Key points
- "Claim 1 is drafted in the form of a purpose-limited product claim, pursuant to Article 54(5) EPC, and is directed to a compound that reduces the activity or expression of a Programmed Cell Death-1 (PD-1) polypeptide (in the following "PD-1 inhibitor") for use in the treatment of nodular lymphocyte predominant Hodgkin lymphoma (NLPHL)"
- Sufficiency of disclosure in the sense of G 2/21 is at issue (i.e., former plausibility).
- "According to decision G 2/21 (OJ EPO 2023, A85, point 77 of the Reasons), "[i]n order to meet the requirement that the disclosure of the invention be sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried out by the person skilled in the art, the proof of a claimed therapeutic effect has to be provided in the application as filed, in particular if, in the absence of experimental data in the application as filed, it would not be credible to the skilled person that the therapeutic effect is achieved. A lack in this respect cannot be remedied by post-published evidence."
- This intermediate conclusion of the Enlarged Board of Appeal can be understood as confirming the established case law that post-published evidence cannot be used to remedy a lack of sufficient disclosure in respect of a medical use (cf. T 609/02, headnote).
- By this statement, the Enlarged Board of Appeal can also [i.e., additionally] be seen to have endorsed the jurisprudence of the boards of appeal that attaining a claimed therapeutic effect is a limiting functional technical feature of a claim directed to the use of a substance or composition in a method of treatment (see also G 2/21, point 74 of the Reasons).
- [...] in decision G 2/21 the Enlarged Board of Appeal focussed on the issue of whether or not post-published evidence can be used by an applicant or patent proprietor in the assessment of Articles 83 and 56 EPC, but did not address the question of the level of proof in an application as filed required to substantiate a therapeutic effect as a prerequisite for using post-published evidence for assessing the requirements of Article 83 EPC."
- "The board therefore does not understand G 2/21 to have quashed the principles established by leading decision T 609/02 despite having qualified the term "plausibility" merely as a generic catchword. Indeed, as decision T 609/02 clearly sets out, a balance should be struck between enabling early patent protection for therapeutic uses and avoiding that the claimed invention is only completed at a later point in time. As a consequence, in order to fulfil the requirements of Article 83 EPC, the suitability of the product for the claimed therapeutic application must be derivable from the application, unless this is already known to the skilled person at the priority date (see T 609/02, point 9 of the Reasons and T 895/13, points 3 to 5 of the Reasons)."
- "The board cannot accept the appellants' [proprietors'] line of argument, that "plausible" in this context means that the "technical concept" and hence the suitability of the claimed compounds for the claimed therapeutic application is "plausible" as long as it is not shown to be "implausible". That would be in direct contradiction with the principles set out in decision T 609/02.
- The current Board then adds some reasoning: "The burden to show the suitability is on the applicant (see G 1/03, OJ EPO 2004, 413, point 2.5.3 of the Reasons: "When an application for a patent is filed, the process of making the invention has to be completed. The requirement of sufficiency of disclosure ensures that a patent is only granted if there is a corresponding contribution to the state of the art. Such a contribution is not present as long as the person skilled in the art is not able to carry out the invention. Therefore, the decisive date for fulfilling the requirement has to be the date of filing or priority, as the case may be. Deficiencies in this respect cannot be remedied during the proceedings before the EPO."). This burden cannot be discharged or shifted to the EPO or the public by merely alleging that a claimed therapeutic effect has to be regarded as having been demonstrated as long as it has not been disproven."
- Cited point 2.5.3 of G 1/03 (about non-disclosed disclaimers) may not directly address the issue of the burden of proof. The current Board uses "see", probably in the strict legal sense of that term ("See [] is used when the cited authority clearly supports a proposition but there is an inferential step between the proposition as stated and the cited authority." - link)
- It would have been useful if the Board had spelt out the 'inferential step' since the case at hand is an opposition appeal, and the general case law is that attacks under Article 100(b) EPC require serious doubts substantiated by verifiable facts.
- "The board therefore assesses below what can be inferred from the information provided in the patent as to a direct effect of a PD-1 inhibitor on a metabolic mechanism specifically involved in NLPHL."
- The Board, after reviewing the technical details, "the appellants [proprietors] on the one hand argued that tumours are characterised by T cell exhaustion and on the other hand that PD-1 expression is concomitant with T cell exhaustion. This explanation would lead to the conclusion that all cancers may be treated by PD-1 blockade, which manifestly is not the case. This is acknowledged in the declaration D55 submitted by the appellants: "All cancers are distinct and it is not possible to predict that a specific pathway, such as the PD-1 pathway, is present in any given type of cancer".
- The Board concludes that the application as filed does not provide support for the second medical indication in the sense of G 2/21, r.77.
- The argument that post-published evidence shows that the compound works (allegedly), therefore, "must fail".