T 1162/11 - Should or could have been filed earlier

Key points

• About Article 12(4) RPBA:
  " Since in fact almost every claim request could have been presented before the department of first instance, the question within that context is whether the situation was such that the filing of this request should have taken place already at that stage." 
• About the effect of lack of experiment results on inventive step in view of D6:
  " While neither in D6, nor in the patent in suit data are available that show an effective reduction in the risk of bearing premature or low birth weight infants (no studies in this respect were done), it is the results presented in D68 (and equally cited in D6 and in the patent) that make it credible in both cases that by treating the periodontal disease a reduction in the risk of bearing premature or low birth weight infants takes place. (...) Under such circumstances and considering the equal credibility of the teaching in D6 and in the patent in suit [], the technical problem is the provision of an alternative treatment."

EPO T 1162/11 - link 

The Main Request reads as follows:

"1. Use of an antimicrobial selected from stannous ion agents; triclosan; [...] bacteriocins; analogs and salts thereof; and mixtures thereof, in the manufacture of a topical oral composition
for reducing the risk of bearing premature and low birth weight infants in humans and other animals,
wherein the composition is in a form selected from a mouthrinse, toothpaste, tooth gel, tooth powder, non-abrasive gel, chewing gum, mouth spray, lozenge, and a pet chew product and comprises a pharmaceutically acceptable oral carrier."

Reasons for the Decision

Admissibility of the appeal

1. Rule 99(1)(c) EPC prescribes that the notice of appeal shall contain a request defining the subject of the appeal. According to the case law this is satisfied if the notice of appeal contains a request to set aside the decision in whole or, (where appropriate) only as to part and it is not necessary in the case of an appeal by a proprietor for the notice of appeal to contain a request for maintenance of the patent in any particular form, which is something which relates to the extent to which the decision is to be amended, and which is therefore a matter for the statement of grounds of appeal under Rule 99(2) EPC (Case Law of the Boards of Appeal of the EPO, 7th edition 2013, IV.E.2.5.2 c), in particular decision T 358/08 of 9 July 2009).

1.1 In the present case the notice of appeal included the explicit request that the decision under appeal be set aside (see point VI, above), which results therefore in the requirements of Rule 99(1)(c) EPC being met.

This fact cannot be changed by a possible decision on the admittance of the requests filed with the statement of grounds which is under the discretion of the Board (Article 12(4) RPBA). Such a decision will influence which requests must be decided upon on the substance, but can have no impact on the admissibility of the appeal, which is not a discretionary decision.

1.3 Accordingly, the requirements of Rule 99(1)(c) EPC are fulfilled. The Board has no doubt that all other formal requirements are met (which has not been contested by the respondents).

1.4 In view of that, the appeal is admissible.

Admittance of the claim requests

2. The main request, as well as the second, third and fifth auxiliary requests, were originally submitted with the statement setting out the grounds of appeal, and were subsequently renumbered with letter of 18 September 2015 after addition of two further requests (first and fourth auxiliary). Thus according to Article 12(1) RPBA, the main request and the second, third and fifth auxiliary requests form part of the basis for appeal proceedings.

2.1 However, the respondents considered that they should not be admitted under Article 12(4) RPBA, which gives the Board the discretion to hold inadmissible requests which could have been presented or were not admitted in the first instance proceedings.

2.2 Since in fact almost every claim request could have been presented before the department of first instance, the question within that context is whether the situation was such that the filing of this request should have taken place already at that stage.

Claim 1 of the main request corresponds to claim 1 of the third auxiliary request decided upon by the opposition division with the limitation of the medical indication to one of the two alternatives (only reducing the risk of bearing premature and low birth weight infants by deleting the reduction of the risk of atherosclerosis) and the deletion of the specification "by treating chronic periodontal infection" (see points IV and IX, above).

2.4 The opposition division found that the third auxiliary request did not involve an inventive step taking position on both alternatives (see point V e), above). The analysis of inventive step of the main request on file is therefore clearly an issue decided upon by the first instance. This is confirmed by the attacks of the respondent which follow the same lines as those before the opposition division and is not changed by the further amendment, which might be discussed under Article 123(2) EPC, but has no impact on inventive step.

2.5 The main request does not result therefore in a fresh case, which has not been examined by the opposition division. Moreover, the limitation to one of the two alternatives appears to be a genuine attempt of the appellant to overcome the objection by restricting the subject-matter to what in its view may be better supported by the evidence on file.

2.6 Consequently the Board considers it appropriate to admit the main request into the proceedings.

[...]

6.9 While neither in D6, nor in the patent in suit data are available that show an effective reduction in the risk of bearing premature or low birth weight infants (no studies in this respect were done), it is the results presented in D68 (and equally cited in D6 and in the patent) that make it credible in both cases that by treating the periodontal disease a reduction in the risk of bearing premature or low birth weight infants takes place. Indeed in D68 a case-control study of 124 pregnant or postpartum mothers was performed and a clear correlation was found between periodontal disease and preterm low birth weight (see abstract and discussion on pages 1110-1112), which makes it credible that by treating periodontal disease (as in D6 or in the patent in suit) a reduction of the risk of bearing premature or low birth weight infants is achieved.

6.10 In other words, the teaching of D6 is as credible (or as speculative) as the teaching in the patent in suit, all the more as no limitation on the quantity of therapeutic agent is given in claim 1 and as toothpicks were even mentioned as alternative to the now claimed forms of composition in the original application from which the patent stems (page 20, last paragraph).

With regard to the identified difference (one of the listed forms instead of a toothpick), no comparative data are available to show that an improvement or an advantage is present for the subject-matter of claim 1 of the main request over the disclosure in D6. Even the post-published study in D63, which has been cited by the appellant as evidence for the formulation of the technical problem, concerns the treatment with an antimicrobial mouth rinse containing cetylpyridinium chloride and its incidence on preterm birth (see objective), but does not provide any comparison with D6.

6.12 Under such circumstances and considering the equal credibility of the teaching in D6 and in the patent in suit (see points 6.9-6.10, above), the technical problem is the provision of an alternative treatment for reducing the risk of bearing premature and low birth weight infants in humans and other animals.

6.13 In view of the teaching in D68 which establishes the link between untreated periodontal disease and an enhancement of the risk of bearing premature or low birth weight infants (see points 6.8-6.9, above), the skilled person, starting from D6, would consider all known ways of treating periodontal diseases as obvious solutions to the posed problem.

6.14 The treatment of periodontal disease by means of topical oral compositions as the ones listed in claim 1 of the main request was undoubtedly known in the art (see e.g. abstracts of D1, D21, D22), which has not been contested by the appellant. The fact that other treatments, such as a mechanical treatment, were also known and possible does not render the treatment by the listed topical oral compositions inventive. On the contrary, it would render obvious also a further alternative treatment.

6.15 On that basis it is concluded that the subject-matter of claim 1 of the main request does not involve an inventive step.

T 1997/11 - Common general knowledge

Key points

• The Board considers the invention to be insufficiently disclosed, because D0,  a more detailed publication by some of the inventors (with a publication date after the priority date) on how the present invention is implemented refers to D3 (an earlier published article) for critical details of the used algorithm. The application did not refer to D3 and D3 is, as scientific article, not common general knowledge.
  
  
  EPO T 1997/11 - link

Reasons for the Decision

1. The appeal is admissible.

2. Sufficiency of disclosure (Article 83 EPC)

2.1 The appellant argued in the statement of grounds of appeal that the skilled person could have implemented the invention given the application description and having D3 available as part of his common general knowledge.

2.2 Hence, the first question to answer is whether D3 forms part of the common general knowledge of the skilled person in the field of blind deconvolution. The Board considers that this is not the case for the following reasons.

2.2.1 Document D3 is a scientific article referring to blind deconvolution of ultrasonic pulses for non-destructive evaluation of an object. As indicated in the decision under appeal with reference to established jurisprudence (Case Law of the Boards of Appeal, 6th edition 2010, I.C.1.5), the common general knowledge is normally represented by encyclopaedias, textbooks, dictionaries and handbooks. Only by way of exception, patent specifications and scientific publications have been considered to form part of the common general knowledge, e.g. if the field of research was so new that technical knowledge was not yet available from textbooks. Blind deconvolution is however by no means a new field of research, a fact which is not in dispute. Indeed, the appellant during the first-instance proceedings cited numerous other scientific publications dealing with blind deconvolution algorithms (referred to as D15 to D24), and a monograph was filed with the statement of grounds of appeal likewise showing that blind deconvolution is well known.

2.2.2 Among the wealth of publications dealing with blind deconvolution algorithms, D3 may be relevant merely in order to explain certain specific aspects of the algorithm with which the present application is concerned. In fact, D3 could only have been found as a result of a comprehensive search among the many specialised scientific publications in the field.

2.2.3 The Board therefore concludes that D3 does not reflect the common general knowledge of the skilled person in the field of blind deconvolution.

2.3 In these circumstances, the next question to answer is whether the skilled person could have implemented the invention on the basis of the application alone using common general knowledge in the field of blind deconvolution.

2.3.1 In the claimed invention (of all requests), a final set of ultrasound response data for the vascular tissue is calculated from (at least) the estimated first set of ultrasound response data (Xest), the estimated transfer function, and the (received) ultrasound data (Z).

2.3.2 The description of the application fails to describe at least one example of how this calculation is carried out, as required by Rule 42(1)(e) EPC.

The description dedicates just three lines (on page 8, lines 7 to 10) to describing how the estimate of X (Xest) and the estimate of the transfer function H is obtained. It indicates that the algorithm of the invention searches first for an estimate of X (Xest) that minimizes a certain error criteria. This criteria measures the differences between the observed data (Z) and the fitted model. Then H is estimated by a least-squares-fit algorithm.

2.3.3 It is pertinent to compare the present application to D0, an even more detailed publication by some of the inventors (with a publication date after the priority date) on how the present invention is implemented. Therein the authors explain (in the two first paragraphs of page 1128) that H is obtained in an iterative maximization estimation, and they refer the reader to citation [5] - which is document D3 - to obtain there the necessary details of the algorithm. D0 mentions a further particularly relevant aspect of the algorithm, i.e. the introduction of a cost function incorporating a penalty term which favours solutions with as few non-zero data Xi as possible, hence ensuring sparse reflectivity as occurs in intravascular ultrasound backscatter measurements (D3, page 564, right column, first portion of the third paragraph). Moreover, the appellant highlighted in the statement of grounds of appeal (point 4.3) the fact that D3 stresses that "sparsity of the reflectivity is fundamental to the approach" (page 572, last full paragraph of the left column; abstract; page 564, right column, second full paragraph; page 566, left column, last paragraph). Hence, according to D3, starting from the last paragraph on page 566, standard sparse matrix techniques are to be used. In section C of D3 these are applied to obtain the iterative estimate of Hi (hi in D3).

It is therefore clear that without the reference to D3 in D0 the reader of D0 would not have been able to reproduce the blind deconvolution algorithm of D0.

Likewise, since the application omits all the detailed and complex aspects of the algorithm described in D0 in combination with D3, the skilled person would not have been in a position to carry out the invention using just standard mathematical skills.

2.4 As a consequence, the Board finds that the application does not disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently complete for it to be carried out by a person skilled in the art, as required by Article 83 EPC.

Order

For these reasons it is decided that:

The appeal is dismissed.

T 1712/10 - Third appeal

Key points

• The present decision is the third appeal decision in this opposition case (filing date 14.08.1995, mention of the grant 29.03.2000).
• The Board confirms the established case law that an appeal is admissible even if the notice of appeal does not contain an explicit address of the appellant, and also if the notice of appeal does not contain an explicit request defining the subject of the appeal.
• After about 16 years of opposition procedure, the patent is revoked. 

EPO T 1712/10 - link 

Summary of Facts and Submissions

I. On 2 August 2010 the appellants (patent proprietors) lodged an appeal (third appeal) against the decision of the opposition division, posted on 4 June 2010, by which European patent No. 0 700 769 was revoked for the third time, this time on the grounds that the subject-matter of claim 1 of the main request and of the auxiliary request did not involve an inventive step, Article 56 EPC 1973. The statement setting out the grounds of appeal was filed on 4 October 2010.

[...]

Reasons for the Decision

1. Admissibility of the appeal

1.1 The notice of appeal contains the name of the proprietor and appellant, the indication "Opposition to European Patent EP 0 700 769 B1" and the statement: "Further to the Opposition Division's letter of 4th June, 2010 reporting the decision revoking the above mentioned European Patent, the Proprietor hereby files a Notice of Appeal in accordance with Articles 106-108 EPC".

The notice of appeal does not contain an explicit address of the appellant, Rule 99(1)(a) EPC.

However, it is established case law that the provisions of Rule 99(1)(a) EPC are deemed to be satisfied if the notice of appeal contains sufficient information for identification of a party, see Case law of the Boards of Appeal (CLBA), 7th Edition, IV.E.2.5.2, in particular page 953, line 8, to page 955, last line.

In the present case the board is of the opinion that the notice of appeal contains sufficient information for identifying the appellant(s), namely appellant/proprietor 1, BP Chemicals Limited, and appellant/proprietor 2, BP Chemicals S.N.C. It may be noticed that current name of appellant 1 is Ineos Sales (UK) Limited.

1.2 The notice of appeal does not contain an explicit request defining the subject of the appeal, cf Rule 99(1)(c) EPC.

It is also established case law that the provisions of Rule 99(1)(c) EPC are deemed to be satisfied if the statement setting out the grounds of appeal indicates the extent to which the decision impugned is to be amended (cf Rule 99(2) EPC). Moreover, when the notice of appeal filed by a patent proprietor is directed against a decision of an opposition division, in which the only ruling is that the patent is revoked (which is the case here), and if said notice contains the wording "(we) hereby file a notice of appeal" or similar, the provisions of Rule 99(1)(c) EPC are also deemed to be satisfied, see CLBA (loc. cit.), in particular page 956, line 13, to page 956, line 30.

1.3 For the above reasons, the appeal is admissible.

2. Admittance of the second auxiliary request into the opposition appeal proceedings

2.1 In exercising its discretion under Article 114(2) EPC 1973, the opposition division did not admit the second auxiliary request, which was filed during the third oral proceedings before the opposition division, into the opposition proceedings, on the grounds that it was late-filed.

The second auxiliary request of the appellant is identical to the second auxiliary request that was not admitted by the opposition division.

2.2 It is established case law that in general "..., it is not the function of a Board of Appeal to review all the facts and circumstances of the case as if it were in the place of the first instance department, in order to decide whether or not it would have exercised such discretion in the same way as the first instance department", see G 7/93, OJ EPO 1994, 775, point 2.6 of the Reasons.

A board of appeal should only overrule the way in which a department of first instance has exercised its discretion it has applied the wrong principles, or not taken account of the right principles, or has acted in an unreasonable way and has thus exceeded the proper limits of its discretion, see G 7/93 (loc. cit.).

The board expressed in its communication (see point II above) that the opposition division did not act in an unreasonable way by not admitting the second auxiliary request into the proceedings, and that therefore it was currently not inclined to admit the second auxiliary request into the opposition appeal proceedings.

Since these findings were not contested, the board has no reason to deviate from them. Consequently, the second auxiliary request of the appellants is not admitted into the opposition appeal proceedings.

T 1385/12 - Scheme for playing games

Key points

• " Thus, whilst claim 1 is not restricted to any particular game, and therefore its subject matter is not founded on any specific game rule, the Board considers that the game developer's choice of having the y coordinate of the slide start-point set a game parameter used in game processes nevertheless represents a non-technical generic scheme for playing various games. Therefore it is excluded from patentability under Article 52(2)(c) EPC." (as part of the assessment of inventive step of claim 1 under essentially, the Comvik approach). 

T 1385/12 - link

3.2 In D3 the swing speed of the shot, a further parameter used for determining game processes, is not determined by the other coordinate ("y") of the stop position but by the speed of the slide operation to the right, see also the application as published, paragraph [0003]).

Thus, the game apparatus of claim 1 differs from that of D3 in that the first parameter setting means is additionally for setting at least another first parameter according to another element of the two-dimensional coordinates of said operating position that satisfies the first requirement, the game processing means performing game processes based also on this parameter. The claimed game apparatus is therefore new with respect to D3.

3.3 The Board must therefore consider whether this differing feature contributes an inventive step.

3.3.1 With respect to D3, the application states the game using this apparatus is so simple that it may lack interesting characteristics (published application, paragraph [0005]). The central idea of the invention is to interact with a game apparatus in a new way, giving rise to the effect that the game is more interesting (published application, paragraph [0007]). Since the screen of D3 is indisputably a touch-screen on which slide gestures are performed (see figures 8 to 11), this idea does not reside in these known features per se, but rather in a new way of deriving parameters from the interaction with the touch screen.

In particular, this new way of interacting with the apparatus generates a further parameter used in game play from the y coordinate of the start of a slide action.

3.3.2 The Board holds it unlikely that such an idea would be conceived of by an engineer tasked with designing a new interface, which could then be used in developing new games, much as would be the case for, say, a new button provided on a joystick.

T 0105/11 - Corrected decision and appeal

Key points

• In this case, the Examining Division had re-issued a "second decision", intended as correction under Rule 140 EPC of the first decision. The Board follows established case law and finds that the date of notification of the corrected decision does not restart the time limits for submitting the Notice of appeal and the Statement of grounds. Therefore, the Statement of ground was filed late. It was filed at the end of four months from the second decision.
• The Board applies the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations and decides that the statement of grounds of appeal is deemed to have been filed in time, "albeit not entirely without hesitation".

 EPO T 0105/11 - [C] - link

Summary of Facts and Submissions

I. The appeal relates to European patent application No. 05771127.7. The application was refused in oral proceedings held on 30 June 2010. The decision was subsequently put in writing and despatched on 29 July 2010.

II. With a letter dated 19 August 2010, the applicant (appellant) noted that point 3.1 of the grounds for the decision referred to a main request and an auxiliary request, but that no auxiliary request had been on file. It requested that the decision be corrected accordingly.

III. On 6 September 2010, the Examining Division re-issued the written decision with a new date and with point 3.1 of the grounds for the decision corrected.

Reasons for the Decision

1. Admissibility of the appeal

1.1 Once an examining division has taken a decision, in the absence of an admissible and allowable appeal it has no power to withdraw that decision and to take a new decision. The re-issuing of the (corrected) written decision on 6 September 2010 therefore does not invalidate the decision issued on 29 July 2010.

1.2 The re-issued decision was evidently intended as a response to the appellant's request for correction of an obvious mistake in the first written decision (Rule 140 EPC), but the form in which it was issued does not make this unambiguously clear. The Board need not decide whether the re-issued decision is legally void or whether, despite its deficient form and in particular the lack of a clear and correct indication of its nature and legal basis, it corrects the first written decision with retrospective effect and, hence, without changing its date (see decision T 116/90 of 3 December 1990, reasons 1). What matters is that, in either case, the date of notification of the decision refusing the application remains the date of notification of the first written decision.

1.3 In the notice of appeal, the appellant requested that the "Decision of September 6, 2010" be set aside. But in view of the further reference to "the refusal of the European patent application" and the appellant's request that "the patent be granted", there can be no doubt that the notice of appeal is to be understood as being directed against the decision refusing the application given in oral proceedings and posted on 29 July 2010.

1.4 Since the written decision of 29 July 2010 is deemed to have been notified on 8 August 2010 (Rule 126(2) EPC), the time limits for filing the notice of appeal and the statement of grounds of appeal laid down in Article 108 EPC expired on Friday, 8 October 2010 and on Wednesday, 8 December 2010, respectively. The notice of appeal was therefore received in time, but the statement of grounds of appeal was not.

1.5 Since the notice of appeal does not contain any statement indicating the reasons for setting aside the decision impugned as required by Article 108, third sentence, and Rule 99(2) EPC, the fact that the statement of grounds of appeal was filed out of time in principle has the consequence that the appeal is to be found inadmissible (Rule 101(1) EPC).

1.6 However, in several cases involving the issuing of a "second decision" by the department of first instance, the boards of appeal have held that an appeal which in principle would have to be rejected as inadmissible should, in the circumstances of those cases, nevertheless be found admissible in view of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations.

1.7 The circumstances of those cases were as follows.

In decision T 1176/00 of 23 July 2003, the EPO had sent a communication to the parties to the effect that the first written decision was withdrawn and that the corrected version would be issued as soon as possible. The board considered that the appellant in that case presumably had relied on this - legally incorrect - communication and that it would therefore conflict with the principle of protection of legitimate expectations to regard the appeal as inadmissible.

In decision T 1081/02 of 13 January 2004, the EPO had informed the parties that the first written decision had been issued erroneously and was to be considered void. This communication, although legally incorrect, had caused the parties to await the second written decision and consequently miss the original time limit for filing their appeals. Although both parties had been professionally represented and should therefore have been aware of the legal situation, the board considered that it would not be consistent with the principle of protection of legitimate expectations if the EPO's legally incorrect communication were allowed to negatively affect the appellants.

In decision T 830/03 of 21 September 2004, the EPO had informed the parties, after a notice of appeal had already been received, that the first written decision "was only a draft". This led the appellant to await a second written decision before filing a second notice of appeal and, outside the period of four months after the date of notification of the first written decision but within the four months after notification of the second decision, a statement of grounds of appeal. Since the appellant had been misled, in application of the principle of protection of legitimate expectations the statement of grounds of appeal was deemed to have been filed within the time limit of Article 108 EPC.

In decision T 993/06 of 21 November 2007, the opposition division had issued two decisions dated 13 April 2006 and 22 May 2006, the second decision being accompanied by a communication containing the information "please find enclosed an Interlocutory Decision with a new date". The appellant-opponent filed a notice of appeal in due time, but filed a statement of grounds of appeal only within the four months after notification of the second decision. Since the opposition division and thus the EPO itself had caused confusion by issuing two decisions, regarding the appeal as inadmissible was considered to be in conflict with the principle of protection of legitimate expectations. The board in that case appears to have considered it relevant that the notice of appeal had been filed in time, so that the legitimate interests of the proprietor had been safeguarded.

In decision T 130/07 of 22 February 2008, the second written decision was accompanied by a communication stating that the first written decision was to be considered void. The appellant-opponent filed the notice of appeal and the statement of grounds only within the time limits with respect to the second written decision. The board noted that, by that time, a professional representative could have been aware of the relevant jurisprudence and have known that such "second decisions" changed neither the date of the decision nor the period for filing an appeal. On the other hand it had to be noted that, despite this same jurisprudence, the EPO still proved incapable of avoiding the mistake of issuing "second decisions" with alleged new dates and alleged new time limits for appeal instead of unambiguous correction decisions as provided for by Rule 140 EPC. The board considered that applying the principle of protection of legitimate expectations did not infringe the legitimate interests of the proprietor, since the way the opposition division had handled the case had not given the proprietor ground to believe that the decision had become res judicata.

1.8 The present case may be distinguished from those discussed above in that the appellant explicitly requested that the written decision be corrected. Although the correction decision was still issued in an incorrect form and, when considered on its own, still suggested a new date and time limit, it appears that the professionally represented appellant should have been aware that the second decision intended to correct, as requested by the appellant itself, the first written decision under Rule 140 EPC.

1.9 In addition, in the cases discussed above the EPO had made explicit statements to the effect that the first decision was to be ignored. In the present case no such explicit statement was made. Although the form and the new date of the second written decision may well have confused the appellant, it could be argued that any such confusion was the result of an incorrect legal understanding of the meaning of a correction decision rather than reliance on an unambiguous statement made by the EPO.

1.10 Nevertheless, it is still imputable to the EPO that the second written decision was not correctly and unambiguously identified as a correction decision in the first place (cf. decision T 130/07, supra, reasons 1.9 and 1.10). The Board does not doubt that this explains why the appellant directed the notice of appeal and the statement of grounds of appeal against the "Decision of September 6, 2010" and filed them within two and four months, respectively, from that decision's date of notification.

1.11 For this reason, albeit not entirely without hesitation, the Board holds, in application of the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, that the statement of grounds of appeal is deemed to have been filed in time.

1.12 Since the appeal also complies with the other provisions referred to in Rule 101 EPC, it is admissible.

T 1845/11 - Asian race unclear

Key points

• A Swiss-tpe claim for "use of recombinant IFN-beta for the production of a medicament treatment of HCV infection by subcutaneous administration to patients of Asian race" is held to be unclear because of the undefined "Asian race" .

T 1845/11 - link

Summary of Facts and Submissions

I. The appeal of the applicant (appellant) lies against the decision of the examining division refusing European patent application No. 03755981.2 entitled "Treatment of hepatitis C in the Asian population with subcutaneous interferon beta" and claiming priority of an earlier application filed on 3 June 2002.

II. The main request before the examining division had one independent claim, which reads as follows:

"1. Use of recombinant interferon-beta-1a (IFN-beta) for the production of a medicament for the treatment of HCV infection by subcutaneous administration to patients of Asian race, who failed to respond to a previous treatment with interferon-alpha (IFN-alpha), in which the dosages and regimens of the treatment are selected in the group consisting of: 12 MIU (44 mcg) recombinant IFN-beta-1a daily, 24 MIU (88 mcg) recombinant IFN-beta-1a three times a week, and 24 MIU (88 mcg) recombinant IFN-beta-1a daily."

III. The sole ground for the refusal of the application was that the subject-matter of claims 1 to 3 lacked clarity (Article 84 EPC). Specifically, the examining division held (see decision under appeal, point 7.4.2) that

"the present application does not clearly define "Asian race"."

[...]

Reasons for the Decision

T 0243/13 - Conditional ground of opposition

Key points

• Insufficient disclosure is sometimes raised as ground  of opposition in a squeeze with e.g. lack of inventive step. However, in such cases, it is important that the ground is not raised merely conditionally. 

T 0243/13 - link

T 2054/11 - Offering a witness

Key points

• Offering a witness should be done by submitting a formal request, indicating the issue the witness will speak about.

T 2054/11 - [C] - link

Sachverhalt und Anträge

VII. Die Beschwerdeführerin Einsprechende hat im Wesentlichen folgende Argumente vorgetragen:

Einvernahme von Zeugen

Mit Schreiben vom 23. März 2010 sei die offenkundige Vorbenutzung des Gegenstandes nach Anspruch 1 in Form des Diavortrags D10 und einer Präsentation am zerlegten Motor während der BMW Techniktage 2004 in jedem Fall angesprochen worden. Herr Steinparzer sei ein hervorragender Techniker und könne aus diesem Grund Tatsachen aus der bereits mit Einspruchseinlegung eingereichten Veröffentlichung D5 bezeugen. Erst in der Verhandlung vor der Einspruchsabteilung wurde ausgeführt, dass D5 nicht relevant sei. Die Einsprechende hatte folglich keine Zeit, zuvor einen lückenlosen Nachweis für die Vorbenutzung basierend auf D5 zu führen. Daraufhin sei mit Schreiben vom 27. Mai 2014 spezifisch angesprochen worden, dass Merkmale des Anspruchs 1 aus der Diashow bzw. dem ausgestellten Motor abgeleitet werden konnten. Merkmal "h)" sei allerdings nicht auf Seite 4 der D5, sondern auf Seite 7 der D5 ersichtlich. Durch Einvernahme der beiden angebotenen Zeugen sei sowohl eine Herausarbeitung als auch Bezeugung möglich, dass einzelne Merkmale des Anspruchs 1, insbesondere Merkmal "h)", zu sehen gewesen seien. Ohne Anhörung der Zeugen sei die offenkundige Vorbenutzung jedoch nicht bewiesen, wie im Übrigen von der Einspruchsabteilung korrekt befunden. Die Entscheidung der Einspruchsabteilung, den bereits am 23. März 2010 benannten Zeugen Herr Steinparzer nicht zu hören, stelle daher einen schwerwiegenden Verfahrensfehler dar. Somit sei eine Vernehmung der Zeugen Steinparzer und Bruch durch die Beschwerdekammer bzw. durch die Einspruchsabteilung nach Zurückverweisung an die erste Instanz gerechtfertigt.

Entscheidungsgründe

1. Die Beschwerde ist zulässig.

2. Einvernahme von verspätet angebotenen Zeugen

Es herrscht Übereinstimmung unter den Parteien, dass die angeblich offenkundigen Vorbenutzungen während des BMW-Techniktags in München und Steyr, erstens durch Diavorführung des Dokuments D5 und zweitens durch Präsentation eines zerlegten Motors aus Dokument D5, mit Schriftsatz der Einsprechenden Beschwerdeführerin vom 23. März 2010 geltend gemacht wurden. Bis zu diesem Zeitpunkt war der Einspruch der Beschwerdeführerin, was die Veröffentlichung am BMW Techniktag betrifft, nur auf den schriftlichen Stand der Technik D5 gestützt.

2.2 Die Kammer verweist auf die ständige Rechtsprechung der Beschwerdekammern(vgl. Rechtsprechung der Beschwerdekammern des EPA, 7. Auflage 2013 (ReBK), III.G.4.3.2), wonach das Europäische Patentamt an die Behauptung einer Vorbenutzung sehr strenge Anforderungen stellt. Es gilt der hohe Beweismaßstab des (fast) zweifelsfreien Nachweises. Dies ergibt sich insbesondere aus dem Umstand, dass praktisch alle Beweismittel dem Wissen des Einsprechenden unterliegen, wohingegen die Patentinhaberin lediglich die Beweisführung angreifen kann, indem sie auf darin enthaltene Widersprüche oder Lücken hinweist.

2.3 Demzufolge sind zur Substantiierung, also vollständigen Begründung einer Vorbenutzung, mit Einlegung des Einspruchs zuallererst jene Tatsachen und Beweismittel vorzulegen, anhand derer die Einspruchsabteilung (und die Inhaberin des Streitpatents) ohne eigene Ermittlung folgende Feststellungen treffen kann:

a) "was" wurde vorbenutzt: die Einsprechende hat anzugeben, welche erkennbaren Merkmale und Eigenschaften dem behaupteten Stand der Technik ihrer Meinung nach objektiv entnommen werden konnten. Hierbei hat die Aufzählung der Merkmale in derart abstrahierter Form zu erfolgen, dass eine etwaige Wesensgleichheit oder -ähnlichkeit des benutzten Gegenstandes mit dem Gegenstand des Streitpatents festgestellt werden kann.

b) "wann" wurde vorbenutzt: anzugeben ist das Datum der Benutzung, also ob vor dem Anmeldetag des Patents eine Benutzung erfolgt ist.

Dieses Substantiierungserfordernis einer Vorbenutzung ist im vorliegenden Fall unbestritten erfüllt und gilt für die Parteien zudem als bewiesen: der BMW Techniktag in München und Steyr fand vom 22. bis 24 Juni 2004 statt.

c) "wie" wurde vorbenutzt: anzugeben sind alle Umstände der Benutzung, durch die diese der Öffentlichkeit (insbesondere "wem") zugänglich wurde, z.B. Ort und Art der Benutzung.

2.4 Ferner spielt bei der Komplexität von Vorbenutzungen eine Rolle, ob ein früheres Vorbringen von Beweismitteln zur Stützung behaupteter Tatsachen für die Einsprechende möglich war und ob dies von ihr erwartet werden konnte, etwa das Angebot der Einvernahme eines Zeugen.

2.5 Zur Stützung der Umstände der öffentlichen Zugänglichmachung von D5 reichte die Einsprechende Beschwerdeführerin im vorliegenden Fall am 26. März 2010, das heißt fast ein Jahr nach Einspruchseinlegung und somit verspätet die Video-CD gemäß D10 und eine Teilnehmerliste der BMW Techniktage D11 ein. Darüber hinaus legte die Einsprechende Beschwerdeführerin sehr spät, nämlich erst zur mündlichen Verhandlung vor der Einspruchsabteilung am 17. Mai 2011, eine eidesstattliche Versicherung D13 des Zeugen Fritz Steinparzer vor.

2.6 Die Benennung des Zeugen Steinparzer seitens der Einsprechenden Beschwerdeführerin bzw. ein Antrag auf Anhörung des Zeugen erfolgte aber zu keinem Zeitpunkt des Einspruchsverfahrens. So heißt es im verspäteten Schriftsatz der Einsprechenden Beschwerdeführerin vom 23. März 2010 auf Seite 9 oben "Gerne sind wir auch bereit...als Zeuge zu benennen". Darin vermag die Kammer keine unbedingte Zeugenbenennung zu sehen.

Zudem trägt die Einsprechende Beschwerdeführerin nicht vor, wozu der Zeuge gehört werden soll. Allein die Tatsache, dass der Zeuge Steinparzer zur Zeit der Techniktage Motoren 2004 Leiter der Entwicklung Dieselmotoren bei BMW, Steyr war, ist hierfür nicht ausreichend. Auf dieser Grundlage hätte die Einspruchsabteilung also eine Ladung nicht vornehmen können.

2.7 Die Kammer ist daher der Auffassung, dass in der Entscheidung der Einspruchsabteilung, den Zeugen Steinparzer nicht als Zeugen zu hören, kein Verfahrensfehler gesehen werden kann.

2.8 Im schriftlichen Einspruchsverfahren erfolgte insbesondere zu dem erfindungswesentlichen Merkmal des Anspruchs 1, nämlich der Anordnung des behaupteten Abgasrückführungssystems aus D5 in Bezug auf eine Gesamtabgasleitung, kein substantiierter Vortrag, also zu der Frage "was" eigentlich anhand des Diavortrags D10 (Video), oder anhand des zerlegten BMW Motors im Detail "wie" präsentiert wurde, dass ausgerechnet dieses Merkmal, welches aus D5 nicht unmittelbar hervorgeht, für die Öffentlichkeit beim BMW Techniktag tatsächlich zugänglich war.

2.9 Dieser Mangel hätte im Übrigen in der Verhandlung vor der Einspruchsabteilung selbst durch Beweisbeschluss am Tag der Verhandlung und Zeugeneinvernahme des Zeugen Steinparzer (falls er denn noch als Zeuge am Tag der Verhandlung angeboten worden wäre) nicht behoben werden können. Im Gegensatz zur Auffassung der Einsprechenden Beschwerdeführerin konnten nämlich durch die Einvernahme des Zeugen Steinparzer fehlende Tatsachen nicht im Nachhinein ergänzt werden. Dies gilt insbesondere für solche Umstände, aus denen nun Details der Abgasrückführung mit ganz bestimmten Merkmalen bei der Präsentation der Dias oder des zerlegten Motors für die Öffentlichkeit zugängig gemacht worden waren. Denn hierzu liegen seitens der Einsprechenden Beschwerdeführerin auch in der erst zur Verhandlung vorgelegten eidesstattlichen Versicherung D13 keine Angaben vor.

Zeugen können Tatsachenbehauptungen lediglich durch ihre Aussage erhärten, also unter Einvernahme bejahen, aber nicht anstelle der Einsprechenden Beschwerdeführerin vortragen, um dadurch Lücken in der Substantiierung der angeblichen Vorbenutzung zu füllen (vgl. ReBk III.G.2.2).

Darüber hinaus erfolgte im schriftlichen Beschwerdeverfahren zur behaupteten Vorbenutzung der Abgasrückführung erneut kein substantiierter Vortrag: auf den Seiten 2 und 3 der verspäteten Eingabe vom 27. Mai 2014 wird lediglich Anspruch 1 erwähnt und behauptet, dass Herr Steinparzer bezeugen könne, dass der ausgestellte Motor Anspruch 1 entspräche. Eine solch pauschale Behauptung der Einsprechenden Beschwerdeführerin kann nach Ansicht der Kammer jedenfalls die Anforderung an die Substantiierung der Zugänglichmachung der fraglichen Merkmale einer Vorbenutzung nicht erfüllen.

Wie von der Patentinhaberin Beschwerdeführerin argumentiert, wurden erneut keine Angaben zu den Umständen gemacht, wie spezifische Merkmale aus der Diashow oder dem zerlegten Motor abgeleitet werden konnten, also dass z.B. bestimmte Folien aus D5 während der Diashow oder Motorpräsentation zu fraglichen Merkmalen näher erläutert wurden.

2.11 Zu der Auflistung der Anspruchsmerkmale auf Seite 3 der Eingabe vom 27. Mai 2014, vorletzter Absatz, ist zudem festzustellen, dass das genannte Merkmal "h)", also die Anordnung bzw. Abzweigung der Abgasrückführung, offenbar den zitierten Seiten 4 und 23 der D5 nicht zu entnehmen ist. In der Verhandlung vor der Kammer führte die Einsprechende Beschwerdeführerin dann aus, dass das Merkmal "h)" anstatt auf Seite 4, auf Seite 7 der D5 zu finden sei, aber auch dort ist dieses erfindungswesentliche Merkmal des Anspruchs 1 nicht ersichtlich. Schließlich kann der ebenfalls angebotene Zeuge Bruch nach dem Vortrag der Einsprechenden Beschwerdeführerin lediglich bekräftigen, dass D5 der Öffentlichkeit "in Hardware gezeigt und ausführlich erklärt", und das "Verfahren" gemäß Video D10 den geladenen Teilnehmern "vorgestellt" wurde. Diese pauschalen Angaben stellen jedoch wiederum keine konkrete Kenntnis über die Umstände der Zugänglichmachung der Abgasrückführung gemäß Kennzeichen des Anspruchs 1 des Streitpatents in das Wissen des Zeugen Bruch, siehe Seite 8 der Eingabe vom 27. Mai 2014, vorletzter Absatz.

Die Kammer ergänzt, dass weder im Einspruchs- noch im Beschwerdeverfahren nachvollziehbare Gründe für die erhebliche Verfahrensverzögerung - zu Ungunsten der Patentinhaberin Beschwerdeführerin - bei der Geltendmachung der Vorbenutzungen und deren Stützung (ein Jahr nach Einlegung des Einspruchs, u.a. gestützt auf fünf Jahre verspätete Zeugenangebote) von der Einsprechenden Beschwerdeführerin genannt wurden.

2.13 Zusammenfassend sieht die Kammer daher keinen Anlass, die nun nach ihrer Beschwerdebegründung vom 5. September 2011 mit abermals verspäteter Eingabe vom 27. Mai 2014 von der Einsprechenden Beschwerdeführerin letztlich angebotenen Zeugen Steinparzer oder Bruch zur Beweisaufnahme (vor der Einspruchsabteilung oder der Beschwerdekammer) gemäß Artikel 12(4) und 13(1) VOBK ins Verfahren zuzulassen.

Die Anträge auf Zeugeneinvernahme durch die Kammer bzw. auf Zurückverweisung an die erste Instanz zur Zeugeneinvernahme waren somit in Hinblick auf die geltend gemachten Vorbenutzungen als unzureichend substantiiert und daher prima facie nicht relevant, und als ungerechtfertigt, da unbegründet verspätet, zurückzuweisen. Insbesondere vermag die Kammer auch keinen Verfahrensfehler der Einspruchsabteilung zu erkennen, die Zeugen nicht gehört zu haben, siehe oben unter Punkt 2.7.

2.14 Die Einspruchsabteilung hatte die angeblich offenkundigen Vorbenutzungen als nicht bewiesen erachtet, vgl. Einspruchsentscheidung, Punkte 17 und 18. Die Einsprechende Beschwerdeführerin räumt ein, dass ohne Einvernahme der Zeugen eine Überprüfung durch die Kammer zum gleichen Ergebnis führen würde. Auch die Kammer hat keinen Grund, von der Entscheidung der Einspruchsabteilung abzuweichen.

3. Zulässigkeit verspätetes Beweismittel

3.1 Die Einreichung des Auszugs D14 aus einem Fachbuch erfolgte praktisch zum spätest möglichen Zeitpunkt, nämlich 4 Tage vor der mündlichen Verhandlung vor der Kammer. Nach Auffassung der Einsprechenden Beschwerdeführerin sei D14 für sie erst jetzt zugänglich gewesen, deren Inhalt leicht erfassbar und in Bezug auf die erfinderische Tätigkeit des Anspruchs 1 wie aufrechterhalten hochrelevant. Aufgrund der Einfachheit und Kürze sei es daher durchaus zumutbar, dass sich die Patentinhaberin Beschwerdeführerin (und auch die Kammer) mit D14 auseinandersetze. Wegen dessen Relevanz könne die Kammer den Fachbuchauszug D14 zudem nicht einfach "sehenden Auges" unberücksichtigt lassen.

3.2 Die Kammer ist der Ansicht, dass das Auffinden eines Fachbuchs, offenbar für Maschinenbaustudenten, die extreme Verspätung seiner Vorlage, nämlich über 6 Jahre nach Einspruchseinlegung, wohl nicht rechtfertigen kann. Darüber hinaus wäre es zu diesem Verfahrenszeitpunkt weder für die Patentinhaberin Beschwerdeführerin noch für die Kammer zumutbar bzw. fair, auf die verspätete Vorlage der D14 während der Verhandlung angemessen zu reagieren. Dies umso mehr, als die Einsprechende Beschwerdeführerin im bisherigen Beschwerdeverfahren der von der Einspruchsabteilung aufrechterhaltenen Fassung nur die geltend gemachten Vorbenutzungen wegen mangelnder Neuheit dem aufrechterhaltenen Anspruch 1 entgegenhielt, und jetzt erstmals Dokument D14 zur Begründung mangelnder erfinderischer Tätigkeit im Lichte der D3 und D2 ("fresh case") vorlegt.

Die Patentinhaberin Beschwerdeführerin erwägt, zu Recht, als Reaktion weitere Hilfsanträge zu stellen (vgl. Artikel 13(2) VOBK). Dies würde aus Sicht der Kammer zum Stand des Verfahrens mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit zu einer Verlegung der Verhandlung führen, da eine Diskussion der neuen Sachlage wohl schon zur aufrechterhaltenen Fassung, in jedem Fall aber in Bezug auf neu zuzulassende Hilfsanträge über den Rahmen der Verhandlung hinausgehen würde. 

Zur angeblich hohen Relevanz der D14 verweist die Kammer auf den Umstand, dass es im Beschwerdeverfahren nach Anberaumung einer mündlichen Verhandlung und insbesondere unmittelbar vor bzw. während der Verhandlung, auf die Relevanz bei der Frage der Berücksichtigung oder Nichtberücksichtigung von späten Änderungen des Vorbringens einer Partei de facto nicht mehr ankommt (vgl. Artikel 13(3) VOBK).

3.4 In Ausübung ihres Ermessens kam eine Zulassung der D14 ins Verfahren für die Kammer folglich nicht in Betracht.

T 0100/13 - Late requests and substantiation

Key points

• Es obliegt der Beschwerdegegnerin, in der Erwiderung auf die Beschwerdebegründung zu substantiieren, inwieweit die Einwände gegen die angegriffene Entscheidung unzutreffend sind bzw. inwieweit durch eine Anpassung der unbedingt oder hilfsweise gestellten Anträge den in der Beschwerdebegründung erhobenen Einwänden so Rechnung getragen wurde, dass die geänderten Anspruchssätze die Grundlage für ein beschränkt aufrecht zu erhaltendes Patent bilden können. Nach Auffassung der Kammer ist erst recht bei, wie im vorliegenden Fall, sehr spät im Verfahren eingereichten Hilfsanträgen eine angemessene Substantiierung im Hinblick auf die Patentfähigkeit der Ansprüche gegenüber dem im Verfahren befindlichen Stand der Technik zu erwarten.

EPO T 0100/13 - [C] - link

Entscheidungsgründe
[...]

2.3 Die erst nach Zustellung der Ladung zur mündlichen Verhandlung eingereichten Hilfsanträge 1 bis 9 wurden nach Auffassung der Kammer ohne erkennbaren Grund, insbesondere nicht in Reaktion auf einen Schriftsatz der Beschwerdeführerin oder eine Mitteilung der Kammer gemäß Artikel 15 (1) VOBK, zu einem sehr späten Zeitpunkt im Verfahren eingereicht. Die Hilfsanträge sind zudem auf divergierende Anspruchsfassungen gerichtet, da sie Merkmalskombinationen des erteilten Anspruchs 1 mit einem aus der Beschreibung stammenden Merkmal (Hilfsantrag 1) oder mit Merkmalen der auf verschiedene Aspekte gerichteten abhängigen Ansprüche (Hilfsanträge 2 bis 7) oder in Kombination (Hilfsanträge 8 und 9) enthalten. Die Hilfsanträge 1 bis 9 wurden zudem mit Schreiben vom 2. Juni 2015 ohne jeden Kommentar hinsichtlich ihrer Patentfähigkeit eingereicht, und auch im Schreiben vom 7. September 2015 wurde lediglich angemerkt (siehe Seite 3, 3. Absatz), dass mit Hilfsantrag 1 klargestellt werde, dass der Datenkommunikations-Kanal "keine reine Steuerleitung wie in den genannten Entgegenhaltungen" sei. Im Übrigen hat die Patentinhaberin und Beschwerdegegnerin auch im Einspruchsverfahren zu Hilfsantrag 1 nur ausgeführt, dass damit Neuheit hergestellt werde, ohne auf die Frage der erfinderischen Tätigkeit gegenüber dem im Verfahren befindlichen Stand der Technik einzugehen, und zur Patentfähigkeit der Hilfsanträge 2 bis 9 keine Erklärungen geliefert.

T 2220/14 - Sufficiency and inventors

Key points:

• A document describing the difficulties that the inventors had in getting the invention to work, is not relevant for Article 83 EPC because that article requires that patent application discloses the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by a person skilled in the art. This is a notional figure, not a real person. 

EPO T 2220/14 - [C] - link

Reasons for the Decision

23. Respondent I submitted document (169) to support its case under Article 83 EPC. Article 83 EPC requires that a European patent application shall disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by a person skilled in the art. Such a requirement needs to be fulfilled at the date of filing of the application. The "person skilled in the art" is a notional figure, not a real person. Document (169) is written from memory by one of the inventors. It describes in an informal way the difficulties that the inventors had in getting the invention to work. The respondents seem to be suggesting that document (169) is relevant to Article 83 EPC upon the basis that if the inventors had problems putting the invention into effect, then this is evidence that the "person skilled in the art" would have such problems. The board is not convinced by this argument. The key issue is the disclosure of the European patent application and how the notional skilled person would understand this disclosure. A document describing what the inventors did in order to make their invention, even if such a document did not suffer from the weaknesses of document (169) enumerated above, would not assist on this point. The board therefore finds that document (169) lacks relevance as regards sufficiency of disclosure and the board therefore declines to admit document (169) into the proceedings.
[...]

T 2440/12 - Software discloses method

Key points

• The patentee had commercialized its software before the priority date of the opposed patent. After having been sued for patent infringement, the patentee had filed the application for which the present patent was granted. Therefore, patentee acknowledged that all features of claim 1 where implemented in the software.  However, users of the software would not be aware of the method steps. 
• " In a situation such as the present one, where a potentially unlimited number of members of the public performed or were able to perform a process by means of a commercially available software tool, the fundamental legal question arises whether, and if so, to what extent these persons had to be aware of the specific features of the performed process for the latter to have been made available to the public."
• The Board concurs with the [opponent] that even a different "disclosure" of the method, as it could be obtained by executing it on a computer line-by-line without infringing copyright protection, is sufficient to take away the novelty of the method as claimed.

EPO T 2440/12 - [C] - link

Prior use

5. The crucial issue of the present case is the effect of the alleged public prior use (see Sections III-VIII above) on the patentability of the claimed invention.

5.1 The essential facts of the prior use are not in dispute. Prior to the filing date of the opposed patent, the respondent [patentee]  already commercialised its software product Cadmould. After having been sued by the appellant for patent infringement, the respondent intended to disclose the method embodied in this software in order to demonstrate that it was based on its own development and did not infringe the appellant's patent. Since the respondent did not wish that the disclosed information be unprotected, it decided to file its own patent application - i.e. the European patent application No. 02016515 leading to the opposed patent - in the assumption that a valid patent could still be granted notwithstanding the prior commercialisation of its software (see documents D6, page 8, and D7, page 6).

5.2 Consequently, the respondent repeatedly emphasised in national court proceedings that the teaching of the patent application did not differ from the technical features of the commercialised software. This can be exemplified by the following statements in proceedings before the District Court I of Munich (see document D6, pages 7 and 8):

"Die Beklagte tritt dem entgegen und verwehrt sich insbesondere gegen die Unterstellung der Klägerin, die Patentanmeldung [...] bewußt abweichend von der tatsächlichen Funktion der Software formuliert zu haben, um eine angebliche Patentverletzung zu verschleiern. Diese Behauptung ist durch nichts gerechtfertigt."

[Translation: "The defendant disagrees with this and rejects the plaintiff's allegation that the defendant has formulated the patent application [...] intentionally in a departure from the actual function of the software to dissimulate an alleged patent infringement. There is no justification to this allegation whatsoever."]

"Ein Softwareprodukt mit dem in der Patentanmeldung Anlage B1 beschriebenen Verfahren wurde von der Beklagten bereits im Jahre 1997 auf der Messe NPE in Chicago, USA, vorgestellt und international, z.B. auch in Brasilien, mit Veröffentlichungen angekündigt."

[Translation: "A software product featuring the method as described in the patent application as per exhibit B1 was already presented in 1997 at the NPE Trade fair in Chicago, USA, and announced in publications internationally, e.g. also in Brazil."]

5.3 In the context of the present opposition and appeal proceedings the appellant heavily relied on these statements and concluded that the subject-matter of all the patent claims was embodied by the commercialised software. This conclusion was never disputed by the respondent in the proceedings before the Opposition Division and in the written appeal proceedings. It is true that, at a late stage of the oral proceedings before the Board, the respondent declared that the subject-matter of claims 1 to 3 according to the auxiliary request 2 (which correspond to claims 23 to 25 of the granted patent) was not embodied by the previously commercialised software (see Section XV, last paragraph, above and points 15.2, 15.5 and 15.6 below). However, this statement is of no relevance for the assessment of the respondent's main request since this request includes several other claims, i.e. claims 1 to 22, in respect of which the respondent has never disputed that they were embodied by the software.

6. According to Article 52(1) EPC, European patents shall be granted for any invention, in all fields of technology, provided, inter alia, that they are new. An invention shall be considered to be new if it does not form part of the state of the art (Article 54(1) EPC). The state of the art shall be held to comprise everything made available to the public by means of a written or oral description, by use, or in any other way, before the date of filing of the European patent application (Article 54(2) EPC).

6.1 In the present case, the invention is a method to be performed by a computer (following some input by the user). As pointed out above (cf. points 3 to 3.3), the essential features of the method relate to the generation of a "semi-volumetric" mesh representing a thin-walled object through which fluid flow is simulated.

6.2 It follows from the uncontested facts set out above that any customer to whom the respondent's software product was delivered before the filing date of the patent was able to perform the claimed method, simply by running the software on a (general purpose) computer. In the Board's view, the circle of customers of an internationally commercialised software product is potentially unlimited in the sense that any interested person could have bought or otherwise acquired a copy of the software. Therefore, the respondent's customers have to be regarded as members of the public.

6.3 In a situation such as the present one, where a potentially unlimited number of members of the public performed or were able to perform a process by means of a commercially available software tool, the fundamental legal question arises whether, and if so, to what extent these persons had to be aware of the specific features of the performed process for the latter to have been made available to the public.

7. In the Board's view, it can be rather convincingly argued that the mere fact that any interested person who acquired the software product and used it for the purpose for which it was commercialised, i.e. for simulating a fluid flow within thin-walled three-dimensional geometries, automatically executed the method steps as defined in claim 1 of the patent, is as such already sufficient for destroying the novelty of the claimed subject-matter.

7.1 The factual circumstances of the present case appear to be very different from a situation where an inventor (or another individual person) carries out a process in public which is later sought to be patented. In that situation a novelty-destroying effect only occurs when cognitive information is transmitted to the public, since, without a proper understanding of the steps of the process, no member of the public would be able to carry out the process himself. On the other hand, the public prior use in the present case is characterised by the commercial availability of a software tool that allowed the repeated execution of the patented method even without requiring any understanding of the steps performed by the software.

7.2 Nevertheless, the Board does not base its decision on this line of argument since the parties did not specifically focus on it in their written submissions and since the Board has come to the conclusion that, as set out in the following, the subject-matter of claim 1 lacks novelty in view of the undisputed public prior use even if one assumes to the benefit of the respondent that in the present case the novelty-destroying effect presupposes a certain amount of cognitive information about the method embodied in the respondent's software.

8. In the contested decision (cf. point 2 of the reasons), the Opposition Division took the view that "[o]n the balance of probabilities a mere disassembly of an available executable will not enable the person skilled in the art to reconstruct the underlying mathematical method for a finite element program. In particular, the person skilled in the art would not be able to directly and unambiguously derive the use of a framework of rod elements in conjunction with the generated mesh as part of the simulation" (emphasis added).

8.1 In particular, the Opposition Division concluded that, "taken into account that a disassembler translates machine language into assembler language and not into a high-level language it is more than doubtful that a person skilled in the art would be able to deduce from code in assembler language clearly and unambiguously for example the feature 'inside the surface mesh a framework of internal rod elements is generated extending from node to node of the polygons'".

9. In the proceedings before the Board, the appellant, inter alia, argued that the present invention related to the particular geometry of the mesh used for a computer-implemented simulation of fluid flow and therefore was essentially of a mathematical nature. This kind of inventions could be expressed in formal mathematical language, in terms of a computer program or in the language of a claim. All these forms of expression constituted a disclosure as long as they were made available to the public and could, in principle, be "read" by the skilled user. This was certainly the case for a computer program that could be disassembled and translated into readable language.

10. The respondent relied basically on the line of reasoning followed by the Opposition Division and stressed that the essential teaching of the present invention, namely the generation and use of two-noded rod elements between nodes of opposite mesh elements (see feature (c) at point 4 above), could not be derived from the low-level language into which a disassembler might translate computer code. In other words, the teaching made available to the public by means of the contested patent was not anticipated by a software product which could not possibly provide the same information to a skilled person.

10.1 It is the respondent's position that executing a complex software program on a computer can be compared to operating a "black box" with input and output terminals. The user may realise that, in response to a given input, the "black box" generates a certain output. However, this operation of the "black box" would, in general, not provide any information as to its modus operandi and, in this respect, would not contribute any teaching to the state of the art.

11. A computer program is essentially a set of instructions given to a computer for performing a sequence of operations on input data and for delivering corresponding output data. These instructions expressed in machine code may indeed as such normally have no understandable meaning for the user. Nevertheless, as argued by the appellant, they could be easily converted by a disassembler into human readable language.

Furthermore, by executing an application line-by-line, the skilled person would be able to see how the input data is processed and understand how the method implemented by the software product is carried out step-by-step. The information provided by the stepwise execution of the software product represents, in the Board's opinion, a form of disclosure of a specific embodiment of this method.

11.1 The respondent has essentially objected that the teaching provided by the opposed patent was not comparable to the teaching which could be obtained even by running a program step-by-step on a computer. In the respondent's view, the skilled person would not be able to derive all the features of the method recited in claim 1 and, in particular, not become aware of the step of generating rod elements between the nodes of opposite surface mesh elements.

11.2 The Board concurs with the respondent that there is no evidence that the skilled person could extract from the disassembled software program or from its execution line-by-line on a computer the notion of rod elements generated between nodes of the surface meshes as recited in claim 1.

On the other hand, the Board considers that what the skilled person obtains from a disassembled code or from the stepwise execution of a software product is indeed an "alternative" description, albeit very concrete and detailed (= low-level), of the method embodied by the software.

11.3 In the Board's opinion, defining a known process or method in different terms does not give rise to a different process or method, just like giving a different definition of a chemical composition does not create a new chemical composition. In the present case, the method implemented by the software product before the filing date of the opposed patent was expressed in computer-readable code, whereas in the patent the method is specified in much more abstract, even somewhat metaphorical language. If the machine code of the software can be translated into human-readable language, the two representations of the method should, in principle, be considered as two different forms of disclosure of the same method which are equally available to the public.

12. The respondent has objected that unconditional decompiling or disassembling of computer programs was not allowed in Europe and that the skilled person would infringe the copyright protection when trying to decompile a software product in order to gain knowledge of the underlying algorithm. The Board notes that, in the context of a prior use involving an international commercialisation which was not restricted to Europe, the respondent's reliance on provisions of European copyright law may not be sufficient in order to demonstrate that all the respondent's customers were bound by corresponding legal restrictions. For the sake of argument, the Board nevertheless follows the respondent's point of departure and uses European copyright law as the relevant yardstick.

12.1 Article 6 of the Council Directive of 14 May 1991 on the legal protection of computer programs (91/250/EEC) as in force when the public prior use occurred (the Directive was replaced in 2009 by Directive 2009/24/EC) deals with decompilation. According to it, the authorisation of the rightholder shall not be required where reproduction of the code and translation of its form are indispensable to obtain the information necessary to achieve the interoperability of an independently created computer program with other programs, provided that certain conditions are met. One of these conditions is that the decompilation is confined to those parts of the original program which are necessary in order to achieve interoperability.

Hence, this directive places indeed some restrictions on a full decompilation of a computer program for the purpose of understanding its structure and all its underlying algorithms.

12.2 However, the appellant has convincingly argued that it was not necessary to disassemble or decompile a program to make the corresponding operations performed by the processor "readable" for a skilled user. It would be sufficient to run the software on a virtual machine and execute it line-by-line. Although this was indeed a very tedious way of running a software program, it did not require any authorisation and would reveal the program's structure and functionalities to the skilled person in a very concrete manner.

12.3 According to Article 5, paragraph 3. of the above directive 91/250/EEC, "[t]he person having a right to use a copy of a computer program shall be entitled, without the authorisation of the rightholder, to observe, study or test the functioning of the program in order to determine the ideas and principles which underlie any element of the program if he does so while performing any of the acts of loading, displaying, running, transmitting or storing the program which he is entitled to do" (emphasis added).

In the light of the above, the respondent's customers were not prevented by law to load the computer program and run it line-by-line "in order to determine its underlying ideas and principles".

12.4 In essence, the Board comes to the conclusion that prior use of a software product in the form of sales makes the method implemented by the software part of the state of the art since, in principle, the skilled person could have executed the software line-by-line on a computer, and, in doing so, would have not only carried out the method, but also gained knowledge of the method steps performed by the computer.

13. The Board finds that its conclusions are in line with the opinion expressed by the Enlarged Board of Appeal in case G 1/92 (OJ EPO 1993, 277).

13.1 According to G 1/92, the chemical composition of a product is state of the art when the product as such is available to the public and can be analysed and reproduced by the skilled person, irrespective of whether or not particular reasons can be identified for analysing the composition. Furthermore, the same principle applies mutatis mutandis to any other product, since, as observed at point 1.1 of the reasons, the EPC does not make any distinction between chemical products and other products such as mechanical or electrical articles.

In particular, the Enlarged Board observed in point 1.4 that an essential purpose of any technical teaching is to enable the person skilled in the art to manufacture or use a given product by applying such teaching. Where it is possible for the skilled person to discover the composition or the internal structure of the product and to reproduce it without undue burden, then both the product and its composition or internal structure become state of the art.

13.2 In the case of a software product, the "internal structure" is represented by the set of instructions which constitute a program to be run on a computer. As explained above, by executing the instructions line-by-line the skilled person can derive knowledge of all the operations to be performed in order to carry out the method embodied by the software product.

13.3 Similarly, a certain electronic circuit may be described and claimed in functional terms, namely as a combination of "means for" carrying out certain steps of a method. However, if an embodiment of this circuit is publicly available for examination, in order to implement the teaching of the claimed circuit (and of the corresponding method), it would be sufficient to reproduce the structure of the physical circuit component-by-component.

It could be argued that the teaching derivable from the "real" circuit would not be the same as the teaching provided by the description of the circuit given in a claim. Nevertheless, it follows from the established case law that the precise and detailed disclosure of the physical embodiment of a circuit takes away the novelty of the same circuit claimed in functional terms.

13.4 In summary, the point of contention in the present case is not whether the respondent's software product executed on a computer falls within the terms of the method according to claim 1 of the patent. It does, as this software product admittedly embodies the claimed invention. In the respondent's view, a software product would take away the novelty of a corresponding claimed method only if it disclosed to the skilled person the same features used in the claim to define the method. However, the Board concurs with the appellant that even a different "disclosure" of the method, as it could be obtained by executing it on a computer line-by-line without infringing copyright protection, is sufficient to take away the novelty of the method as claimed.

13.5 Hence, the Board comes to the conclusion that the subject-matter of claim 1 is not new within the meaning of Article 54 EPC following the prior use of a software product which undisputedly embodied the claimed subject-matter.