T 1750/16 - Admissibility appeal

Key points

• In this opposition appeal, the patentee as appellant files a new main request and auxiliary request with the Statement of grounds. The appeal is admissible because the patentee discussed in the Statement of grounds why the new requests overcome the objections of the OD.
• However, the requests are not admitted because they should have been filed during the first instance proceedings. The patentee made the choice to not file requests responsive to the Article 84 and 123(2) objections of the opponents and the preliminary opinion of the opposition division. The  Board notes that the preliminary opinion was issued 8 months before the oral proceedings. Therefore, the requests can not be filed only in appeal. The new claims also constitute a fresh case

EPO T 1750/16 - link



Machine translation from the French original

Reasons for the decision

1. Admissibility of the appeal

1.1 The board is of the view that the appeal is admissible for the reasons set out below.

1.2 In the present case, the admissibility of the appeal depends on the conformity of the appeal brief with Article 108, third sentence, EPC, combined with Rule 99 (2) EPC. According to these provisions, in the statement of grounds of appeal, the applicant must indicate "the grounds on which the contested decision must be annulled or the extent to which it must be amended, as well as the facts and evidence on which the appeal is well-founded ".

The question whether the conditions of Article 108, third sentence, EPC and Rule 99 (2) EPC are satisfied must be decided on the basis of the statement of grounds of appeal and the grounds of the contested decision, in taking into account the amendments to the claims (see Case Law of the Boards of Appeal of the European Patent Office, 8th edition, IV.E.2.6.3a) with reference, inter alia, to decisions T 162/97 and T 2001 / 14).

T 1680/17 - Fulvestrant formulation

Key points

• In this opposition appeal (whith parallel national litigation), claim 1 is for a second medical use of fulvestrant for the treatment of breast cancer with intra-muscular injection with distinguishing feature over D4 that fulvestrant is formulated with ehtanol, benzyl alcohol, benzyl benzoate, and castor oil. The gist is that this combination of solvents allows for a high concentration of fulvestrant and hence a small volume for injection. D4 is silent about the cosolvents in the "castor oil-based vehicle" used therein. 
• D1 is a scientific article using in one of the examples the precise formulation of fulvestrant according to claim 1. D1 " aims to elucidate mechanisms underlying an acquired tamoxifen resistance in the therapy for estrogen receptor-positive breast cancer". 
• The objective technical problem in view of D4 is therefore, according to the Board: "The technical problem is the provision of a castor oil-based vehicle for a fulvestrant containing composition allowing for treatment of breast cancer by intramuscular injection." 
• The Board finds that the use of the formulation of D1 is not obvious. " However, the purpose of [D1] is the elucidation of a biochemical mechanism. [D1]  does not aim at the provision of a therapy." 
• " Firstly, [D1] is a scientific paper dealing with basic research. The board considers that the skilled person would not have turned to formulations used in basic research when aiming at providing a formulation for therapeutic treatment. The requirements of a formulation to be used in basic research are fundamentally different from the requirements of a formulation to be administered to a patient. While in basic research merely the availability of the active at the test site is of relevance, in a clinical situation aspects such as safety/tolerability and bioavailability over the treatment period are decisive factors." 

EPO T 1680/17 -  link

II. Independent claim 1 of the patent in suit as granted reads as follows:

"1. A pharmaceutical formulation for use in the treatment of breast cancer by intra-muscular injection,
wherein the pharmaceutical formulation comprises fulvestrant,
a pharmaceutically-acceptable alcohol being a mixture of 10 % weight of ethanol per volume of formulation and 10 % weight of benzyl alcohol per volume of formulation,
and the formulation contains 15 % weight of benzyl benzoate per volume of formulation
and a sufficient amount of a ricinoleate vehicle so as to prepare a formulation of at least 45 mgml**(-l)of fulvestrant,
wherein the ricinoleate vehicle is castor oil, and wherein the total volume of the formulation is 6 ml or less."

Reasons for the Decision

4. Novelty (Article 100(a) and Article 54(1) EPC)

Document (1) [McLeskey et al.,] does not provide a direct and unambiguous disclosure of the feature of intramuscular injection and is thus not novelty-destroying for the subject-matter of claim 1.

Respondent 1 has argued that the skilled person would have understood the disclosure of document (1) as referring to intramuscular administration. The board cannot accept this line of argument since document (1) discloses the formulation under consideration solely for animal studies. In animal studies a subcutaneous administration is a common mode of administration which is, however, distinct from intramuscular administration. Therefore, intramuscular administration is not directly and unambiguously disclosed.

The board notes that document (1) does not disclose any concrete formulations in the context of the therapeutic treatments discussed in the passages of the "introduction" (page 697, right column, first paragraph to page 698, left column, first paragraph).

The ground for opposition under Article 100(a) and Article 54 EPC does therefore not prejudice the maintenance of the patent.

T 1338/12 - Deposit of micro organisms (and transfer priority)

Key points

• In this examination appeal (taken by the Board in extended composition) and with EPC1973 as applicable law (as the Board concluded), claim 1 refers to a deposited microorganism. The applicant is not the same person as the depositor microorganism. Rule 28(1)(d) EPC1973 requires that in such a case an authorization from the depositor must be filed, as well irrevocable consent from the depositor to the deposited material being made available to the public (the same is now in Rule 33). No such consent was filed within the period of Rule 28(2).
• The applicant had requested under Rule 139 EPC2000 (Rule 88 EPC1973) to correct the applicant to the effect of adding the depositor. This correction was accepted by the Examining Division. However, the Board assesses the requested correction substantively.
• The Board finds the submitted evidence to be insufficient to show that the application should have been filed by both the depositor and the applicant. The request was also filed only 9 years after the filing date when the "applicant identity" issue came up.
• "The board considers that the request for correction pursuant to Rule 139 EPC 2000, first sentence, was not a request for correction of an error to reflect the true intention of the sole original applicant at the relevant time, but rather a request for correction at the plaintiff's convenience resulting from a modification of his opinion or a development of his intentions subsequent to the relevant date. Therefore, the board considers that the request for correction under Rule 139 EPC 2000, first sentence, should have been refused by the Examining Division."
• Note the clear analogy with the transfer of priority. 
• Note also that the Board appears to apply (implicitly) the rule that there can be no reformatio in peius in appeals against refusals of applications. Hence, the Board's adverse finding contrary to the decision of the Examining Division to allow the correction presumably does not lead to reformatio in peius.
• The Board leaves open the question of whether the correction if it had been allowable in substance, would have retroactive effect. The Board notes that the microorganism was deposited by two depositors jointly, whereas only one of these was requested to be added. This is still not sufficient under Rule 28 EPC 1973. 
• The Board also rejects the applicant's argument based on the protection of good faith (which argument was based on the Examining Division raising the invalidity of the deposit only years after the filing date).

EPO T 1338/12 - link

Machine translation from the French original

Statement of Facts and Evidence

I. An appeal was lodged by the applicants (SEDERMA and the National Center for Scientific Research, CNRS) against the decision of the Examining Division dated 16 January 2012 to refuse the application European patent no. 02 702 466.0, published as International Patent Application WO 02/066668. The Examining Division considered that the request did not comply with the requirements of Article 83 EPC in conjunction with Rules 31 and 33 EPC, and that the principle of good faith or the protection of legitimate expectations was not applicable in this case.

II. With their statement setting out the grounds of appeal, the applicants sought annulment of the decision of the Examining Division and submitted five annexes in support of their arguments. In the alternative, if the decision of the Examining Division was not annulled, the applicants also sought reimbursement of the renewal fees from 2003 to 2012 and, in any event, the holding of the following oral proceedings Article 116 EPC.

III. By a communication dated 1 August 2018, annexed to the notice of oral proceedings and issued pursuant to the provisions of Rule 15 (1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Boards of Appeal (RPCR), the Chamber explained a provisional and non-binding opinion on some of the points raised.

IV. By a letter of 7 December 2018, the applicants replied to that notification and, without putting forward any new arguments or commenting on that notification from the Chamber, stated that they would not take part in the oral proceedings.

V. Following the oral proceedings held on 14 December 2018 in the absence of the applicants, the Chamber rendered its decision.

VI. Claim 1 on the basis of the sole basis of the decision of the Examining Division is as follows:

1. Cosmetic or dermopharmaceutical composition containing a mixture of proteins obtained by fermentation of microorganisms, then extraction of the proteins produced from the fermented medium, characterized in that the microorganisms are derived from marine waters located near hydrothermal sources of great depth and are of the family Thermus thermophilus and strain GY 1211 (registered under the serial number I-2715 from the National Collection of Microorganisms Culture (CNCM) of the Pasteur Institute of Paris - France), proteins obtained being thermostable up to 100 ° C.

T 1317/13 - Examples already published / bonus effect

Key points

• In this examination appeal, D1 is a PCT application "published shortly before the priority date of the present application. The applications have two inventors in common. The disclosure content of document D1 is largely identical to that of the latter, and in particular, all three examples are identical." Hence, the complete experimental disclosure of the application at issue was already prior art by D1.
•  Claim 1 is directed to a medicament for the treatment of  " gout, gouty arthritis or pseudogout" using an antibody, the antibody ACZ885 was used in the examples of the application and also in D1.
• The closest prior art is D5 about the colchicine standard therapy of gout.
• " the board is satisfied that document D5 teaches the skilled person that: (i) increased production of IL-1beta is the trigger for the auto-inflammation in gout as in other auto-inflammatory diseases; (ii) administration of colchicine completely blocks the crystal-induced production of IL-1beta and leads to greatly reduced inflammation and, (iii) gout patients were anticipated to benefit from treatments designated to block IL-1beta." 
• " Document D1 discloses compounds suitable for blocking IL-1ß in patients suffering in general from auto-inflammatory syndromes, in particular also the ACZ885 antibody as an embodiment of the antibodies defined in claim 1." 
• The Board concludes that claim 1 is obvious. 
• The applicant argues a surprising further effect. " The appellant further argued that anti-IL-1beta antibodies had an additional effect on pain perception which was not reported in any of the cited prior art, in particular not in documents D1 and D5, which was however an effect which was indeed achieved by the antibody ACZ885 as demonstrated by the results in the post-published document D9." 
• The Baord considers this a bonus effect.
• The applicant "has further submitted that "arguments about a 'bonus effect' were often used when there was effectively a 'one-way-street' situation", which according to the appellant was a situation "in which the skilled person was inevitably guided towards a particular destination, such that any surprising effects would be a 'bonus' which would have been achieved anyway." However, the present situation was not a one-way-street situation since document D20 described various different approaches to inhibiting the IL-1 system." 
• This argument does not convince the board to change its conclusion in point 22 above either. In fact, decision T 21/81, supra, considers a situation in which it was already obvious that the skilled person would arrive at something falling within the terms of a claim, because an advantageous effect was expected to result from the combination of teachings of the prior art documents, resulting in a situation in which an extra effect cannot establish inventive step. Accordingly, a "one-way-street" situation in the sense defined by the appellant cannot be inferred as a mandatory prerequisite for the principle established in this decision.

EPO T 1317/13 - link

Main request - claim 1

3. The claimed subject-matter (see section II) is a medicament for use in the treatment of auto-inflammatory syndromes, namely gout, gouty arthritis or pseudogout (for the ease of reading the three disorders will in the following be referred to as "gout"). The medicament is defined as comprising a human interleukin (IL)-1beta binding antibody characterised by comprising a first and second domain defined by particular amino acid sequences. The anti-human IL-1beta monoclonal antibody ACZ885, an example of an antibody falling under this definition, was used in the examples of the application. The antibody ACZ885 was known to the skilled person from the disclosure in document D1.

Closest prior art

4. A frequently applied line of therapy for treating patients suffering from auto-inflammatory diseases such as gout at the priority date of the application was the oral administration of colchicine. This treatment is in particular able to resolve the initial inflammatory phase of gout but was also known to be poorly tolerated because of predictable gastrointestinal side-effects (see e.g. document D5, page 238, right-hand column, lines 15 to 17; page 239, right-hand column, lines 10 to 12, and document D12, e.g. abstract, last sentence, and Table 1, final part).

5. The appellant agreed with the board and the examining division that document D5, disclosing inter alia the colchicine standard therapy of gout (see point 4), represented the closest prior art for the assessment of inventive step for the claimed subject-matter.

T 1389/13 - Admissibility appeal; wrong name

Key points

• In this opposition appeal, the Notice of appeal was filed in the correct (new) name of the opponent, but the Statement of grounds mentioned the old name on the second page. The Board concludes that this does not lead to inadmissibility of the appeal
• " The statement of grounds of appeal that was subsequently received was signed by the same representative who had signed the notice of appeal and the notice of opposition. The appeal case number, the number of the patent in suit, the name of the (then sole) patent proprietor and the internal reference number mentioned in the document corresponded to the indications provided in the notice of appeal. Explicit reference was made to the "appeal of opponent filed on 13 June 2013"." 
• "The fact that "Bayer Schering Pharma AG", the opponent's former name, as proven by the documentary evidence, was indicated on the second page of the statement of grounds of appeal as the legal person on behalf of which the document was submitted, points to the fact that it was indeed on behalf of the opponent and not on behalf of a third party."
• " considering that there is no indication on file that a legal person called "Bayer Schering Pharma AG" existed at the point in time when the statement of grounds was filed, the mentioning of "Bayer Schering Pharma AG" in the statement of grounds of appeal is an obvious error and it is evident that it should read "Bayer Pharma AG" (or "Bayer Pharma Aktiengesellschaft").
• " Thus, the board has no doubt that the statement of grounds of appeal in question was indeed filed on behalf of the opponent, i.e. the party referred to as appellant II in these appeal proceedings." 
• The Board does not identify a formal request for correction of the appellant's name under Rule 139.
• There was also a request of the patentee for apportionment of costs. " The board notes that the latter line of argument on the perceived misconduct on the part of the EPO (the board dealing with the case) has no bearing on the board's decision about a different apportionment of costs under Article 104 EPC since the EPO is not a party to the proceedings, nor is it conceivable that the delay in forwarding the communication or the non-issuance of a written preliminary opinion can be ascribed to [the opponent]. Hence, these submissions need not be dealt with." 

EPO T 1389/13 -  link

Reasons for the Decision

1. The appeals of both appellants are admissible. Each of them complies with the requirements pursuant to Articles 106 to 108 and Rule 99 EPC.

2. Admissibility of the opponent's (appellant II's) appeal had been contested by appellant I based on the argument that no statement of grounds of appeal pursuant to Article 108, third sentence, EPC had been filed by the opponent, and the statement of grounds of appeal in question had been filed by a different legal person.

3. Notice of appeal dated 13 June 2013 was duly filed by the opponent Bayer Pharma Aktiengesellschaft and the appeal fee was duly paid. The notice of appeal comprises, in addition to the details required pursuant to Rule 99(1) EPC, the party's internal reference number.

T 0872/13 - Strawman opponent and acceleration appeal

Key points

• The opponent asks for acceleration of the appeal. The opponent is "Strawman Limited". The opponent submitted that: "The real party of interest behind the opponent Strawman Limited was CSL Limited, which was developing a recombinant Factor VII- albumin fusion protein and therefore needed certainty to continue its development activities in view of the large sums involved. Any decision of CSL Limited as a potential licensee under the patent depended on the outcome of the appeal proceedings, and thus the request for accelerated proceedings should be granted as falling within one of the examples given in tOJ 2008 p.220].
• The Board denies the reuest. "As to the appellant-opponent's second request for acceleration, the board noted that the party requesting acceleration, the appellant-opponent, had not argued that it had itself a legitimate interest in the proceedings being dealt with rapidly. The interests on which the request for acceleration were based concerned the company CSL Limited. This company was however not a party to the present appeal proceedings and the board saw no reason why the interests of this third party should be attributed to the appellant-opponent." 
• This shows a disadvantage of a strawman opponent. 

EPO T 0872/13 - link

XVII. The arguments of the appellant-opponent, in so far as they are relevant to the present decision, may be summarised as follows:

Request for accelerated proceedings

The patent was causing uncertainty and hampering investment and development decisions by interested parties (first request for acceleration presented with the statement of grounds of appeal). The real party of interest behind the opponent Strawman Limited was CSL Limited, which was developing a recombinant Factor VII- albumin fusion protein and therefore needed certainty to continue its development activities in view of the large sums involved. Any decision of CSL Limited as a potential licensee under the patent depended on the outcome of the appeal proceedings, and thus the request for accelerated proceedings should be granted as falling within one of the examples given in the Notice from the Vice-President DG3 of 17 March 2008 (OJ EPO 2008, 220; second request for acceleration of the appeal proceedings).

T 1455/14 - Correcting an error: threefold procedural violation

Key points

• In this opposition appeal, the Opposition Division had used "its discretion to correct this obvious error" in the text of claim 1 after the oral proceedings had been closed. The Board finds this to constitute three procedural violations.
• " there is no basis in the EPC for such an alleged discretion of the Oppo­si­tion Division. Furthermore, even if the opposition division considered there to be an obvious error, there was no corre­spon­ding request according to Rule 139 EPC on the part of the patent proprietor who may not have been aware of the existence of such an error. 
• This results in a threefold procedural violation, because the written decision is based on a text amended by the opposition division" 

EPO T 1455/14 - link

Reasons for the Decision

1. Procedural violations

1.1 According to point 8 of the contested decision, the "Opposition Division uses its discretion to correct this obvious error" in the text of claim 1 after the oral proceedings had been closed. However, there is no basis in the EPC for such an alleged discretion of the Oppo­si­tion Division.

Furthermore, even if the opposition division considered there to be an obvious error, there was no corre­spon­ding request according to Rule 139 EPC on the part of the patent proprietor who may not have been aware of the existence of such an error.

This results in a threefold procedural violation, because the written decision is based on a text amended by the opposition division:

- which was not submitted by the patent proprietor [The reasoning of the decision is thus not based on an actual request of the patent proprietor - fundamental procedural violation number 1],

- on which the opponent had had no opportunity to comment [The opponent's right to be heard has been violated - fundamental procedural violation number 2] and

- which does not correspond to the decision announced at the end of the oral proceedings (Minutes, page 4, last paragraph) [The decision as announced at the end of the oral proceedings is not reasoned in wri­ting - fundamental procedural viola­tion number 3].

T 1000/14 - Remittal in examination appeal?

Key points

• In this examination appeal, the applicant requests remittal on the ground that "the board had raised new objections in the appeal proceedings which had not been discussed in the decision under appeal". Furthermore, according to G10/93, the Board can also examine new issues.
• The Board discusses this request first. The Board notes that is a discretionary power to remit the case. The Board then " that both the claims under examination and the issues to be discussed have remained the same. The appellant could not have been taken by surprise by the aspects of the case pointed out by the board" 
• " Since the substantive basis of the discussion has not changed, the board finds it appropriate not to remit the case to the department of first instance." 
• I wonder if this means that if the Board had raised new issues, remittal would have been necessary. Article 111(1) EPC appears to assume that the Board first carries out "the examination as to the allowability of the appeal" and is quite clear that only following such examination, the Board "shall decide on the appeal". Article 111(1) EPC second sentence then states that "the Board of Appeal may either exercise any power within the competence of the department which was responsible for the decision appealed or remit the case to that department for further prosecution". In my view, this second sentence gives more information about the "shall decide" of the first sentence. This means that the Board must first decide whether the appeal is allowable, only if the appeal is allowable and the impugned decision is hence set aside, can a remittal be ordered. This rule is actually quite important because it safeguards the appellants right to a decision of the Board on the merits of his appeal: the Board can not simply remit the case to avoid having to take a decision on the merits of the appeal. 
• Note 05.04.2019: the above ["Board must first decide whether the appeal is allowable"] of course only applies if the Board does not refuse the application. If the Board refuses the application, it can do so on any ground. E.g. if the Board finds the claims unclear, the Board can leave open the question if a refusal by the Examining Division based on lack of novelty was correct or not.

EPO T 1000/14 - link

X. The appellant's arguments may be summarised as follows:

Remittal (Article 111 EPC)

The board had raised new objections in the appeal proceedings which had not been discussed in the decision under appeal, in particular the objection concerning lack of clarity. The board's further remarks implied that it regarded document D2 rather than D1 as the closest prior art. It was not fair for the appellant to have only one chance to respond to these new issues.

Reasons for the Decision

1. Remittal (Article 111 (1) and (2) EPC)

1.1 Under Article 111(1) EPC, a board of appeal has the discretionary power either to exercise any power within the competence of the department of first instance or to remit the case to that department for further prosecution.

1.2 Thus the appropriateness of remittal is a matter for decision by the boards, which assess each case on its merits.

1.3 In its Decision G 10/93 (OJ EPO 4/1995, 172), the Enlarged Board of Appeal held that in an appeal from a decision of an examining division in which a European patent application was refused, the board of appeal has the power to examine whether the application or the invention to which it relates meets the requirements of the EPC, including requirements which the examining division did not take into consideration or which it regarded as having been met. If there is reason to believe that such a requirement has not been met, the board shall include this ground in the proceedings.

T 0174/16 - Airline strike and oral proceedings

Key points

• This opposition appeal deals the decision of the OD to not cancel the oral proceedings held on 10 November 2015 in Munich when Lufthansa had a strike (with nearly 1,000 flights cancelled). 
• The representative of the proprietor (patentee) found out about the strike on Monday 9 November 2015 (the strike was announced only on Saturday 7 November). By that time, he could not arrange for alternative flights from Warsaw to Munich. 
• The Boards considers the decision of the OD to not cancel the oral proceedings to be a substantial procedural violation.
• " It was also unreasonable to consider it "possible by taking due care" to travel by airplane and that "at least going by car would still have been possible". 
• " it is not reasonable to expect the appellants' representative to take the car on the afternoon of the day before the oral proceedings by referring to "Google Maps" for a total (net) driving time of "8 - 10 hours", as the opposition division did, irrespective of whether the appellants' representative had a driving licence. Whether a [member of the public] present at the oral proceedings came by car from Warsaw is immaterial in this respect. Thus, it can certainly not be said that the appellant's representative "did not [make] all efforts [...] to get to the oral proceedings in Munich". It is thus unreasonable to consider the cancellation of the flight, along with the impossibility of using other travel means, not to constitute "serious reasons" within the meaning of the above provisions."
• This is a substantial procedural violation. The impugned decision is set aside, the case is remitted, and the appeal fee is reimbursed.

EPO T 0174/16 -  link

Summary of Facts and Submissions

I. The appeal was filed by the appellants (patent proprietors) against the decision of the opposition division to revoke the patent in suit.

II. In the proceedings before the opposition division, the parties were summoned to oral proceedings to be held on 10 November 2015 in Munich.

[...]

VIII. The arguments of the appellants, as far as relevant to the present decision, may be summarised as follows:

The opposition division's decision to refuse the request for postponement was flawed. The request for postponement was not filed late, because the appellants' representative only found out about the strike on the morning of 9 November 2015, when he tried to perform an online check-in. As soon as he had found out about the strike he did everything he could to remedy the situation. While the written request was filed by fax only at about 15.00 hrs, the representative tried to contact the opposition division by telephone as early as 12.20 hrs, immediately after he had found out that rebooking of the flight was not possible, and around 13.45 hrs there was a telephone conversation with the first examiner of the opposition division, who was informed of the situation. It was not possible to fly to Munich on 9 November 2015. The fact that three people on the side of the opponent were present at the oral proceedings and came from Warsaw and Krakow cannot justify the assumption made by the opposition division that it was possible to fly to Munich. It was not possible to drive by car in particular because the appellants' representative does not have a driving licence. Immediately after the representative had been informed by the EPO that a written request was necessary, such a request was prepared and submitted by fax at about 15.00 hrs. The opposition division's argument that the representative could have gone to the airport in order to try to rebook was unreasonable. The representative had contacted the airline trying to rebook his flight, but to no avail. It was therefore pointless to go to the airport in order to try to rebook the flight.

Not only was the opposition division's decision unreasonable, but the appellants had also been misled by the EPO, in that the formalities officer had assured the appellants' representative in several telephone conversations that the oral proceedings would be postponed.

Reasons for the Decision

1. Request for postponement of the oral proceedings before the opposition division

1.1 It is within the discretion of the opposition division to grant a request for postponement of the oral proceedings before it. When arriving at its decision the opposition division has to consider all relevant factors of the particular circumstances of the case and must exercise its discretion in a reasonable way (T 1505/06, Reasons 1.3 and 1.4; T 447/13, Reasons 2 and 3 referring to G 7/93, Reasons 2.6, and citing T 2526/11, Reasons 2.2).

T 0683/14 - Appeal decision without appeal

Key points

• The decision was taken by the Board in extended composition with five members.
• In this examination appeal, interlocutory revision was granted but the request for refund of the appeal fee was refused. Hence, this request is forwarded to the Board. The Board issues summons. The applicant withdraws the appeal and requests a 50% refund under (relatively new) Rule 103(2)(a) EPC.
• The Board refuses the 50% refund. The reason is that there was no appeal to be withdrawn.
• " The board notes that the examining division rectified the decision under appeal pursuant to Article 109(1) EPC. [...] This means that the examining division set the decision under appeal aside and allowed the appeal. The appeal was not remitted and has thus never been pending before the board. [...] In the absence of a pending appeal that might be withdrawn, Rule 103(2) EPC does not apply."
• The Board also decides on the request for 100% refund based on an alleged procedural violation.
• The facts are as follows. Oral proceedings were held before the OD, no decision was announced. A Rule 71(3) intention to grant based on auxiliary request was issued. In response, the applicant filed new claims and a new document, namely a declaration evidencing that an alleged prior art document was confidential. The ED then issued the refusal decision, which also stated that the new evidence was disregarded.
• The Board finds that the ED erred by acting in this way. Even if the debate was closed at the end of the oral proceedings, no formal decision was taken, and the debate may be re-opened. The Board cites T 595/90 and finds that it applies by analogy to EPO departments of first instance. The quote of T95/90 is " ... the closing of the debate ... normally terminates the possibility of [making] further submissions. Observations submitted thereafter could only be taken into account if the Board reopened the debate (Article 113 EPC) which depends on its discretion." 
• However, the Board labels this as an error "of a substantive nature" 
• " In so proceeding, the examining division implemented its erroneous position that the confidentiality document submitted on 1 August 2013 could not be taken into account because the debate had been closed and a "decision" had been taken during the oral proceedings of 10 December 2012. This error was of a substantive nature, and the procedural consequences thereof, i.e. in particular the adopting of a decision directly, without considering resuming examination, on the basis of the confidentiality document, were caused exclusively by the implementation of the erroneous substantive position." 
• As a comment, this means that if an Examining Division applies Article 113 erroneously (see the cited decision T 595/90) based on an incorrect understanding of case law, this is not a procedural violation according to this Board. I find this difficult to understand. Does the Board mean that a violation of the right to be heard based on a mistaken view on the case law or the meaning of Article 113 EPC is not a procedural violation? 
  
  
• As a further comment, I note that the Board decides on the part of the appeal relating to the request for 100% refund while simultaneously finding that there was no appeal at all. Clearly, had the applicant not filed a notice of appeal, there would have been no decision on this point by the Board. So here we have a decision of the  Board, resulting from a Notice of appeal, but were an appeal "never [has] been pending before the board". I don't find this persuasive. Clearly, granting the 50% refund would have opened a loophole in Rule 103 in case of interlocutory revision (Rule 103 appears to assume that the negative impugned decision is accepted by the appellant rather than overturned by interlocutory revision). However, that loophole can easily be remedied by amending Rule 103(2) EPC.
• Note 02.02.2024: As properly seen, only the request for reimbursement is forwarded to the Board, not the appeal. See e.g. T 1216/23.
• The actual reasoning of the Board merely refers to the Board's preliminary opinion. This makes the decision difficult to read.

EPO T 0683/14 -  link

Summary of Facts and Submissions

I. The then applicants, now patent proprietors, had filed an appeal against the decision of the examining division refusing European patent application number 10 153 812.2. The examining division, enlarged by a legal member, rectified the decision under appeal pursuant to Article 109(1) EPC. The corresponding Form 2710 was dispatched on 25 March 2014.

The examining division did not allow the request for reimbursement of the appeal fee made in the statement of grounds of appeal. As a consequence, the case was referred to the board pursuant to Rule 103(2) (now 103(3)) EPC. The present decision deals with this sole pending request.

II. The board issued a summons to oral proceedings. In a communication attached thereto it expressed its provisional and non-binding view that, in the absence of a procedural violation, the appeal fee could not be reimbursed under Rule 103(1)(a) EPC. The communication is, in essential part, reproduced verbatim below.

[beginning of reproduction]

B. The grounds relating to the request for reimbursement of the appeal fee

1. In their statement setting out the grounds of appeal, the (former) appellants submit that, with the decision of 2 October 2013, the examining division refused the application in issue without having considered new evidence and without having issued a communication prior to the refusal. This constituted a clear violation of the "established procedural steps of the EPO". Accordingly, the appellants request reimbursement of the appeal fee.

T 0324/14 - Request for remittal

Key points

• In this examination appeal, the Board decides that claim 1 of the Main Request is obvious. AR1 to 4 are not admitted into the proceedings as being filed late. The applicant then requests remittal to the examining division. The applicant argues "that the new objections raised by the board as well as the fact that there seemed to be patentable subject-matter included in the application, justified remittal and further consideration by the examining division" .
• The Board does not grant this request. " the mere presumption of potentially patentable subject-matter in the application does not justify a remittal to the department of first instance. Should the appellants have wished to proceed with requests that they considered to contain potentially patentable subject-matter and thus as a promising basis for the examination proceedings, requests defining subject-matter of this nature should have been filed already in the first instance proceedings." (the Board also expresses that it had not raised new objections).
• As a comment, appeals before the USPTO can be taken back to the examiner by filing an RCE and paying the applicable fee.

T 0324/14 - link

2.12 The board therefore concludes that the subject-matter of claim 1 is an obvious combination of concepts known from documents D1 and D2. In particular, the combination of two stages of amplification in each amplifier with pre-distortion provided in a first stage in the amplifier is obvious to the person skilled in the art and the subject-matter of claim 1 of the main request therefore does not involve an inventive step in the sense of Article 56 EPC.

3. First to fifth auxiliary requests - Admittance (Articles 12(4) and 13(1) RPBA)

[...]

3.8 In consideration of the specific circumstances of the present case, in particular the late stage of the proceedings as well as the new complex issues raised by the auxiliary requests, the board exercised its discretion under Articles 12(4) and 13(1) RPBA to not admit the first to fifth auxiliary requests into the appeal procedure.

4. Remittal to the department of first instance

4.1 The appellants have requested that the case be remitted to the examining division for further prosecution. They have particularly argued that the new objections raised by the board as well as the fact that there seemed to be patentable subject-matter included in the application, justified remittal and further consideration by the examining division.

4.2 Contrary to the appellants' arguments, no new objections have been raised by the board during the appeal procedure (see the reasons under point 3.7 above). Furthermore, the mere presumption of potentially patentable subject-matter in the application does not justify a remittal to the department of first instance. Should the appellants have wished to proceed with requests that they considered to contain potentially patentable subject-matter and thus as a promising basis for the examination proceedings, requests defining subject-matter of this nature should have been filed already in the first instance proceedings.

4.3 For these reasons, the board refuses the request for remittal of the case to the examining division.

4.4 Since there is no allowable request on file, the appeal has to be dismissed.

Order

For these reasons it is decided that:

The appeal is dismissed.

T 0691/18 - Interlocutory revision

Key points

• In this examination appeal, the amendments made in the main request address the clarity objections. The Board then discusses whether interlocutory revision should have been granted by the ED.
• " In the context of Article 109(1) EPC, an appeal is to be considered "well founded" if the main request submitted with the appeal includes amendments which clearly overcome the objections on which the decision relies, such that the examining division could reasonably be expected to recognise this and thus rectify its decision. It is established case law of the Boards of Appeal that other objections which arise in the current request but which were not the subject of the contested decision cannot preclude the application of Article 109(1) EPC [...]." 
• "  Thus, even if the amendments raise new objections not previously discussed, interlocutory revision must be allowed since an applicant should in such circumstances have the right to examination at two instances. In particular this would enable the applicant to address the objection under Article 123(2) EPC, by argument and/or amendment, as well as, if appropriate, giving the examining division the opportunity to address the issues of novelty and inventive step."
This appears a good summary of established case law. EPO GL E-XII,7.4.2 still prescribe that interlocutory revision is not granted if "amendments made to the independent claims clearly do not meet the requirements of Art. 123(2)".

EPO T 0691/18 -  link

Reasons for the Decision

1. Admissibility

The appeal was filed in due time and form and is therefore admissible.

2. Clarity (Article 84 EPC)

The examining division based their decision on objections under Article 84 EPC regarding two features of the former independent claims.

On the one hand, it was argued that the resonant frequency of the electronic horn was not characteristic for the claimed driving circuit. This objection is overcome by the amendment to "connectable to" in the main request and in the first auxiliary request, and by the inclusion of the electronic horn into the subject-matter of the second auxiliary request in accordance with the Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office F-IV-4.14.

On the other hand, the examining division held the expression "consistent with" unclear in the sense of Article 84 EPC. The examining division had assumed that "consistent" meant "compatible" and found that there was a contradiction with the description which allegedly meant something more specific. However, the expression "consistent with" no longer forms part of any of the requests of the appellant. Consequently, neither of the two features on which the reasoning in the decision under appeal is based forms part of the current requests of the appellant as filed together with the statement of grounds of appeal.

Under Article 109(1) EPC, if the department whose decision is contested considers the appeal to be admissible and well founded, it shall rectify its decision.

In the context of Article 109(1) EPC, an appeal is to be considered "well founded" if the main request submitted with the appeal includes amendments which clearly overcome the objections on which the decision relies, such that the examining division could reasonably be expected to recognise this and thus rectify its decision. It is established case law of the Boards of Appeal that other objections which arise in the current request but which were not the subject of the contested decision cannot preclude the application of Article 109(1) EPC (T 139/87, point 4; T 1060/13, point 4.1). Thus, even if the amendments raise new objections not previously discussed, interlocutory revision must be allowed since an applicant should in such circumstances have the right to examination at two instances. In particular this would enable the applicant to address the objection under Article 123(2) EPC, by argument and/or amendment, as well as, if appropriate, giving the examining division the opportunity to address the issues of novelty and inventive step.

3. Conclusion

In the present case no other conclusion is possible than that the appeal is admissible and well founded, since the features leading to the objections under Article 84 EPC are no longer claimed.

The examining division should therefore have rectified its decision and continued with the examination of other requirements of the EPC.

Consequently, the board decides to remit the case.

Order

For these reasons it is decided that:

1. The decision under appeal is set aside.

2. The case is remitted to the department of first instance for further prosecution.

T 0413/16 - Procedural violation - new document in decision

Key points

• In this opposition appeal, the Board finds a substantial procedural violation of the OD. The OD had relied in its decision not only on document E1 but also on document R1 which was mentioned in the 'background of the invention' section of E1. E1 had been discussed during the oral proceedings, but not R1.
• " In its grounds of appeal, the appellant [opponent] maintained that R1 was a point of discussion neither in the written opposition procedure nor during oral proceedings before the opposition division. This was notably not contradicted by the respondent [patentee], which simply maintained that the appellant had been given ample opportunity to present arguments on E1 during the oral proceedings. However, despite being cited in E1 amongst several other documents, the content of R1 was evidently never a point of discussion before the opposition division and the appellant was given no reason to believe that the disclosure in R1 would be of any significance in the opposition division's decision. The appellant was thus not given an opportunity to present its comments on R1." 
• " It thus follows that the opposition division used the content of R1 and the alleged commercial activities of the assignee named in E1 in its decision without the appellant at least having been given the chance to be heard on its content, contrary to Article 113(1) EPC. A party being denied their right to be heard amounts to a substantial procedural violation." 

EPO T 0413/16 - link

3. Reimbursement of the appeal fee (Rule 103 EPC)

3.1 In point 2.4.1.4 of its decision, the opposition division refers to R1. This document was however not on file before the opposition division, it simply being mentioned in the 'background of the invention' section of E1. In its decision the opposition division details how R1 clearly discloses vertical axis washing machines and uses this as a justification for its conclusion that E1, therefore, 'clearly does not suggest the use of the described motor in horizontal axis washing machines'. The opposition division thus based its reasoning on this evidence.

3.2 In its grounds of appeal, the appellant maintained that R1 was a point of discussion neither in the written opposition procedure nor during oral proceedings before the opposition division. This was notably not contradicted by the respondent, which simply maintained that the appellant had been given ample opportunity to present arguments on E1 during the oral proceedings. However, despite being cited in E1 amongst several other documents, the content of R1 was evidently never a point of discussion before the opposition division and the appellant was given no reason to believe that the disclosure in R1 would be of any significance in the opposition division's decision. The appellant was thus not given an opportunity to present its comments on R1.

3.3 It should also be added that the further reasoning mentioned in item 2.4.1.4 of the interlocutory decision to establish that E1 was only related to vertical axis washing machines, referred to alleged commercial activities since 1986 of the assignee named in E1, for which no evidence has been given by the opposition division. Also in this regard, the appellant argued that it was not given any opportunity to present its comments. The respondent did not dispute this and there is indeed no indication in the minutes or the decision that could allow the Board to arrive at a different conclusion.

3.4 It thus follows that the opposition division used the content of R1 and the alleged commercial activities of the assignee named in E1 in its decision without the appellant at least having been given the chance to be heard on its content, contrary to Article 113(1) EPC. A party being denied their right to be heard amounts to a substantial procedural violation.

3.5 According to Rule 103(1)(a) EPC, the appeal fee shall be reimbursed in full .... if such reimbursement is equitable by reason of a substantial procedural violation. It is clear from the opposition division's reasoning in its decision that the appellant being denied its right to be heard with respect to R1 and the alleged commercial activities of the assignee in E1 had a direct influence on the interpretation of E1 (see point 2.4.1.4 of the opposition division's decision), and thus also had a causal effect on the decision regarding both novelty (see points 2.4.1.4 and 2.4.1.5) and inventive step (see point 2.4.8). In view of the above, the Board finds it equitable by reason of the substantial procedural violation for the appeal fee to be reimbursed in full.

Order

For these reasons it is decided that:

1. The decision under appeal is set aside.

2. The patent is revoked.

3. The appeal fee is to be reimbursed.

T 0592/15 - Filing divisional in appeal

Key points

• In this examination appeal, the board rejects the appeal and refuses the applicant's request to delay the taking of the decision until a divisional application is filed.
• As a comment, the Register shows that a divisional application was in fact filed. As a further comment, it is not clear to me why you would ask for such a delay rather than just file the divisional application - the fees for the divisional can be paid later.

EPO Headnote
A request to postpone the taking of the decision on the allowability of an appeal at least until a divisional application is filed would oblige a board to examine questions outside of the framework of the appeal concerned and is therefore to be refused

EPO T 0592/15 - link

3. As there is no admissible claim request of the appellant, the appeal is to be dismissed.

4. The request that the "application be maintained pending until [a] divisional application has been filed"

4.1 A divisional application in the sense of Article 76(1) EPC can be filed as long as the earlier European patent application is pending (Rule 36(1) EPC). In the case where a decision is taken on the allowability of an appeal, a European patent application is pending at least up to the point in time when the decision is taken (J 5/08, Reasons 20, referring to Rule 25 EPC 1973 corresponding to Rule 36 EPC).

ADA 2019 - Consolidated text

EPO ADA 2019 - consolidated version: see here

T 0888/17 - Second appeal, two oral proceedings

Key points

• In case T 2614/11 notified 03.03.2015, the Board had remitted the case to the OD to decide on the adaption of the description to the claims found allowable by the Board. By decision of 02.02.2017, the OD took a decision. The opponent appealed. The BoA held oral proceedings on 28.06.2018 (09:00 - 09:45); the patentee did not attend these. The patent raised new objections against the amended description pages filed on 17.05.2018. The BoA decided to continue the proceedings in writing. The BoA issued on 17.07.2018 summons for second oral proceedings as well as a  Communication, the patentee filed an amended page 2 on 14.08.2018. The opponent requested a correction of the minutes of the oral proceedings by letter of 03.09.2018. The second oral proceedings took place on 05.11.2018 (from 13:00 to 14:15), the patentee did not attend these. 

EPO T 0888/17 -  link

III. By the decision T 2614/11, the case was remitted to the department of first instance with the order to maintain the patent on the basis of the third auxiliary request as submitted with the letter of 9 October 2014 and a description to be adapted thereto.
[...]
IV. The appeal by the opponent lies from the decision of the opposition division that the adapted description met the requirements of Article 84 EPC and that the amended patent on the basis of auxiliary request 3 met the requirements of the EPC.

VI. The opponent (hereinafter the appellant) filed an appeal against said decision. [...]

T 0104/15 - The Board can properly judge technical content

Key points

• In this examination appeal, the Board cites a new document D8. The applicant requests immediate remittal so that D8 can be discussed in two instances. The Board does not grant the remittal.
• D8 originates from the applicant is cited by the Board in reply to fresh arguments of the applicant. Furthermore, in examination appeal, the Boards are restricted neither to an examination of the grounds for the contested decision nor to the facts and evidence on which the decision was based (G10/93). 
• " Thirdly, the board, comprising technically qualified members, is in a position to properly judge the technical content of the present claims and the newly introduced prior-art document, and to deal with the merits of the present case without remittal" 

EPO T 0104/15 -  link

2. PRINCIPAL REQUEST

2.1 The appellant requested that the case be remitted to the examining division for further prosecution in the light of newly introduced document D8. The appellant argued that citing a document for the first time at this late stage of the proceedings effectively meant that prosecution of the application had to be condensed down to one round of written communication during which the opportunities for amendment and for filing new requests were limited. Thus, immediate remittal was consistent with the principles of G 9/91 (OJ EPO 1993, 408).

T 0839/14 - Remittal in 10th year opposition procedure

Key points

• Notice of opposition was filed in 2008, so the procedure is taking 10 years by now. The Board remits the case back to the OD.
• The Board finds the Main Request to be sufficiently disclosed and to be novel over E13 (I understand unlike the OD, which had allowed the 1st AR).
• " The opposition division has neither considered novelty with respect to the other documents brought forward against it, nor did it examine and decide on the ground of inventive step in the light of further citations. At appeal stage neither the Appellant-Opponent nor the Appellant-Proprietor have submitted any argument in relation to these issues. Therefore, as was confirmed at the oral proceedings before the Board, neither the parties nor the Board were in a position to conduct a meaningful discussion of these remaining issues. Indeed at the oral proceedings both parties for this very reason requested remittal."

EPO T 0839/14 - link

5.5 Since E13 does not directly and unambiguously disclose a high resolution linear actuator moving the piston, the Board can but conclude that the subject-matter of claim 1 [of the Main Request, PJL] is novel with respect to this prior art according to Art. 54(2) EPC.

6. Remittal

6.1 The Board has considered the exercise of the first instance discretionary power not to admit the fresh ground under Art 100c), and has further considered opposition grounds based on Art l00(b) and Art 100a) in relation with Art 54(1) EPC in respect of E13 and has reached the conclusion its subject-matter contained novel features with respect to this disclosure.

T 1167/13 - Fact or argument

Key points

• The Board does not admit a new objection of the opponent submitted with the Statement of grounds.
• " The board has come to the conclusion that the objection has been raised for the first time in the statement of grounds of appeal and represents an alleged new fact within the meaning of Article 114(2) EPC and Article 12(4) RPBA rather than an argument of the sort that can be presented at any time during the proceedings." 
• This remark is (likely) a follow-up to T1914/12 (proposing that new arguments can not be held inadmissible under Art. 114 EPC) by analysing the matter in line with T 392/16 (labelling a new attack a new fact rather than an argument). 
• The Board's phrase "an argument of the sort that can be presented at any time" suggest that there also arguments that cannot be presented at any time. Perhaps it could have been said that the objection at issue was not an "attack of the sort that can be presented as argument at any time during the proceedings", if the reasonng of T1914/12 that arguments are always admissible.

EPO   1167/13 -  link

3. Admission of a new objection into the appeal proceedings (Articles 114(2) EPC and 12(4) RPBA)

3.1 In the statement of grounds of appeal, the appellants raised the objection under Articles 100(b) and 83 EPC that the person skilled in the art could not carry out the invention over the whole range claimed, because the circuit described in the patent in suit was only suitable for detecting serial, not parallel, arc faults, which was however not reflected in claim 1. The respondent considered this to be a new objection which was raised for the first time in the statement of grounds of appeal and therefore should not be admitted into the appeal proceedings.

3.2 The board has come to the conclusion that the objection has been raised for the first time in the statement of grounds of appeal and represents an alleged new fact within the meaning of Article 114(2) EPC and Article 12(4) RPBA rather than an argument of the sort that can be presented at any time during the proceedings. In the first instance proceedings, the appellants raised two objections concerning Article 100(b) EPC. Neither of these objections remotely related to the question of the type of arc fault to be detected, and in particular not to the specific question of whether the invention can be carried out over the whole range claimed. The corresponding objection thus cannot reasonably be considered as a mere argument, which was provided in support of alleged facts that have already been presented. Since the appellants did not contest during the oral proceedings before the board that the new objection is a new alleged fact, the board sees no reason to deviate from the above assessment.

3.3 According to Article 12(4) RPBA the board has the discretionary power to hold inadmissible facts which could have been presented in the first instance proceedings. The board notes that the opposition division stated in its preliminary opinion of 10 December 2012 that the requirements of Article 83 EPC were considered to be fulfilled. The board concludes that the appellants could not have been surprised by the final decision of the opposition division to reject the objection under Article 83 EPC. The further objection under Article 83 EPC could, and should, therefore have been presented already in the first instance proceedings. Furthermore, the questions that were raised by the new objection are not in any way related to the other objections raised in the first instance proceedings in the context of Article 100(b) EPC, and admitting them into the appeal proceedings would have required a fresh discussion of points that had not been at issue before the opposition division.

3.4 Moreover, the board is not convinced by the appellants' argument that the objection at issue was in fact presented during the oral proceedings before the opposition division, since this allegation was neither confirmed by the respondent nor is it reflected in the minutes. The board is also not aware of any request of the appellants for correction of the minutes.

3.5 Thus, the board exercised their discretion under Article 12(4) RPBA to not admit the new objection into the appeal proceedings.

3.6 The board therefore concludes that the patent in suit discloses the invention according to claim 1 in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by a person skilled in the art, so that the opposition ground under Article 100(b) EPC does not prejudice the maintenance of the patent.

T 1261/13 - Rule 116 and opposition

Key points

• The Board reviews whether the OD was correct in not admitting a request filed by the Rule 116 date for written submissions before the OD. 
• Post first published on 19.02.2019 by mistake;  now republished. 
• The OD had during the oral proceedings announced a negative conclusion on the main request and AR1 and AR2 and then had given the patentee a 'last chance' to file a further AR, even thouhg AR3 to 6 were pending. The patentee filed AR3-new, which was not admitted.
• " Regel 116 EPÜ dient nach ihrem Sinn und Zweck auch dazu, allen Beteiligten sowie der Abteilung genügend Zeit für eine sorgfältige Vorbereitung der mündlichen Verhandlung einzuräumen, []. In der Regel sind somit Anträge, die vor dem Ablauf der Frist nach Regel 116 EPÜ eingereicht werden und Regel 80 erfüllen, zuzulassen, [...]. Das gilt auch für Anträge, in denen Anspruchsmerkmale aus der Beschreibung aufgenommen worden sind. Die Frist nach Regel 116 gewährt den Einsprechenden die Möglichkeit, angemessen, z.B. durch Nachrecherche, zu reagieren." 
• As a comment, the Board decides that any new requests filed by the Rule 116 date are as a rule timely filed, even if the requests involve feature taken from the description. AppApparentlye Rule 79(1) period of four months for filing a response does not entail any obligation to file AR's in view of attacks already in the Notice of opposition and the patentee can simply wait for the Rule 116 time limit. The EPO then notifies the opponent of the new requests, leaving the opponent a few days to carry out a prior art search for the features taken from the description. And gives the opponent the task to submit present the found prior art during the oral proceedings. At least that is how I understand the Board's analysis of the meaning of Rule 116 in opposition proceedings. Note that the Board does not indicate that the OD had raised new objections of own motion in the Rule 116 communication. Note that the Board also does not say that the plain text of Rule 116 prescribes that the requests must be admitted.
• The Board is also very critical of giving the patentee "one last chance" during the oral proceedings.
• " Dass die Abteilung nach Diskussion des Hilfsantrags II der Patentinhaberin eine letzte Gelegenheit oder Chance gewährt hat [...], ohne über die Zulässigkeit der noch geltenden Hilfsanträgen III(alt) bis VI zu befinden, hat keine Rechtsgrundlage und scheint auf reiner Willkür zu basieren. Wenngleich die Behandlung dieser Anträge, und sei es nur auf ihre Zulässigkeit in das Verfahren hin, möglicherweise eine Vertagung der Vertagung der Verhandlung erforderlich gemacht hätte, bleibt für die Kammer unerfindlich, woher die Einspruchsabteilung die Befugnis herzunehmen glaubte, gleichsam nach Gutsherrenart zu verfügen, dass als "letzte Chance" nur noch ein Antragssatz behandelt werde, gleich wie viele sich noch im Verfahren befanden. Durch dieses willkürlich und rechtlich nicht gestützte Vorgehen wurde der Patentinhaberin ihr Recht auf Gehör verwehrt. " 
• 
  

EPO T 1261/13 -  link

Entscheidungsgründe

1. Die Beschwerde ist zulässig. Die Zulässigkeit der Beschwerde wurde von den Parteien nicht mehr bestritten. Da sie form- und fristgerecht eingereicht wurde, sieht auch die Kammer keinen Grund, die Zulässigkeit in Frage zu stellen.

2. Die vorliegende Erfindung betrifft eine Verstelleinrichtung für das Rotorblatt (Pitchwinkelverstelleinrichtung) einer Windenergieanlage. Zwecke der Erfindung sind die Erhöhung von Zuverlässigkeit sowie die Reduzierung der Motorabmessung der Verstelleinrichtung. Zu diesem Zweck umfasst die Verstelleinrichtung wenigstens zwei Antriebe, die ihre Kraft zum Verstellen des Rotorblattes an verschiedenen Stellen in die Blattwurzel einleiten. Durch einen gleichzeitigen Betrieb aller Antriebe muss jeder nur einen Bruchteil der erforderlichen Gesamtkraft aufbringen. Somit kann die entsprechende Dimensionierung des Motors kleiner ausfallen, siehe Patentschrift Absätze [0005]-[0008].

G 2/19 - Referral T 0831/17 - Haar and the EPC

Key points

• The Board refers to the Enlarged Board essentially the question if holding oral proceedings in Haar is conformity with the EPC.
• The Board is of the opinion that deciding on the location of the oral proceedings is in the competence of the Boards (and divisions), thereby disagreeing with T1142/12 where this was held to belong to "the management of the Office". The Board agrees that even if the location is a matter to be decided by the President, such decision needs to comply with the EPC and is a preliminary question for the compliance with Art. 116 EPC.
• The Board then raises the question if the President (or AC) is competent to locate the organs of the Office outside the locations mentioned in Art.6(2) EPC (and, for Berlin, the Protocol on Centralisation), or if "Munich" in Art.6(2) EPC needs to be interpreted as encompassing Haar.
• This leads to the third question of the referral.
• The first and second question are preliminary matters which follow from the exceptional procedure leading to the appeal: it is an appeal of a third party (not the applicant) against a grant decision on the ground of lack of clarity. The appellant is a professional representative, the Statement of ground mentions "unserer Mandantin, der Vodafone GmbH". The appellant asserts that the appellant is the patent attorney firm (letter)
• The first question is if the right to oral proceedings is restricted if the appeal is clearly inadmissible.
• The second question asks, if the answer to question 1 is yes (there are restrictions), essentially whether the appeal is inadmissible.
• A second appeal against the decision to grant (in 2017)was recently filed by the same patent attorney firm. According to the letter, the appeal is in time because the decision to grant was never notified to the third party. In addition references are made to the German constitution.

Questions referred


3. Wenn die Antwort auf eine der ersten beiden Fragen nein ist, kann die Kammer ohne Verletzung von Artikel 116 EPÜ die mündliche Verhandlung in Haar durchführen, wenn die Beschwerdeführerin diesen Standort als nicht EPÜ-konform gerügt und eine Verlegung der Verhandlung nach München beantragt hat?


3. (translation) [...] May the Board hold oral proceedings in Munich without violating Article 116 EPC, if the appellant considers this place to be not in conformity with the EPC and has requested a relocation of the oral proceedings to Munich?


Further questions referred
1. Ist im Beschwerdeverfahren das Recht auf Durchführung einer mündlichen Verhandlung gemäß Artikel 116 EPÜ eingeschränkt, wenn die Beschwerde auf den ersten Blick unzulässig ist?
2. Wenn die Antwort auf Frage 1 ja ist, ist eine Beschwerde gegen den Patenterteilungsbeschluss in diesem Sinne auf den ersten Blick unzulässig, die ein Dritter im Sinne von Artikel 115 EPÜ eingelegt und damit gerechtfertigt hat, dass im Rahmen des EPÜ kein alternativer Rechtsbehelf gegen eine Entscheidung der Prüfungsabteilung gegeben ist, seine Einwendungen betreffend die angebliche Verletzung von Artikel 84 EPÜ nicht zu berücksichtigen?


EPO G 2/19 G0002/19 - G 0002/19- T 0831/17 - link

Sachverhalt und Anträge

I. Die Beschwerdeführerin, die nicht am Prüfungsverfahren beteiligt war, dort aber verschiedene Einwendungen Dritter eingereicht hatte, wendet sich mit der vorliegenden Beschwerde gegen die Entscheidung der Prüfungsabteilung vom 12. Januar 2017 betreffend die Erteilung des Europäischen Patents Nr. 2 378 735 gemäß Art. 97 (1) EPÜ.

II. Sie rügt die Nichtbeachtung der von ihr erhobenen Klarheitseinwände gegen die erteilten Patentansprüche und vertritt die Auffassung, ihr müsse ein Beschwerderecht gegen den Erteilungsbeschluss zustehen, da wegen der beschränkten Anzahl von Einspruchsgründen andernfalls kein Rechtsschutz gegen die Nichtbeachtung ihrer Einwände nach Art. 84 EPÜ bestehe.