T 2221/21 - Oppo rejected, auxiliary requests in reply to appeal

Key points

• Another case where the OD rejects the opposition, the opponent appeals, the proprietor presents auxiliary requests in their reply to the appeal, and the Board considers the claims as granted to be unallowable. How to assess the admissibility of the auxiliary requests?
• "Under Article 12(4), fifth sentence, RPBA, the board is to exercise its discretion in view of, inter alia, the complexity of the amendment and the need for procedural economy."
• "the board is of the opinion that it would at least require a complex discussion to ascertain whether there was a basis for [the added feature]. (The Board explains why this is the case for the feature at hand).
• "Such a complex discussion would be contrary to the need for procedural economy."
• The Board could have admitted the request and decided that it lacks a direct and unambiguous basis in the application as filed.
• However, the underlying procedural question is: to what degree does the right to be heard under Article 113(1) EPC entail a right to present auxiliary requests that provoke a complex discussion? Is the requirement stricter than before the OD?  Assuming, of course, the auxiliary request is introduced into the procedure without undue delay and does not amount to an abuse of procedure?
• Just to be clear, I don't have a settled view on this point. I'm not just sure if the text of Art. 12(4) provides the complete and definitive answer to those questions. 
• The auxiliary request is not admitted.

EPO 

The link to the decision can be found after the jump.

T 0500/23 - OD rejects oppo, auxiliary requests in appeal

Key points

• The OD maintained the patent as granted. The opponent appeals. The Board finds the main request and AR-1 to be unallowable.
•  "The appellant [opponent], in point 7.2 of its grounds of appeal, argued that inter alia auxiliary request 2 should not be admitted since this was filed late before the opposition division without any explanation or justification.
• I think that, strictly speaking, the opponent as the appellant must present attacks to the set of claims held allowable by the OD (the claims as granted) without a need to speculate on which auxiliary requests are presented by the proprietor in appeal. 
• The objection is under Art. 12(4) RPBA.
• The Board: "In this regard, it should be noted that the opposition division had in its annex to the summons already outlined its preliminary view that the ground for opposition under Article 100(a) EPC, in conjunction with Articles 54 and 56 EPC, did not prejudice maintenance of the patent as granted. Nevertheless, the [proprietor] clarified its fall-back positions by filing auxiliary requests (shortly) before the oral proceedings before the opposition division. The fact that the auxiliary requests were filed shortly before the oral proceedings, although this was not strictly necessary due to the preliminary opinion of the opposition division, should not be unfavourable to the patent proprietor."
• The remark about "not strictly necessary" could also be relevant under Art. 12(6)(s.2) in cases where the proprietor does not present such auxiliary requests after the favorable preliminary opinion of the OD.
• " Furthermore the opposition division found the patent as granted to meet the requirements of the EPC such that it had no need to consider any further requests, including the auxiliary requests that were late filed. Therefore, with no need to consider any auxiliary requests in the impugned decision, it is clearly reasonable for the respondent to be able to pursue auxiliary requests filed in the opposition proceedings and/or to file other auxiliary requests on appeal as part of its complete appeal case (see Article 12(3) RPBA) in order to provide suitable fall-back positions should the patent as granted be found not to be allowable. This the respondent has done at the first opportunity on appeal i.e. in its reply to the grounds of appeal."
• As a comment, the auxiliary request should then be fully substantiated in the reply to the statement of grounds.
• Furthermore, the auxiliary request should be suitable to address the attacks raised by the opponent/appellant in their SoG.
• Note, the "and/or" makes the sentence also relevant under Art. 12(6)(s.2).
• 5.3 Consequently, under the particular circumstances, the Board exercises its discretion to admit auxiliary request 2 into the proceedings."
• How to deal with AR-2 in the appeal? 
• The Board examines the novelty of the amended claim over two prior art documents and remits for inventive step, in a specifically reasoned part of the decision.
• "In the present case an important aspect is that the Board has, through its finding with respect to claim 1 of the main request, overturned the entire basis on which the opposition division had understood D1 to subsequently conclude that the claims before it met the requirements of the EPC. The Board would thus be considering the specific issues with respect to inventive step for the very first time on a totally different basis, which would deprive the parties of the opportunity of having an examination of the claimed subject-matter before two instances and moreover would go far beyond the purpose of the appeal proceedings as being primarily a review of the impugned decision. Not least due to this, special reasons (Article 11 RPBA) exist for remitting the case. Also, the parties had not developed their inventive step arguments with respect to the subject-matter of claim 1 of auxiliary request 2 in view of how this is differentiated over D1 and D2."

EPO 

The link to the decision can be found after the jump.

T 2240/22 - Auxiliary requests of the proprietor/respondent

Key points

• The OD maintains the patent on the basis of AR 5bis. The Board finds those claims to be obvious. The board turns to the lower-ranking requests.
• " These auxiliary requests were filed for the first time in appeal with the respondent-proprietor's reply to the opponent's appeal. "
• "The Board is unconvinced that these requests could and should have been filed already in the opposition proceedings (so that Article 12(6) RPBA would come into play), because there was no reason for the proprietor to file further auxiliary requests in the opposition proceedings after auxiliary request 5bis was held to be allowable."
• " However, these requests are amendments of the respondent proprietor's appeal case in the sense of Article 12(4) RPBA. ... these requests, ... are undoubtedly newly filed in appeal and indisputably have not been raised and maintained in the preceding opposition proceedings, are amendments."
• "As they are amendments to the respondent proprietor's appeal case their admission is at the discretion of the Board, Article 12(4) RPBA, 1st paragraph, 2nd sentence. The Board exercises its discretion according to the following two paragraphs of Article 12(4) RPBA, that amendments should be identified as such, reasons for their filing and (for claim requests) a basis given; they bring in no additional complexity, are suitable to address the relevant issues, and they meet the need for procedural economy. The latter criteria are similar though not identical to those that the opposition division would have applied if these requests had been filed at the oral proceedings before the division: clear allowability (clearly resolve all relevant issue), convergence and procedural expediency, cf. E-VI.2.2.3. "
• Art. 12(4), fifth sentence, specifies factors, not cumulative criteria. 
• Turning again to auxiliary requests 6bis, 7bis, 6tris, 7tris, these are not simple combinations of granted claims (as admitted auxiliary request 5bis is). Rather, they combine granted claims with subject-matter taken from the description and figures of the alternative embodiments of figures 2 and 4 []
• "In the Board's view, such amendments are complex and not suitable for addressing the lack of inventive step, as taking features from specific embodiments of the description raises questions of added subject-matter and would have required additional examination, especially considering that such subject-matter may not have been searched. It is unlikely, that the opposition division would have admitted such requests filed at the very last moment in opposition oral proceedings, as they would have failed the criterion of clear allowability for the same reasons."
• Comparing the filing of an auxiliary request with the reply to the appeal to the filing an auxiliary request at the end of the oral proceedings before the OD is interesting. The reply in appeal is filed months, if not years, before the Board holds oral proceedings.
• "This approach is also confirmed by jurisprudence of the Boards of appeal, see for example T 0288/16, reasons 8, in which the Board confirmed that the opposition division had exercised its discretion in a reasonable manner and in accordance with the right principles when deciding not to admit requests incorporating a feature from the description."
• "For these reasons, the Board decided not to admit auxiliary requests 6bis, 7bis, 6tris, 7tris into the appeal proceedings, Article 12(4) RPBA with Article 114(2) EPC. The question as to whether the requests had been adequately substantiated can be left undecided."
• It stands to reason that the non-appealing proprietor should have a fair chance to respond to an appeal against an amended patent that may be successful, but they should also not gain any advantage by waiting to file auxiliary requests in the appeal rather than during the opposition oral proceedings. In other words, it should not have a better chance of having auxiliary requests admitted in appeal than in the proceedings leading to the appealed decision.
• 
  

EPO 

The link to the decision can be found after the jump.

T 0930/23 - No technical effect being attributable (in patent year 20)

Key points

• The  Board on inventive step: "Further, with no technical effect being attributable to the distinguishing feature, the further arguments of the respondent that D2 was silent about the bending properties of the materials used in the central portions and in the side portions and that there was no hint or motivation in D2 to work with the bending properties of the materials, are irrelevant. Features that do not provide a technical effect and which would be implemented as part of the normal design of such articles which are deemed suitable in the circumstances, are an obvious choice for a skilled person even if there is no specific hint or pointer towards exactly the claimed range. It is thus not necessary in the circumstances of the present case (where there is no proven technical effect and no technical problem solved across the scope of the claim by the distinguishing feature) to find a hint by way of common general knowledge or in the prior art, contrary to the reasoning of the opposition division in the impugned decision on page 4, third paragraph. In a case merely involving an arbitrary selection from obvious alternatives, the prior art does not need to contain an incentive for the skilled person to select the particular solution claimed, rather all possible and suitable solutions are considered to be suggested to the skilled person (T 1862/15, reasons 8)."
• "Auxiliary requests 1, 2 and 4 to 24 are not admitted into the appeal proceedings as they lack substantiation as to which objections might be overcome by the various amendments and how such amendments actually overcome them (Articles 12(3) and (5) RPBA)."
• "The subject-matter of claim 1 of auxiliary request 3 thus lacks an inventive step"
• The patent is revoked.
• Which so far is not unusual, except that the patent was granted in Feb 2014 and the Board's final decision was issued on 10 March 2025. Filing date in 2005 as a PCT application. The Board in the first appeal decision in T 0259/17 in 2021 found claim 1 to be sufficiently disclosed (contrary to the first OD decision). 
• The Board in the first decision: " As [...] argued by the appellant [ proprietor], however, the problem to be solved is not defined in the claim, such that identifying the technical measures to solve any particular problem is limited in this case to carrying out what is defined in the claim itself, i.e. the relative flexural rigidities where the measurement of each is defined by the described test procedures. Whether the relative flexural rigidities measured in this way ultimately solve any particular problem is something which can be left for discussion of inventive step."
• 
  

EPO 

The link to the decision can be found after the jump.

J 0004/24 - Proceeding further kills the patent application (?)

Key points

• "Nanosteel's request to interrupt the proceedings of European patent application No. 17 867 378.6 had been motivated on the grounds that Nanosteel, although still the legal owner [of] the application, had lost the legal capacity to act on or before 5 December 2020 due [some US legal procedure/event]."
• "The applicant replied to [the Rule 70(2)/70a(2) Communication of 8 June 2020]  by letter dated 8 December 2020 [received on 9 December]. The representative of Nanosteel wrote that the applicant desired to proceed with the European patent application. No comment on the objections raised in the opinion accompanying the European search report was submitted."
• As the skilled reader may have inferred, it was a Euro-PCT application (the EPO was not the ISA) and a supplementary European search report, and the applicant did not use the former ten-day period under former Rule 126 EPC that was applicable in the case of a Rule 70(2) communication for a Euro-PCT application. 
• The EPO issues a Notice of loss of rights on 28.01.2021 for failure to reply under Rule 70a(2). This gives a two-month period for requesting further processing, expiring on 07.04.2021 (Wed), which was not used. 
• "Having received no comments on the objections raised in the opinion accompanying the European search report within the given deadline and no request for an extension of the time limit, a communication was issued by the Examining Division on 28 January 2021. With this communication, the loss of rights pursuant to Rule 112(1) EPC was notified to the applicant."
• Note that filing this formal indication of the wish to proceed further without a substantive reply to the search opinion saves one further processing fee later. 
• On 04.06.2021, the applicant files the substantive reply on the search opinion, pays the further processing fee, and requests interruption " starting from 5 December 2020 until at least 6 April 2021" and, auxiliary, re-establishment. The request for interruption is based on Rule 142(1)(b) EPC: "in the event of the applicant for or proprietor of a patent, as a result of some action taken against his property, being prevented by legal reasons from continuing the proceedings".
• The Legal Board of Appeal rejects the interruption on the ground that the letter of 8 December showed that the applicant could "continue the proceedings", according to the Legal Board of Appeal.
• "Nanosteel answered the communication of the Examining Division pursuant to Rules 70(2) and 70a(2) EPC of 8 June 2020 in letters sent on its behalf during and after the period of its alleged legal incapacity. In its letter filed on 9 December 2020, Nanosteel partially reacted to the communication when informing the EPO that the applicant wished to proceed with the European patent application."
• "The Board therefore holds from these facts, and since no evidence to the contrary was filed, that the applicant Nanosteel was not prevented by legal reasons from continuing the proceedings before the European Patent Office (see J 11/95, Reasons 5.3)."
• J 11/95: "In the circumstances of the present case, A/S Køge Stormølle (in bankruptcy) continued the proceedings before the EPO even after they had gone bankrupt in October 1990. In particular, they filed a request for entry into the regional phase before the EPO on 16. January 1992 and paid the corresponding fees. From these facts and since no evidence to the contrary has been filed it has to be concluded that A/S Køge Stormølle (in bankruptcy) was not prevented by legal reasons from continuing the proceedings before the EPO."
• As a comment, I could very well imagine that after the "US legal event" on 5 December, the professional representative could still take care of the letter on 8 December 2020. On the other hand, the missed time limit is that for filing the reply to the search opinion with further processing by 7 April 2021. The letter of the representative on 8/9 December 2020 does not conclusively prove that the applicant was not prevented from "continuing the proceedings" in the period between 28 January and 7 April 2021. Interruption is to be applied ex officio, and the Legal Board is not bound by the applicant's statement of 5 December as the starting point. Hence, submitting a letter on 8/9 December 2020 does not exclude that grounds for interruption existed at (some point) during the period of filing the reply to the search opinion with further processing, which ran from (at least) 28 January 2021 (without prejudice to the possibility of using further processing between the date of the loss of rights and the notification of the loss of rights)
• "In accordance with the case law of the Boards, bankruptcy proceedings can only lead to an interruption of proceedings when, if no specific circumstances are present, the action taken against the property of the applicant indeed makes it impossible for the applicant to continue the proceedings (see J 11/95, J 26/95 and J 11/98)."
• J 26/95:  "The decisive criterion for interruption is whether the action against the property is such as to make it legally impossible for the applicant to continue with proceedings." (underlining added)
• J 11/98: "No such special circumstances have been substantiated in the present case, which could be compared to the exceptional case underlying unpublished decisions [J 9/94] and [J 10/94], in which it was regarded as being analogous to a case of legal impossibility because the applicant, as a consequence of an action against his property, did not have at his disposal any remaining property by means of which he could have effected the required payment and where he was thus placed in a situation where it was factually and legally impossible for him to continue the procedure before the EPO, because he was devoid of any financial means whatsoever with which to pay the required actions, see decision J 26/95, point 4.5 of the reasons. "
• J 9/94: headnote in translation: "Rule 90(1)(b) EPC does not require that an action against the property of the applicant for or proprietor of a European patent be a judicial action. Where an action or actions have been taken against the property of the applicant for or proprietor of a European patent, it is appropriate to determine, in order to stay the proceedings, whether the action or actions had the effect of making it impossible for him, in fact or in law, to continue his proceedings before the EPO."
• As a further comment, this consistent case law shows that the factual possibility of acting in the procedure, does not rule out that it is legally impossible to do it and hence that there is an interrpuption. In the present case, the Legal Board does not address the issue of whether the letter of the professional representative of 8/9 December 2020, after the US legal event affecting the applicant, was legally proper. Perhaps, by bankruptcy, any power of attorney also becomes ineffective (Nemo dat quod non habet), though I would have to check national law.
• None of J11/95 (refusal to issue a priority document), J26/95 (Chapter 11 Reorganization) and J11/98 (Chapter 11 Reorganization) were about bankruptcy in the strict sense, it seems. Hence, the remark in the present decision that "In accordance with the case law of the Boards, bankruptcy proceedings can only lead to an interruption of proceedings when, if no specific circumstances are present, the action taken against the property of the applicant indeed makes it impossible for the applicant to continue the proceedings" should probably be understood as "bankruptcy proceedings in the broad sense can only lead to an interruption of proceedings when ... the action taken against the property of the applicant indeed makes it impossible for the applicant to continue the proceedings". However, then the preceding sentence in the decision is unclear: "Even if the Board agreed with the appellant that the Article 9 US UCC procedure constituted a procedure equivalent to bankruptcy proceedings, this would still not lead as such to the interruption of proceedings under Rule 142(1)(b) EPC."
• The Board does not analyse Article 9 US UCC in any detail. So we must assume that the outcome is the same as in the case that a 'classical' bankruptcy had happened on 5 December, but for whatever reason, the professional representative had still filed the letter on 8/9 December (e.g. possibly, as not being informed of the bankruptcy or similar event on 5 December).
• J26/95, J11/98, J9/94 and J10/94 concern a missed time limit for paying a fee. Interruption of the proceedings was applied in those cases. The Boards in those cases did not analyse if the applicant could perhaps have performed another action than paying a fee, e.g. filing a request for extension. It seems to me that the possibility of submitting a letter would not have negated the interruption. The implications of this observation for the present case, however, requires more study.
•  According to J 16/05 the rationale of Rule 90(1)(b) EPC 1973 (corresponding to Rule 142(1)(b) EPC) was to protect parties not able to act in the proceedings for the defined legal reasons against a loss of rights which would otherwise occur, until such time as the EPO could resume the proceedings under Rule 90(2) EPC 1973 (Rule 142(2) EPC)."" (cf. J 12/19) (underlining added)
• In conclusion, the present decision is difficult to understand. 
• It seems that no decision has been taken yet on the request for re-establishment. That is the competence of the Examining Division and the Board of Appeal in any appeal (whether it will be the Technical Board or the Legal Board, depending on whether a legally qualified examiner will be added to the Examining Division (see e.g. T1570/20). 
  
  
• 
  

EPO 

T 1977/22 - Open ended ranges for desirable properties

Key points

• Claim 1: "1. An inorganic composite oxide material, comprising: (a) from 25 to 90 pbw [parts by weight] Al2O3; (b) from 5 to 35 pbw CeO2; (c)(i) from 5 to 35 pbw MgO, [...] and (d) optionally up to 10 pbw of a combined amount of oxides of one or more dopants selected from transition metals, rare earths, and mixtures thereof, and exhibiting a BET specific surface area: of greater than 150 m**(2)/g"
• In the technical field, a high specific surface area (high porosity) is a desired property.
• T 595/90 (Kawasaki steel) is well known (in the chemistry field, especially for materials) for its headnote that " A product which can be envisaged as such with all the characteristics determining its identity including its properties in use, i.e. an otherwise obvious entity, may become non-obvious and claimable as such, if there is no known way or applicable (analogy) method in the art to make it and the claimed methods for its preparation are the first to achieve this and do so in an inventive manner ". 
• Incidentally, the headnote is obiter in T 696/90 as the preparation method was found to be obvious, the product claim accordingly as well, and the patent was revoked.
• The present Board: "When an invention is defined in terms of a desideratum, sufficiency of disclosure is generally assessed on the basis of the principle of reproducibility over the whole scope, which was proposed and developed in a number of early landmark decisions (see in particular T 435/91, T 292/85, T 226/85, T 409/91, and G 1/03)."
• The Board provides a useful review of the existing case law on the topic.
• "The most controversial aspect in the underlying discussion is the burden to be applied for determining whether the information at hand would enable the skilled person to reproduce the open-ended range over the whole scope of the claim, in particular because the interpretation of the concept "over the whole scope" is not straightforward when applied to a range with no specific upper limit. 
• " In summary, the board considers that the key criterion for enabling a technically challenging open-ended range desideratum over the whole scope of the claim is the provision of teachings demonstrating that, by operating within the scope of specific (essential) structural and/or process features, the skilled person would be in a position to achieve multiple variants of the invention without undue effort i.e. embodiments with different parametric values falling within the open-ended range. If this condition is met, an invention that defines both the open-ended range desideratum and the essential structural and/or process features required to achieve it may, in principle, be considered reproducible over the whole scope (at least with regard to the reproducibility of the open-ended range itself), irrespective of how far the numerical values can be extended beyond the lower end of the open-ended range. "
• Not sure if this means that three examples at 151, 152 and 154 m**(2)/g are sufficient to support the entire range "at least 150 m**(2)/g".
• The Board: "While it might have been open to discussion whether the process proposed for producing the composite oxide (or at least certain steps thereof) should also be considered an essential aspect of the invention (i.e. necessary to achieve parametric values within the open-ended range) and thus defined in the claim, the opponent explicitly stated that its argumentation did not rely on this point. The board also found no justification for introducing this argument ex officio."
• "Since the composite oxide in claim 1 at issue does not only define the open-ended range desiderata but also the above mentioned structural features (i.e. the metal oxide components and their amounts) considered to be essential for achieving parametric values within the claimed range, the board concludes that the open-ended ranges desiderata defined in claim 1 at issue are enabled by the teachings in the patent and that the invention is reproducible over the whole scope of the claim."
• To approach the matter from a different angle, if the claim had defined the composition only in terms of the chemical composition, such a product claim could have been perfectly fine and would not be limited to any particular range for the specific surface area. This aspect of product claims is not entirely free from criticism in the literature but is uncontroversial in the case law of the EPO. 
• Furthermore, under T 595/90, it is fine to have the desirable property as the distinguishing feature of the product claim. 

The link to the decision can be found after the jump.

On petition for review cases and clearing the backlog

Key points

(updated 18.06.2025)

• The announced measures for clearing the backlog of petition for review cases are being implemented, and the difference with the situation in 2024 is quite impressive.  
• 
  
• R 6/21: negative preliminary opinion 13.01.2025, withdrawal request for oral proceedings 06.02.2025. No written decision yet.
• R 7/22: oral proceedings on 18.02.2025, decision online 18.06.2025
• R10/22: oral proceedings 01.04.2025, written decision 28.05.2025
• R 15/22: oral proceedings 15.03.202, no written decision yet at the time of writing.
• R 16/22: concerns case T 2175/22, with four decisions of the BoA as of yet. The appeal was withdrawn. This published decision shows the application number. The petition for review is not visible in the online file. 
• R 1/23: oral proceedings 31.01.2025. No written decision yet.
• Note, there is no official time limit or target for issuing the written decision in petition for review cases, unlike what is provided in Art. 15 RPBA.
• R 3/23: pending, preliminary opinion 18.03.2025
• R 6/23, R9/23, R10/23: pending, preliminary opinion was issued.
  R 11/23 - forwarded to five-member panel. Oral proceedings 28.07.2025.
• R 12/23: negative preliminary opinion of 21.08.2024. No further action yet.
• R 13/23: oral proceedings 20.01.2025. No written decision yet.
• R 14/23: oral proceedings on 20.01.2025. No written decision yet. 
• R 16/23: five-member panel
• R 17/23: oral proceedings 24.02.2025. No written decision yet.
• R 18/23: preliminary opinion 21.02.2025. 
• R 01D/23: no access to the online file (concerns decision D 33/22 about an EQE appeal)
  
  
• R 1/24: oral proceedings 10.03.2025.
• R 2/24: preliminary opinion 10.04.2025
• R 3/24: summons issued.
• R 4/24: summons issued.
• R 5/24: five-member panel, and summons issued. 
• R 6/24: summons issued, five-member composition.
• R 7/24: summons issued.
• R 8/24: preliminary opinion 19.03.2025
• R 9/24: preliminary opinion issued 19.0.2025.
• R 10/24: summons issued 18.03.2025
• R 11/24: deemed not filed for failure to pay the fee (link)
• R 12/24: summons issued 10.02.2025.
• R 13/24: oral proceedings 03.12.2024. No written decision yet (!)
• R 14/24: preliminary opinion 19.03.2025
• R 15/24: summons 03.04.2025.
• R 16/24: preliminary opinion 07.04.2025
• R 17/24: decision issued.
• R 18/24: summons issued.
• R 19/24: petition withdrawn after summons with preliminary opinion 16.12.2024.
• R 20/24: summons issued 17.04.2025
• R 21/24: summons issued 17.04.2025
• R 22/24: summon sissued 03.04.2025
• R 23/24: summons issued 18.03.2025.
• R 24/24: summons issued 24.01.2025
• R 25/24: the oldest case with no action of the EBA yet. Pro se case.
• R 26/24: summons issued 14.04.2025.
• R 27/24: the  "oldest" petition for review filed by a professional representative (on 18.11.2024) with no action of the EBA yet.

• R 29/24: Petition filed on 10.12.2024. Summons issued on 10.02.2025.Preliminary opinion on 07.03.2025. Oral proceedings on 13.05.2025 (now we are talking). Petition withdrawn 13.05.2025.
• The opposition and appeal of the opponent were withdrawn on 19.05.2025; the opponent was the sole appellant. The TBA had decided to maintain the patent in amended form. 
• R 1/25: summons on 03.04.2025
• R 2/25:  summons 23.05.2025 with preliminary opinion.
• R 6/25: summons on 29.04.2025; on a substantiated request of the "respondents" (not actually parties in the three-member panel stage), the oral proceedings were advanced from 12.01.2026 to 12.09.2025.
  
  

• The backlog of petition for review cases no longer appears to be a graveyard where you can buy approximately three years' pendency of your patent or application for a modest fee. 
• For sure, the EBA will also issue the written decisions in petition for review cases without any (undue) delay. Would three months be reasonable?