T 0333/14 - General medical use

Key points

• A claim for "use of an water-soluble emulsion concentrate according to [claim 1] for cosmetic, pharmaceutical or dietary purposes"  is unallowable under Article 53(c) EPC.

EPO T 0333/14 - link

Sachverhalt und Anträge

I. Das europäische Patent Nr. 1 565 163 wurde mit neun Ansprüchen erteilt.

Die unabhängigen Ansprüche 1 und 8 und der abhängige Anspruch 9 der erteilten Fassung lauten wie folgt:

"1. Wasserlösliche Emulsionskonzentrate von fettartigen Substanzen hergestellt mit den folgenden Schritten: [...]

8. Verwendung der wasserlöslichen Emulsionskonzentrate gemäß mindestens einem der vorhergehenden Ansprüche für kosmetische, pharmazeutische oder diätetische Zwecke.

Entscheidungsgründe

[...]

2. Ausnahme von der Patentierbarkeit (Artikel 53 c) EPÜ)

2.1 Gemäß Artikel 53 c) Satz 1 EPÜ sind Verfahren zur therapeutischen Behandlung des menschlichen oder tierischen Körpers von der Patentierbarkeit ausgenommen.

2.2 Anders als von der Beschwerdeführerin unter Verweis auf die Entscheidung T 0004/98 (ABl. EPA 2002, 139; Gründe Nr. 8.1) behauptet, sind therapeutische Verfahren unter Artikel 53 c) EPÜ somit nicht auf spezifische Behandlungsverfahren beschränkt, die bestimmte Angaben bezüglich Art der Krankheit, Art des einzusetzenden Mittels und Patientengruppe erfordern würden. Vielmehr umfasst Artikel 53 c) EPÜ auch die unbestimmte Therapie; vgl. hierzu Artikel 54(4) und 54(5) EPÜ, wo sowohl auf die unbestimmte Anwendung in einem in Artikel 53 c) EPÜ genannten Verfahren (entsprechend einer ersten medizinischen Indikation) als auch auf die spezifische Anwendung in einem in Artikel 53 c) EPÜ genannten Verfahren (entsprechend einer weiteren medizinischen Indikation) Bezug genommen wird. Es gibt im EPÜ keine Grundlage dafür, dem allgemeinen Begriff der therapeutischen Behandlung bestimmte implizite Einschränkungen zuzuschreiben (vgl. auch die diesbezüglichen Ausführungen in der Entscheidung T 1020/03 (ABl. EPA 2007, 204; Gründe Nr. 31 bis 37)).

T 0736/14 - One invention examined

EPO Headnote

If an applicant whose application is non-unitary responds unclearly and/or in a misleading way to an invitation from the examining division to designate which searched invention it wishes to prosecute further (e.g. by submitting a main request covering one invention and an auxiliary request covering the other invention searched), it cannot be automatically assumed that the applicant selected the invention covered by the main request for examination. Rather, the examining division must clarify, e.g. via a further communication, which of the searched inventions the applicant actually wants it to examine. Confronting the applicant with an irrevocable decision not to admit an auxiliary request covering one of the inventions searched, without giving an opportunity to comment on its admissibility beforehand, is regarded as a substantial procedural violation (see Reasons, point 3).

Analysis

• The present case concerns the application of the remark in G 2/92 that: " At the examination stage, having regard to the requirement of unity of invention and the fact that only one examination fee can be paid for each application, clearly only one invention in each application is to be examined for conformity with the patentability and other requirements of the EPC"

EPO T 0736/14 - link

T 1727/12 - No Biogen

Key points

• The concept of "Biogen sufficiency" is, according to the Board, not part of the established jurisprudence of the boards of appeal of the EPO. In any case, it is a matter of support under Article 84, not of insufficiency of disclosure under Article 83 EPC.
" The fact that the skilled person is aware of only one way of maintaining the tension (which it knows how to carry out) cannot possibly justify an objection under Article 100(b) EPC 1973."

EPO T 1727/12 - link

Reasons for the Decision

1. Sufficiency of disclosure

The opposition division distinguished between "classical insufficiency" and "Biogen sufficiency". It found the invention as exemplified in the patent specification to be disclosed in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by a person skilled in the art.

It then considered the subject-matter of claim 1 and found that "the skilled person would not be able to carry out the invention without using the tension monitoring disclosed in claims 3 to 5" (Grounds for the decision, sheet 9, third paragraph). From this lack of "Biogen sufficiency" it concluded that claim 1 did not meet the requirements of Articles 100(b) and 83 EPC 1973.

1.1 Burden of proof

A principle intrinsic to EPO proceedings is that the party who raises an objection bears the burden of proving it (see "Case Law of the Boards of Appeal of the EPO", 7th edition, 2013, III.G.5.1.1). The application of this principle to opposition proceedings leads to the conclusion that the burden of proof in respect of the grounds for opposition raised by an opponent lies on the opponent. An opposition division may, in application of Article 114(1) EPC, of its own motion raise a ground for opposition not covered by the notice of opposition (see decision G 9/91 (OJ EPO, 1993, 408), point 16 of the reasons) or a fortiori raise new arguments in respect of a ground for opposition covered by the notice of opposition, but if it does so, it has to bear the burden of proof for its objections.

1.2 "Biogen sufficiency"

To the best knowledge of the board, the concept of "Biogen sufficiency" is not part of the established jurisprudence of the boards of appeal of the EPO and is not commonly used in EPO proceedings.

However, as an Internet search easily shows, the concept is well known in the UK. It has its origin in a decision handed down by the House of Lords

on October 31, 1996 (Biogen v. Medeva, [1997] RPC 1). This decision concerned the patentability of a biotechnology invention and mentioned, as an obiter dictum, that under Article 83 of the EPC, the EPO had jurisdiction "to hold a patent invalid on the substantive ground that, as the EPO said in Exxon/Fuel Oils (T 409/91) [1994] OJ EPO 653, para. 3.3., the extent of the monopoly claimed exceeds the technical contribution to the art made by the invention as described in the specification" (point 80 of the decision).

Decision T 409/91 states:

"... in the Board's judgment, in order to fulfil the requirement of Art. 83 EPC, the application as filed must contain sufficient information to allow a person skilled in the art, using his common general knowledge, to carry out the invention within the whole area that is claimed." (Reasons, point 2), and

"Art. 84 EPC also requires that the claims must be supported by the description, in other words it is the definition of the invention in the claims that needs support. In the Board's judgment, this requirement reflects the general legal principle that the extent of the patent monopoly, as defined by the claims, should correspond to the technical contribution to the art in order for it to be supported, or justified (see T 133/85, OJ EPO 1988, 441). This means that the definitions in the claims should essentially correspond to the scope of the invention as disclosed in the description. In other words, as was stated in Decision T 26/81 (OJ EPO 1982, 211, point 4 of the reasons), the claims should not extend to subject-matter which, after reading the description, would still not be at the disposal of the person skilled in the art. Consequently, a technical feature which is described and highlighted in the description as being an essential feature of the invention, must also be a part of the independent claim or claims defining this invention (see also Decision T 133/85, point 2 of the reasons)" (Reasons, point 3.3; it is this passage that is cited by Lord Hoffmann in Biogen v. Medeva)

As Lord Hoffmann's obiter dictum in Biogen v. Medeva expressly refers to the jurisprudence of the Boards of appeal, there was no need for the opposition division to invoke the concept of "Biogen sufficiency". When using this concept, the opposition division should at least have explained what exactly was meant, namely that the extent of the monopoly claimed ought not to exceed the technical contribution to the art made by the invention as described in the specification. The opposition division appears to have considered that claim 1 could not be said to be sufficiently disclosed within the whole scope of the claim because the only invention disclosed in the specification corresponded to the combination of claims 1 and 3 to 5.

1.3 First the board notes that the statement of decision T 409/91 cited in Biogen v. Medeva referred to the requirements of Article 84 EPC 1973 rather than to Article 83 EPC 1973 but then stated that "... since Art. 83 relates to the disclosure of the invention, whilst Art. 84 deals with the definition of the invention by the claims, the underlying purpose of the requirement of support by the description, insofar as its substantive aspect is concerned, and of the requirement of sufficient disclosure is the same, namely to ensure that the patent monopoly should be justified by the actual technical contribution to the art." (Reasons, point 3.3, fourth paragraph).

Case T 409/91 was an ex parte case, which means that the argument based on the common purpose of Articles 83 and 84 EPC 1973 is unproblematic, because an application can be refused for lack of compliance with each of Articles 83 and 84 EPC 1973. The present case, however, is an opposition appeal case, which means that it is necessary to clearly distinguish the requirements of Article 83 EPC 1973 (sufficiency of disclosure) and Article 84 EPC 1973 (clarity and support in the description). Lack of clarity and lack of support are not grounds for opposition under Article 100 EPC 1973 and cannot be transformed into such grounds by means of teleological considerations. It is, therefore, irrelevant to the present case whether claim 1 has sufficient support in the description; the only question to be raised under Article 100(b) EPC 1973 is whether the opposed patent discloses the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by a person skilled in the art.

1.4 The opposition division has justified its dismissal of the main request as follows:

"The patent only discloses how to monitor the tension in the tape by monitoring the power supplied to the motors by monitoring the magnitude of current using a regulated power supply, since the patent does not give any technically enabling disclosure to use another method to monitor the tension in the tape and since claim 1 is claiming a controller operative to monitor tension in the tape without monitoring the power supplied to the motors (claim 3) by monitoring the magnitude of current (claim 4) using a regulated power supply (claim 5), the skilled person would not be able to carry out the invention without using the tension monitoring disclosed in claims 3 to 5. Moreover, there is no hint in the available prior art how to maintain the tension without contacting the tape. The only solution to maintain the tension for the skilled person would by the one above indentified (sic). The subject matter of claim 1 of the main request does not meet the requirements of articles 100(b) and 83 EPC." (Grounds for the decision, sheet 9, third paragraph; emphasis of the division).

1.5 The board is not persuaded by this reasoning of the opposition division, for the following reasons:

Claim 1 is directed at a tape drive. This drive comprises a controller which is inter alia operative to monitor tension in the tape and to control the motors to maintain the monitored tension between predetermined limits.

Claim 3 adds that the power supplied to at least one of the stepping motors is monitored and used to calculate an estimate of the tension of the tape, so as to monitor the tension of the tape.

Claim 4 further adds that the monitoring of the power is itself indirect, because the directly monitored quantities are the magnitude of voltage and/or current supplied to the motors and/or the motor drive means.

According to claim 5, a constant voltage is supplied to the stepper motor and what is monitored is the magnitude of current supplied to the stepper motor drive means.

The statement of the opposition division according to which "... claim 1 is claiming a controller operative to monitor tension in the tape without monitoring the power supplied to the motors (claim 3) by monitoring the magnitude of current (claim 4) using a regulated power supply (claim 5) ..." (emphasis added by the board) is not correct because claim 1 does not comprise any such disclaimer. Claim 1 simply does not state how the tension is monitored; it certainly does not exclude monitoring as described in claims 3 to 5.

The statement of the opposition division that "the skilled person would not be able to carry out the invention without using the tension monitoring disclosed in claims 3 to 5" may be correct, but is not sufficient to justify the conclusion of the opposition division that the skilled person is thus hindered from carrying out the invention. The argument would be correct if there clearly were other options than what is disclosed in the dependent claims or in the patent specification and if the skilled person would not know how to carry them out. This has, however, not been established by the opposition division - although it bore the burden of proof. The opposition division has presumed the existence of alternatives and the impossibility for the skilled person to carry them out. The objection, therefore, appears to be purely speculative and, as a consequence, unfounded.

The same holds true for the argument according to which there is no hint in the available prior art how to maintain the tension without contacting the tape. The fact that the skilled person is aware of only one way of maintaining the tension (which it knows how to carry out) cannot possibly justify an objection under Article 100(b) EPC 1973.

1.6 Thus the board has reached the conclusion that the opposition division has not established that claim 1 of the main request fails to comply with the requirements of Article 100(b) EPC 1973.

2. Remittal to the opposition division

In the present case the opposition division dismissed the main request exclusively for lack of compliance with Articles 100(b) and 83 EPC 1973 and left the other issues undecided.

Since proceedings before the boards of appeal are primarily concerned with the examination of the contested decision, remittal of the case to the opposition division in accordance with Article 111(1) EPC 1973 is normally considered by the boards in cases where the opposition division has issued a decision solely upon a particular issue and leaves substantive issues such as novelty (Article 54 EPC 1973) or inventive step (Article 56 EPC 1973) undecided.

The board, therefore, considers it appropriate to remit the case to the first instance for consideration of the undecided issues.

3. Request for oral proceedings

In its statement of grounds of appeal, item 4, the appellant has made the following statement:

"In the event that the Patent is not to be maintained in the form in which it was granted, the Proprietor requests oral proceedings."

The decision to remit the case to the opposition division for further prosecution does not imply that the patent will not be maintained as granted. According to the established jurisprudence of the boards of appeal, the appellant is not adversely affected by this decision, so that there is no need to grant the auxiliary request for oral proceedings (see "Case Law of the Boards of Appeal of the EPO", 7th edition, 2013, III.C.2.5, in particular decision T 42/90).

Order

For these reasons it is decided that:

1. The decision under appeal is set aside.

2. The case is remitted to the opposition division for further prosecution.

T 2186/12 - Fresh grounds and amendments

Key points

• Amended claims were filed in this opposition appeal. The Board refuses to consider sufficiency of disclosure because it was a fresh ground of opposition and the patentee did not approve its consideration (citing G10/91)
• The decision seems to depart from established case law: " Amendments must be examined fully for compatibility with the EPC. Thus, where the respondents (opponents) first raise an objection under Art. 100(b) EPC during the appeal proceedings to an amended claim, the appellants cannot [] refuse permission to discuss the new ground (T 27/95)." 

EPO T 2186/12 - link

Reasons for the Decision

1. Admissibility of the request (Article 13(1) RPBA)

1.1 Under Article 13(1) RPBA, the admission of any amendment to a party's case after it has filed its grounds of appeal or reply is at the board's discretion. When exercising such discretion, the complexity of the new subject-matter submitted, the current state of the proceedings and the need for procedural economy should be considered.

1.2 Since the request was filed after oral proceedings had been arranged, it constitutes an amendment to the appellant's case within the meaning of Article 13(1) RPBA.

1.3 The board observes that claim 1 at issue is limited to the specific type of reaction which was the subject-matter of dependent claim 10 as granted, namely steam reforming of a hydrocarbon. [...]

1.4 The board thus considers that the amendments made in claim 1 are a fair reaction to the decision of the opposition division and to the preliminary opinion of the board. Since the amendments are not unexpected and are not so complex that they would notably change the scope of discussion, and since they could prima facie lead to an allowable set of claims, they are admitted into the proceedings.

[...]

4. Sufficiency of disclosure - Article 83 EPC

The ground of opposition under Article 100(b) EPC not being part of the opposition proceedings, it is a fresh ground of opposition. Since the patentee did not approve its consideration, sufficiency of disclosure cannot be questioned (G 10/91, Reasons 18).

T 0139/12 - Late filed documents

Key points

• The Board does not admit late filed evidence and documents into the proceedings, because the publication date was not clear for two documents. The Board notes that oral proceedings do not provide a framework for determining the precise circumstances of the publication of the journal article at issue.

4. Verspätetes Vorbringen

4.1 In ihrem Schreiben vom 4. Dezember 2015 hat die Beschwerdeführerin die neuen Beweismittel D6 bis D12 eingereicht und zum ersten Mal die Neuheit basierend auf D5, D6, D7 oder D8 angegriffen, sowie einen neuen Angriff der mangelnden erfinderischen Tätigkeit ausgehend von einem der D6 oder D7 in Kombination mit dem Fachwissen, belegt durch die Dokumente D9 bis D12 vorgebracht.

T 1871/09 - Novelty and Art 69

Key points:

• D1 discloses a method that differs from the method defined in claim 1. However, the specification is not adapted to the claims as granted and contains a paragraph stating that the embodiment (as disclosed in D1) is also encompassed. This paragraph must be taken into account when deciding on novelty of claim 1. Therefore, the method of claim 1 is not novel over D1.

EPO T 1871/09 - [C] - link

EPO Headnote
La Chambre fait application d'un principe général d'interprétation, dont l'article 69 CBE n'est qu'une illustration, en vertu duquel une partie d'un document ne saurait être interprétée indépendamment de son contexte, mais qu'il convient au contraire de considérer l'intégralité du document, dès lors que l'on recherche le sens de telle ou telle affirmation dont il est fait état (cf point 3.1). [...] Il n'est donc pas justifié, à ce titre, de retenir un passage de la description au détriment d'un autre, afin de donner une coloration particulière à certains termes utilisés (cf. point 3.3).

Dans le même temps, il ne saurait être fait abstraction de la particularité du fascicule de brevet pour lequel les revendications ont vocation à généraliser les modes de réalisation particuliers effectivement divulgués dans le fascicule de brevet. Dans quelle mesure, cette particularité intervient dans l'exercice d'interprétation relève du cas d'espèce. [...] Il n'en demeure pas moins que les termes choisis dans les revendications sont supposés avoir été choisis pour servir cet objectif de généralisation des modes de réalisation particuliers. En conséquence, dès lors que le titulaire du brevet aura omis, sciemment ou non, de définir certains concepts, ou aura accepté de laisser subsister certaines ambiguïtés dans la description du brevet inhérente à la requête considérée, celui-ci sera alors mal fondé à se retrancher derrière une interprétation limitative des termes de la revendication, tout au moins dans la mesure ou l'interprétation générale retenue est techniquement sensée et conforme à l'enseignement général du brevet (cf. point 3.4).

Motifs de la décision

[...] 5.4 Dans D1, les opérations de normalisation en énergie par sous bandes et de mise en forme sont concomitantes (cf. équation 9, page 6), contrairement à ce qu'exige la formulation de la revendication 1. En effet, celle-ci stipule que l'étape de mise en forme s'applique au signal à spectre transposé, ce qui présuppose son élaboration préalable.

La prise en compte du brevet tel que délivré conduit, cependant, à généraliser le procédé revendiqué au-delà de son interprétation littérale. En effet, le paragraphe [0033] du brevet stipule la possibilité de procéder au blanchiment et au filtrage en une seule opération par un filtre de fonction de transfert égale au produit des fonctions de transfert respectives du filtre blanchisseur et du filtre de mise en forme. Il est regrettable que la version de la description n'ait pas été adaptée à la version des revendications considérée brevetable par la division d'examen et conduise à ce qui constitue avant tout un problème de clarté du procédé revendiqué. La version du brevet relève cependant de l'entière responsabilité du requérant. Si aucune objection de clarté (article 84 CBE 1973) ne peut être soulevée à l'encontre de la version délivrée du brevet en vertu de l'article 100 CBE 1973, les titulaires du brevet doivent néanmoins accepter que toute contradiction, ambiguïté ou imprécision puisse être exploitée par les opposantes qui pourront notamment tirer bénéfice de la portée élargie des revendications que de telles circonstances permettent. En l'espèce, l'argument selon lequel D1 reproduit le procédé de la revendication 1, tel qu'interprété à la lumière de la description, est donc justifié.

5.5 En conclusion, le procédé de la revendication 1 selon la requête principale des requérantes I n'est donc pas nouveau au sens de l'article 54(3) CBE compte tenu de l'enseignement du document D1.

Il s'ensuit que la Chambre ne saurait faire droit à ladite requête principale.

T 0030/15 - Sufficiency and proof

Key points:

• If a patent is revoked on the ground of insufficient disclosure by the OD, the burden of proof shifts to the patentee in appeal to demonstrate that the subject-matter of the claims (as amended in appeal) is sufficiently disclosed.

EPO T 0030/15 - [C] - link

Motifs de la décision

1. Admission de T18

1.1 La requérante justifie l'introduction tardive de T18 en faisant valoir que, comme il ne s'agit que d'une réaction à l'avis préliminaire de la Chambre, elle n'aurait ni pu ni du soumettre ce document auparavant.

[...]

1.4 Devoir de prouver l'insuffisance

1.4.1 La requérante fait valoir qu'il appartenait aux intimées, en tant qu'opposantes, de prouver en réponse au mémoire de recours qu'un lecteur averti du brevet serait incapable d'exécuter, à partir de ses connaissances générales, cette nouvelle invention limitée au thon précuit. Les intimées n'ont tout simplement qu'affirmé les difficultés qu'on pourrait rencontrer en réalisant les inventions, objets des revendications soumises en recours, mais n'ont fourni aucun moyen de preuve que ces objets n'étaient pas réalisables. Elles auraient donc du soumettre leurs commentaires dans leurs écritures à un stade bien antérieur de la procédure de recours, et non les présenter comme une réponse nécessaire à T18.

La requérante, quant à elle, n'avait pas à soumettre ces moyens de preuve avec son exposé des motifs du recours, car c'est aux seuls opposants qu'il incombe, quels que soient les cas de figure, de prouver que l'exposé de l'invention n'est pas suffisant. Ceci s'applique également en recours suite à une décision de révocation du brevet pour insuffisance de description, et notamment lorsque les motifs de la décision attaquée ne sont plus censés faire grief à la requérante suite à une modification de l'objet revendiqué.

1.4.2 La Chambre ne partage pas les positions exprimées par la requérante pour les raisons suivantes:

Le mémoire exposant les motifs du recours doit contenir, selon l'article 12 (2) RPCR, l'ensemble des moyens invoqués par la requérante, notamment tous les faits, arguments et justifications qui sont invoqués au soutien de la demande d'annuler ou de modifier la décision attaquée.

Les intimées ont apporté pendant la procédure d'opposition des éléments apparemment suffisamment crédibles sur l'impossibilité de réaliser l'invention d'une façon systématique et répétitive en suivant les informations contenues dans le brevet; celles-ci seraient, de plus, trop limitées et contradictoires.

Ceci a conduit la division d'opposition à rendre la décision attaquée qu'elle a dûment motivée. Cette décision non seulement clôture la procédure d'opposition, mais a comme conséquence d'attribuer des rôles différents aux parties en cause pour la phase de recours. Une fois le brevet révoqué, c'est à la titulaire du brevet en sa qualité de requérante qu'il incombe de prendre une position plus active et de présenter, dans un premier temps, une argumentation détaillée dans son mémoire de recours et ce, même si par un nouveau jeu de revendications les motifs à la base de la décision attaquée semblent être surmontés. Elle ne peut plus se contenter d'attendre des intimées qu'elles démontrent la non validité du brevet.

La titulaire du brevet, en tant que requérante, doit, de ce fait, agir à l'encontre de la décision qu'elle conteste, c'est-à-dire qu'elle est tenue, en l'espèce, de démontrer que les connaissances générales de l'homme du métier permettraient effectivement de réaliser l'invention sur la base du brevet. Cette démonstration doit être complète et non sélective, et sans attendre que la Chambre ou les intimées l'invitent à le faire plus en avant.

La procédure de recours, à cet égard, n'est pas une continuation de la procédure d'opposition, mais une nouvelle procédure engagée par la requérante. De ce fait, les principes qui, dans un premier temps gouvernaient la procédure d'opposition ne sont plus nécessairement applicables au stade du recours, ceux énoncés dans le règlement de procédure des chambres de recours leur étant substitués, notamment l'obligation de fournir l'ensemble des moyens pour lesquels la décision ne peut pas être maintenue.

Une titulaire qui pense pouvoir écarter le fondement de la décision attaquée par des motifs de recours uniquement limités à un seul aspect de ladite décision prend le risque d'être ultérieurement au cours de la procédure de recours dans une situation telle que le dépôt de motifs ou de moyens de preuve supplémentaires soit considéré comme tardif en application des articles 13 (1) et/ou 13 (3) RPCR.

1.5 Au vu de ce qui précède, la Chambre juge, par conséquent, de ne pas admettre T18 dans la procédure de recours, en application de l'article 13(3) RPCR.