T 0304/17 - Intervention and national court proceedings

Key points

• This case is about the admissibility of a Notice of intervention, and in particular, if it was filed within the time limit of three months, more in particular, the question was what the starting point was for that period. 
• "Pursuant to Rule 89(1) EPC, notice of intervention is to be filed within three months of the date on which proceedings referred to in Article 105 EPC are instituted, i.e. either when proceedings for infringement of the same patent have been instituted against the assumed infringer (Article 105(1)(a) EPC), or when, following a request of the patent proprietor to cease alleged infringement, the assumed infringer has instituted proceedings for a ruling that he is not infringing the patent (Article 105(1)(b) EPC)."
• The intervener had filed the Notice of intervention within 3 months from the date of filing of the counterclaim of infringement by the Patentee in the UK. However, a counterclaim is generally filed in running court proceedings, in this case in running court proceedings initiated by the intervener, namely proceedings for a declaration of non-infringement .
• The Patentee argues that the intervener had already earlier standing to intervene, namely under Article 105(1)(b).
• "This point is of relevance because it is established case law that the two alternative means for intervention under Article 105(1) EPC are mutually exclusive in the sense that once an opportunity has existed for the third party to intervene under one alternative, subsequent fulfilment of the requirements under the second alternative does not provide any further opportunity to intervene"
• It appears that in this case, patentee had requested the intervener to cease infringement only after the proceedings for a declaration for non-infringement had been instituted, i.e. in the reverse order of what is envisaged in Article 105(1)(b).
• The Board concludes that because of this reverse chronological order (request after, not before, the commencement of proceedings for a declaration of non-infringement", Article 105(1)(b) was not met, such that the intervener had still a right to intervene when the patentee started the action for non-infringement.

EPO T 0304/17 - link


VI. On 4 April 2018, notice of intervention under Article 105 EPC was received from Eli Lilly and Company (intervener I) and the opposition fee was paid. A copy of Genentech's counterclaim of infringement in proceedings before the Patents Court, High Court of England and Wales, case reference HP-2017-000041, was filed in support of the intervention. The counterclaim is dated 5 January 2018 and document D97 in these proceedings.

XI. By letter dated 21 November 2019, notice of intervention under Article 105 EPC was filed, together with supporting evidence, by Eli Lilly Nederland B.V. (intervener II). The opposition fee was paid on the same date.

Reasons for the Decision

1. The appeal complies with Articles 106 to 108 and Rule 99 EPC and is therefore admissible.

Interventions (Article 105 EPC)

Intervention of Eli Lilly and Company

2. Notice of intervention was filed on behalf of Eli Lilly and Company on 4 April 2018 in a written reasoned statement in accordance with Rule 89(2) EPC and Rule 76 EPC. The opposition fee was paid on the same date.

3. Pursuant to Rule 89(1) EPC, notice of intervention is to be filed within three months of the date on which proceedings referred to in Article 105 EPC are instituted, i.e. either when proceedings for infringement of the same patent have been instituted against the assumed infringer (Article 105(1)(a) EPC), or when, following a request of the patent proprietor to cease alleged infringement, the assumed infringer has instituted proceedings for a ruling that he is not infringing the patent (Article 105(1)(b) EPC).

T 1077/17 - Remittal after sufficiency reversal

Key points

• In this opposition appeal, the OD found the patent to be insufficiently disclosed. The Board reverses and finds the disclosure to be sufficient. Then the question arises of whether to remit the case. 
• “In the present case, substantive issues (such as novelty and inventive step) raised in opposition proceedings are not dealt with in the decision under appeal nor have the parties submitted their case on these issues in the appeal proceedings”
• “the primary object of the appeal proceedings is to review the decision under appeal in a judicial manner. This principle would not be respected if the Board were to conduct a complete examination of the patent for compliance with the requirements of Articles 54 and 56 EPC for which no decision of the first instance exists yet. Therefore, the Board considers it appropriate to remit the case to the opposition division”
• The alternative strict approach would probably have been for the Board to conclude that the opponent should have maintained all novelty and inventive step objections in its initial appeal submissions. 

EPO T 1077/17 -  link


3.8 The Board thus concludes that the disclosure of the invention in the patent in suit as granted is sufficient, in particular as regards the defined minimum recovery of the monomeric form, contrary to the findings in the decision under appeal.

4. Amendments

For the Board, the claimed subject-matter is based on at least original claims 1, 2, 9, 12, 14, 18 and 23. Each of these claims referring back to any one of the preceding claims, their combination is at least implicitly and unambiguously disclosed thereby. It follows that there is no reason to deviate from the decision under appeal on this ground.

5. Remittal

Under Article 11 RPBA 2020 the Board may remit the case to the department whose decision was appealed if there are special reasons for doing so.

In the present case, substantive issues (such as novelty and inventive step) raised in opposition proceedings are not dealt with in the decision under appeal nor have the parties submitted their case on these issues in the appeal proceedings.

Under these circumstances, the Board holds that such special reasons are apparent in the present case.

As recalled in Article 12(2) RPBA 2020, the primary object of the appeal proceedings is to review the decision under appeal in a judicial manner. This principle would not be respected if the Board were to conduct a complete examination of the patent for compliance with the requirements of Articles 54 and 56 EPC for which no decision of the first instance exists yet. Therefore, the Board considers it appropriate to remit the case to the opposition division (see also T 1966/16, point 2.2 of the reasons).

Order

For these reasons it is decided that:

1. The decision under appeal is set aside.

2. The case is remitted to the first instance for further prosecution.

T 0314/18 - OD should have heard witness

Key points

• The opponent submitted a public prior use in the Notice of opposition and offered a witness. The OD did not hear the witness after deciding that “the alleged prior use was insufficiently substantiated in the notice of opposition with respect to its date, subject-matter and circumstances and that the lack of adequate substantiation could not be removed by hearing of the proposed witness”. 
•  The OD refers to GL E-IV 1.2 where it is said that “If the testimony of a witness is offered, the opposition division may decide to hear this person in order to verify the facts for which this witness is brought forward, e.g. the prior use of the claimed product in an undertaking or the existence of an obligation to secrecy. For adequate substantiation the notice of opposition must make clear these facts, as witnesses are meant to serve for corroboration of facts brought forward, not for supplying these facts in place of the opponent”. I think that 'substantiation' here refers to 'the request to hear the witness'.
• “The Board agrees with the [opponent] that, in particular having regard to the existing evidence on file as well as to the doubts that the opposition division had with respect to its probative value, the opposition division should have heard the witness. From the language used to offer the witness it is clear upon reading the notice of opposition that - contrary to the view of the opposition division and the respondent - the appellant offered the witness solely to corroborate the facts already brought forward in support of the alleged prior use  [...].”
• “No provision of the EPC requires that an alleged prior use be conclusively proven within the opposition period. When referring to the EPO Guidelines G-IV, 7.2 and E-IV, 1.2, and arguing that the lack of adequate substantiation of the prior use in the notice of opposition could not be removed by hearing the witness, the opposition division mixed up the submission of facts and the proof required to establish them”.
• “By refusing to hear the proposed witness, the opposition division proceeded in fact to assess evidence that had not been established, although it appeared to be prima facie relevant for the decision to be taken. This is procedurally incorrect. The opposition division thus has infringed the appellant's right to be heard under Articles 117(1) and 113(1) EPC.”

EPO  T 0314/18 -  link


3. Alleged public prior use

3.1 With respect to the public prior use alleged by the appellant, the opposition proceedings can be summarised as follows:

3.1.1 In the notice of opposition, the appellant alleged that the claimed invention was anticipated by a public prior use in the form of several sales of the pocket spring coiling machine PWS-100 by REMEX AG before the patent's filing date (19 December 2012). The appellant explained in detail why the claimed subject-matter was anticipated by the machine PWS-100 as described in operating manuals O1 and O2 and document O3, when used in the system PST-200 as disclosed in document O5. The appellant submitted that O1 to O3 were printed before 19 December 2012, whereby O1 and O2 were delivered with the machine. To confirm the alleged sales the appellant provided copies of shipment orders, delivery notes and invoices relating to the sale and delivery of a machine PWS-100 and the corresponding system PST-200 by REMEX AG to AGRO International (Germany) in 2007 (O6), Charles Blyth & Co. Ltd. (England) in 2007 (O7) and Kovas (Lithuania) in 2010 (O8). These different public disclosures were subsumed under the term "prior use". The appellant asserted that the sales were not subject to any confidentiality agreement. Finally, the appellant offered the hearing of a witness (Mr Nussbaum) to corroborate the date, the subject-matter and the circumstances of the alleged prior use (page 7) as well as the correctness of the appellant's submissions with respect to the technical features and the mode of operation of the machine PWS-100 and the system PST-200 (page 9).

T 1969/17 - Fresh ground of opposition

Key points

• “Since the ground for opposition pursuant to Article 100(c) EPC was not admitted into the proceedings by the opposition division, it constitutes a fresh ground for opposition within the present appeal proceedings as well. Its introduction therefore requires the consent of the proprietor/respondent (see G 9/91 and G 10/91, Reasons 18). As the respondent does not consent, this ground is not admitted into the proceedings.”
• “it is noted that, according to T 986/93 (Reasons 2.4) and T 620/08 (Reasons 3.4), a board of appeal is at least not barred from considering a late-filed ground for opposition which has been disregarded by the opposition division if it is of the opinion that the opposition division exercised its discretion wrongly in this respect. Similarly, in T 22/15 (Reasons 3.2 to 3.5) it was held that, if the respective reasoning in the impugned decision does not comply with R[Rule 111(2) EPC 2000], considering the late-filed ground for opposition in the appeal proceedings lies in the discretion of the board and depends on whether it is prima facie relevant for the maintenance of the patent.”
• “The ground for opposition concerning inventive step was never raised in the proceedings before the opposition division. It is also to be noted that the alleged lack of inventive step is not based on D1 as the closest prior art, the sole document relied upon in the proceedings before the opposition division. Therefore, this ground of opposition is a fresh one in the appeal proceedings (see also T 448/03, Reasons 5.1 and 5.2). Moreover, the lack of inventive step was not argued within the same factual and evidentiary framework as the novelty objection (see also T 184/17, Reasons 4). The respondent does not agree to its introduction into the appeal proceedings (see G 9/91 and G 10/91, Reasons 18). Thus, this ground is not admitted into the proceedings.”

EPO T 1969/17 -  link

Reasons for the Decision

1. Ground for opposition pursuant to Article 100(c) EPC


1.1 This ground was raised for the first time at the oral proceedings before the opposition division. It was thus at the discretion of the opposition division to admit it. The standard to be applied in such a case is whether the fresh ground prima facie prejudices the maintenance of the patent (G 9/91 and G 10/91, Reasons 16). To the dismay of the board, and as correctly pointed out by the appellant, the decision's reasoning with respect to the non-admittance of this fresh ground (page 6, second paragraph of the decision) is rather short, to say the least.


However, as can be seen from the minutes of the oral proceedings before the opposition division, the appellant as well as the respondent were heard concerning this issue (see the minutes of the oral proceedings before the opposition division, item 1.4). Furthermore, it is clear from the written decision and the minutes that the appellant considered the feature "average cooling rate >=3**(o)C/s to cooling stop temperature" not to be disclosed in the application documents as originally filed, and that the respondent had pointed to paragraph [0029] for support of this feature. It is clear - at least on a prima facie level - that in paragraph [0029] of the application documents as published the "average cooling rate" to cool to the "cooling stop temperature" or "target temperature" is disclosed to be "at least >=3**(o)C/s". Thus, the opposition division concluded that the appellant's submissions with respect to the fresh ground for opposition pursuant to Article 100(c) EPC prima facie did not prejudice the maintenance of the patent as granted. Therefore, although it did not give an explicit explanation for not admitting this ground into the proceedings, it is evident that the opposition division applied the correct standard and, thus, correctly exercised its discretion.

T 0665/17 - Offer to present the original

Key points

• This is an opposition case about a patent for a 'security element' e.g. for a bank note. The claim specifies basically that the element has randomly arranged lines to form a matt structure, such that when viewed the structure 'shows no diffractive effects'. The patent contains no example.
• The Board notes that the opponents have made it plausible that the patent is not enabled, so that the burden of proof shifts to the Patentee. The  Patentee files a color copy of the security element and offers - in the statement of grounds! - to show the original, e.g. during oral proceedings; this security element has the effect as specified in the claim. The Board considers that now the burden of proof shifts back to the opponents.
• The opponents “have not taken up the offer of presenting the original of the security element, which would have given them the necessary size, quantity and arrangement relationships of the corresponding dashed lines for a possible reworking.” 
• “The [opponents] could have taken up the offer in order to get a concrete basis for reworking. Since they did not take this opportunity, they did not meet their burden of proof”.

T 0665/17 -  link

1.3.1 Beweislast


Nach ständiger Rechtsprechung tragen die Einsprechen­den, hier Beschwerdegegner­innen die Beweislast für den Nachweis einer behaupteten mangelnden Ausführbarkeit.


In der Patentschrift ist kein Ausfüh­rungs­beispiel eines Sicherheitselements mit Strichgitter­linien beschrieben, bei denen zumindest einer der charakteristischen Para­me­ter Orientierung und Krümmung über der Fläche des Gitterfelds eine zufällige und sprunghafte Variation aufweist/aufweisen, um eine Mattstruktur zu bilden, die bei Betrachtung keine diffraktiven Effekte zeigt. Somit konnten die Beschwerdegegnerinnen den Nachweis der mangelnden Ausführbarkeit nicht anhand eines beschrie­benen Ausführungsbeispiels führen. Es ist zudem im vorliegenden Fall für die Beschwerdegegnerinnen unver­hältnismäßig aufwendig, über eine Vielzahl von Möglich­keiten eine negative Tatsache zu belegen. Die Beschwer­degegnerinnen haben ihre Beweislast in soweit Rechnung getragen, als sie sie auf Plausibilitätsüberlegungen gestützt haben. Die Beweislast zum Nachweis des Gegenteils liegt daher auf der Patentinhaberin, hier Beschwerdeführerin.


In diesem Zusammenhang hat die Beschwerdeführerin auf ihr Angebot in der Beschwerdebegründung (Seite 12) hingewiesen, das Original eines Sicherheitselements, welches als Farbfotographie mit Schreiben vom 16. Mai 2018 vorgelegt wurde, z.B. in einer mündlichen Verhandlung vorzulegen. Nach Angaben der Beschwerde­führerin enthalte dieses Sicherheitselement sowohl diffraktive Gitterfelder als auch matte Gitterfelder nach Anspruch 1 des Streitpatents. Die matten Gitter­felder enthielten eine Vielzahl von Gitterlinien, bei denen der Parameter Orientierung zufällig und sprung­haft über die Fläche des Gitterfelds variiert. Sie bilden jeweils eine Matt­struktur, die bei der Betrachtung keine diffrak­tiven Effekte zeige. Die Beweislast zum Nachweis des Gegenteils liegt daher auf der Seite der Beschwerdegegnerinnen.

T 1435/13 - Completeness of the search

Key points

• In this examination appeal, the Board concludes that claim 1 is novel and inventive in view of the documents cited in the search report. The question then arises if perhaps other documents not yet on file teach the features at issue.
• “In the communication accompanying the summons to oral proceedings, the Board had some doubts whether the aspect of a plurality of group interrupt controllers had been sufficiently searched. However, since this subject-matter was present in claim 7 and 8 as originally filed, which are indicated as searched in the search report, the Board must be able to assume that it was searched completely.”
• The Board therefore orders the grant of the patent.
  
• As a separate matter, the appellant requests reimbursement of the appeal fee due to a substantial procedural violation. “The appellant argued that the examining division's failure to deal with all the independent claims of the then main request constituted a substantial procedural violation”.
• “The Board does not consider that the appeal fee should be reimbursed. Whilst it might have been desirable that the decision under appeal included reasoning with respect to all independent claims and thus also claim 9, the fact that claim 1 of the main request did not fulfill the requirements of the EPC meant that the main request could not be allowed, even if independent claim 9 complied with the requirements of the EPC. As the examining division decided on all requests before it, the Board does not consider that a substantial procedural violation occurred.”

EPO T 1435/13 - link



Thus, the Board judges that the subject-matter of claim 1 of the auxiliary request involves an inventive step over D1 (Article 56 EPC).

3.5 No objection was raised during the examination proceedings based on documents D2 to D4 and the Board considers the disclosure in those documents to be no more relevant than that provided by D1 and D5.

4. Completeness of the search

4.1 In the communication accompanying the summons to oral proceedings, the Board had some doubts whether the aspect of a plurality of group interrupt controllers had been sufficiently searched. However, since this subject-matter was present in claim 7 and 8 as originally filed, which are indicated as searched in the search report, the Board must be able to assume that it was searched completely.

T 0144/17 - Visual inspection

Key points

• This is an example of a case wherein the OD carried out a visual inspection of the evidence of the alleged public prior use.
• “According to the appealed decision and to the "Minutes Inspection of the Seat Altea" the Opposition Division visually inspected the vehicle”
• The inspection took place on the car park of the EPO in Berlin.

Minutes of the taking of evidence by the OD

EPO T 0144/17 -  link

Reasons for the Decision

1. The appeal is admissible.

2. The subject-matter of claim 1 is new (Article 54 EPC) over the public prior use "Seat Altea", at least feature M7 not being derivable therefrom.

According to the appealed decision and to the "Minutes Inspection of the Seat Altea" the Opposition Division visually inspected the vehicle, which "showed a boot with boot floor, two sides, shelves on each side and slits in the shelves. A foldable luggage compartment cover was provided. The cover could be folded and inserted into the slots as well as between the front end of the shelves and the rear of the back seats" (see said Minutes). Thus, the Opposition Division noted that the load platform could be folded and inserted in a vertical position into said slots (corresponding to Respondent's aforementioned first configuration; see also appealed decision, Facts and Submissions, points 7.5.3, 7.5.6), the folded load platform being in a vertical and not tilted, though stable position (see decision, Facts and Submission, point 7.5.6). This is confirmed in point 3.1.2 of the "Reasons for the decisions", stating that "while the nice fit of the load platform in the grooves allowed the load platform to be maintained in a stable position, this position was not tilted with respect to the floor".

T 2114/16 - Comparative example no CPA

Key points

• The opponent's assert that comparative example 2 of E22 is the closest prior art. The Board does not agree.
• “Thus, comparative example 2 [of E22] is disclosed to illustrate the poor bond strength obtained in the absence of the filler-NFC-CP mixture flocculation step, which is proposed in document E22 as the solution to improve paper strength despite the presence of fillers.
  It is not apparent for the Board why the skilled person would select the most disadvantageous starting point (having the lowest internal bond strength) for the purpose of solving the technical problem of increasing the mechanical strength of paper. ”
• “As correctly pointed out by the respondent, an inventive step objection based on selecting such a clearly disadvantageous starting point would necessarily be contaminated by hindsight, since this choice could only be motivated by the previous knowledge of the claimed invention”

EPO T 2114/16 -  link

Comparative example 2 of E22 discloses a method wherein filler, NFC and CP are sequentially added in this order to a fibre pulp slurry. As argued by the respondent [patentee] , the results presented in table 1 on page 12 of E22 indicate that this method gives rise to the worst outcome among all of the tested alternatives in terms of internal bond strength. Thus, comparative example 2 is disclosed to illustrate the poor bond strength obtained in the absence of the filler-NFC-CP mixture flocculation step, which is proposed in document E22 as the solution to improve paper strength despite the presence of fillers. It is not apparent for the Board why the skilled person would select the most disadvantageous starting point (having the lowest internal bond strength) for the purpose of solving the technical problem of increasing the mechanical strength of paper. As correctly pointed out by the respondent, an inventive step objection based on selecting such a clearly disadvantageous starting point would necessarily be contaminated by hindsight, since this choice could only be motivated by the previous knowledge of the claimed invention (in line with e.g. reasons 3.1 of T 1307/12).

T 1928/17 - All independent claims

Key points

• In this examination appeal, the set of claims that was refused has three independent claims 1, 2 and 3 each for a composition, and each with a  different characterizing feature (i.e. claim 1 has feature X, claim 2 has feature Y, claim 3 has feature Z).
• The ED refused the application, explaining that claims 1 and 2 were not novel. The Board surprisingly sees a substantial procedural violation in the ED not commenting on claim 3.
• The refusal decision was based on the lack of novelty of independent claim 3 wheres the earlier novelty objections of the ED concerned the independent claims 1 and 2 only. Hence, the ED had not complied with the right to be heard of Art. 113 EPC. [see also the comments]
• " Was die Schlussfolgerung "Deshalb sind die Ansprüche 1-29 nicht neu" anbelangt, bleibt diese - zumindest im Hinblick auf die Ansprüche 3 bis 29 - völlig unbegründet, weil keines der technischen Merkmale, die die Ansprüche 3 bis 29 kennzeichnen, berücksichtigt word."
• “Durch die ausschließliche Bezugnahme auf die technischen Merkmale X und Y, die die Ansprüche 1 und 2 charakterisieren, erweckt daher die Prüfungsabteilung in der Mitteilung den Eindruck, dass lediglich die Neuheit des beanspruchten Gegenstandes bestritten wird, der auf einer durch die Merkmale X und Y charakterisierten Tanninfraktion beruht.”
• As far as I know, one claim being not novel is enough to make the entire set of claims unallowable. But this Board apparently sees it differently.
• This decision is also interesting for the in my experience quite common case that the search report only deals in substance with claim 1 and then merely asserts that the features of the other claims do not provide for inventive step. 

EPO  T 1928/17 

Entscheidungsgründe

1. Verletzung des rechtlichen Gehörs und unzureichende Begründung

1.1 Gemäß Artikel 113(1) EPÜ dürfen Entscheidungen nur auf Gründe gestützt werden, zu denen die Beteiligten sich äußern konnten. Dies bedeutet insbesondere, dass ein Beteiligter in der Entscheidungsbegründung nicht durch bisher unbekannte Gründe überrascht werden darf.

1.2 Es ist zu entscheiden, ob der Beschwerdeführerin zuvor die Gelegenheit gegeben wurde, sich mit den Gründen, auf die sich die Entscheidung stützt, auseinander zu setzen. Dies setzt voraus, dass der Beschwerdeführerin die Gründe vorab mitgeteilt worden waren.

1.3 In den unabhängigen Ansprüchen des Anspruchssatzes, welcher der Mitteilung nach Artikel 94(3) und der angefochtenen Entscheidung zu Grunde liegt, finden sich drei kennzeichnende Merkmale, die die Tanninfraktion näher charakterisieren:

- Merkmal X: ein bestimmtes Zahlenmittel des Molekulargewichts von mindestens 1000g/mol

- Merkmal Y: ein bestimmtes Gewichtsmittel des Molekulargewichts von mindestens 1000g/mol

- Merkmal Z: das Vorhandensein von hydrolysierbarem Gallotannin in der Tanninfraktion.

1.4 Ansprüche 1, 2 und 3 sind jeweils durch die Merkmale X, Y und Z charakterisiert. Anspruch 18 umfasst drei alternative Ausführungsformen, die jeweils durch eines der Merkmale X, Y oder Z gekennzeichnet sind.

T 1177/17 - Plausible and burden of proof

Key points

• The concept of 'plausibility' is often applied in the context that the applicant may only rely on post-published evidence of the technical effect if the application as filed makes that effect at least plausible. 
• In the present opposition case, the concept is used in connection with the burden of proof.
• The opponents allege that the technical effect is not made plausible by Example 1 of the patent.
• The Board decides that the technical effect is not plausible. " there is no evidence on file to show that [the compound] 2-FL, by itself, achieves the required NK cell stimulation that is necessary to attain the claimed antiviral effects." 
• " the [patentee] did not substantiate its submissions with any evidence other than the data reported in example 1. By contrast, it argued that it was down to the [opponents] to demonstrate that 2-FL did not provide for the claimed antiviral effects by means of NK cell stimulation. However, this argument cannot succeed, since the technical effects invoked by the [patentee] are not plausible over the whole scope of claim 1 of the main request" 
• The patent is revoked.

EPO T 1177/17 -  link



4.2.5 The subject-matter of claim 1 differs from the closest prior art in that the fucosyllactose is 2-FL.


4.3 Objective technical problem and solution


4.3.1 In order to formulate the objective technical problem, it is necessary to establish the technical effect(s) achieved by the aforementioned distinguishing feature.


[...]

4.3.3 While the appellants [opponent] did not dispute the validity of the data contained in example 1 of the patent in suit, they submitted that there was no evidence supporting the alleged link between the immunomodulatory effects of 2-FL shown in the mentioned example and the compound's activity against infections caused by the list of viruses recited in claim 1 of the main request.


4.3.4 Accordingly, it needs to be established whether the disclosure of example 1 renders the alleged, indirect antiviral activity of 2-FL by means of NK cell stimulation (see point 4.3.2 above) credible or at least plausible over substantially the whole scope of claim 1 of the main request.


4.3.5 Example 1 of the patent in suit pertains to a study in mice vaccinated with Influvac (an influenza vaccine; see paragraph 0048). The test animals received either a control diet or a diet supplemented with the following respective oligosaccharides: [...]


Diet supplementation with 2-FL resulted in a significant increase in NK cell number and activity compared with control-fed animals (see experimental data in Table 1 in paragraph 0052). Hence, in the board's judgement, example 1 credibly shows that dietary 2-FL augments the NK-cell-stimulating effects of the Influvac vaccine in the tested animals and thus contributes to the effective protection of these animals against infections caused by influenza viruses.

T 2350/15 - Cost apportionment for not attending oral proceedings

Key points

• In this opposition appeal, the preliminary opinion of the Board is to maintain the patent as granted. The opponent informs the Board that they will not attend oral proceedings adding that “this did not mean that it was withdrawing its appeal or its request for oral proceedings”.
• The Board orders a cost apportionment. “By maintaining its request for oral proceedings, the appellant/opponent thus not only obliged the Board to hold the oral proceedings but also obliged the appellant/patent proprietor to come to the oral proceedings and to prepare for them. Under these circumstances, pursuant to Article 104(1) EPC and Article 16(1)(e) and 16(2) RPBA 2020, the Board finds it equitable that the appellant/opponent bears the costs (for preparation, travel and presence) incurred by the appellant/patent proprietor for the oral proceedings before the Board.”.
• I note that the opponent was “Strawman Limited” represented by a large British patent attorney firm. I assume that they will pay upon first request.
• The Board also notes, under Art.123(2), that “it is established case law that claims should not be read alone but in the context of the patent as a whole with a mind willing to understand [...] This means that a word or expression in a claim must always be given the same meaning as the one the author of the patent wished to give it.”.

EPO T 2350/15 - link



3. Objection pursuant to Article 100(c) EPC

[...]


3.1.1 Interpretation of claim 1

In the Board's opinion, it is established case law that claims should not be read alone but in the context of the patent as a whole with a mind willing to understand (e.g. T 0190/99, point 2.4 of the Reasons; T 0556/02, point 5.3 of the Reasons). This means that a word or expression in a claim must always be given the same meaning as the one the author of the patent wished to give it. This line of thought is confirmed in T 1592/14 (point 5 of the Reasons), which was cited by the appellant/patent proprietor.

In the present case, for a person skilled in the art having read the patent as a whole, it is clear that a mistake was made in claim 1, namely "first" and "second" were inverted in this litigious feature. This is evident not only from a whole-content-disclosure point of view but also from a technical point of view.

Indeed, the object of the patent is a suturing apparatus, and it is only once the suture has passed through the tissue that it should be released from the needle. Or, said differently, it makes no technical sense to release the suture during the movement which brings the suture through the tissue, namely the movement from the first to the second position. Hence, even if the person skilled in the art had read the claim alone, contrary to the opinion of the appellant/opponent, they would have immediately understood that in the claim wording the two words "first" and "second" had been inverted.

This also means that the decisions T 0431/03 (point 2.2.2 of the Reasons), T 1018/02 (point 3.8 of the Reasons), T 1395/07 (point 4 of the Reasons) and T 0197/10 (point 2.3 of the Reasons) cited by the appellant/opponent in any case do not apply because they start with the assumption that the claim wording is clear and makes technical sense in itself for the person skilled in the art, which as explained above is not so in the present case.

The technically sensible interpretation of claim 1 is supported by the rest of the specification since, indisputably throughout the description and figures, it is when the needle goes back from the second to the first jaw, or more precisely once the suture is retained, that the suture is released from the needle.

T 0584/17 - May rely on Art.13(1) criteria

Key points

• The Board notes that Art. 13(2) RPBA 2020 does not refer to Art. 13(1) RPBA. The Expl. Note says that “At the third level of the convergent approach, the Board may also rely on criteria applicable at the second level of the convergent approach, i.e. as set out in Art. 13(1).”.
• The Board interprets this the term ‘may’ as giving the Board the freedom (possibility) to use the criteria of Art. 13(1) for submissions filed in the ‘third stage’ (typically: after the notification of the summons).

EPO T 0584/17 - link


EPO Headnote

In der dritten Stufe des nach der revidierten Fassung der Verfahrensordnung der Beschwerdekammern (VOBK 2020) im Beschwerdeverfahren anzuwendenden Konvergenzansatzes steht es der Kammer frei, die in Artikel 13 (1) VOBK 2020 angegebenen Kriterien heranzuziehen, wenn sie in Anwendung des Artikels 13 (2) VOBK 2020 und in Ausübung ihres Ermessens darüber entscheidet, ob eine in diesem Verfahrensstadium vorgenommene Änderung zugelassen wird. Dies gilt auch, wenn Artikel 13 (2) VOBK 2020 nicht anwendbar ist und stattdessen weiterhin Artikel 13 VOBK 2007 anzuwenden ist. (Siehe Punkte 1.2.7 bis 1.2.11 der Entscheidungsgründe)

Entscheidungsgründe

1.2 Dokument D17

1.2.1 Das Dokument D17 wurde von der Beschwerdeführerin mit der Beschwerdebegründung eingereicht und es wurde dazu ausgeführt, dass dieses Dokument als Patentliteratur im Dokument D4a zitiert sei und in Reaktion auf die überraschende Entscheidung der Einspruchsabteilung, dass das Merkmal M5d doch nicht im Dokument D6 offenbart sei, eingereicht worden sei. Im Laufe der Diskussion in der mündlichen Verhandlung vor der Kammer über die Zulassung des Dokuments D17 in das Beschwerdeverfahren nahm die Beschwerdegegnerin ihren im schriftlichen Verfahren erhobenen Einwand gegen die Zulassung des Dokuments D17 zurück. Daraufhin nahm die Beschwerdeführerin ihren Antrag, das Dokument D17 in das Verfahren zuzulassen, zurück.

1.2.2 In Reaktion darauf wiederum beantragte die Beschwerdegegnerin erstmals in der mündlichen Verhandlung die Zulassung des Dokuments D17 und der dazu bereits gemachten Ausführungen in das Verfahren.

1.2.3 Die Kammer sieht dies als ein geändertes Vorbringen der Beschwerdegegnerin im Sinne von Artikel 13 (1) und (3) VOBK 2007, der gemäß Artikel 25 (3) VOBK 2020 im vorliegenden Fall statt des Artikels 13 (2) VOBK 2020 weiterhin anzuwenden ist, da die Ladung zur mündlichen Verhandlung vor Inkrafttreten der revidierten Fassung der Verfahrensordnung der Beschwerdekammern zugestellt wurde.

1.2.4 Nach Artikel 13 (1) VOBK 2007 steht es im Ermessen der Kammer, Änderungen des Vorbringens eines Beteiligten nach Einreichung seiner Beschwerdebegründung oder Erwiderung zuzulassen und zu berücksichtigen. Bei der Ausübung dieses Ermessens werden insbesondere die Komplexität des neuen Vorbringens, der Stand des Verfahrens und die gebotene Verfahrensökonomie berücksichtigt. Artikel 13 (3) VOBK 2007 ergänzt, dass Änderungen des Vorbringens nach Anberaumung der mündlichen Verhandlung nicht zugelassen werden, "wenn sie Fragen aufwerfen, deren Behandlung der Kammer oder dem bzw. den anderen Beteiligten ohne Verlegung der mündlichen Verhandlung nicht zuzumuten ist".

1.2.5 Die in Artikel 13 (1) VOBK 2007 beispielhaft aufgezählten Kriterien für die Ermessensausübung stellen keine abschließende Auflistung von Kriterien dar, sodass auch andere Überlegungen und etablierte, für die Frage der Zulässigkeit relevante Kriterien berücksichtigt werden können (siehe Rechtsprechung der Beschwerdekammern des Europäischen Patentamts, 9. Auflage 2019, V.A.4.1.2). Auch müssen diese Kriterien nicht kumulativ erfüllt sein. Nach der im Rahmen von Artikel 13 (1) und (3) VOBK 2007 entwickelten Rechtsprechung der Beschwerdekammern können bei geändertem Vorbringen i.S.v. Artikel 13 VOBK 2007, wie spät eingereichte Tatsachen und Beweismittel, auch weitere Kriterien angewandt werden, wie u. a. die Relevanz des verspäteten Vorbringens, überzeugende Gründe für das verspätete Vorbringen, ob das verspätete Vorbringen als ein Verfahrensmissbrauch zu werten ist oder ob es eine angemessene und alsbaldige Reaktion auf Vorgänge im bisherigen Verfahren darstellt (siehe z.B. Rechtsprechung der Beschwerdekammern, supra, V.A.4.13). Bei der Ermessensausübung ist nach der ständigen Rechtsprechung allen im jeweiligen Fall rechtserheblichen Faktoren Rechnung zu tragen, und es sind bei der Ausübung dieses Ermessens die Umstände des Einzelfalls zu berücksichtigen (siehe Rechtsprechung der Beschwerdekammern, supra, V.A.4.3).

1.2.6 Im vorliegenden Fall reichte die Beschwerdeführerin das Dokument D17 bereits mit ihrer Beschwerdebegründung ein und begründete, warum dieses Dokument für die Frage der erfinderischen Tätigkeit relevant sei. Die Zulassung dieses Dokuments und dessen Relevanz wurde auch in der mündlichen Verhandlung vor der Kammer diskutiert bevor die Beschwerdeführerin ihren Antrag auf Zulassung des Dokuments D17 zurücknahm.
Deshalb ist die Kammer der Ansicht, dass die Beschwerdegegnerin durch die Änderung ihres Vorbringens in der mündlichen Verhandlung keine neuen Fragen aufgeworfen hat. Auch erfolgte diese Änderung in unmittelbarer Reaktion auf die Rücknahme ihres Antrags auf Zulassung des Dokuments D17 seitens der Beschwerdeführerin, so dass das Beschwerdeverfahren auch nicht verzögert wurde.
Der Inhalt des Dokuments D17 wirft nach Ansicht der Kammer auch keine komplexen Fragen auf, deren Behandlung der Kammer oder der Beschwerdeführerin, die dieses Dokument erstmals selbst im Beschwerdeverfahren vorgebracht hat, ohne Verlegung der mündlichen Verhandlung nicht zuzumuten gewesen wäre. In Ausübung ihres Ermessens nach Artikel 13 (1) und (3) VOBK 2007 und unter Berücksichtigung der im Rahmen von Artikel 13 (1) und (3) VOBK 2007 entwickelten Rechtsprechung (siehe oben Punkt 1.2.5) ließ die Kammer daher das Dokument D17 und den dazu ergangenen Vortrag der Beschwerdegegnerin in das Beschwerdeverfahren zu.

1.2.7 Darüber hinaus wurde in einigen jüngsten Entscheidungen die Auffassung vertreten, dass in Fällen, in denen wie im vorliegenden Fall Artikel 13 VOBK 2007 anstatt Artikel 13 (2) VOBK 2020 weiterhin anzuwenden ist, zusätzlich Artikel 13 (1) VOBK 2020 Anwendung findet, da Artikel 25 VOBK 2020 dies nicht ausschließe (siehe z.B. die Entscheidungen T 634/16 vom 10. Januar 2020, Punkte 7 bis 14 der Entscheidungsgründe, und T 32/16 vom 14. Januar 2020, Punkte 1.1.1 bis 1.1.3 der Entscheidungsgründe).

1.2.8 Im vorliegenden Fall hält es die Kammer jedoch für nicht erforderlich, die in Artikel 13 (1) VOBK 2020 angegebenen Kriterien zusätzlich zu den Kriterien, die bei der Ermessensausübung nach Artikel 13 VOBK 2007 berücksichtigt werden können (siehe oben Punkte 1.2.4 und 1.2.5), heranzuziehen.

1.2.9 In Fällen, in denen die Ladung am oder nach dem 1. Januar 2020 zugestellt wurde, implementiert Artikel 13 (2) VOBK 2020 die dritte Stufe des im Beschwerdeverfahren anzuwendenden Konvergenzansatzes (siehe Dokument CA/3/19, Abschnitt VI, Erläuterungen zu Artikel 13 (2), 1. Absatz, Satz 1; siehe auch Zusatzpublikation 2 zum ABl. EPA 2020). Er sieht die am weitesten reichenden Beschränkungen für Beschwerdevorbringen vor, das erst in einem vorgerückten Verfahrensstadium erfolgt, nämlich nach Ablauf einer Frist, die die Kammer in einer Mitteilung nach Regel 100 Absatz 2 EPÜ bestimmt hat, oder, wenn keine solche Mitteilung ergeht, nach Zustellung einer Ladung zur mündlichen Verhandlung (siehe Dokument CA/3/19, Abschnitt VI, Erläuterungen zu Artikel 13 (2), 1. Absatz, Satz 2). Nach dem Wortlaut des Artikels 13 (2) VOBK 2020 werden Änderungen in der dritten Stufe des Konvergenzansatzes grundsätzlich nicht mehr berücksichtigt, es sei denn, der betreffende Beteiligte hat stichhaltige Gründe aufgezeigt, dass außergewöhnliche Umstände vorliegen. Jedoch gilt auch hier, dass die Kammer in Ausübung ihres Ermessens entscheiden kann, eine in diesem Verfahrensstadium vorgenommene Änderung zuzulassen (siehe Dokument CA/3/19, Abschnitt VI, Erläuterungen zu Artikel 13 (2), 3. Absatz, letzter Satz).

1.2.10 Zu der Frage, ob in der dritten Stufe des Konvergenzansatzes zusätzlich zu den Bestimmungen des Artikels 13 (2) VOBK 2020 auch Artikel 13 (1) VOBK 2020 heranzuziehen ist, stellt die Kammer zunächst fest, dass der Wortlaut des Artikels 13 (2) VOBK 2020 keinen ausdrücklichen Verweis auf den Absatz 1 dieses Artikels enthält. Nur die Erläuterungen zu Artikel 13 (2) VOBK 2020 enthalten zu dieser Frage Folgendes:

"In der dritten Stufe des Konvergenzansatzes kann die Kammer auch Kriterien heranziehen, die für die zweite Stufe des Konvergenzansatzes, d. h. nach dem vorgeschlagenen neuen Artikel 13 Absatz 1, maßgeblich sind." (Dokument CA/3/19, Abschnitt VI, Erläuterungen zu Artikel 13 (2), 4. Absatz; Hervorhebung durch die Kammer)

Die Kammer folgert daraus, dass es der Kammer in der dritten Stufe des im Beschwerdeverfahren anzuwendenden Konvergenzansatzes freisteht, die in Artikel 13 (1) VOBK 2020 angegebenen Kriterien heranzuziehen, wenn sie in Anwendung des Artikels 13 (2) VOBK 2020 und in Ausübung ihres Ermessens darüber entscheidet, ob eine in diesem Verfahrensstadium vorgenommene Änderung zugelassen wird.

Insofern unterscheidet sich Artikel 13 (2) VOBK 2020 auch von Artikel 13 (1) VOBK 2020. Anders als in Artikel 13 (2) VOBK 2020, hat der Gesetzgeber in Artikel 13 (1) VOBK 2020 durch den ausdrücklichen Verweis in Satz 2 auf den neuen Artikel 12 (4) bis (6) VOBK 2020 klargestellt, dass die in diesen Absätzen angegebenen und bereits in der ersten Stufe des im Beschwerdeverfahren anzuwendenden Konvergenzansatzes maßgeblichen Kriterien auch für jegliches Vorbringen in der zweiten Stufe des im Beschwerdeverfahren anzuwendenden Konvergenzansatzes entsprechend gelten (siehe auch Dokument CA/3/19, Abschnitt VI, Erläuterungen zu Artikel 13 (1), 2. Absatz, Satz 2).

1.2.11 Die Kammer vertritt die Auffassung, dass es ihr in der dritten Stufe des Konvergenzansatzes auch dann freisteht, die in Artikel 13 (1) VOBK 2020 angegebenen Kriterien bei ihrer Ermessensentscheidung zusätzlich heranzuziehen, wenn, wie im vorliegenden Fall, Artikel 13 (2) VOBK 2020 nicht anwendbar ist und stattdessen weiterhin Artikel 13 VOBK 2007 anzuwenden ist. Es ist weder aus den Übergangsbestimmungen des Artikels 25 VOBK 2020 noch aus den Erläuterungen dazu ersichtlich, warum bei Anwendung des Artikels 13 VOBK 2007 in der dritten Stufe des Konvergenzansatzes hinsichtlich der in Artikel 13 (1) VOBK 2020 angegebenen Kriterien etwas anderes gelten sollte als bei der Anwendung des Artikels 13 (2) VOBK 2020.

1.2.12 Nach Ansicht der Kammer entsprechen die Kriterien zur Ermessensausübung in Artikel 13 (1) VOBK 2020 jedoch im Wesentlichen den Kriterien, die von der einschlägigen Rechtsprechung im Rahmen von Artikel 13 (1) VOBK 2007 entwickelt wurden (siehe dazu auch die Entscheidungen T 634/16, Punkt 14, zweiter Absatz der Entscheidungsgründe und T 32/16, Punkt 1.1.3, zweiter Absatz der Entscheidungsgründe). Nachdem die Kammer bei ihrer vorliegenden Ermessensentscheidung nach Artikel 13 (1) und (3) VOBK 2007 über die Zulassung des Dokuments D17 in das Beschwerdeverfahren bereits die in
Artikel 13 (1) und (3) VOBK 2007 genannten Kriterien und auch die dazu von der Rechtsprechung entwickelten Kriterien berücksichtigt hat (siehe oben Punkte 1.2.4 bis 1.2.6), sah sie im vorliegenden Fall keinen Grund, die in Artikel 13 (1) VOBK 2020 angegebenen Kriterien zusätzlich heranzuziehen.

T 0890/17 - A summary of novelty

Key points

• The Board explains that in view of G2/10: “a prior art document is novelty destroying only if the skilled person would derive directly and unambiguously from the whole of that document, using common general knowledge, and seen objectively and relative to the date of said document, a subject-matter falling within the scope of what is claimed”.
• This statement is correct in the case at hand. It may be added that the prior art must also be enabling. Furthermore, for selections of sub-ranges, special rules apply.

EPO - T 0890/17 - link

Reasons for the Decision

Novelty

1. Objections that the subject-matter of claim 1 of the granted patent lacks novelty have been raised over the disclosure of each of documents D3, D1, D2 and D4. These four objections have in common that they have been made having regard to multiple separate passages of each of the documents concerned.

1.1 The Enlarged Board reminded in decisions G 1/03 (OJ EPO 2004, 413, point 2.2.2 of the Reasons) and G 2/10 (OJ EPO 2012, 376, point 4.6 of the Reasons) that the concept of disclosure must be the same for the purposes of Articles 54, 87 and 123 EPC, which concept defined in opinion G 3/89 and decision G 11/91 of the Enlarged Board of Appeal (OJ EPO 1993, 117 and 125, respectively) was reaffirmed in decision G 2/10 (OJ EPO 2012, 376, point 4.3 of the Reasons).

1.2 In application of that concept, a prior art document is novelty destroying only if the skilled person would derive directly and unambiguously from the whole of that document, using common general knowledge, and seen objectively and relative to the date of said document, a subject-matter falling within the scope of what is claimed.

In the present case, it must be therefore determined whether for at least one of the prior art documents D3, D1, D2 and D4 the enumeration of the various passages thereof made by the appellant is sufficient to demonstrate the existence of an anticipatory disclosure within the above meaning for the subject-matter of granted claim 1.

T 1930/14 - Purpose in method claim

Key points

Claim 1 is directed to a method of producing an antibody. The claim recites active method steps, as well as the effect that “wherein said IgG2 antibody [...] elutes as several separate forms on RP-HPLC and said method [...] alters the relative distribution of said several separate forms on said RP-HPLC”.

The Board concludes that this feature does not provide for novelty.

“The second non-medical use claims considered in decisions G 2/88 and G 6/88 of the Enlarged Board of Appeal were directed to the use of a substance for achieving an effect but not to methods/processes/uses for the production of a product. For the former type of claim [use of a substance], attaining of a "newly discovered technical effect" should be considered as a functional technical feature of the claim, whereas for the latter type of claim [methods/processes/uses for the production of a product] it should not”.

“a disclosure in the state of the art of a method for producing a product having the same process steps as the claimed process would anticipate the claimed subject-matter even if that disclosure did not explicitly mention the effect of carrying out said process steps, since the effect would necessarily
be achieved by following the steps of the method.”.

“it is not relevant in the assessment of novelty whether the authors of document D1 recognised that this effect was taking place in the method that they disclosed.”

“Thus, document D1 discloses a method of producing an IgG2 antibody falling within the ambit of claim 1, the subject-matter of which therefore lacks novelty.”

T 1930/14 - link
See also T 0308/17 about a related patent.




IX. Claims 1, 6, 7, 12 and 13 of the main request read:

"1. A method of producing an IgG2 antibody or an IgG2 antibody fragment preparation enriched for one of several separate IgG2 forms comprising:
contacting an IgG2 antibody or an IgG2 antibody fragment that has been recombinantly produced by mammalian cells with a reduction/oxidation coupling reagent at a pH of 5 to 11; wherein said IgG2 antibody or IgG2 antibody fragment elutes as several separate forms on RP-HPLC and said method decreases the number of forms eluting on RP-HPLC, or alters the relative distribution of said several separate forms on said RP-HPLC;

further comprising contacting said IgG2 antibody with a chaotropic agent before, after or concurrently with said contacting with said reduction/oxidation coupling reagent.

Reasons for the Decision

 [...]

4. The claim further specifies that the starting IgG2 antibody elutes as several separate forms on RP-HPLC and carrying out the steps of the method leads to a decrease of the number of forms eluting on RP-HPLC, or an alteration in the relative distribution of said forms on said RP-HPLC.

T 1749/14 - Notional business person

Key points

• This case is about inventive step of a software-related invention. The question is whether a claim feature is technical or not under the Comvik approach. The Board applies the test of T 1463/11 (CardinalCommerce), namely whether the notional business person would come up with the feature (as part of his request to a software programmer). 
• The Board finds that the notional business person would not come up with the feature at issue.
• “The notional business person might come up with the abstract idea of avoiding the customer having to provide PIN and account information to the merchant. The invention however requires a new infrastructure, new devices and a new protocol involving technical considerations linked to [...]. ”
• “This goes beyond what the notional business person knows and concerns technical implementation details (how to implement) which are more than a straight-forward 1:1 programming of an abstract business idea”.
• Therefore, the feature is technical and is to be taken into account for formulating the objective technical problem.
• “The invention is in the field of mobile point-of-sale (POS) terminals for carrying out transactions, e.g. involving a credit card. Conventionally, the merchant possesses such mobile POS terminals and the customer has to provide his identification credentials such as account number and PIN to this merchant's unit [...]. The invention tries to avoid the customer's sensitive information becoming known if the merchant's device is tampered with by allowing a transaction to be carried out without the customer having to present account information and the PIN to the merchant.” 
• I suppose that this is a valid security concern, once you think about it, typing in your PIN code into a device held by someone else is perhaps less safe than typing it into your own mobile phone. I note however that claim 1 at issue is rather broad, much broader than the drawings and the abstract of the patent application. 

EPO T 1749/14 - link



EPO Headnote

• The notional business person might come up with the abstract idea of avoiding the customer having to provide PIN and account information to the merchant.
• The invention however requires a new infrastructure, new devices and a new protocol involving technical considerations linked to modified devices and their capabilities as well as security relevant modifications of the transfer of sensitive information using new possibilities achieved by the modifications to the previously known mobile POS infrastructure.
• This goes beyond what the notional business person knows and concerns technical implementation details (how to implement) which are more than a straight-forward 1:1 programming of an abstract business idea. (See point 5 of the reasons).
• This is in the sphere of the technical expert and subject to the assessment of inventive step (see T 1082/13).

III. Independent claim 1 of the main request reads as follows:

"1. A method comprising:

(a) storing customer account information in a customer mobile personal point-of-sale terminal (CMPPT), wherein the CMPPT includes a cellular telephone portion and a point-of-sale attachment portion; this CMPPT is personalized for the individual customer by storing (a) encryption key(s) that is(are) used for communication with the individual CMPPT of the individual customer, and using this personalized CMPPT in subsequent operations;

(b) after the storing of customer account information in the CMPPT according (a) [sic] receiving merchant account information into the CMPPT; and

(c) initiating a transaction by sending the customer account information and the merchant account information from the CMPPT to a financial transaction verification entity (FTVE)."

Reasons for the Decision

1. The invention is in the field of mobile point-of-sale (POS) terminals for carrying out transactions, e.g. involving a credit card. Conventionally, the merchant possesses such mobile POS terminals and the customer has to provide his identification credentials such as account number and PIN to this merchant's unit (see e.g. D1 [0024], [0025] or [0106], 0107]). The invention tries to avoid the customer's sensitive information becoming known if the merchant's device is tampered with by allowing a transaction to be carried out without the customer having to present account information and the PIN to the merchant.

[...]


This transaction with the mobile POS terminal of D1 therefore involves the security problem of the customer having to provide his PIN and account number to the merchant's device, which then encrypts this information and passes it on to the Financial Transaction Verification Entity (FTVE).

The present invention seeks to overcome this by directly communicating the customer's sensitive information to the FTVE (see [0033] of the description and Figure 3 for the overall transaction handling). This is achieved by dividing the POS terminal into a merchant part (merchant POS terminal 32 in Figure 3 of the application) and a customer part consisting of a docking station or sleeve (point-of-sale attachment portion according to the wording of the present application) and a cellular phone, the combination of both called customer mobile personal POS terminal (CMPPT 10 in Figure 3 of the application).

T 1538/15 - From "and/or" to "and": not admitted

Key points

• In this opposition appeal, the Board considers claim 1 with "and/or" to be unclear (claim 1 of the main request is amended with features taken from the description). The patentee then files one month before the oral proceedings an auxiliary request with only "and" in claim 1 (i.e. with "/or" deleted). The Board does not admit the request, inter alia because the amendment raises new and complex questions.
• “Diese Merkmalskombination wurde von der Einspruchsabteilung in der angefochtenen Entscheidung nicht behandelt. Die Kammer kann nicht erkennen, warum der erste Hilfsantrag nicht bereits früher hätte eingereicht werden können. Die Änderung wurde zudem in einem sehr späten Verfahrensstadium eingereicht.
  Auch wenn die vorgenommene Änderung einfach erscheint, wirft sie doch neue und komplexe Fragen auf. So ist es auf den ersten Blick nicht erkennbar, dass der Anspruch die Erfordernisse der Klarheit erfüllt und dass die Merkmalskombination durch keine Kombination der über 60 zitierten Dokumente des Stands der Technik nahegelegt wird.”

T 1538/15 -  link

Der unabhängige Anspruch 1 gemäß erstem Hilfsantrag, eingereicht mit Schreiben vom 15. Oktober 2019 als "Hilfsantrag 8", unterscheidet sich von Anspruch 1 gemäß Hauptantrag dadurch, dass im Merkmal 1.10 der Ausdruck "/oder" gestrichen wurde, sodass es dort heißt: "Zählerwerte und Fehlermeldungen".

Entscheidungsgründe

2.5 Die Kammer kommt daher zum Schluss, dass der Anspruch 1 nicht die Erfordernisse der Klarheit gemäß Artikel 84 EPÜ erfüllt.

3. Erster Hilfsantrag - Zulassung (Artikel 13 (1) VOBK)

3.1 In der mündlichen Verhandlung vor der Kammer argumentierte die Beschwerdeführerin, dass der Anspruch 1 gegenüber dem Anspruch 1 gemäß Hauptantrag nur minimal geändert worden sei und lediglich eine Variante gestrichen worden sei. Der im Anspruch 1 gemäß erstem Hilfsantrag beanspruchte Gegenstand sei bereits im Gegenstand des Anspruchs 1 gemäß Hauptantrag beansprucht. Die Änderung sei auf den ersten Blick nachvollziehbar. Es habe bisher keinen Grund gegeben auf die bisherige Merkmalskombination zu verzichten. Das Dokument A50 offenbare die beanspruchte Merkmalskombination, neben den Zählerwerten auch Fehlermeldungen in längeren Zeitabständen zu senden, nicht. Somit sei Anspruch 1 auf den ersten Blick gewährbar.

T 1601/15 - CGK doesn't need a hint

Key points

• In this opposition appeal, the objective technical problem is how to provide an alternative 'friction prevention or friction reduction' (the claim is directed to an ‘actuating device for locking needles in injection molding tools’). The Board explains that the skilled person needs no hint or pointer to apply something that is part of his common general knowledge.
• The Board, in translation: “For the skilled person, who - prior to the priority date - started from the device of the prior use and set himself the task of finding an alternative type of friction prevention or reduction, it would be obvious, in view of his specialist knowledge, to use a diamond-like material.
• The Board in translation: “The argument that the skilled person would have had no reason to use his specialist knowledge is not convincing. The skilled person does not need any reason to apply his specialist knowledge. To a certain extent, his specialist knowledge forms the technical background for every activity of the skilled person and is incorporated into all his decisions. In this regard, the general specialist knowledge must be distinguished from the teaching of subject-specific publications.”.

EPO T 1601/15 - link





IV. Anspruch 1 des nunmehrigen Hauptantrags, von dem die Einspruchsabteilung der Auffassung war, dass er den Erfordernissen des EPÜ genüge, lautet wie folgt:

"Betätigungsvorrichtung (10) für Verschlussnadeln in Spritzgießwerkzeugen
a) mit Nadelverschlussdüsen,
b) mit einem Hubelement (20), [...]

Entscheidungsgründe

3.3 Fachmann

Im vorliegenden Fall ist der Fachmann ein Maschinenbauer mit Erfahrung auf dem Gebiet der Spritzgießmaschinen und -werkzeuge. Als solcher ist er mit Reibungs- und Bewegungsvorgängen, wie sie in solchen Vorrichtungen auftreten, vertraut.

3.4 Objektive technische Aufgabe

Die Einspruchsabteilung hat die technische Aufgabe darin gesehen, eine alternative Art der Reibungsverhinderung bzw. Reibungsverminderung vorzuschlagen.

[...]




3.5 Naheliegen

Für den Fachmann, der - vor dem Prioritätstag - von der Vorrichtung der Vorbenutzung ausging und sich die Aufgabe stellte, eine alternative Art der Reibungsverhinderung bzw. Reibungsverminderung zu finden, wäre es angesichts seines Fachwissens, wie es insbesondere durch die Druckschrift D15 belegt ist (vgl. Tabelle 2, Spalten 2.3, 2.4, 2.6 und 2.7), naheliegend gewesen, zu einem diamantähnlichen Material zu greifen und die verschleißgefährdeten Bauteile von Spritzgießwerkzeugen entweder zur Gänze aus einem solchen Material herzustellen oder eine entsprechende Beschichtung auf einem geeigneten Grundmaterial (z.B. Werkzeugstahl) aufzubringen.

T 0695/16 - Support under Art 84

Key points

• In this examination appeal, the ED had refused the application solely on the grounds that the claims would lack 'support' in the description as required by Article 84. There was no issue of Article 123(2) as the claims had verbatim basis in the application as filed. The claims were also verbatim repeated in the description. The ED also accepted that the claims were clear and concise. There were no comments on novelty and inventive step.
• Hence, the question raises: what does the requirement of 'support' in Article 84 mean?
• The ED considered that “neither the figures nor the description of the preferred embodiment describe in detail at least one way of carrying out the invention and that claim 1 is not supported by the description”.
• The Board: “It is further undisputed that there exists in the description at least a verbatim repetition of the characterising features of claim 1 []. This means, that said features, clearly defined in claim 1, are also disclosed, obviously also in a clear manner, in the description, supporting thereby the wording of claim 1. Due to this fact, the scope of the claims is not broader than is justified by the extent of the description, as argued by the examining division[].”
• “the Board concurs with the applicants that any reading of the description and viewing of the figures must be done with the knowledge that the features a and b are present and that these features interact to produce audible signals [the claim is basically directed to a packaging that 'clicks' when locked]. Under these circumstances the person skilled in the art would recognise the relevant features in the figures, having thereby a detailed description of them, including their location and their shape.”
• The issue is that in the figure, the features are described only in specific terms and not using the same wording as in the characteristic features of the claim.
• “The Board considers that since the features a and b are per se clear to the person skilled in the art, []  a specific denomination of said features in the part of the description directed to the specific embodiment depicted in the figures is not mandatory.”

EPO T 0695/16 - link




2. Support by the description - Article 84 EPC

2.1 According to Article 84 EPC the claims shall define the matter for which protection is sought. The claims shall be clear and concise and be supported by the description.

2.2 According to Rule 42(1)(e) EPC the description shall describe in detail at least one way of carrying out the invention claimed, using examples where appropriate and referring to the drawings, if any.

2.3 In the impugned decision the examining division accepts that claim 1 is clear and concise, see chapter 3.5, second paragraph of the impugned decision. On the other hand, it considers that neither the figures nor the description of the preferred embodiment describe in detail at least one way of carrying out the invention and that claim 1 is not supported by the description, see chapter 3.3 and chapter 4.1, last paragraph of the impugned decision.

2.4 The examining division argues that although there exists in the description a verbatim repetition of the characterising feature of claim 1, see chapter 3.5 of the impugned decision, due to the fact that "nowhere in the description can be found a detailed description (in terms of a representation, or example) of the "projection" of the circular collar or of its position" and also of "the "non-rotating feature" of the inner surface of the over-cap" the requirements of Article 84 EPC and Rule 42(1)(e) EPC are not met, see chapter 4.1 of the impugned decision.

T 0369/15 - Admissibility objection is late filed

Key points

• In this opposition appeal decided in 2019, the OD found AR-1 to be allowable and did not deal with AR-2. AR-2 was filed by the Rule 116 date a few weeks prior to the oral proceedings before the OD (as I understand it, without a substantiation as to how the added feature provides for novelty and inventive step). AR-2 is maintained in appeal by the Patentee as respondent in their Statement of response, but without substantiation as to why the added feature provides for novelty and inventive step. 
• The Board considers the claims of the Main Request to be obvious. The opponent submits for the first time during the oral proceedings that AR-2 is inadmissible as it is unsubstantiated. This objection is late, according to the Board.
• “Spätestens nach Erlass der für die Beschwerdegegnerinnen [patentee] negativen Mitteilung der Kammer zum Hauptantrag und der darin angekündigten Absicht der Kammer, die mit der Beschwerdeerwiderung eingereichten Hilfsanträge zu berücksichtigen, hätte die Beschwerdeführerin [opponent] damit rechnen müssen, dass im Falle einer Nichtgewährung des Hauptantrags in der mündlichen Verhandlung eine Diskussion über diese Hilfsanträge folgen würde und sie hätte etwaige Einwände gegen die Zulassung oder die Gewährbarkeit dieser Anträge bereits in Reaktion auf diese Mitteilung schriftlich erheben können.”
• “Auch das Argument, den Hilfsantrag 1 nicht zuzulassen, da die Beschwerdegegnerinnen erstmalig in der mündlichen Verhandlung vor der Kammer vorgetragen hätten, warum eine erfinderische Tätigkeit vorliege, was zu einer Vertagung der mündlichen Verhandlung führen könnte, überzeugt die Kammer nicht. Da sich die Beschwerdeführerin entschieden hatte, bis zur mündlichen Verhandlung weder zur Zulässigkeit der Änderungen e bis h des Verfahrensanspruchs noch zur erfinderischen Tätigkeit des beanspruchten Gegenstands etwas vorzutragen, war es für die Kammer bis zu diesem sehr späten Verfahrensstadium in keiner Weise ersichtlich, ob seitens der Beschwerdeführerin die Absicht bestand, den beanspruchten Gegenstand des Hilfsantrags anzugreifen.”
• AR-1 is admitted into the proceedings and is found to comply with Art. 123(2). The Board remits the case for examination of inventive step, despite the opponent protesting against the remittal, under the RPBA 2007. An important factor is that the opponent had not submitted reasons why the added feature was obvious in the written stage of the appeal proceedings.

EPO T 0369/15 -  link



Entscheidungsgründe

[...]

2.3 Aus den oben genannten Gründen ist der Hauptantrag der Beschwerdegegnerinnen nicht gewährbar.

3. Hilfsantrag 1

3.1 Zulassung

3.1.1 Für die Frage der Berücksichtigung von Vorbringen der Beteiligten unterscheidet die Verfahrensordnung der Beschwerdekammern generell zwischen Vorbringen, das erstmals mit der Beschwerdebegründung bzw. Beschwerdeerwiderung eingereicht wurde (vgl. Artikel 12 (2) und (4) VOBK), und Vorbringen, das zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt erfolgt (vgl. Artikel 13 VOBK).

[...]

3.1.4 In der mündlichen Verhandlung vor der Beschwerdekammer beantragte die Beschwerdeführerin [opponent] erstmals, sämtliche Hilfsanträge mangels Substantiierung seitens der Beschwerdegegnerinnen [patentee] nicht in das Beschwerdeverfahren zuzulassen, und machte auch erstmals geltend, dass die Beschwerdegegnerinnen es versäumt hätten, mit der Beschwerdeerwiderung bzw. in Reaktion auf die Mitteilung der Kammer zu begründen, warum bei ihren Hilfsanträgen Neuheit und erfinderische Tätigkeit vorliegen würden und insbesondere warum die Änderungen im Anspruch 1 des vorliegenden Hilfsantrags 1 eine erfinderische Tätigkeit des beanspruchten Gegenstands gegenüber den im Verfahren befindlichen Beweismitteln herstellen könnten.

T 0487/16 - Document admitted by the OD

Key points

• In this opposition appeal, document D7 was admitted by the OD. The patentee requests to exclude the document in appeal.
• “Since D7 was part of the opposition proceedings and the decision is based on D7 (i.e. it was substantively evaluated by the opposition division in order to reach its reasoned conclusion on lack of inventive step), D7 is thus part of the appeal proceedings (see also Article 12(2) RPBA 2020). Furthermore, considering the aim of the appeal proceedings being to review the decision under appeal in a judicial manner (cf. Article 12(2) RPBA 2020) and in view of the appellant's main request to maintain the patent as granted, which requires a review of the decision with regard to the conclusion drawn inter alia on the basis of D7, the Board sees no legal basis on which it can be excluded from the appeal proceedings. Thus, in this regard, the Board confirms the case law developed under RPBA 2007”.
• “the opposition division could even have introduced D7 of its own motion under Article 114(1) EPC.”
• “It is also noted here that the appellant did not argue that its right to be heard under Article 113(1) EPC had been infringed due to the admittance of D7 during the opposition proceedings”

EPO T 0487/16 - link

3. Appellant's request to exclude D7

3.1 D7 was filed after the expiry of the opposition period. Despite the opposition division having discretion under Article 114(2) EPC to "disregard" facts or evidence not submitted in due time, it nevertheless decided not to disregard it. On the contrary, D7 was admitted into the proceedings (cf. point 3.2 of the Minutes of the oral proceedings) and the opposition division based its decision regarding lack of inventive step on it. Since D7 was part of the opposition proceedings and the decision is based on D7 (i.e. it was substantively evaluated by the opposition division in order to reach its reasoned conclusion on lack of inventive step), D7 is thus part of the appeal proceedings (see also Article 12(2) RPBA 2020). Furthermore, considering the aim of the appeal proceedings being to review the decision under appeal in a judicial manner (cf. Article 12(2) RPBA 2020) and in view of the appellant's main request to maintain the patent as granted, which requires a review of the decision with regard to the conclusion drawn inter alia on the basis of D7, the Board sees no legal basis on which it can be excluded from the appeal proceedings. Thus, in this regard, the Board confirms the case law developed under RPBA 2007 (cf. T26/13, Reasons 2; T1568/12, Reasons 2.4; T2603/18, Reasons 1.1 to 1.2). For the sake of completeness it is added that Article 12(4) RPBA 2007 would also not provide a basis for excluding D7 from the appeal proceedings since the document was admitted into the proceedings by the opposition division.

3.2 Furthermore, the Board had addressed this issue in its provisional opinion (see point 2.1 thereof) and had additionally explained that, had the case arisen, the opposition division could even have introduced D7 of its own motion under Article 114(1) EPC.

3.3 It is also noted here that the appellant did not argue that its right to be heard under Article 113(1) EPC had been infringed due to the admittance of D7 during the opposition proceedings, nor did the appellant submit any counter-argument in response to the Board's preliminary opinion.

3.4 D7 is thus not excluded from the appeal proceedings.

T 1845/16 - Reformatio in peius and clarity

Key points

• In this opposition appeal, only the opponent appeals against the decision to maintain the patent in amended form. The opponent raises as new issue that the claims as held allowable are not clear because of the added features. The Board agrees: the claims at issue are unclear. The patentee then submits amended claim deleting the unclear terms at issue from the claims. Art. 123(2) and (3) are complied with.
• The opponent argues that the amendment violates the prohibition of reformatio in peius. The Board notes that the exceptions of G 1/99 concern amendments that are unallowable because of Art. 123(2), whereas in the present case the new objection in appeal is based on Art. 84. 
• “Da sich die Entscheidung [G 1/99 ] ausdrücklich auf den Fall unzulässiger Änderungen im Sinne von Artikel 123 (2) EPÜ bezieht, ist sie für den vorliegenden Fall, bei dem das Patent als Folge eines Klarheitsmangels zu widerrufen wäre, nicht unmittelbar anwendbar.”
• “Allerdings sind [...] dieselben Billigkeitsbetrachtungen, die zur Entscheidung G 1/99 geführt haben, auch über den Fall unzulässiger Änderungen hinaus anwendbar.”
• The exceptions of G 1/99 are to be applied by analogy in the present case. In particular, the amendments are only allowable if there are no other amendments possible to resolve the clarity issue while affecting the opponent less.
• “Somit ist im vorliegenden Fall eine Übertragung der in der G 1/99 getroffenen Ausnahmeregelung vom Verbot einer reformatio in peius angebracht. Unter Nr. 15 der Entscheidungsgründe mahnt die G 1/99 an, eine solche Ausnahmeregelung vom ansonsten verbindlichen Grundsatz des Verschlechterungsverbots aus Billigkeitserwägungen zwar zuzulassen, aber eng auszulegen. Sie fordert, dass die Streichung eines unzulässigen Merkmals nur dann vorgenommen werden darf, wenn es keine andere Möglichkeit der Änderung gibt, die die Einsprechende weniger schlechter stellt. Im vorliegenden Fall vermag die Kammer keine solche Möglichkeit zu erkennen und auch von der Beschwerdeführerin wurde diesbezüglich nichts vorgetragen. 
• Folglich rechtfertigen im vorliegenden Fall die Änderungen in Anspruch 1 des Hilfsantrags 1 eine Ausnahme vom Grundsatz des Verschlechterungsverbots und es ist der Patentinhaberin somit gestattet, die Klarheitsmängel des Hauptantrags wie im Hilfsantrag 1 beantragt auszuräumen.”

EPO T 1845/16 -  link


Der Schutzbereich der Ansprüche ist zudem gegenüber dem erteilten Patent eingeschränkt, so dass auch die Erfordernisse von Artikel 123 (3) EPÜ erfüllt sind.

2.3 Verschlechterungsverbot

2.3.1 Die aus dem Anspruch gestrichenen Begriffe "hohe" und "fest" besitzen, auch wenn sie nicht deutlich sind, im Kontext des Streitpatents eine technische Bedeutung. Die Streichung dieser Ausdrücke hebt deren Einschränkung auf und stellt daher eine Verbreiterung des Gegenstands und Schutzbereichs von Anspruch 1 gegenüber der Fassung dar, die der angefochtenen Entscheidung zugrunde lag, wodurch die Einsprechende und alleinige Beschwerdeführerin schlechter gestellt wird, als wenn sie keine Beschwerde eingelegt hätte.

2.3.2 Grundsätzlich ist ein solchermaßen geänderter Anspruch daher zurückzuweisen, weil er gegen das in der Rechtsprechung der Beschwerdekammern etablierte Verschlechterungsverbot verstößt (vgl. G 9/92, ABl. EPA 1994, 875).

2.3.3 Von diesem Grundsatz kann nach der Entscheidung G 1/99 (ABl. EPA 2001, 381, Entscheidungsformel) "jedoch ausnahmsweise abgewichen werden, um einen im Beschwerdeverfahren erhobenen Einwand auszuräumen, wenn andernfalls das in geändertem Umfang aufrechterhaltene Patent als unmittelbare Folge einer unzulässigen Änderung, die die Einspruchsabteilung in ihrer Zwischenentscheidung für gewährbar erachtet hatte, widerrufen werden müsste" (Hervorhebung durch die Kammer). Da sich die Entscheidung ausdrücklich auf den Fall unzulässiger Änderungen im Sinne von Artikel 123 (2) EPÜ bezieht, ist sie für den vorliegenden Fall, bei dem das Patent als Folge eines Klarheitsmangels zu widerrufen wäre, nicht unmittelbar anwendbar.

2.3.4 Allerdings sind in Übereinstimmung mit der Rechtsprechung der Beschwerdekammern des Europäischen Patentamts (9. Auflage 2019, V.A.3.1.6 und 3.1.8; T 1843/09, ABl. EPA 2013, 508, Leitsatz, zweiter Absatz) dieselben Billigkeitsbetrachtungen, die zur Entscheidung G 1/99 geführt haben, auch über den Fall unzulässiger Änderungen hinaus anwendbar.

Insbesondere wäre es generell, wie unter Nr. 12 der Entscheidungsgründe der G 1/99 ausgeführt, unbillig, "dem Einsprechenden/Beschwerdeführer oder der Kammer [im Beschwerdeverfahren] neue Angriffe zu erlauben, während man dem Patentinhaber/Beschwerdegegner eine Verteidigungsmöglichkeit vorenthält". Zwar ist der Patentinhaber gemäß der Entscheidung G 9/92 "primär darauf beschränkt, das Patent in der Fassung zu verteidigen, die die Einspruchsabteilung für gewährbar erachtet hatte", doch "insbesondere wenn der Aufrechterhaltung des Patents Gründe entgegenstehen, die in der ersten Instanz nicht vorgebracht wurden, verdient der nicht beschwerdeführende Patentinhaber aus Gründen der Billigkeit Schutz" (G 1/99, Entscheidungsgründe, Nr. 12). Diese Erwägungen gelten in allgemeiner Weise und sind nicht auf den Fall einer unzulässigen Änderung begrenzt.

Den Entscheidungsgründen der mit der vorliegenden Beschwerde angefochtenen Entscheidung sowie der Niederschrift über die mündliche Verhandlung im Einspruch ist zu entnehmen, dass gegenüber dem erst in der mündlichen Verhandlung eingereichten Hilfsantrag, der der Zwischenentscheidung zugrunde lag, keine Einwände unter Artikel 84 EPÜ erhoben, und dessen Erfordernisse nicht überprüft wurden. Da die Patentinhaberin daher erst mit der Beschwerdebegründung auf mögliche Probleme mit den Begriffen "hoch" und "fest" aufmerksam gemacht wurde, liegt im vorliegenden Fall eine mit der G 1/99 vergleichbare Situation vor.

2.3.5 Somit ist im vorliegenden Fall eine Übertragung der in der G 1/99 getroffenen Ausnahmeregelung vom Verbot einer reformatio in peius angebracht.

2.3.6 Unter Nr. 15 der Entscheidungsgründe mahnt die G 1/99 an, eine solche Ausnahmeregelung vom ansonsten verbindlichen Grundsatz des Verschlechterungsverbots aus Billigkeitserwägungen zwar zuzulassen, aber eng auszulegen. Sie fordert, dass die Streichung eines unzulässigen Merkmals nur dann vorgenommen werden darf, wenn es keine andere Möglichkeit der Änderung gibt, die die Einsprechende weniger schlechter stellt. Im vorliegenden Fall vermag die Kammer keine solche Möglichkeit zu erkennen und auch von der Beschwerdeführerin wurde diesbezüglich nichts vorgetragen.

2.3.7 Folglich rechtfertigen im vorliegenden Fall die Änderungen in Anspruch 1 des Hilfsantrags 1 eine Ausnahme vom Grundsatz des Verschlechterungsverbots und es ist der Patentinhaberin somit gestattet, die Klarheitsmängel des Hauptantrags wie im Hilfsantrag 1 beantragt auszuräumen.

T 2112/16 - Filing Request 1A kills ARs 2, 3 and 5-14

Key points

• In this opposition appeal, the Board considers the claims of the Main Request to be not novel and the claims of AR-1 to lack basis in the application as filed. AR-1a was filed after the Statement of grounds and is not admitted because “prima facie the requirement of Article 123(2) EPC is still not fulfilled and the appellant did not provide any reason why these requests were submitted at this late stage of the proceedings”. The same applies for AR-4.
• The Board then arrives at the admissibility of AR-2, filed with the Statement of grounds. The Board does not admit the request: “the sequence of the auxiliary requests has been changed during the course of the appeal proceedings at least due to the introduction of auxiliary request 1A [after the Statement of grounds], this involving a material change in focus of the claimed invention and thus resulting in an amendment of the case which the Board and the respondents had to deal with.”
• “The selected sequence of the auxiliary requests leads to an evident broadening and lack of convergency in the requests. The feature "X", which is present in auxiliary request 1A, is not present in claim 1 of any of the lower ranking auxiliary requests 2, 3 and 5 to 14 filed with the grounds of appeal. This has the effect of the Board and parties having to consider subject-matter broader than that included in the higher ranking auxiliary request 1A. Such a change made after a party has presented its complete case does not meet the requirement for procedural economy as set out in Article 13(1) RPBA 2020.”
• The Board exercises its discretion under Article 13(1) RPBA 2020 not to admit the auxiliary requests 2, 3 and 5 to 14 into the proceedings.

EPO T 2112/16 - link

Reasons for the Decision


7. Auxiliary requests 2, 3 and 5 to 14


7.1 Auxiliary requests 2, 3 and 5 to 14 were filed with the grounds of appeal. Although the numbering of these requests has not been altered, the sequence of the auxiliary requests has been changed during the course of the appeal proceedings at least due to the introduction of auxiliary request 1A, this involving a material change in focus of the claimed invention and thus resulting in an amendment of the case which the Board and the respondents had to deal with.


7.2 The Board had already alerted the appellant in its preliminary opinion (see point 5.1) that the filing of auxiliary request 1A had the effect of changing its complete case, particularly in respect of all lower ranking requests. Since the appellant has not presented any further arguments regarding this point, the Board sees no reason to change its opinion in this regard.


7.3 The selected sequence of the auxiliary requests leads to an evident broadening and lack of convergency in the requests. The feature "an exhaust inlet and an exhaust outlet of the dispersion chamber are coplanar", which is present in auxiliary request 1A, is not present in claim 1 of any of the lower ranking auxiliary requests 2, 3 and 5 to 14 filed with the grounds of appeal. This has the effect of the Board and parties having to consider subject-matter broader than that included in the higher ranking auxiliary request 1A. Such a change made after a party has presented its complete case does not meet the requirement for procedural economy as set out in Article 13(1) RPBA 2020.


7.4 Accordingly, the Board exercised its discretion under Article 13(1) RPBA 2020 not to admit the auxiliary requests 2, 3 and 5 to 14 into the proceedings.


8. In the absence of any request in the proceedings on the basis of which the patent can be maintained, the impugned decision cannot be set aside and the appeal must be dismissed.

Order

For these reasons it is decided that:

The appeal is dismissed.