and this was not the case for the priority right concerning the Programme 2 formulations. An applicant cannot transfer a partial priority right and at the same time keep it for claiming it in a broader context." 
  • The Board finds that "Consequently, the subject-matter of claim 1 as granted encompasses embodiments for which the patent proprietor did not have the priority right and for which therefore the priority is not valid."  
  • The priority is therefore partially invalid.
  • Claim 1 is therefore not novel over D14, a prior right under Article 54(3). D14 validly claims priority of D16 and which discloses embodiments for which the priority of the claim 1 at issue is not valid. Consequently, the main request does not meet the requirements of Article 54(3) EPC.
  • As a comment, I think that the Board assumes too easily that "Once it is acknowledged that partial priority rights exist, they must also be transferable separately." Not everything that exists, can be transferred under law. For example, under Dutch law, claims of a patent can not be transferred:  a person can e.g. be owner of a 50% share of a patent or a patent application, but claim 1 and claim 2 can not have different owners (same for the EPO of course). The same applies to e.g. pedals of a bike under Dutch law. The pedals and the bike can have a different owner once the pedals are removed from the bike, but not as long as the pedals are part of the bike, the owner of the bike is owner of the entire bike. I can perfectly agree to with someone to sell to him the pedals, or to sell to him claim 2 of a patent, but such agreement is without effect as a matter of Dutch property law. Hence, the fact that "partial priority" exists as a matter of patent law, does not mean that it is separately transferable. The latter is a priori a matter of national law. If Dutch law is the applicable national law, it must be concluded that the assignment D22 is without effect as to the ownership of the priority right (under Dutch law, there is a strict distinction between agreements and ownership, as in German law). 
  • Auxiliary Request 4 adds a disclaimer to exclude the "Programme 2 formulations", the disclaimer feature was in claim 17 of the application as filed."The amendment brought to claim 1 of this request overcomes all issues as regards the validity of the priority and the relevance of D14 under Article 54(3) EPC." However, AR4 is not admitted because it was filed with the Statement of grounds. "The patent proprietor could have filed a request disclaiming the formulations for which the priority was not valid. He even had an express basis for this in claim 17 as filed and in claim 16 as granted to address this very issue." The request should have been filed before the OD.



EPO T0969/14 -  link


Reasons for the Decision
1. Validity of the priority
1.1 Pursuant to Article 87(1) EPC, a right of priority originates in the applicant of a first application. Therefore, in principle, the applicant has to be the same for the first application and for the subsequent application for which the right of priority is invoked. However, pursuant to Article 87(1) EPC, the right of priority may also be invoked by the "successor in title" of the person who has filed the first application. By reference to the "successor in title", it is recognised that the right of priority, being a legal right, may be transferred from the original applicant to a third person. It is generally accepted that the right of priority is transferable independently of the corresponding first application. The transfer must have occurred before the filing date of the subsequent application. This is well established jurisprudence of the Boards of Appeal (cf T 205/14 of 18 June 2015, with further references).